James Collins vs. Summers Hrdwe & Supply Co. E2001-00578-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Thomas J. Seeley, Jr.
This is a suit by Plaintiffs James A. Collins and Gary Smith seeking damages from their former employer, Summers Hardware and Supply Company, in connection with their employment. The Plaintiffs contend that Summers Hardware made certain deductions from their pay which were contrary to their employment contract. Summers Hardware asserts otherwise. A jury found this issue in favor of the Plaintiffs and assessed damages, which the Trial Court, on motion of the Plaintiffs, altered upward. Summers Hardware appeals questioning whether the statute of limitations has run as to Mr. Collins' suit and whether both parties were estopped to press the claim or had waived their right to assert it. Summers Hardware also contends the Trial Court was in error in increasing the jury award without giving them the option of receiving a new trial. We affirm.
Washington
Court of Appeals
Alfred Earl Vincent vs. Cheryl Lynn Vincent E2000-02529-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Frank V. Williams, III
In this divorce case, the Trial Court awarded custody of the minor child to father and divided the parties' marital assets. The wife appealed and we affirm.
James Nelson s. Victoria Nelson E2000-02873-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Michael A. Davis
James Roger Nelson ("Husband") filed a Complaint for Absolute Divorce ("Complaint") against Victoria Kay Goad Nelson ("Wife"). Wife filed an Answer and a Counter-Complaint for divorce. Wife admitted to Husband she had been and still was involved in an extramarital affair with a co-worker. Before trial, Husband obtained a temporary restraining order against Wife, and Wife obtained an Order of Protection against Husband. Wife testified Husband had subjected her to verbal and physical abuse in front of their minor children. Wife also testified Husband had threatened her with a gun while their children were at home with them. The Trial Court granted both parties a divorce, divided the parties' property, and awarded custody of the children to Husband. The Trial Court based its custody decision upon Wife's extramarital affair and the fact that Husband, at the time of trial, had the more stable home environment. The Trial Court failed, however, to address Wife's allegations that she was abused by Husband. Wife appeals the custody award and portions of the Trial Court's property division. We vacate, in part, and affirm, in part, and remand.
Morgan
Court of Appeals
Gwen Lay vs. Mark Lay, et al E2000-02914-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: John D. Mcafee
In this case the second wife of Mark Lindsay Lay seeks an increase in child support for their child. Because an attack was made on the constitutionality of the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines, the Attorney General of the State was permitted to intervene. Although neither the former wife nor Mr. Lay appeals, the Attorney General does appeal. We vacate the judgment insofar as it addresses the constitutional issue before the Trial Court, and remand.
Campbell
Court of Appeals
State ex rel Mickey Phillips vs. Gwen Knox E2000-02988-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Ronald N. Murch
The Trial Court found Gwen Knox ("Knox") to be in civil contempt for failure to pay child support. This is the second appeal in this case. This Court, in State ex rel. Phillips v. Knox, No. E1999-00205-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 217936, at * 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2000), vacated and remanded the Trial Court's dismissal of Knox's Second Petition to Vacate and Modify the Trial Court's order finding that Knox was in contempt for failure to pay child support. On remand, the Trial Court denied Knox's petition, again holding, among other things, Knox in civil contempt but reducing Knox's incarceration time for contempt from thirty days to ten days and her purge amount from $1,000 to $100. Knox appeals. We reverse, in part, and affirm, in part.
Anderson
Court of Appeals
Thomas Wynns III vs. Rae Cummings W2000-02156-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Walter L. Evans
This case involves a dispute between Thomas Clinton Wynns, III ("Thomas") and Rae Ann Cummings ("Rae Ann"), the son and granddaughter of Mrs. Leola Wynns ("Leola"), concerning Leola's mental capacity and ability to manage her own affairs. Plaintiff, Thomas, holder of a power of attorney from his mother, filed a complaint against the defendant, Rae Ann, seeking to have Rae Ann turn over to him all of Leola's assets in possession of Rae Ann. Rae Ann filed an answer to the complaint and a petition for appointment of a conservator for Leola and for an injunction against Thomas from removing any more of her assets. After a nonjury trial, the trial court found that the court had jurisdiction to appoint a conservator for Leola; that the facts warranted the appointment of a conservator; that the power of attorney held by Thomas and a will executed by Leola in 1998 were void, and that the quit claim deed executed on April 22, 1999, in favor of Thomas, was also void. Thomas appeals. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
James Ray vs. Billy Williams W2000-03000-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
This case involves the doctrine of promissory fraud. The plaintiff service station owner claimed that the defendant rental trailer company fraudulently induced him into entering into a contract to operate a rental trailer dealership by orally assuring him that his dealership rights would be exclusive in Ripley, Tennessee. At the bench trial below, the trial court admitted parol evidence of the oral assurances to show fraud in the inducement of the dealership contract. Based on that evidence, the trial court held that the rental trailer company had committed promissory fraud and awarded damages to the plaintiff service station owner. The rental trailer company now appeals. We affirm the finding of promissory fraud, but reverse in part the damage award.
Lauderdale
Court of Appeals
Guy Varnadoe vs. Shelton McGhee Jr. W2001-00075-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.
This appeal arises from a breach of contract claim brought by the Appellee against the Appellants in the Chancery Court of Shelby County. The trial court entered a consent order, referring the case to a special master. Pursuant to the consent order, the trial court directed the special master to conduct an investigation and report his findings to the trial court. The special master conducted an investigation and submitted his report to the trial court. The special master concluded that the Appellee was entitled to full payment under the contract but that the Appellants were entitled to a set-off. The trial court entered a judgment in the Appellee's favor and gave the Appellants a set-off. The trial court ordered that the fees approved by the special master be divided equally between the Appellants and the Appellee.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Richard Crowe vs. First American W2001-00800-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
Owner of a pickup truck sued the bank that financed the purchase for conversion after the bank repossessed the truck. The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $250,000.00. Bank appeals. We affirm in part reverse in part and remand.
McNairy
Court of Appeals
Scarlett/Patrick Spencer vs. James Aydlotte W2001-00995-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: George R. Ellis
This is a suit for the termination of parental rights. The Appellants filed a petition in the Chancery Court of Gibson County to terminate the Appellee's parental rights to his child. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the Appellants' petition. The Appellants appeal the trial court's order denying the Appellants' petition to terminate the Appellee's parental rights. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court's decision.
Gibson
Court of Appeals
CH-00-1207-2 CH-00-1207-2
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
State v. Mark Doolen M2000-01953-COA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace
A thirteen-year-old boy was convicted of vandalism in juvenile court, and was ordered to pay restitution of over $6,600. He claimed that the amount of restitution was excessive, and appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the juvenile court's determination. We affirm the order of restitution, but modify the amount, for the reasons set out below.
Dickson
Court of Appeals
Myron Hubbard vs. Sandi Hubbard E2001-00110-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: W. Dale Young
The Trial Court granted appellee Judgement before the 30 days to answer process provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure had expired. On appeal, we vacate and remand.
Blount
Court of Appeals
Rouse Construction Co. vs. Interstate Steel Corp. E2001-00242-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Sharon J. Bell
This is a case wherein the Plaintiff/Appellant, Rouse Construction Company, seeks damages for breach of contract from the Defendant/Appellee, Interstate Steel Corporation. The Chancellor found that there was no meeting of minds between the parties as to essential contract terms and, therefore, ordered that Rouse's claim be denied. The Chancellor further determined that Interstate should be allowed a judgment in the amount of $19,090.00 for materials and plans delivered to Rouse. We concur in the determination of the Chancellor and affirm.
Carl O. Koella, Jr. vs. Fred McHargue, et ux E2001-00544-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: C. K. Smith
Defendants have right of first refusal on tract of real property. The Trial Court held that the giving of a quitclaim deed did not trigger the right of first refusal. Defendants appealed, we affirm.
Blount
Court of Appeals
Linda Greene vs. Dr. Woody Stinson E2001-00628-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: William M. Dender
Jefferson
Court of Appeals
Linda Greene vs. Dr. Woody Stinson E2001-00628-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: William M. Dender
Jefferson
Court of Appeals
Paul Seaton, et al vs. Richard Rowe, et al E2000-02304-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: John B. Hagler, Jr.
Monroe County -This is an action for specific performance of an option agreement for the sale of some farmland acreage, from which a 60-acre tract was excepted. The trial court dismissed the action, holding that the option agreement did not satisfy the statute of frauds because the description of the excepted property was inadequate and that the deficiency could not be remedied by parol evidence. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a motion to "reopen the proof" to introduce evidence to support reformation of the description of the excepted property. The motion was denied. The plaintiffs appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) finding that the option agreement did not satisfy the statute of frauds; (2) refusing to consider parol evidence of the location of the excepted property; and (3) refusing to "reopen the proof" on the issue of reformation. The defendants argue that the appeal is frivolous. We find that the option agreement is sufficiently definite to satisfy the statute of frauds and that parol evidence should have been admitted to locate the excepted property. We therefore vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Monroe
Court of Appeals
Denise Frazier vs. Robert Frazier E2000-02929-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Sharon J. Bell
Appellant ask the Court to void portions of the marital settlement agreement incorporated in the parties' Divorce Decree in the State of Illinois. The Trial Court refused and granted appellee summary judgment. We affirm.
Knox
Court of Appeals
New Covenant Baptist Church vs. Panther Sark E2000-02930-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Thomas R. Frierson, II
In this suit New Covenant Baptist Church seeks a declaration that certain restrictions applicable to Technology Park West subdivision do not preclude New Covenant from using one of the lots for driveway purposes to other unrestricted property owned by New Covenant outside the subdivision. Panther Sark, a partnership, and certain other owners of lots in the subdivision were named as Defendants and they filed a counter-complaint seeking a declaration to the contrary. The Trial Court found in favor of New Covenant. We reverse and hold in favor of the partnership and other owners of lots in the subdivision.
Knox
Court of Appeals
Lonnie Wilder vs. Leslie Wilder E2000-03184-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: John D. Mcafee
In this divorce case, the Trial Court awarded husband attorney's fees against wife. On appeal, we reverse.
Claiborne
Court of Appeals
Southwest Williamson County Community Assoc. et al vs. Bruce Saltsman M2001-00943-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: J. Russ Heldman
Being dissatisfied with the State's concept of, and planning for, the extension of State Route 840 through southwest Williamson County, three residents in the County, two nonprofit corporations, and a partnership that owns property in the County, sued J. Bruce Saltsman, Sr. ("the Commissioner"), in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Transportation ("TDOT"). Following a bench trial, the court below entered a final judgment including (1) a writ of mandamus ordering the Commissioner to perform a number of "duties" in connection with Route 840; and (2) a permanent injunction enjoining him from moving forward with the planning and construction of Route 840 through Williamson County until he complies with the trial court's order. The Commissioner appeals. In addition to other bases for reversal, he asserts that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction of this controversy. We agree with the appellant that the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment below in its entirety and dismiss the petition.
