Brandy Leigh Frame Taylor (now Tipper) v. Joseph Daniel Taylor
This post-divorce appeal arises from competing petitions to modify a parenting plan and a petition for criminal contempt. At the time of the divorce, Brandy Leigh Frame Taylor2 (“Mother”) and Joseph Daniel Taylor (“Father”) adopted a parenting plan naming Mother the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child and awarding Father visitation. The child was four years old at the time of the divorce. Five years later, the then nine-year-old child purportedly began refusing to visit Father. Thereafter, Mother petitioned the trial court to modify the parenting plan to, inter alia, stop all visitation with Father. Father filed a counter-petition to modify the parenting plan to, inter alia, name him the primary residential parent. Father also filed a contempt petition alleging, in relevant part, that Mother intentionally and repeatedly obstructed his visitation and coached the child to refuse to visit Father. After a two-day hearing in which the trial court found Father was a credible witness and Mother was not credible, the court determined that a material change in circumstances had occurred due to Mother’s severe alienation of the child from Father and that a drastic modification of the parenting plan was in the child’s best interest. The court’s modifications of the parenting plan included designating Father as the primary residential parent with sole decision-making authority, reducing Mother’s parenting time to what Father had been awarded in the previous order, and restricting Mother to supervised visitation pending a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 35 psychological evaluation. In a separate order, the court found Mother guilty of seventy-one counts of criminal contempt for willfully violating the parties’ visitation schedule and sentenced Mother to serve concurrent ten-day terms in jail for six of the seventy-one acts of contempt but suspended the sixty-day sentence except for the service of three weekends on the condition that Mother strictly adhere to the court’s orders going forward. Mother appeals the modification of the parenting plan and the trial court’s seventy-one criminal contempt findings. Both parties challenge the sentence imposed for Mother’s criminal contempt. We affirm. Father also requests his attorney’s fees on appeal. We find Father’s request to be well taken and remand for a determination of Father’s reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
First South Financial Credit Union v. Collierville 385 Motors, LLC
Appellant appeals from the trial court’s denial of a motion to vacate a default judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Radonda Vaught v. Tennessee Board of Nursing
This is an appeal arising from a decision by the Tennessee Board of Nursing (“the Board”) |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joe H. Edwards v. Angela L. Underwood
Property owners retained a licensed engineer to develop subdivision lots. As partial compensation for his services, the engineer agreed to accept a 6% share of the gross proceeds when the lots were sold. The agreement was to be binding on the property owners’ heirs and assigns. After both owners died, ownership of the remaining unsold lots passed to a daughter through probate. She sold some of the lots without payment of the engineer’s 6% share. The engineer sued the daughter for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Among other things, the daughter argued that the engineer’s action was barred by the probate statutes. The trial court held that the engineer’s 6% share was secured by a statutory lien on the real property and its proceeds and that such lien was not subject to any affirmative defenses. After careful review, we reverse. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Emmeline C.
In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her daughter, the trial court found that three statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further found that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Betty Ann Wallace v. First Cash Inc.
The appellant filed a civil summons in the general sessions court, asserting that items she had pawned at one of the appellee’s locations were returned to her damaged. After the appellant failed to appear at the initial hearing, the matter was dismissed. The appellant appealed the dismissal to the circuit court, which found that the appeal was not timely filed and dismissed the appeal. On appeal in this Court, we have determined that the appellant’s brief is deficient under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and dismiss the appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Wendy Rose, Et Al v. Lakeway Medical Property Partnership, Et Al
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right filed pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Due to numerous deficiencies in the petition, the appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Roger Judd et al. v. Kaylee Powell et al.
This appeal arises out of a petition filed by Roger and Regina Judd (collectively, “Appellants”) seeking grandparent visitation with three minor children, Appellants’ grandchildren. Kaylee and Spencer Powell (collectively, “Appellees”) filed their answer to the petition, claiming that Appellants lacked standing to bring their request. The Putnam County Juvenile Court (“juvenile court”) dismissed Appellants’ petition for failure to state a claim based on lack of standing. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Kendin L.
Rhonda L. (“Mother”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for the City of Bristol (“the Juvenile Court”) to modify a parenting plan granting Mark K. (“Father”) sole custody of Kendin L. (“the Child”) and Mother at least four days of parenting time each month.1 Father filed a motion for injunctive relief seeking the suspension of Mother’s parenting time based upon Mother’s persistent inappropriate behavior and psychological evaluation results. The Juvenile Court entered an ex parte order granting the motion for injunctive relief. After trial, the Juvenile Court dismissed Mother’s petition for her failure to prosecute and ordered that the suspension of Mother’s parenting time remain in full effect until Mother engaged in therapy and treatment for her personality disorder. Mother appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Gabriel T.
This appeal concerns termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Humphreys County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Tabitha P. (“Mother”) and Cody T. (“Father”) to their minor child Gabriel T. (“the Child”). After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights on several grounds. Mother and Father appeal, arguing mainly that DCS failed to assist or communicate with them. The Juvenile Court determined that Mother and Father were not credible witnesses, a determination we leave undisturbed. We find that each ground for termination found by the Juvenile Court was proven by clear and convincing evidence. We find further by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Juvenile Court, that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
Deena Brell v. Deniece Thomas, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development et al.
This is an appeal of a denial of unemployment benefits. The issue presented is whether, under Tennessee’s unemployment statutes, an employee who gives her employer notice of her resignation as of a certain date and is terminated by the employer prior to the effective resignation date is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits on the ground that the employee voluntarily quit. The trial court affirmed the agency’s decision denying benefits. Based upon the plain language of the relevant statutory provision, we conclude that the employee’s actions do not constitute a voluntary decision to quit. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s decision. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Mahdieh Shabanian v. Seyed Mohammad Hadi Hosseini
We do not reach the substantive issues because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01. Vacated and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jeremy Wayne Long v. Candice O'Brien Beasley et al.
This is a defamation action filed by a plaintiff police officer against two defendants concerning allegedly defamatory comments the defendants posted on Facebook about the officer. The defendants, citizens of Ashland City, where the plaintiff had served as a police officer for several years, filed a petition to dismiss the defamation action pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). The trial court denied the petition, determining that the officer had successfully established a prima facie case of defamation against each defendant and that the defendants had not met their burden to establish a valid defense. The defendants appealed the denial, arguing that the officer, a public official, had not met the heightened standard of proof necessary to establish that either of them had acted with actual malice when posting their comments to Facebook. During the pendency of this appeal, the officer attempted to nonsuit the underlying defamation lawsuit and moved to dismiss this appeal as moot. Upon review, we determine that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the officer’s voluntary nonsuit, and therefore we deny the motion to dismiss this appeal. We further determine, upon our de novo review of the record, that the trial court should have granted the defendants’ TPPA petition and dismissed the defamation lawsuit, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 17-20-105(b), because the officer failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that either defendant had acted with actual malice when posting the Facebook comments. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Stevy Ellis, et al. v. Snookums Steakhouse, LLC, et al.
The patron of a restaurant sued the business and its owner when she was injured attempting to sit on a bench outside the business. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that the patron failed to demonstrate the existence of a dangerous or defective condition. We affirm. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
Manoucheka Thermitus v. Schiller Jerome
Appellant, Schiller Jerome, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Chancery Court that was entered on September 3, 2024. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald Austin v. Angela Kay Plese
This appeal arises from a lawsuit over defamation and false light invasion of privacy. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Merritt v. Home Town Disposal, LLC
The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Barbara Ellen Lee v. Deanna Lynn Peavy
After an unfavorable judgment in a detainer action for real property in general sessions court, the Plaintiff sought relief in Davidson County Circuit Court. Two and a half years later, after numerous resettings, the court dismissed the action for failure to prosecute. The Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Dale Muhlenberg v. Neva Muhlenberg
This is an appeal from an order entered on January 2, 2025. The appellant filed her notice of appeal on February 24, 2025, together with a motion requesting an extension of time within which to file the appeal. Because the thirty-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional and cannot be waived, we deny the motion for extension and dismiss the appeal. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Jolene Renee Scholl v. Michael Ray Scholl
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered on December 10, 2024. The appellant filed his notice of appeal with the appellate court clerk on March 3, 2025, together with a Motion to Accept Late Filing. Because the thirty-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal with the appellate court clerk is jurisdictional and cannot be waived, we deny the Motion to Accept Late Filing and dismiss the appeal. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
City of Memphis v. Malcom Gary
This appeal arises from the denial of line of duty disability benefits to the appellee by a pension board. The denial went before an administrative law judge who reversed the decision of the pension board and determined the appellee was entitled to benefits. The appellant filed a petition for judicial review in the chancery court, which affirmed the ruling of the administrative law judge. This appeal followed. Because the record does not contain evidence showing that the board entered a final determination, we are without subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tatum M. Campbell v. T.C. Restaurant Group, LLC et al.
The Plaintiff sued a musician and the establishment where he performed for negligence after the Plaintiff climbed on stage and sustained a concussion as a result of a fall from the stage while being escorted therefrom. The jury found that the Defendants were not at fault. On appeal, the Plaintiff claims reversible error because of defense counsel’s statement during opening argument that Plaintiff hoped to be a “lottery lawsuit winner” and error in admitting evidence of medical leave benefits Plaintiff obtained from her work. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Rhonda Lawson v. Judge Randy Kennedy Et Al.
A mother sought the recusal of the juvenile court judge overseeing a custody case involving her minor child. After the judge denied two recusal motions, the mother filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the circuit court. The circuit court determined that it lacked authority to issue the writ of mandamus and dismissed the petition. The mother appealed. We affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Dallas K. Hurley, Jr. v. Ryan B. Pickens Et Al.
In this healthcare liability action, the trial court excluded the plaintiff’s proffered expert witness after concluding that the witness failed to satisfy the competency requirements in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115(b). Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Southern Roofing & Renovations, LLC v. Aron Austin, et al.
In this case that began as a breach of contract action, the defendant property owner attempts to appeal from two cases that were not consolidated in the trial court but resulted in the entry of a single order in favor of the plaintiff roofing company. Because the order appealed from did not adjudicate all of the claims of all of the parties, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |