In Re Dakari M.
This is the second appeal by a mother and a father of the termination of their parental rights. We have concluded that the juvenile court correctly determined that a ground for termination existed as to the father. Regarding Mother, we find that the court erred in its analysis finding a ground for termination. We also conclude that the court failed to make sufficient findings regarding the ground for termination and vacate this portion of the order and remand for further proceedings. We also conclude that the juvenile court did not make sufficient findings of fact in its best interests analysis regarding Father. Therefore, we also vacate this part of the order and remand the matter for the juvenile court to enter an order that makes sufficient findings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re The Conservatorship of Joan Perrett Gaskin
In this conservatorship action, the trial court’s appointment of the ward’s stepdaughter as conservator has been appealed by the ward’s nephew and ostensibly the ward herself. Because the record leaves us unable to discern the basis of the trial court’s decisions, we vacate the trial court’s ruling and remand for the entry of an appropriate order. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas Cecil Cletus Virden v. Myven Magdy Virden
This is an appeal from an order suspending a mother’s parenting time until she completes a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 35 mental health evaluation. Because the order does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE ZARIAH H.1 ET AL.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to one minor child. Discerning no error, we affirm |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Hunter W.
The appellant appeals the circuit court’s findings that her minor child is dependent and neglected and a victim of severe abuse. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Laila Rumsey v. Regions Morgan Keegan Trust et al.
This case originates in a dispute over the administration of two trusts created for Joseph Peter Meersman, Jr. (“Meersman”). Meersman has filed multiple lawsuits against former trustees Michael Castellarin (“Castellarin”) and Regions Bank (“Regions”) (“Defendants,” collectively) alleging that they mismanaged the trusts. The trusts were terminated by court order in 2015. Laila Rumsey (“Rumsey”), Meersman’s partner, sued Defendants in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that she too was damaged by Defendants’ actions. Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the Trial Court granted based on the statute of limitations. Rumsey filed a motion to alter or amend within thirty days of entry of judgment but, contrary to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04, did not serve Defendants within thirty days. The Trial Court denied Rumsey’s motion as untimely. Rumsey appeals. Rule 59.04 requires such a motion be both “filed and served” within thirty days of entry of judgment. Rumsey failed to serve Defendants timely. Therefore, Rumsey’s motion to alter or amend was untimely and did not toll the time in which to file a notice of appeal. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Rodger Broadway v. Tennessee Department of Correction et al.
This appeal concerns a disciplinary action taken against a prisoner. Rodger Broadway (“Petitioner”), an inmate at Turney Center Industrial Complex, was found guilty of Class B Defiance by the prison’s disciplinary board (“the Board”) for cursing at another inmate while in the gym. Petitioner, pro se, filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Hickman County (“the Trial Court”) against the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) and multiple officials (“Respondents,” collectively). The Trial Court upheld the Board’s decision. Petitioner filed a motion to alter or amend, which the Trial Court denied as untimely even though Petitioner delivered the motion to the appropriate individual at his correctional facility within the time fixed for filing. We vacate the Trial Court’s judgment and remand for the Trial Court to consider Petitioner’s motion to alter or amend on its merits. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Gracie W., et al.
The appellant appeals the circuit court’s finding that her minor children are dependent and neglected. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE STEELE M
Appellee filed a petition in juvenile court seeking to terminate a father’s parental rights. After a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition and entered an order terminating the father’s parental rights based on the grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to support, (2) abandonment by failure to visit, (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody and financial responsibility, and (4) failure by a putative father to timely file a petition to establish paternity. The trial court also determined termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We affirm the grounds for termination. However, we conclude that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact regarding its best interest analysis. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s decision that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Benjamin (Odziana) Boatman v. Karuna Chaudhary Odziana
A mother appeals the trial court’s decision in this post-divorce modification action. We find no error in the trial court’s decision to change the residential parenting schedule and to make the father the primary residential parent. We further find no error in the trial court’s ruling making the father the sole decision-maker on non-emergency medical care and educational matters. However, we reverse the trial court’s ruling that neither parent could obtain a passport for the children or take them out of the country. Further, we vacate and remand the trial court’s decision on the residential parenting schedule for failure to make a specific provision for holiday parenting time. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Romeashea Springfield v. Darwin Eton, M.D. ET AL.
In this healthcare liability case, appellant/patient appeals the trial court’s grant of appellee/doctor’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02 motion to dismiss and its grant of appellee/doctor’s employer’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.03 motion for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court held that appellant failed to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121. As such, the statute of limitations barred appellant’s claims against the doctor. Having granted the doctor’s motion to dismiss, the trial court applied the common-law, operation-of-law exception to dismiss appellant’s vicarious liability claims against the doctor’s employer. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
CARBON FIBER RECYCLING, LLC v. TIMOTHY SPAHN
A Tennessee LLC sued one of its members seeking injunctive relief, monetary damages, and his expulsion as an LLC member. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order restraining the defendant from misappropriating, using, or disclosing the LLC’s trade secrets and confidential and proprietary business information. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint and dissolve the temporary restraining order based upon an arbitration provision, a choice of law provision, and a forum selection clause contained in the LLC’s operating agreement. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion and held that it lacked jurisdiction and venue based on the forum selection clause and that the LLC failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted due to the arbitration provision. We conclude that Tennessee law governs the operating agreement and affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint based upon the arbitration provision. However, we reverse the trial court’s holding that it lacked jurisdiction and venue over the LLC’s claims for temporary injunctive relief. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Josh Boyd et al. v. William Chad Finchum et al.
This appeal concerns two issues: (1) whether a 2024 amendment to the unlawful detainer statute made possession bonds mandatory for all tenants in appeals from the general sessions court to the circuit court, abrogating the decision in Johnson v. Hopkins, 432 S.W.3d 840 (Tenn. 2013); and (2) whether a tenant’s failure to sign an affidavit of indigency filed in lieu of a cost bond deprives the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. Here, the general sessions court awarded possession of the property to the landlords and entered a monetary judgment for unpaid rent against the tenants. One of the tenants then filed a timely notice of appeal with an unsigned affidavit of indigency. The general sessions court found the tenant indigent and qualified to proceed on a pauper’s oath. But the circuit court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the tenant remained in possession of the property and did not post a bond equal to one year’s rent per Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-18-130(b)(2). This appeal followed. The tenant contends that a possession bond was unnecessary under the decision in Johnson because he did not seek to retain possession of the property pending the appeal, and he argues that his failure to sign the affidavit of indigency is a correctable, technical defect. We conclude that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the tenant did not file a properly executed affidavit of indigency in the general sessions court. For this reason, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
SCOTT HENSLEY V. LAWRENCE SLATTERY, ET AL.
This is a property action involving the plaintiffs’ years long pursuit to establish a right-of-way to landlocked property. The trial court dismissed the action for failure to prosecute. We now vacate the order of dismissal and remand for further hearing. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Charles W. Shoffner v. Ephraim Muvire Urevbu
A property developer purchased a portion of a two-story building without having fully examined the property prior to acquiring it. The only existing means of accessing the second floor of his property was via a staircase owned by his neighbor. The developer did not have an express easement to use the staircase, and disagreements arose between the developer and his neighbor over the developer’s use of his neighbor’s staircase. In response, the developer filed suit. The developer claimed an easement implied by prior use, an easement by necessity, and/or a prescriptive easement. At trial, the neighbor sought, in effect, an involuntary dismissal at the close of the developer’s proof. The trial court granted that motion, reasoning that the developer failed to meet his burden of proof with respect to all three of his easement theories. The developer appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tyler King et al. Mobasher Revocable Trust et al.
Because the order appealed lacks finality based on the failure to comply with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58 and no good cause exists to waive the procedural deficiency, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
IN Re Zae'Alei R.
This is a termination of parental rights appeal. The trial court found that two statutory grounds existed to terminate mother’s parental rights to the two minor children: abandonment by failure to visit or support and persistence of conditions. The trial court found that three statutory grounds existed to terminate father’s parental rights to the minor children: abandonment by failure to visit or support, persistence of conditions, and abandonment due to father’s confinement of ten or more years. The trial court then concluded that termination was in the children’s best interests. We reverse the trial court’s findings on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit or support. We affirm the remainder of the trial court’s judgment. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Buchanan Dobson Dunavant v. The William B. Dunavant, Jr. Revocable Living Trust, et al.
This case involves the interpretation of a marital dissolution agreement (“MDA” ) in which the father was obligated to establish an irrevocable life insurance trust for his youngest child in an amount equal to the average of the after-tax funds received by his other children from four other trusts. He did not establish the trust before his death in 2021. Before he died, his youngest child sued to force him to create the trust. Ultimately, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the father’s estate and another trust he established, holding that the MDA trust was too vague and indefinite to enforce and that the father’s failure to establish the trust constituted a non-arbitrary disinheritance of the youngest child pursuant to the MDA. This Court, in Dunavant v. The William B. Dunavant, Jr. Revocable Living Trust, No. W2023-01213, 2024 WL 4211156 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2024), affirmed the trial court. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the Rule 11 application for the Living Trust and the Estate, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals “for further consideration in light of Pharma Conference Education v. State, 703 S.W.3d 305 (Tenn. 2024).” We reverse the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ronnie Bradfield v. Mark Thoman, et al.
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2.02. We have determined that the petition must be summarily dismissed due to significant failures to comply with Rule 10B. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Leonard Gamble v. Eric Brian Friend
A property owner granted a friend permission to live on his property while the friend was renovating the owner’s house. Five years later, the owner filed a successful detainer action against the friend in general sessions court. The friend appealed the adverse judgment to circuit court and, in that forum, filed a counterclaim asserting multiple causes of action including breach of contract and quantum meruit. After a bench trial, the trial court granted the property owner a detainer and dismissed the friend’s counterclaims. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Baker, et al. v. Amanda Lynn Smith A/K/A Amanda Mitchell
The plaintiff entered into an agreement with a company to make certain improvements to |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Remington B.
The guardian ad litem filed a petition to terminate a mother’s parental rights to her child. After the mother failed to respond, the guardian ad litem moved for entry of a default judgment against her. The mother appeared pro se at the default judgment hearing and requested a continuance to allow for court appointed counsel. The court found the mother was entitled to appointed counsel but denied the continuance. After hearing the petitioner’s proof, the court found clear and convincing evidence of multiple grounds for termination and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the court erred in denying the mother a continuance to consult with counsel. So we vacate the termination of the mother’s parental rights and remand for further proceedings. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE KYLEIGH C.
This is a termination of parental rights appeal. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate mother’s parental rights to the minor child on two statutory grounds: severe child abuse and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent. The trial court further concluded that termination was in the child’s best interest. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE KENDYL M.
This is a termination of parental rights appeal. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate mother’s parental rights to the minor child on two statutory grounds: severe child abuse and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent. The trial court further concluded that termination was in the child’s best interest. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
A.M. by Amanda M., et al. v. Carol Masek, et al.
The family of a child bitten by a dog appeal the dismissal of their lawsuit at the summary judgment stage. The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs failed to present evidence that the defendant owners knew or should have known of the dog’s dangerous propensities as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 44-8-413(c)(1). The plaintiffs argue that (1) the trial court committed reversible error when it granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment without a hearing; and (2) they presented sufficient evidence to create a dispute of genuine material fact as to whether the defendant owners should have known of the dog’s dangerous propensities. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
