COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

Jacqueline Payne v. Shelby County, Tennessee et al.
W2024-00641-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rhynette N. Hurd

This is an appeal from a trial court’s award of damages to the plaintiff after a bench trial in an auto accident case. The trial court declined to award the plaintiff all of the damages she sought because it concluded that her most significant injury, a torn rotator cuff, was not caused by the auto accident at issue. The plaintiff then filed a motion to recuse and to set aside the judgment due to a friendship between the trial judge’s son and counsel for the defendant, but the trial court denied the motion. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Tammy Hutson Boone v. Paul Dale Boone
M2024-00029-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Deana C. Hood

The main issues in this post-divorce appeal concern the trial court’s rulings on the parties’ requests for attorney’s fees. In addition to the post-divorce proceedings, the husband filed a declaratory judgment petition to determine the amount he owed the wife under the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“the MDA”). The husband and the wife then engaged in protracted litigation to determine the amount owed. The husband later amended the declaratory judgment petition to include a request to modify alimony. The parties resolved the declaratory judgment petition by providing the trial court with an amount upon which they agreed. The husband then voluntarily nonsuited the petition to modify alimony. Both parties sought an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the MDA. The trial court determined that the husband was the successful party in the declaratory judgment action and that there was no successful party in the request to modify alimony. The court declined to award either party attorney’s fees. The wife appealed, asserting that she was the successful party in both actions and that the court should have awarded her attorney’s fees to her. The wife also challenged discovery sanctions entered against her. First, we determine that the declaratory judgment action did not fall under the fee provision of the parties’ MDA. Therefore, the trial court erred in finding the husband to be the successful party in that action; we affirm the portion of the order declining to award either party attorney’s fees. Next, based upon a recent decision of our Supreme Court, we determine that the wife was the successful party in the petition to modify alimony and reverse the trial court’s decision to the contrary. We affirm the imposition of discovery sanctions.

Williamson Court of Appeals

Kristen Alice Rowe v. Calvin Albert Rowe, III
M2024-00114-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kathryn Olita

Following a bench trial in this divorce action, the trial court granted a divorce to the wife on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. The court entered a permanent parenting plan order, designating the wife as the primary residential parent to the parties’ four minor children and granting the husband 144 days of annual residential co-parenting time. In what the court found to be an equitable division of the marital estate, it awarded to the wife $303,260.00 in marital assets, which included the equity in and possession of the marital residence and her marital share of the husband’s military retirement. The husband received $274,097.10 in marital assets, which included the equity in and possession of an unimproved parcel of real property. The court directed that the wife would be responsible for the mortgage owed on the marital residence but also directed that the wife would not be required to refinance the mortgage debt until the youngest child had reached the age of eighteen years. Finding the wife to be the economically disadvantaged spouse and expressly finding that she was not voluntarily underemployed, the court awarded to her $5,000.00 monthly in transitional alimony for a period of six years, to be offset by her share of the husband’s military retirement benefits upon his retirement. However, the court specified that “[t]he amount of $5,000.00 is a global amount which shall include the child support obligation owed by [the husband].” Based on the child support guidelines, the court ordered the husband to pay $1,992.00 monthly in child support. The court further awarded to the wife $10,127.00 in reasonable attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. The husband has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment with the minor modification of an added provision stating that the wife will indemnify and hold the husband harmless for the mortgage debt on the marital residence until it is paid in full or refinanced. We also award to the wife her reasonable attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

Montgomery Court of Appeals

HG Jones, LLC v. Jordan Howell et al.
M2024-00654-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Darrell Scarlett

At issue is a purely legal question, the interpretation and application of “other insurance” clauses in two respective insurance policies that determine which policy provides primary coverage and which provides excess coverage to the property management company in the underlying premises liability action. HG Jones, LLC, d/b/a Real Property Management Solutions (“HG Jones”), is the manager of property owned by Jordan Howell (“Mr. Howell”). Both are defendants in the underlying premises liability action. HG Jones is the named insured under a Commercial General Liability Policy issued by Auto-Owners Insurance Company (“Auto-Owners”). Mr. Howell is the named insured in a Dwelling and Personal Property Coverage Policy issued by The Cincinnati Insurance Company (“Cincinnati”). In this action, HG Jones sought a declaration that Cincinnati had a duty to defend and indemnify HG Jones in the premises liability action as the primary insurer because HG Jones qualifies as an “insured” as that term is defined in the Cincinnati policy. For its part, Cincinnati claimed that its policy only provides excess coverage over HG Jones Auto-Owners’ policy based, inter alia, on the “other insurance” clauses in the two policies and the fact that HG Jones was not specifically listed as an “additional insured” under the Cincinnati policy. The parties filed competing motions for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court determined that there was no legal distinction between the terms “insured” and “additional insured” and HG Jones was an insured under the Cincinnati policy. Therefore, the court ruled that Cincinnati had the primary duty to defend and indemnify HG Jones in the premises liability action. Cincinnati appeals. We have determined that the “other insurance” clauses set forth in the two policies must be deemed void because they are mutually repugnant. Because HG Jones is the named insured under the Auto-Owners’ policy and HG Jones is an insured under the Cincinnati policy by virtue of the definition of an “insured” under that policy, both policies afford HG Jones primary coverage. Thus, the duty to defend and indemnify HG Jones in the premises liability action must be prorated between Cincinnati and Auto-Owners. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Rutherford Court of Appeals

The Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority d/b/a Erlanger Health System v. Division of TennCare, Department of Finance and Administration et al.
M2023-01619-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Anne C. Martin

A hospital system filed a declaratory judgment action in the Davidson County Chancery Court seeking invalidation of two TennCare State Plan Amendments on the basis that they violate Tennessee Code Annotated section 71-5-108. The two State Plan Amendments set forth reimbursement rates for emergency services provided to Tennessee’s Medicaid beneficiaries when the provider of those emergency services does not have a contract with the managed care organizations that insure the beneficiaries. The Davidson County Chancery Court declared that the TennCare State Plan Amendments were invalid and void ab initio. We affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

JANINE M LAMOTHE ET AL. v. DEER HILL VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION INC.
E2024-00465-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Elizabeth C. Asbury

Deer Hill Village Homeowners Association (“the HOA”) appeals from the order of the Chancery Court granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs Janine M. Lamothe and Matthew T. Davenport (hereinafter “Appellees”).  The underlying controversy is a request from Appellees, who own a condominium in Deer Hill Village, to inspect the HOA’s corporate records pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-66-102 et seq.  After subsequent filings from both parties, including multiple motions to enlarge time for discovery from the HOA, the Chancery Court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment.  The HOA timely appealed to this Court.  Having determined that the Chancery Court failed to state the legal and factual grounds on which it was granting summary judgment, we vacate the order at issue and remand for entry of an order that complies with Rule 56.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

Campbell Court of Appeals

The Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority v. Division of TennCare et al.
M2023-01350-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Anne C. Martin

A hospital system that was the aggrieved party in this contested case before The Division of TennCare, Department of Finance and Administration sought judicial review of the agency’s decision upholding the validity of two TennCare rules. The two rules regulate reimbursement rates for emergency services provided to Tennessee’s Medicaid beneficiaries when the provider of those emergency services does not have a contract with the managed care organizations that insure the beneficiaries. The Davidson County Chancery Court reversed the agency’s decision and held that the two rules were invalid and void ab initio. We affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

David L. Richman Et Al. v. Joshua Debity Et Al.
E2024-00919-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert Lowell Headrick

This is the parties’ second appeal before this Court in the above-styled case. In the first appeal, we remanded the case back to the trial court for entry of an order containing sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. After this Court’s mandate issued, however, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit. The defendants opposed the notice, but the trial court entered an order dismissing the plaintiffs’ action without prejudice. The defendants again appealed to this Court. Because the plaintiffs’ notice of voluntary nonsuit was untimely, and because the trial court’s action exceeds the scope of our instructions on remand, we vacate the trial court’s order and again remand this case to the trial court for entry of a sufficient order.

Blount Court of Appeals

IN RE EMORY S.
E2024-00628-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement JR.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor J. Eddie Lauderback

In this parental termination case, the father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child, Emory S. The trial court found that one ground for termination had been proven and that termination of his parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Based on these findings, the court terminated the father’s parental rights. We affirm.

Washington Court of Appeals

Ferguson Enterprises, LLC v. Norris Bros. Excavating, LLC et al.
M2024-00459-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Terry A. Fann

A contractor purchased construction materials from a supplier and then failed to pay for the materials. The supplier brought suit to recover payment and later filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the supplier’s motion. Finding no error, we affirm and remand the matter to calculate the supplier’s appellate attorney’s fees.

Rutherford Court of Appeals

STATE OF TENNESSEE, EX. REL. STACY PAZ v. BRET PROCISE
E2024-01653-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny W. Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Tom McFarland

The State of Tennessee, on behalf of Mother, brought suit against Father for retroactive and prospective child support. The trial court deviated from the Child Support Guidelines in setting Father’s retroactive child support, and he appeals. Because the trial court failed to make necessary findings of facts and conclusions of law to support its deviation from the guidelines, we cannot conduct a meaningful review. The trial court’s order is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

Loudon Court of Appeals

In Re Rinyah J.
W2024-01339-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Special Judge W. Ray Glasgow

In the Juvenile Court for Shelby County ("the Juvenile Court"), the Tennessee Department of Children's Services ("DCS") filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Rickey J. ("Father") and Anionetta J. ("Mother") to their child, Rinyah J. ("the Child"), who was born drug-exposed. After trial, the Juvenile Court found that Father had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody 9f the Child and that Mother had committed severe child abuse. It further found that termination of their parental rights was in the Child's best interest. Mother and Father appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Dustin Keith Gamble v. Madison Darlene Gamble
W2024-01001-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Tony Childress

This is an appeal from a divorce proceeding. The mother appeals, arguing, among other things, that the trial court failed to properly apply the statutory best interest factors when making its parenting plan determination. Because of the lack of findings in the final decree, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

Dyer Court of Appeals

Daniel H. Rader IV ex rel. Estate of Christine Joy Koczwara v. John Beasley
M2024-00069-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ronald Thurman

This is an action for abuse or neglect, exploitation, or theft of money or property of Christine Joy Koczwara during her life, as provided by Tennessee Code Annotated § 71- 6-120(b) of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act. The complaint seeks to recover assets as well as compensatory and punitive damages. After the defendant failed to file a timely responsive pleading to the complaint, the trial court entered a default judgment on the issue of liability. Prior to the trial on damages, the defendant moved to set aside the default judgment on the ground of excusable neglect. The claimed excuse was based on the contention that the defendant was the named executor and sole beneficiary under a purported 2020 will. The trial court rejected that argument because there was no pending will contest and the defendant had not filed a petition to admit the purported will to probate. The trial court also denied the motion to set aside upon the finding that the defendant’s failure to file a responsive pleading was willful. After a trial on damages, the court invalidated a quitclaim deed, ordered the return of personal property, and awarded $48,500 in compensatory damages and $97,000 in punitive damages against the defendant. The court also ordered the sale of the decedent’s real property. This appeal followed. We affirm in part and vacate in part.

Putnam Court of Appeals

EMILY ELIZABETH BUCKNER v. COMPLETE WELLNESS CHIROPRACTIC CENTER ET AL.
E2024-00698-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Michael Sharp

I write separately to concur with and in support of the majority opinion of the Court.
Although both the majority and dissenting opinions are correct that Plaintiff bore the initial
burden of establishing compliance with Section 121, I concur with the majority’s decision
to remand for an evidentiary hearing, given one defense counsel’s admission that his client
received a signed medical authorization. Martin v. Rolling Hills Hosp., LLC, 600 S.W.3d
322, 334 (Tenn. 2020).

Bradley Court of Appeals

EMILY ELIZABETH BUCKNER v. COMPLETE WELLNESS CHIROPRACTIC CENTER ET AL.
E2024-00698-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Michael Sharp

I respectfully dissent from the majority's reversal of the trial court's judgment dismissing Ms. Buckner's health care liability claims. Ms. Buckner failed to substantially comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) because she filed noncompliant medical authorizations and failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that the defendants were not prejudiced thereby.

Bradley Court of Appeals

EMILY ELIZABETH BUCKNER v. COMPLETE WELLNESS CHIROPRACTIC CENTER ET AL.
E2024-00698-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Michael Sharp

This healthcare liability case comes before the court on appeal from the trial court’s granting of a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The defendants asserted that the plaintiff failed to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121, part of Tennessee’s Health Care Liability Act. The trial court found that the plaintiff failed to establish that unsigned medical authorizations attached to the complaint were sufficient to satisfy the mandatory requirements of section 29-26-121 and dismissed the case. The plaintiff appealed. Upon our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Bradley Court of Appeals

Cassandra (Averitt) McGuire v. Brian Lewis
M2024-01242-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Craig S. Monsue

In this appeal from the trial court’s 2024 final order disposing of her untimely motion, Appellant fails to properly cite to the record or legal authority and offers no argument that does not stem from alleged errors in the trial court’s 2008 child custody modification or 2012 child support order. Because these procedural and substantive deficiencies prevent effective appellate review, this appeal is dismissed.

Dickson Court of Appeals

Alicia Franklin v. City of Memphis, Tennessee
W2023-01142-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary L. Wagner

A crime victim filed a tort action against a city under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, alleging police misconduct. Arguing that it was immune from liability for the alleged misconduct, the city moved to dismiss the complaint. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. We conclude that the city is immune from liability for the asserted negligence under the public duty doctrine and that the allegations in the complaint do not support application of the special duty exception. So we affirm the dismissal.

Shelby Court of Appeals

In Re Willow B.
M2024-01126-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ryan J. Moore

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights for abandonment by an incarcerated parent, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of his child. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Warren Court of Appeals

Leslie K. Jones v. Tennessee State University
M2024-01008-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor I'Ashea L. Myles

Leslie K. Jones (“Mr. Jones”), an at-will support staff employee of Tennessee State University (“TSU”), appeals the termination of his employment. His at-will employment agreement provided for fourteen days-notice prior to termination of his employment. When he received a termination notice on March 1, 2012, Mr. Jones filed a grievance. TSU responded advising Mr. Jones that he could not grieve his termination because he was terminated under the terms of his at-will employment agreement “without cause.” Following extensive delays and a declaratory judgment action in a related proceeding, TSU was ordered to afford Mr. Jones a grievance hearing pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-8- 117(a)(1). Following an evidentiary hearing, the Hearing Officer found that “[TSU] was not obligated to provide a reason for termination under the terms of the employment contract;” nevertheless, he found that good cause for his termination had been established. Therefore, the Hearing Officer ruled that his termination should be upheld. After TSU’s President upheld the Hearing Officer’s decision, Mr. Jones filed a petition seeking judicial review pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-322. The chancellor affirmed and dismissed the petition with prejudice. Mr. Jones appeals. On appeal, TSU insists that its compliance with the notice provision of the employment agreement is the substantial and material evidence needed to uphold the Hearing Officer’s ruling. We disagree. As this court explained in Lawrence v. Rawlins, No. M1997-00223-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 76266, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2001), “[w]hen the General Assembly enacted Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-8-117 in 1993, it modified the employment-will-relationship between the educational institutions in the . . . State University and Community College System [which includes TSU] and their ‘support staff.’” The statute requires these educational institutions to establish a grievance procedure for their support staff, which “must cover employee complaints relating to adverse employment actions[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-8- 117(b)(2)(A). Finding that Mr. Jones’s employment could only be terminated “for cause” or as part of “a bona fide reduction in force,” neither of which was the basis of Mr. Jones’s termination, we reverse the judgment of the chancery court and the Hearing Officer and remand with instructions for the Hearing Officer to, inter alia, ascertain the relief and benefits Mr. Jones is entitled to receive.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Mawule Tepe v. Connor McCarthy Blair Et Al.
E2025-00552-COA-T10B-CV
Dispositive Order
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael E. Jenne

Petitioner seeks accelerated review of the denial of his motion to recuse the trial judge in two separate cases. After a de novo review, we affirm.

Bradley Court of Appeals

Araceli Cordova et al. v. Nashville Ready Mix, Inc. et al.
M2024-00467-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Larry J. Wallace

This case concerns a dispute regarding attorney’s fees. Appellee is the next of kin of the attorney who represented Appellants for a period of time in the underlying wrongful death action. After Appellants terminated his representation, the attorney filed a notice of attorney’s lien. A few years later, while represented by their new counsel, Appellants settled their claims against the underlying defendants. While pursuing the attorney’s lien, the attorney died. Thereafter, the attorney’s estate was substituted as a party. In a previous appeal, we reviewed the trial court’s $133,333.33 attorney’s fee award to the attorney’s estate. We affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that Appellants owe the attorney’s estate fees and that the result the attorney obtained for Appellants was a $400,000.00 settlement offer. In the first appeal, we vacated the $133,333.33 attorney’s fee award and remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to make findings consistent with Rule 1.5(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct. Following remand, the attorney’s estate was closed, and Appellee sought to be substituted, individually, as a party to this action. The trial court allowed the substitution, over Appellants’ objections. Concerning the amount of attorney’s fees, the trial court referred the parties to a special master, who disregarded this Court’s prior opinion, wherein we affirmed that the “results obtained” by the deceased attorney was a $400,000.00 settlement offer. Rather, the special master concluded that the “results obtained” was a $450,000.00 settlement offer and awarded attorney’s fees of $150,000.00 based on that amount. The trial court adopted the special master’s findings. Although we affirm the trial court’s substitution of Appellee as a party, we vacate the award of $150,000.00 in attorney’s fees as this amount is in conflict with the law of the case, i.e., this Court’s previous conclusion that the results the attorney obtained was a $400,000.00 settlement offer.

Cheatham Court of Appeals

DAVID HEARING v. DAN E. ARMSTRONG ET AL.
E2023-01281-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor William Erwin Phillips II

Appellant, who pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree murder and is currently serving two life sentences, filed a complaint in the Hamblen County Chancery Court, alleging that he was not given proper credit for time served. Appellant specifically sought credit for the time he was confined in Texas while fighting his extradition to Tennessee. In his complaint, Appellant requested that the trial court compel the Defendants to enforce the judgments to give him credit for time served and further requested that the Defendants be found in contempt for failure to do so. The trial court dismissed Appellant’s complaint based on collateral estoppel, finding that the criminal court that entered the judgments previously denied Appellant’s request for pretrial jail credits. Appellant appeals the dismissal of his complaint. We conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; thus, we dismiss the appeal.

Hamblen Court of Appeals

NIKKI SIXX v. VANESSA MARIE HENSLEY (CLARK)
E2024-01019-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Gregory S. McMillan

This appeal arises from the trial court’s judgment finding the respondent guilty of forty-one counts of criminal contempt of court for violating an order of protection issued on February 23, 2024. The respondent timely appealed from the trial court’s order finding her in contempt. However, due to significant deficiencies in the respondent’s appellate brief, we conclude that she has waived consideration of all issues on appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

Knox Court of Appeals