Daryl A. Gray v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility concluded that Daryl A. Gray violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.15(d) and (e), 1.16, 4.1(a), and 8.4(c) of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct and suspended him from the practice of law for six months. The violations stemmed from two separate complaints, both involving Mr. Gray’s representation of plaintiffs in personal injury lawsuits. The trial court affirmed the hearing panel’s decision. After careful consideration, we too affirm. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Robin M. McNabb v. Gregory H. Harrison
This appeal addresses constitutional residency requirements for Tennessee municipal court judges. Article VI, Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution requires inferior court judges to be “elected by the qualified voters of the district or circuit to which they are to be assigned [and] have been a resident . . . of the circuit or district one year” prior to election. Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 4. The appellant, Robin McNabb, proceeding pro se, filed an election contest against the appellee, Gregory Harrison, contending that he was constitutionally ineligible to be elected as Lenoir City Municipal Judge. Ms. McNabb asserted that “district” in Article VI, Section 4 refers to Lenoir City, and that Mr. Harrison had not lived within city limits in the year preceding. The trial court found that “district” as used in Article VI, Section 4 refers to the modern-day judicial district. Because Mr. Harrison resided in the Ninth Judicial District, the trial court found him to be eligible to serve as Lenoir City Municipal Judge. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, but modified the trial court’s judgment, finding that Article VI, Section 4 required Mr. Harrison to be a resident of Loudon County, rather than the Ninth Judicial District. McNabb v. Harrison, No. E2022-01557-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 7019872, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2023), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2024). The Court of Appeals reasoned that because the Lenoir City Municipal Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Loudon County General Sessions Court, “district” as used in Article VI, Section 4 means Loudon County. Id. We respectfully disagree. We hold that Article VI, Section 4 requires a candidate running for a municipal judgeship to be a resident of the same municipality to which they will be assigned. Therefore, Article VI, Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution required Mr. Harrison to reside in Lenoir City. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the Chancery Court for Loudon County. |
Loudon | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. William Rimmel, III
This appeal arises from a road-rage incident in Marion County involving the defendant, William Rimmel, III, and the victim, Bobbie Burke. While riding his motorcycle, Rimmel aggressively pursued Burke on the interstate and eventually broke the passenger window of Burke’s car by pounding on it with the slide of a loaded handgun. Rimmel never fired the handgun or pointed it in Burke’s direction, however, and Burke was unaware that the object used to break the window was a gun. A jury convicted Rimmel of attempted aggravated assault and felony reckless endangerment with a handgun. Rimmel challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for both convictions. Because we conclude that Rimmel intended to place Burke in reasonable fear of serious bodily injury by using his handgun and took a substantial step toward doing so, we affirm his conviction for attempted aggravated assault. But because the evidence does not establish that Rimmel’s handgun-related conduct placed Burke in imminent danger of serious bodily injury or death, we reverse his conviction for felony reckless endangerment. |
Marion | Supreme Court | |
Leah Gilliam v. David Gerregano, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Revenue et al.
For over a decade, Leah Gilliam’s vehicle displayed a personalized license plate that read “69PWNDU.” The State eventually revoked the plate after deeming the message offensive. Gilliam sued state officials, alleging that Tennessee’s personalized license plate program discriminates based on viewpoint in violation of the First Amendment. The State argues that the First Amendment’s prohibition of viewpoint discrimination does not apply to the alphanumeric characters on Tennessee’s personalized license plates because they are government speech. In Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held that Texas’s specialty license plate designs were government speech. 576 U.S. 200, 213 (2015). Although personalized alphanumeric combinations differ from specialty plate designs in some respects, a faithful application of Walker’s reasoning compels the conclusion that they are government speech too. We reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary holding and reinstate the trial court’s judgment in favor of the State. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Michael Dinovo, Jr. et al. v. Kenneth Binkley et al.
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Frank L. Slaughter, Jr. v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility found that a Sullivan County attorney violated Rules 1.6, 4.4, and 8.4 of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct after the attorney disclosed confidential information about a client’s case to third parties in a separate case. The hearing panel imposed a public censure as punishment. The attorney appealed, and the chancery court affirmed the hearing panel’s decision. The attorney now appeals to this Court, arguing that Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9 violates his due process rights and that his actions did not amount to violations of Rules 1.6 and 4.4. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the chancery court with regard to Rule 1.6. However, we reverse the chancery court’s judgment upholding the hearing panel’s finding that the attorney violated Rule 4.4. |
Sullivan | Supreme Court | |
Charles Youree, Jr. v. Recovery House of East Tennessee, LLC et al.
Charles Youree, Jr. filed a lawsuit against two business entities seeking to hold them liable, under the theory of piercing the corporate veil, for a judgment he previously had obtained against another business entity. When the two entities did not answer, he was awarded a default judgment. The entities moved to vacate the default judgment before it became final. They argued that the trial court should not have entered judgment in the first place because the complaint did not plead the elements required for piercing the corporate veil. They also argued that their failure to respond was due to excusable neglect, but they later withdrew that argument. The trial court denied the motion to vacate. In determining that the complaint stated a claim for piercing the corporate veil, the trial court evaluated the factual allegations under the so-called Allen factors. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Allen, 584 F. Supp. 386 (E.D. Tenn. 1984). On appeal as of right, the Court of Appeals reversed. The court looked not to the Allen factors, but rather to a three-element standard set forth in Continental Bankers Life Insurance Co. of the South v. Bank of Alamo, 578 S.W.2d 625 (Tenn. 1979). We granted permission to appeal. Based on our review of the applicable law, we hold that it was proper in this case to address whether the complaint pleaded the elements for piercing the corporate veil even absent a claim of excusable neglect. We further hold that the Continental Bankers elements provide the correct framework for piercing the corporate veil and that the complaint failed to plead the elements sufficiently. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred in denying the motion to vacate the default judgment. We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Clayton D. Richards v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center
In this health care liability action, Clayton D. Richards asks us to consider whether the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint. Previously, Mr. Richards sued Vanderbilt University Medical Center alleging negligence. That lawsuit ended in a voluntary nonsuit. Mr. Richards refiled his complaint, which became the current action, over a year later. The trial court dismissed his complaint, holding that he had not complied with the terms of the saving statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-105. On appeal, Mr. Richards argues that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) offers him a 120-day extension of the one-year saving statute, making his lawsuit timely. We disagree and conclude that section 29-26-121(c) does not extend the saving statute. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s order granting Vanderbilt University Medical Center’s motion to dismiss. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Robert L. Trentham v. Mid-America Apartments, LP et al.
This appeal arises from a slip-and-fall incident at an apartment complex in Franklin, Tennessee. On a rainy morning at the Venue at Cool Springs apartment complex, owned and operated by Mid-America Apartments, LP, Robert Trentham slipped and fell on a pedestrian bridge on the way back to his apartment. Mr. Trentham sustained serious injuries and filed a premises-liability lawsuit alleging that MAA had been negligent in maintaining the pedestrian bridge. Mr. Trentham asserted that his slip-and-fall was caused by a microbial growth on the bridge that MAA should have known about and should have addressed. The trial court found in favor of Mr. Trentham, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. MAA disputes the holding of the lower courts that it was on constructive notice of a dangerous condition on the pedestrian bridge. We hold that, because the microbial growth on the pedestrian bridge amounts to a “general or continuing condition indicating the dangerous condition’s existence,” Blair v. W. Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761, 762 (Tenn. 2004), MAA was on constructive notice of a dangerous condition on the bridge at the time of Mr. Trentham’s fall. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
Robert L. Trentham v. Mid-America Apartments, LP et al. (dissenting)
SARAH K. CAMPBELL, J., dissenting. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Oberton Curry, Jr.
Christopher Oberton Curry, Jr. (“Defendant”) sought this Court’s review of his 2022 |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
Teresa Thompson Locke et al. v. Jason D. Aston, M.D. et al.
This case is before the Court on the Rule 11 application of Plaintiffs Teresa |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Pharma Conference Education, Inc. v. State of Tennessee
Pharma Conference Education, Inc., entered into an agreement with the University of Tennessee Health Science Center to produce as many pharmaceutical continuing education programs “as is feasible.” The Health Science Center terminated the agreement before any programs were held. When Pharma sued to enforce the agreement, the State argued that the agreement lacked consideration and therefore was not a valid contract. The question in this appeal is whether a promise to produce as many programs “as is feasible” constitutes consideration or instead is an illusory promise. We hold that this promise constitutes adequate consideration. We reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary decision and remand to the Claims Commission for further proceedings. |
Supreme Court | ||
Pharma Conference Education, Inc. v. State of Tennessee (Concurring)
I concur fully in the majority opinion. I write separately only to elaborate on the admissibility of extrinsic evidence, versus how it may be used. The extrinsic evidence at issue in this case is Mr. Smith’s deposition testimony. During the deposition, the State’s counsel asked Mr. Smith whether it was his “understanding that it was within Pharma’s ability and Pharma’s sole determination to decide what conferences were feasible to produce?” Mr. Smith responded, “Yes.” Discussing this evidence, the majority opinion says that evidence of “a party’s subjective views on the contract’s meaning . . . should not be considered.” |
Supreme Court | ||
Terry Case v. Wilmington Trust, N.A. et al. (concurring)
I concur in the majority’s well-written opinion. I write separately only to clarify a point that is important but tangential to the Court’s resolution of the issues presented. It relates to the majority’s discussion of the Open Courts provision in our Constitution, Tenn. Const. art. I, § 17. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Terry Case v. Wilmington Trust, N.A. et al.
Plaintiff Terry Case did not make his mortgage payments for several years. The real property which secured his loan was subsequently sold at a foreclosure sale following the postponement of a prior sale date. Mr. Case brought a claim for “wrongful foreclosure,” among others, alleging Defendants Wilmington Trust, N.A. and Wilson & Associates, PLLC violated the notice requirements in the applicable deed of trust by failing to provide him with written notice of the postponement. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants, and Mr. Case solely appealed the dismissal of his claim for “wrongful foreclosure.” The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Defendants failed to satisfy their notice obligations under the deed of trust and that summary judgment on the claim for “wrongful foreclosure” was therefore inappropriate. Defendant Wilmington Trust applied for permission to appeal to this Court, and we granted review to determine (1) whether Tennessee recognizes a common law cause of action for “wrongful foreclosure,” and (2) whether the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Deed of Trust requires written notice of postponement in addition to oral announcement pursuant to section 35-5-101(f) of the Tennessee Code. We further instructed the parties to address whether Mr. Case satisfied the requirements for constitutional standing. We hold that Mr. Case has constitutional standing to bring his claim. However, we also hold that there is no common law cause of action for “wrongful foreclosure” in Tennessee. As a result, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for entry of an order consistent with this opinion. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Robert E. Lee Flade v. City of Shelbyville, Tennessee et al.
In this appeal, we examine the intersection of the rule governing the voluntary dismissal of a civil action, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01, and the statutory scheme of the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-17-101 to -110 (2021). Robert E. Lee Flade filed suit against several defendants over what he considered to be disparaging remarks that were made on social media. Two of the defendants, Stephanie Isaacs and the Bedford County Listening Project (“the BCLP”), each filed not only a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, but also a petition to dismiss pursuant to the TPPA. The TPPA petitions sought dismissal of the complaint with prejudice, an award of attorney’s fees and costs, and an award of sanctions. Mr. Flade filed responses, and both the motions and the petitions were set for hearing. However, before the trial court conducted the hearing, Mr. Flade voluntarily nonsuited his complaint. As a result, the trial court entered an order of dismissal without prejudice. Ms. Isaacs and the BCLP sought to have the trial court adjudicate their TPPA petitions notwithstanding the dismissal of the complaint. The trial court determined that Mr. Flade’s nonsuit concluded the matter and declined to adjudicate the TPPA petitions. On appeal as of right, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Flade v. City of Shelbyville, No. M2022-00553-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2200729, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2023), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Aug. 9, 2023). We granted permission to appeal. Based on our review of applicable law, we conclude that although the right to take a voluntary nonsuit is subject to certain limitations, the mere filing of a TPPA petition is not among them. Thus, we hold that the trial court correctly declined to adjudicate the pending TPPA petitions after Mr. Flade voluntarily nonsuited his complaint. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Bedford | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Andre JuJuan Lee Green
This appeal presents the issue of how the legalization of hemp affects a probable cause analysis where law enforcement relied, in part, on a positive alert from a drug-sniffing canine incapable of differentiating between the smell of legal hemp and illegal marijuana. After initiating a routine traffic stop, law enforcement conducted an open-air sniff using a drug-sniffing canine. Based on the canine’s positive alert on the vehicle, combined with other facts observed by the officer, law enforcement searched the vehicle without a warrant pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The search revealed the following items inside a backpack: one ounce of marijuana, a loaded handgun, Ziploc bags, and a scale. The defendant, a passenger in the vehicle, was indicted for possession of marijuana with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver; possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia. The defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the canine sweep could not provide probable cause because the canine could not distinguish between the smell of legalized hemp and illegal marijuana. The trial court granted the motion to suppress and dismissed the charges against the defendant. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed by holding that the smell of illegal marijuana provides law enforcement with probable cause to search a vehicle. Alternatively, the intermediate court held that law enforcement possessed probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances. The defendant appealed to this Court, and we granted review. First, we clarify that State v. England, 19 S.W.3d 762 (Tenn. 2000), does not provide a per se rule of probable cause based on a positive indication from a drug-sniffing dog. Rather, England provides for an examination of the totality of the circumstances. Second, we hold that a positive indication from a drug-sniffing canine may continue to contribute to a finding of probable cause when examining the totality of the circumstances, notwithstanding the legalization of hemp. After examining the totality of the circumstances in this case, we conclude that law enforcement possessed probable cause to search the vehicle. As a result, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals reinstating the indictments against the defendant and remanding for further proceedings. |
Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
Peggy Mathes et al. v. 99 Hermitage, LLC
This appeal raises a thorny question about adverse possession. Under that doctrine, a party may gain legal title or a defensive possessory right to real property by maintaining exclusive, actual, adverse, continuous, open, and notorious possession of the property for a certain length of time. At issue here is the adversity requirement. The original plaintiff in this case, Ora Eads, Jr., obtained legal title to a commercial property near downtown Nashville years ago but did not register the deed. About two decades later, the individual who sold the property to Mr. Eads defaulted on a loan, and his creditor obtained a judgment lien against the property, which was eventually sold to enforce the lien. Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Eads adversely possessed the property during the intervening years. Defendant, the subsequent purchaser of the property, disagrees and argues that Mr. Eads’s possession was not adverse. We agree with defendant. Adversity, for purposes of both common-law and statutory adverse possession, requires either a conflict of title or a controversy about the right to possess the property. Because neither existed here for the requisite time period, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary decision and reinstate the chancery court’s judgment in favor of defendant. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Peggy Mathes et al. v. 99 Hermitage, LLC (Dissenting)
I agree with the majority that, to acquire legal title or a defensive possessory right to real property through adverse possession, the Plaintiffs must show Mr. Eads had “exclusive, actual, adverse, continuous, open, and notorious” possession of the property for the requisite time. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Eads’s possession of the property was not “adverse.” 1 I would hold Mr. Eads has met the requirements to show a hostile or adverse possession for common-law and statutory adverse possession.2 |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Colleen Ann Hyder v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
In this case, we review a trial court’s determination that a Montgomery County attorney violated Rule 5.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct by practicing law while her license was suspended for failure to pay the professional privilege tax and the accompanying sanction of a public censure. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
Family Trust Services LLC et al. v. Green Wise Homes LLC et al.
In this case, plaintiffs alleged defendants committed fraud in connection with their property rights. After a jury trial, plaintiffs moved for a new trial asking the trial court to fulfill its role as thirteenth juror. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals reversed upon finding the trial court misconceived its role as thirteenth juror. When a trial court misconceives its role as thirteenth juror or applies an incorrect standard, remand for a new trial historically has been the only remedy available under common law. In this appeal, we consider whether our law should allow the alternative remedy of remand for the trial court to fulfill its role as thirteenth juror under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.06. We hold that remand for the trial court to fulfill its role as thirteenth juror is an appropriate remedy when a civil trial court misconceives that role or applies an incorrect standard. We further hold that the lower courts erred in finding that a claim for unjust enrichment requires a voluntary conferral of a benefit. Finally, we hold that our law does not recognize a claim for misappropriation or conversion of a right of redemption. We affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Bill Charles v. Donna McQueen
Ordinarily, a plaintiff asserting a defamation claim must prove that the defendant made a false statement and did so negligently. If the plaintiff is a public figure, however, he must prove that the statement was made with actual malice. This is a steep hill to climb, so determining whether the plaintiff is a public figure is a crucial inquiry in any defamation case. This case is no exception. The plaintiff here, Bill Charles, assisted with the development of the Durham Farms community in Hendersonville, Tennessee, and is president of its homeowners’ association. Charles brought defamation and false light claims against Donna McQueen, a Durham Farms resident who posted a Google review that was critical of him. McQueen sought dismissal of Charles’s claims under the Tennessee Public Participation Act, arguing that Charles could not establish a prima facie case for his claims because he could not prove actual malice. The trial court agreed with McQueen and dismissed the claims. The Court of Appeals reversed in part. It agreed with McQueen that Charles had to prove actual malice to prevail on his false light claim and had failed to do so. But it held that Charles is not a public figure and therefore need not prove actual malice for his defamation claim. We disagree with the Court of Appeals on that score. We hold that Charles is a limited-purpose public figure given the voluntary and prominent role he played in a controversy concerning changes to the Durham Farms development plan. We further hold that Charles failed to establish a prima facie case of actual malice. Finally, we reject Charles’s argument that McQueen waived her request for appellate attorney’s fees by failing to list it as an issue in her Court of Appeals brief. We reverse the Court of Appeals in part and affirm in part, and we remand for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
Thomas Edward Clardy v. State of Tennessee
The prisoner in this case filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis long after expiration of the one-year limitations period and sought tolling of the statute of limitations. The petition was filed under the tolling exception to the coram nobis statute of limitations adopted by this Court in Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100 (Tenn. 2001). The coram nobis court held a hearing on whether to toll the statute of limitations. It accepted the factual allegations in the coram nobis petition as true, but determined that the new evidence did not show that the petitioner was actually innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted, so he was not entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations. Consequently, the coram nobis court dismissed the petition as untimely. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the coram nobis court on the tolling exception, reversed the dismissal for untimeliness, and remanded for a hearing on the allegations in the petition. On appeal, we hold that if a petition for a writ of error coram nobis is not timely filed and seeks tolling of the statute of limitations, it must be based on new evidence, discovered after expiration of the limitations period, that clearly and convincingly shows that the petitioner is actually innocent of the underlying crime, i.e., that the petitioner did not commit the crime. To obtain tolling of the coram nobis statute of limitations, the prisoner must file the petition no more than one year after he discovers the new evidence of actual innocence. From our review of the record, we agree with the analysis and conclusion of the coram nobis court and find no error. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and affirm the decision of the coram nobis court dismissing the petition as untimely. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Thomas Edward Clardy v. State of Tennessee (Concurring)
I agree with the majority that the trial court correctly dismissed Mr. Clardy’s petition for a writ of error coram nobis without conducting a hearing on the merits because the petition was untimely and was not entitled to tolling. I also agree with the majority that the trial court handled and decided this case exactly as it should have. Thus, I concur in the judgment of the Court. |
Davidson | Supreme Court |
