IN RE TAMIRIA M.
A mother appeals a juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to her two children. We affirm the juvenile court’s decision that clear and convincing evidence established the existence of two statutory grounds for termination. Because the juvenile court’s order failed to make sufficient factual findings to support its best interest analysis, we vacate that portion of the court’s decision and remand for entry of an order making sufficient factual findings |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
SARAH BROWN v. BRETT WALLACE
The trial court found a father guilty of nine counts of criminal contempt based on his alleged violation of the trial court’s previous order addressing child support arrearage and the current child support arrangement for the father’s minor child. Because the order appealed from contains no findings on the essential elements of criminal contempt, on what evidence supports the judgment, or on whether the criminal contempt was initiated on proper notice, we vacate and remand to the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
MONA WORD v. KNOX COUNTY ET AL.
Plaintiff brought claims against Knox County and the County Clerk based on allegedly discriminatory employment practices. The trial court determined that Plaintiff committed serious discovery violations and imposed as a sanction the exclusion of certain evidence. With this evidence excluded, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Defendants. Plaintiff appeals, challenging the discovery sanction, the trial court’s conclusion under the Tennessee Human Rights Act that the continuing violation doctrine did not apply, the trial court’s conclusion that the Clerk was not individually liable, and the award of attorney’s fees against the Plaintiff and her attorney. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Betty Jane Davis v. Leesa Renna Davis, et al.
This case arises out of allegations that Appellees misappropriated Appellant’s inheritance funds for their own use. Appellant also alleges elder abuse based on the conversion as well as a physical altercation between Appellant and an Appellee. Appellees allege that Appellant gifted them the inheritance funds. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court concluded that: (1) because Appellant engaged in bad faith, the doctrine of unclean hands applied and barred her full recovery; (2) Appellees converted and misappropriated a portion of Appellant’s inheritance funds; (3) Appellees did not commit elder abuse; and (4) Appellant intended a partial gift of the inheritance funds to Appellees. Because the trial court erred when it sua sponte raised the affirmative defenses of bad faith and unclean hands, we reverse the trial court’s application of these doctrines to reduce the judgment awarded to Appellant. We also conclude that the trial court failed to consider the elements of elder abuse, the elements of a properly executed gift, and failed to make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the same. As such, we vacate the trial court’s order as to Appellant’s elder abuse claim and Appellees’ gift claim. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment awarded to Appellant. The remainder of the trial court’s order is affirmed. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Appellant’s request for appellate attorney’s fees is pretermitted. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
Arnold Whitmore, et al. v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division
The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dylan Whitmore v. Melyssa Atkinson
This is an action to modify a permanent parenting plan. Mother appeals the trial court’s order finding her in civil contempt, modifying the parties’ parenting plan, and awarding attorney’s fees to Father. She also argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Father’s initial petition to establish a parenting plan. We have determined that the trial court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. We affirm the trial court’s finding that Mother’s failure to abide by the parenting plan constituted a material change of circumstance. However, Father failed to carry his burden of proof to demonstrate that modification of the 2021 parenting plan to designate Father as primary residential parent is in the child’s best interest. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment granting Father’s petition to modify. We affirm the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Father and remand for recalculation of the parties’ child support obligations. Father’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal is denied. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Clata Renee Brewer et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County et al.
In the spring of 2023, The Metro Nashville Police Department (“Metro”) received several public records requests seeking information about a school shooting that occurred in a Nashville private school on March 27, 2023. Metro denied all such requests. The various requestors filed petitions for access to the records in the Davidson County courts, which were eventually consolidated into one action. The private school at which the shooting occurred, its affiliated church, and parents of surviving children intervened in the action as parties. These intervening parties advocated that the school shooter’s personal writings and other creative works, which Metro collected in the course of its investigation, should remain confidential. The trial court ultimately denied all petitions for access to Metro’s file for numerous reasons. The requestors appeal to this Court. Following our review, we affirm in part and reverse in part. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the intervening parents have standing to raise arguments under the United States Copyright Act. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that neither Article I, section 35 of the Tennessee Constitution, nor Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-38-102, bar disclosure of any public records in this case. On all other issues, we reverse the trial court. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Bella H., et al.
The trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights to her two minor children after finding clear and convincing evidence that the conditions that led to the children’s removal persist, that the mother failed to manifest an ability to assume custody of the children, and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The mother appeals. Upon diligent review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
BARBARA MATTHEWS LAW v. HALBERT GRANT LAW, JR.
Halbert Grant Law, Jr. (“Husband”) and Barbara Matthews Law (“Wife”) divorced in 2020, and Husband appealed the ruling to this Court. In the first appeal, we determined that the trial court erred in classifying several significant assets and remanded the case back to the trial court. Following a hearing on remand, the trial court re-divided the marital estate and awarded Wife both alimony in futuro and alimony in solido. Husband appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Ewald v. Tetyana Ewald
Husband and Wife divorced. In ruling upon contested matters, the trial court adopted a parenting plan submitted by Husband with minor modifications, named Husband primary residential parent of the parties’ minor children, and granted Husband primary custody of his stepson. The trial court ordered Wife to pay child support and declined to grant her alimony. The court also categorized and distributed the parties’ marital property. The court denied Wife’s request to hold Husband in contempt for purportedly interfering with her parenting time. Because the parties agree there was error as to Wife’s income for purposes of the child support calculation and agree as to the number that should have been used for her income, we modify the trial court’s award of child support accordingly. We also conclude that the trial court erred in failing to value the marital property and to apply the statutory factors and make relevant findings in connection with dividing the marital estate. We conclude that the issue of primary custody over Husband’s stepson, who was nearly 18 at the time of argument in this case, is moot. We affirm as to the other issues presented in this appeal. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Jing Han Belfiglio et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
A landslide led neighboring property owners to jointly file suit against Metro Water Services. Further investigation complicated their understanding of what may have caused the landslide, resulting in withdrawal of their shared counsel and in one property owner bringing suit against the other while still maintaining the action against Metro Water Services. While all three parties engaged in a variety of settlement-related actions, the suit filed by one property owner against the other sat largely dormant. This sparked a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The trial court held the motion in abeyance. While the settlement-related matters became ever more mired, the case did not move forward. Fifteen months later, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute and awarded attorney’s fees. Because we are unable to determine the trial court’s basis for the award of attorney’s fees from its order, we vacate that portion of the judgment and remand for further findings. Otherwise, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Oldsmith Group, LLC et al. v. Mosby Cool Springs, LLC
In this complex suit over a breach of a contract to sell real estate, the trial court dismissed one of the plaintiffs in an order certified as final under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02, but it reinstated that plaintiff two years later. The court awarded the plaintiff-buyers specific performance, one of the limited available remedies under the contract. However, because the seller had meanwhile taken actions that may have made this relief impossible, the trial court also noted it would consider civil contempt in the event the seller would not perform, and would award approximately $12.2 million in damages, which was the measure of harm for the dismissed plaintiff party. The seller appeals. We conclude that the trial court erred in reinstating the party and that the proper method to challenge an improvidently granted 54.02 final judgment is appeal or an appropriate post-judgment motion. We also conclude that, although the party was erroneously reinstated, the seller is not entitled to a new trial on the issue of liability. Additionally, the trial court did not err in its determination that the seller committed the first material breach and did not err in awarding specific performance. This court cannot review a future and speculative contempt judgment, and we vacate the portion of the judgment delineating any future contempt award. We remand for consideration of whether the buyer is entitled to attorney’s fees on appeal under the contract. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Chelsea C. Stewart v. Kyle P. Hester
This appeal arises from Mother’s petition to modify the parties’ parenting plan and request that Father be held in contempt for failure to pay child support. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order generally finding that the parties simply had two different parenting styles and denying Mother’s request to modify the parenting plan. The trial court also found that the contempt matter had been addressed, but the trial court’s order lacked any findings of fact or conclusions of law concerning the alleged contempt. After review, we reverse the trial court’s determination that Mother had not proven a material change in circumstances to permit modification of the parenting plan. To that end, the matter is remanded for the trial court to conduct an analysis of whether a change in the parties’ parenting plan is in the children’s best interest pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106(a). Further, we vacate the trial court’s order as it relates to the civil contempt action against Father. That matter is remanded as well for additional findings and conclusions related to Father’s civil contempt. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Robin L. Duffer v. Marc N. Duffer
The present case is Husband’s second appeal in relation to the parties’ divorce. In the first |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Fredna McAlister v. Calvin Miller
This is an appeal from an order reforming a deed to correct the legal description of the |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
ROBERT MICHAEL SWAFFORD v. CATHERINE LYDIA TRAIL SWAFFORD
Husband and Wife divorced. In dividing the marital estate, the trial court determined that an account inherited by Wife had been transmuted into marital property and that Wife had dissipated a substantial portion of the transmuted account. Considered as a whole, the trial court allocated the marital estate in a manner that Wife asserted was inequitable. She repeatedly requested findings by the trial court explicating its division of marital estate. The trial court declined to provide such findings. On appeal, Wife challenges the trial court’s classification of the aforementioned account and its conclusion that she dissipated the account. Wife also challenges the trial court’s overall division of marital property both as being inequitable and for the insufficiency of the trial court’s findings. We affirm the trial court’s ruling as to transmutation. We vacate the trial court’s ruling as to dissipation and the trial court’s division of property, and we remand for further proceedings. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie Paige Roper (now Stephanie Paige Bruce) v. Wesley Garrett Roper
In this post-divorce dispute, a father petitioned to modify the permanent parenting plan and child support. The mother counterpetitioned for civil contempt alleging the father had willfully violated the parenting plan. After a bench trial, the court denied the father’s petition and held him in civil contempt. Because the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding of a material change in circumstance sufficient to modify the residential parenting schedule, we vacate the denial of the father’s petition to modify the parenting plan and remand for the court to determine whether modification is in the child’s best interest. We reverse the court’s decision to hold the father in civil contempt for failure to maintain insurance coverage because the decision lacked sufficient factual support. Given our disposition of these issues, we also vacate the court’s award of attorney’s fees to the mother as the prevailing party. Otherwise, we affirm. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
THOMAS N. ALLEN v. TAMMY LYNCH ET AL
The April 2025 order from which the appellant has appealed was not effectively entered, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58. Therefore, there is no final appealable judgment, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Patricia Slate v. Smiley Bail Bonds et al.
The plaintiff, Patricia Slate, appeals the dismissal of her complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against either of the defendants. Because the appellant’s brief is profoundly noncompliant with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss this appeal. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Burma Anderson v. Saint Thomas Midtown Hospital et al.
This appeal presents the question of whether, under the Health Care Liability Act, a party in a wrongful death action can rely on a prior beneficiary’s pre-suit notice after succeeding to that beneficiary’s interest in the wrongful death litigation. The trial court concluded that such reliance is permissible. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin Carnett v. State of Tennessee, et al.
We do not reach the merits of the appeal due to Appellant’s failure to comply with the briefing requirements outlined in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a), and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
Brian S. Waggoner, M.D. v. Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners
A physician disciplined by the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners challenges the reasonableness and necessity of the costs assessed against him. We find substantial and material evidence to support the cost assessment and affirm the chancery court’s decision affirming the Board’s final order. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Avery H.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her special needs child. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that several grounds for termination were proven and that termination is in the best interest of the child. We reverse one ground for termination but otherwise affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Juanita M.
In this action to terminate parental rights, the mother, father, and child all tested positive for methamphetamine. Accordingly, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) took the child into protective custody, and the child was adjudicated dependent and neglected. Despite completing many of DCS’s requirements, the mother and father continued to fail drug tests. DCS filed a petition for termination of parental rights, and the trial court determined that three grounds supported termination as to both parents: (1) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal, (2) severe child abuse, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume physical custody of or financial responsibility for the child. The trial court also concluded that termination of both parents’ rights was in the child’s best interest. Both parents have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Juanita M.-Dissent
I concur with most of the majority’s analysis of the grounds for termination of the parents’ parental rights. However, I disagree with the finding of severe abuse by the father and I disagree that the best interests of the child require termination. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals |
