Jessica Munoz v. Jose Sepulveda
A woman sued a dog owner for injuries caused by the owner’s dog biting her while she was on the owner’s property. The trial court granted summary judgment to the dog owner based on the owner’s testimony that the dog had never bitten anyone and had never exhibited a dangerous propensity to bite. We have concluded that the woman presented evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to the dog owner’s credibility regarding his knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s decision. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Miriam T.
Mother appeals the trial court’s ruling that (1) the grounds of abandonment by failure to support, mental incompetence, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the child supported the termination of her parental rights and (2) termination was in the child’s best interest. Although we reverse as to the ground of abandonment by failure to support, we affirm the remainder of the trial court’s ruling, including the termination of Mother’s rights. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Justice W.
The mother and father of Justice W., a minor, appeal the termination of their parental rights. The trial court found that multiple grounds for termination had been proven against each parent and that termination of both parents’ parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Pryor E. Bacon, III, et al. v. Carolyn Poynton Sandlin, et al.
This action involves interpretation of a right-of-first-refusal provision originally executed |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Micah N.
The trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights to her minor child based on several statutory grounds. The mother appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Jospheen Guirguis et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
The plaintiffs were injured by gunfire when the police were called to their residence to stop a domestic incident and burglary in progress. The plaintiffs sued the defendant city, arguing that their employee police officers were negligent in failing to adhere to department policies and rules. Some years after the case had been filed, the city filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that the claims involved civil rights and that the city’s governmental immunity was not removed under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court agreed and granted the city’s motion, dismissing the case. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Patrick Kevin Morris and Gabrielle Morgerman, Trustees of the Morris Morgerman Trust UAD September 28, 2000 v. Jeffrey M. Foster et al.
This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action regarding whether one homeowner in a subdivision has the exclusive right to access a private road within the subdivision. The homeowner asserted that it had exclusive access to the road pursuant to a contractual agreement between the homeowner’s association and a previous owner of the property, so it maintained a gate across the road, preventing other homeowners from accessing it. The trial court ruled, in the context of various summary judgment motions, that the contractual agreement did not give the homeowner exclusive access to the road, and it ordered the homeowner to provide access to all HOA members. The trial court also awarded attorney fees to the respondents, which included the homeowner’s association and the owners of a neighboring property. The petitioning homeowner appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Parker v. Management & Marketing Concepts, Inc.
This is an appeal from an order denying a motion for summary judgment. Because the order does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Parker v. Staysail Properties, LLC
This is an appeal from an order denying a motion for default judgment. Because the order does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Will P. Cotten v. Elizabeth Austin Cotten
A mother appeals the trial court’s entry of a parenting plan that designates her and her former spouse joint primary residential parents and grants them equal residential parenting time. Because the parties did not agree to be joint primary residential parents, we modify the parenting plan to name the mother primary residential parent. Otherwise, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
JUSTIN TYLER HOBBS ET AL v. DON GRISSETTE ET AL
Because no final order has been entered in the underlying trial court proceedings, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
ROBERT F. CROSKERY ET AL. v. CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S OF LONDON
Because no final order has been entered in the underlying trial court proceedings, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
TRINITY CLARK, ET AL. v. LANCE BAKER
This appeal concerns Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(e), an ethics rule requiring that a division of fees between lawyers who are not in the same firm be agreed to by the client in writing. Trinity Clark (“Clark”) entered into a retainer agreement with attorney Troy Jones (“Jones”) on a 1/3 contingency fee. Jones brought Clark’s matter to attorney Lance Baker (“Baker”), who was not in a firm with Jones. Clark later entered an agreement with Baker on a 45% contingency fee. The Clark-Baker agreement provided, in writing, that Baker could associate other attorneys on the case, but that Clark’s overall fee obligation would not increase. The agreement neither identified any other attorneys nor specified how fees would be divided between them. After Clark’s case settled, Clark sued Baker in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”), alleging Baker’s fee was unreasonable. Jones joined the lawsuit, arguing he was entitled to a share of the fees (“Plaintiffs,” Jones and Clark collectively). Baker filed a motion for summary judgment. The Trial Court denied Baker’s motion, finding that both the Clark-Jones agreement and the Clark-Baker agreement were invalid for noncompliance with Rule 1.5(e). This interlocutory appeal followed. We find the Clark-Jones agreement invalid. However, with respect to the Clark-Baker agreement, we find that the entire arrangement and Clark’s assent thereto satisfied Rule 1.5(e). We reverse on this issue and find that the Clark-Baker agreement is not invalid for failure of compliance with Rule 1.5(e). We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
ELIZABETH KILLEN V. LINDA M. BOARDMAN
The defendant landowner appeals the trial court’s finding that the restrictive covenants applicable to her property prohibited the construction of a second residence. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Gerald Kiner v. Shelby County Government Public Records Department
Appellant asks this Court to order the trial court to remove certain allegedly disparaging comments from the trial transcript and two court orders. Appellant also asks this Court to issue a “letter of reprimand” to the trial judge for the allegedly disparaging comments. Due to the deficiencies in Appellant’s brief, and because we cannot grant Appellant the relief he seeks, we dismiss the appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mireille M. Lee v. The Vanderbilt University
This appeal arises from a complaint filed by a faculty member against The Vanderbilt University (“Vanderbilt”) after Vanderbilt rejected her applications for promotion and tenure during the academic years 2015-16 and 2018-19. The faculty member initially alleged one count each of gender discrimination, retaliation, and breach of contract but subsequently amended her complaint to omit the gender discrimination and retaliation claims. Concerning her breach of contract claim, the faculty member alleged that Vanderbilt had not followed its own policies and procedures for promotion and tenure when reviewing her tenure file and had shown bias against her, thus exhibiting a substantial departure from accepted academic norms and procedural regularity. After discovery, the parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The trial court adopted this Court’s deferential standard for reviewing promotion and tenure decisions by academic institutions as set forth in Figal v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. M2012-02516-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 5459021 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2013), and determined that Vanderbilt had not exhibited a substantial departure from accepted academic norms or procedural regularity in denying tenure to the faculty member. The trial court then determined that Vanderbilt had met its burden of negating an essential element of the breach of contract claim because the evidence was insufficient to establish that Vanderbilt had failed to follow its own tenure review process. The trial court further determined that the faculty member had failed to establish undisputed material facts that would entitle her to summary judgment. Accordingly, the trial court denied the faculty member’s motion for summary judgment, granted Vanderbilt’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the case with prejudice. The faculty member timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kelly D. Bush et al. v. Commerce Union Bank d/b/a Reliant Bank et al.
Over ten years ago, Commerce Union Bank, d/b/a Reliant Bank (“the Bank”) obtained a deficiency judgment for a property owned by Dr. Byron V. Bush and Kelly D. Bush (“Plaintiffs”) that Plaintiffs used to secure a loan. Since then, Plaintiffs have filed and lost four appeals related to this case. In March 2024, Plaintiffs filed a complaint for fraudulent breach of contract against the Bank; the late Devan D. Ard, Jr., the former Bank president; Rick Belote, Senior Vice President of the Bank; and William Ronald DeBerry (collectively, “Defendants”). Defendants filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11.03. The Chancery Court for Williamson County (“the Trial Court”) granted the motion, dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice, awarded Defendants attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in filing the motion, and imposed a screening mechanism on any future filings by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appeal. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Maria Bernabe Martinez v. Amy Bryant
The owner of a Pitbull mix canine appeals from the trial court’s denial of her motion to set aside the judgment entered in favor of the canine’s victim. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Cayla C.
The mother of the minor child at issue appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found that four grounds for termination had been proven and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the minor child’s best interest. Although we vacate the finding that the ground of persistence of conditions was established, we affirm the finding that three grounds for termination have been proven and that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the minor child’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Annie Douglas v. Geraldine Latimer et al.
Thirty-one days after entry of the trial court’s final order, Appellants filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rules 59.02 and 59.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellants subsequently filed a motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60.02, requesting that the court consider their untimely Rule 59 Motion due to their attorney’s excusable neglect or mistake. The basis for the alleged excusable neglect was Appellants’ counsel’s admitted calendaring error, which resulted in counsel filing the Rule 59 Motion one day late. Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied Appellants’ Rule 60.02 Motion, determining that the circumstances did not constitute excusable neglect. Upon review of the parties’ briefs and record on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Christina Sanders, as next of kin to Terry Lee Sanders, deceased v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
The appellant has filed a late notice of appeal together with a request to waive the late filing. Because the thirty-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal with the appellate court clerk is jurisdictional and cannot be waived, we deny the request to waive the late filing and dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Cannistra v. William Charles Brown
This matter involves an ongoing dispute between a landlord and a tenant in Pulaski, Tennessee. Following a detainer action in General Sessions Court over unpaid rent, the tenant, representing himself, filed the present case against the landlord, alleging numerous causes of action. The trial court dismissed all the tenant’s claims against the landlord, finding that the tenant erred in failing to join his claims in the original detainer action. The tenant, still representing himself on appeal, challenged the trial court’s dismissal of his claims. Due to the deficiencies in his brief, we conclude that he has waived consideration of any issues on appeal and hereby dismiss the appeal. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
Philip L. Lozano, III v. Charlotte R. Sappo et al.
A property owner sued his neighbors, claiming that he acquired title to a part of their land by adverse possession or, in the alternative, that he held a prescriptive easement. He asserted additional causes of action against one of the neighbors, including private nuisance, trespass to land, and forcible entry and detainer. The neighbors sought dismissal of the action via Tennessee Rule of Procedure 12.02(6) motions. The trial court dismissed the claims for adverse possession and prescriptive easement based on Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-2-110(a). It dismissed all other claims except for private nuisance based on deficiencies in the complaint. We vacate the dismissal of the prescriptive easement claim because facts warranting application of the statutory bar do not clearly appear on the face of the complaint. Because the appellant waived review of all other issues, we otherwise affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
SUSAN OAKES, ET AL. v. MARK A. FOX, M.D., ET AL.
This is a healthcare liability action against a surgeon and the hospital where the surgeon practiced. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants. We affirm. John W. McClarty, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. Michael Swiney, C.J., and Kristi M. Davis, J., joined. Ira M. Long, Jr., Chattanooga, Tennessee, and William Cameron, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Susan Oakes and Randy Oakes. Rachel Park Hurt, Devin P. Lyon, and Raymond Grant Lewallen, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Mark A. Fox, M.D. and Covenant Medical Group, Inc. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Alton Earl Ingram v. Lisa Marie Glode
The appellant filed an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of a recusal motion pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. However, the trial judge has presented this case to the presiding judge of his district, pursuant to local rule, for another judge to hear the matter by interchange. Thus, we determine that the appellant’s Rule 10B appeal is moot and dismiss the appeal. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals |
