Rebecca Hudson et al. v. Paul Gravette et al.
A kennel technician filed a personal injury action against the owners of two dogs, asserting a claim under the statute governing dog owners’ liability for injuries caused by their dogs and a claim for common law negligence. The technician alleged that the dogs attacked and injured her while they were boarded at her place of employment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the dog owners on both claims. We affirm the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment on the statutory claim, but we reverse the court’s decision to grant summary judgment on the common law negligence claim. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela Crenshaw on behalf of her mother Dorothy Murphy v. Methodist Healthcare-Memphis Hospitals, et al.
This is a health care liability case that centers around the statutory requirements for the pre-suit notice to be provided to defendants pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29- 26-121. The trial court granted the defendants’ joint motion to dismiss with prejudice after determining the pre-suit notice provided in this matter did not substantially comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Gabriel F.
This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that two grounds for termination existed as to the father: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent and (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The juvenile court also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. The father appeals. We vacate in part, affirm in part, and reverse in part, but ultimately affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Harpeth Crest HOA v. Cypressbrook Coley Davis, General Partnership
This case involves a disputed easement. Appellant filed a complaint for declaratory judgment asking the trial court to conclude that Appellee did not possess an easement over Appellant’s property. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that: (1) Appellee had an express easement appurtenant over Appellant’s property; and (2) an increase in traffic due to the normal development of Appellee’s property did not overburden the easement. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
NIKKI SIXX v. VANESSA CLARK
This case involves a petition for criminal contempt filed by the petitioner, Nikki Sixx, against the respondent, Vanessa Clark, concerning Ms. Clark’s alleged violations of multiple orders of protection. The trial court found Ms. Clark guilty of 100 counts of contempt, sentencing her to 300 days in jail and imposing $5,000 in fines. Ms. Clark has appealed. As a threshold matter, we determine that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Ms. Clark’s challenges to the validity and scope of the underlying orders of protection from which no appeal was timely filed. In addition, we conclude that Ms. Clark has waived any challenges to her bond conditions by failing to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 8. Regarding the trial court’s contempt findings, upon our thorough review of the record, we modify the trial court’s judgment in part, vacating the contempt finding regarding count 7 and subtracting count 43, which was found not to constitute a violation of the order of protection, from the trial court’s total. We also reduce Ms. Clark’s sentence by one day, awarding her the appropriate pretrial jail credit. Accordingly, the judgment is modified to reflect a total of 98 counts of contempt. These modifications also require that the judgment reflect total fines of $4,900 and a sentence of 293 days. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Renegade Mountain Community Club, Inc. v. Cumberland Point Condominium Property Owners Association, Inc.
This appeal arises out of a breach of contract action brought by the appellee against the appellant based upon the appellant’s purported breach of a duty to collect and remit to the appellee annual dues owed to it by the appellant’s members. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the appellee. Appellant timely appealed to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
City of Milan, TN v. Frederick H. Agee
This appeal arises from a dispute between two municipalities and the district attorney general responsible for prosecuting cases in the jurisdiction in which the municipalities lie. The district attorney general threatened to cease the prosecution of cases in the courts of the municipalities and stated that he would only continue to do so if the municipalities provided an additional assistant attorney general position for his office or funding for such a position. The district attorney general justifies his threat by citing Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-7-103(1), which he asserts requires municipalities to fund additional prosecutorial personnel in order for his duty to prosecute cases in municipal court to be triggered. The municipalities filed a complaint for writ of mandamus and later amended their claims to include a request for declaratory judgment. The trial court ordered that the municipalities were entitled to a declaratory judgment “that they ha[d] provided ‘sufficient personnel’” to the district attorney general and that he could not avoid the responsibility of prosecuting cases “by invoking Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-7-103(6).” The trial court also determined that the district attorney general had a “clear statutory mandate” and issued a “peremptory writ of mandamus” compelling the district attorney general to comply with the statute. The district attorney general appeals. Finding that Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-7-103(1)’s “personnel requirement” does not refer to prosecutorial personnel, we affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Sawyer B.
This appeal concerns termination of parental rights. John W. and Kelli W. (“Petitioners”) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) against Crystal B. (“Mother”) seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights to her minor daughter, Sawyer B. (“the Child”). The juvenile court previously found that Mother committed severe child abuse by failing to protect the Child’s half-sibling from abuse by John B., a man Mother lived with. Mother did not appeal the juvenile court’s finding. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse. Mother appeals, arguing among other things that she left John B. as soon as she could, although she remained with him for months after the termination petition was filed and continued to contact him. We find, as did the Trial Court, that the ground of severe child abuse was proven against Mother by clear and convincing evidence. We find further by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Trial Court, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Debbie Williams v. Rodney Holt et al.
This appeal concerns the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress relating to her interaction with a transit bus operator. We affirm the dismissal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE JAXON N. ET AL.
This appeal concerns termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Hamblen County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Janlynn B. (“Mother”) and Eric N. (“Father”) to their minor children Jaxon N. and Colton N. (“the Children,” collectively). Janice B. (“Foster Mother”) filed an intervening petition also seeking to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. The Juvenile Court found in part that Mother failed to attend to the Children’s health needs, including Colton’s serious heart condition. Mother appeals.1 On appeal, Mother argues that the Juvenile Court did not make sufficient best interest findings and, even if it did, it erred in its analysis. We vacate the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan as the record contains only Mother’s third plan. Thus, we modify the Juvenile Court’s judgment to that extent. Otherwise, we find that each of the other grounds found by the Juvenile Court was proven by clear and convincing evidence. We find further that the Juvenile Court made sufficient findings on best interest. We find, as did the Juvenile Court, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm as modified. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
SONYA HARNESS v. JOHN MANSFIELD, ET AL.
A home health nurse was injured in an automobile accident while driving her vehicle in connection with her employment. She later sought uninsured motorist benefits under a business automobile liability policy issued to her employer. Arguing that the uninsured motorist coverage in the business policy did not apply to the employee’s accident, the insurance carrier moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the carrier’s motion. We conclude that the business policy unambiguously limited uninsured motorist coverage to specifically listed automobiles. Because the nurse’s vehicle was not listed, the uninsured motorist coverage in the business policy did not apply. We further conclude that this policy limitation does not contravene our uninsured motorist statutes. So we affirm the grant of summary judgment. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
CITY OF PIGEON FORGE, TENNESSEE v. RLR INVESTMENTS, LLC
In this condemnation action, the trial court entered an order of possession granting to the petitioner city two greenway easements and two construction easements over two tracts of land owned by the respondent corporation. In the order of possession, the court found that the city’s taking was for the public purpose of the city’s greenway project. The corporation filed two successive motions for summary judgment, claiming that because the taking was partially for a private purpose, it violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 21 of the Tennessee Constitution. The corporation averred that the order of possession required the city to construct parking spaces on one of the corporation’s tracts to replace parking spaces taken from the other tract and that this would yield only a private benefit. The corporation also asserted that the city had abandoned its taking by failing to construct the replacement parking despite the completion of the greenway. The trial court denied both motions for summary judgment, determining that the order of possession had not required the city to build replacement parking and that no abandonment had occurred. Following a jury trial regarding compensation, the trial court entered a judgment approving the jury’s monetary award to the corporation with prejudgment interest. The corporation has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We deny the corporation’s request for an award of costs and attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Quinton A. Et Al.
Father appeals the trial court’s findings that (1) termination of Father’s parental rights is supported by the grounds of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, and (2) termination is in the children’s best interests. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County v. Governor Bill Le et al.
In this dispute, the trial court found that certain subsections of 2023 Tennessee Public Acts, chapter 488, violated the home rule amendment and the equal protection guarantee found in the Tennessee Constitution. The defendants, who are officials of the State of Tennessee, have appealed the trial court’s ruling. Following our thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s determination that section two of the act is unconstitutional. However, we reverse the trial court’s determination that sections two, six, seven, eight, and nine of the Act violate the equal protection guarantee found in the Tennessee Constitution. We therefore also reverse the trial court’s elision of sections six, seven, eight, and nine from the statute. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Courtney L. Wherry, et al. v. Obion County Board of Education, et al.
This negligence action arose when Courtney L. Wherry (“Ms. Wherry”), a member of the South Fulton High School sideline cheerleading team, fell and injured her neck while performing a “shoulder sit” stunt in the endzone of a football field prior to a high school football game. Ms. Wherry and her parents, Jason T. Wherry and Jaime L. Tidwell, (collectively, “the Wherrys”) brought suit against the Obion County Board of Education and Obion County School District (collectively, “the School District”)1 under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act to recover damages for the injuries sustained by Ms. Wherry. The Wherrys sought recovery based upon two negligence theories: (1) that the school district’s selection and hiring of the South Fulton High School cheerleading coach Nichole Harrell (“Ms. Harrell”) was negligent, and (2) that the negligent acts and omissions of Ms. Harrell on the night of the accident related to the football field conditions were the cause in fact and proximate cause of Ms. Wherry’s injuries. Following a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the School District on both negligence theories. The Wherrys appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Marilee Z. Hurley, Trustee of the Marilee Z. Hurley Revocable Trust Dated September 26, 2008 v. Green Shadows Homeowners Association, Inc.
This case involves a dispute between a property owner and her homeowners’ association. Appellant’s property is governed by the homeowner’s association’s covenants, conditions, and restrictions. There are two improvements to appellant’s property, a main house and a carriage house, both of which were originally roofed with vintage concrete tiles. Appellant replaced the roof on the carriage house with asphalt shingles, but did not replace the roof on the main house. Rather, appellant had the main house roof cleaned, which resulted in a lighter appearance. The homeowners’ association demanded that appellant replace the main house roof with shingles to match the carriage house. Appellant refused and filed an action for declaratory judgment and injunction. The association filed a counter-complaint alleging that appellant was in breach of certain provisions of the covenants, conditions, and restrictions. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court dismissed appellant’s declaratory judgment action on its finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because appellant failed to join all necessary parties. The trial court granted the homeowners’ association’s motion for summary judgment on its counter-complaint and awarded attorney’s fees. Because the trial court’s order does not adequately explain its reasons for dismissing appellant’s declaratory judgment action, we cannot conduct a meaningful review of that holding, and we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of appellant’s complaint. There are disputes of material fact that preclude the grant of summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and its award of attorney’s fees to the homeowner’s association. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of David Alan Beddingfield
This appeal arises from an order requiring a petitioner to pay a filing fee or face dismissal of his case. Because the order is not final, we lack subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Lori Jean McKee Kelly v. Christopher Roberts Kelly
In this divorce, the trial court sanctioned Husband for failing to participate in discovery. After a final hearing at which Husband failed to appear, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce that awarded Wife monetary judgments and alimony, divided the marital property, adopted Wife’s proposed parenting plan, and set child support. Husband filed a motion to set aside, alter, or amend the final decree, which the trial court denied. On appeal, Husband challenges the sanctions and complains that the trial court failed to consider the statutory best interest factors when fashioning the permanent parenting plan. Although the trial court’s factual findings concerning the children’s best interest are deficient, we can “soldier on” by conducting a de novo review of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies. After that review, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
ROBERT "WOODY" DEW ET AL. v. ADRIAN'S INC. ET AL
Following mediation, family members signed a settlement agreement resolving their business dispute. One party then sought to withdraw from the agreement. The trial court determined that the party’s ability to withdraw was limited and ordered him to close on the transactions contemplated by the agreement. Because we conclude that the settlement agreement’s language was ambiguous, we vacate and remand for an evidentiary hearing. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Dorothy Ann Britton
This appeal involves of the administration of an estate. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final order closing the estate as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
Langford Farms Common Facilities Association, Inc. v. Paul A. Clark
A homeowners’ association sued a resident for violations of neighborhood regulations. The resident did not answer requests for admission. The trial court found that the requests were, therefore, admitted and granted a judgment for the association. The resident appealed. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Kyle Leath v. Angelea Nicole Flowers
Mother and Father entered into an Agreed Permanent Parenting Plan. Thereafter, Father learned of information he allegedly was not privy to before, namely, that the Mother’s new husband was physically abusive, had been using drugs, and has an extensive criminal record; additionally, new incidents involving domestic violence and other criminality occurred involving Mother’s new husband. In response, Father sought to modify the parenting plan. The Juvenile Court modified the plan, reducing the number of days of Mother’s visitation and limiting Mother to supervised visitation. Mother appeals the trial court’s modifications. We affirm. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
Keith Riddle v. Andrei Miclaus
A plaintiff was awarded a judgment against a defendant who failed to complete home improvement work. The defendant appeals; however, he has failed to provide an adequate record to allow for consideration of his arguments on appeal and has asked this court to perform fact-finding that is beyond the scope of our authority. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment. |
Sequatchie | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE GABRIEL M.
This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found clear and convincing evidence to establish the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home and (2) the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We now affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Milcrofton Utility District of Williamson County, Tennessee v. Non-Potable Well Water, Inc.
A utility district sued a private corporation alleging that the corporation was illegally providing water services to customers in the utility district’s service area. The trial court ruled in favor of the corporation. On appeal, the district asserts that the trial court erred in requiring the district to prove that the company qualified as a “public utility” under the pertinent statute. We have concluded that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the statute. We, therefore, reverse and remand. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals |
