Shawn Farien vs. Regina Farien W2000-00656-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey
This is a child custody case. The parties and their minor child lived in Tennessee with the father's parents. The mother moved to Georgia with the child to live with her parents. Custody was awarded to the mother, and the father was granted broad visitation rights. The father appeals. We affirm, finding that the custody award is based in large part on the trial court's determinations of credibility and assessment of the parties' demeanor, and finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the award of custody to the mother.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Shawn Farien vs. Regina Farien W2000-00656-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey
This is a child custody case. The parties and their minor child lived in Tennessee with the father's parents. The mother moved to Georgia with the child to live with her parents. Custody was awarded to the mother, and the father was granted broad visitation rights. The father appeals. We affirm, finding that the custody award is based in large part on the trial court's determinations of credibility and assessment of the parties' demeanor, and finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the award of custody to the mother.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Lorrie Barnes vs. Richard Barnes W2000-01285-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Don H. Allen
Father filed a petition for change of custody of the parties' three minor children. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that there had been a material change of circumstances and that a change of custody to Father was in the best interest of the children. Mother has appealed. We affirm.
Madison
Court of Appeals
Jeffrey Ward vs. Valarie Ward W2000-01081-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: George R. Ellis
This appeal arises from a change of child custody action. Mother was awarded custody of Child pursuant to a marital dissolution agreement. Thereafter, Mother had sexual relations with a minor. This relationship led to an assault on minor by a third party in the presence of Child. This assault revealed the relationship of Mother and minor to the minor's parents. Pursuant to a deal with the minor's parents, Mother was forced to relocate to another state. When Father discovered the circumstances surrounding this relationship, he petitioned for a change of custody on the basis that Mother had exposed Child to criminal activity. In addition, Father cited Mother's refusal to grant him visitation and charged that she was improperly caring for Child. The trial court found a material change of circumstances requiring a comparison of the fitness of the parents. The court found Father more fit and granted a change of custody. We affirm.
Crockett
Court of Appeals
Phillip Page vs. Lucille Page W2000-01314-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
William Wilson vs. Patricia Wilson W2000-01384-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Childers
This is a divorce case in which alimony is in dispute. At trial, the parties stipulated to the grounds for divorce, and the issue of fault was not considered. The trial court awarded the wife alimony in solido of $750 per month until she reached the age of sixty, and specified that it was non-modifiable upon the wife's death or remarriage. The husband appeals. On appeal, we affirm the trial court's decision awarding the wife alimony in solido, and modify the amount to $500 per month until she reaches the age of sixty.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Phillip Page vs. Lucille Page W2000-01314-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
William Fann vs. Annette Fann W2000-02431-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Ron E. Harmon
Husband sued for divorce, alleging inappropriate marital conduct. Wife filed an answer and counter-complaint, but later dismissed the counter-complaint and chose to contest the divorce. Trial court granted divorce to husband. Wife appeals, alleging that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the divorce on grounds of inappropriate marital conduct without evidence to corroborate husband's allegations and that husband had failed to carry his burden of proving cruel and inhuman treatment. We affirm.
Gary Willingham vs. Gallatin Group, Inc., et al M1998-00990-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray
This appeal involves a dispute between a secured creditor and two local governments regarding the priority of their claims against the proceeds from the sale of the assets of a judicially dissolved corporation. Following a bench trial, the Chancery Court for Sumner County held that the local governments' claims for delinquent business taxes had priority over the claim of the secured creditor. We have determined that the secured creditor's claim should have been given priority over the local governments' claims and, therefore, reverse the judgment.
State ex rel Debbie Whitfield vs. Michael Honeycutt M1999-00914-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Carol A. Catalano
Appellant, who was married to the mother at the time of the child's birth, responded to a petition for contempt regarding past due child support with a request to determine paternity of the child. A paternity test is irrelevant in this case because even proof that he is not the child's father would not be a defense to contempt for failure to comply with a valid court order. We affirm the trial court's denial of the request.
Robertson
Court of Appeals
Ernest Frye vs. Blue Ridge Neuroscience Center, et al E2000-02155-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: John S. Mclellan, III
Plaintiff sued Defendants on November 25, 1998, alleging medical malpractice. Summonses were issued but never served on Defendants or returned to the court. Process was never reissued on the first Complaint. A voluntary nonsuit was entered by the Trial Court on June 8, 1999. On November 22, 1999, Plaintiff refiled a similar lawsuit, process issued, and Defendants were served the next day. Defendants filed summary judgment motions claiming that the statute of limitations had run because Plaintiff failed to have process reissued on the first Complaint as required by Rule 3 of the Tenn. R. Civ. P. Plaintiff claimed compliance with Rule 3, and, therefore, that the second lawsuit was filed within the statute of limitations. The Trial Court denied the summary judgment motions after determining that Defendants had actual notice of the first lawsuit and thus the spirit of the rules had been complied with. The Trial Court granted Defendants' request for an interlocutory appeal. We granted this interlocutory appeal to decide whether Plaintiff can comply with Rule 3 of the Tenn. R. Civ. P. not by obtaining issuance of new process in his original lawsuit within the one year period provided for in Rule 3, but instead by voluntarily dismissing the first lawsuit and refiling a similar lawsuit with the issuance of process in the second lawsuit within the one year period. Our answer is "no." We reverse the decision of the Trial Court.
Sullivan
Court of Appeals
Cynthia Coppage vs. Grady Coppage E2000-01630-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: L. Marie Williams
At issue in this divorce case is the trial court's valuation and division of two parcels of real property and the court's decree with respect to the parties' credit card debt. The husband appeals, arguing that the trial court erred (1) in its valuation and division of the two properties; and (2) in denying his post-trial motion to sell the two parcels and divide the proceeds equally. The wife asserts as an additional issue that the husband should be required to place in his sole name the credit card debt assigned to him by the trial court. We find and hold that the wife's request is a reasonable one, and, accordingly, modify the trial court's judgment so as to require the husband to convert the debt over into his name by no later than December 31, 2001. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
Debra Cissom, et al vs. Al Miller, et al E1999-02767-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Jerri S. Bryant
The Plaintiffs sue the Defendants, alleging a nuisance created by chicken houses owned and operated by them in close proximity of the Defendants' property. The Trial Court found a temporary nuisance was created and that, although T.C.A. 44-18-102 was a complete bar to any claims the Plaintiffs might have insofar as three older chicken houses were concerned, is not a bar to their claim as to five new chicken houses. We affirm.
Bradley
Court of Appeals
Ernest F. Phillips vs. County of Anderson, et al E2000-01204-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: William E. Lantrip
The defendants, Anderson County and the City of Clinton, entered into an agreement to jointly finance the development of an industrial park to be owned and operated by the City. The plaintiff, Ernest F. Phillips, brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the County's financing of a portion of the industrial park is illegal and unconstitutional and that the defendants violated various statutory requirements for the development of industrial parks. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment. The plaintiff appeals, arguing: (1) that the County's use of bond proceeds to finance its portion of the industrial park's infrastructure costs constitutes a lending or giving of credit to or in aid of a corporation within the meaning of Article II, Section 29 of the Tennessee Constitution; (2) that the agreement between the County and the City is not legally sufficient under the Industrial Park Act; (3) that the County obtained a statutorily-required certificate of public purpose and necessity by fraud and misrepresentation; and (4) that the County's bond resolutions are fatally defective and call for prohibited expenditures. The City argues (a) that the plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the City's actions and (b) that the plaintiff's appeal is frivolous. We affirm the grant of summary judgment to the defendants but do not find the plaintiff's appeal to be frivolous.
Anderson
Court of Appeals
Jonathan Wilson vs. Sandra Wilson E2000-01374-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: William H. Russell
This appeal from the Loudon County General Sessions Court questions whether the Trial Court erred in awarding a change of residential custody from Appellant, Sandra Kay Wilson to Appellee, Jonathan David Wilson. Ms. Wilson appeals the decision of the General Sessions Court. We affirm the decision of the Trial Court and remand for such further proceedings, if any, consistent with this opinion. We adjudge costs of the appeal against the Appellant, Ms. Sandra Kay Wilson and her surety.
Loudon
Court of Appeals
Bobby Everett, et al vs. Gordon McCall, M.D. E2000-02012-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: W. Dale Young
The complaint in this medical malpractice case was dismissed on motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff filed a Rule 56.07 Response to the motion, requesting additional time within which to take the defendant's deposition for the purpose, inter alia, of ascertaining his thought processes during the 27-day period he treated the plaintiff for a gastroenterological condition which ended in her death. The request for additional time was denied, and the motion for summary judgment was granted because the affidavit of the defendant was not countervailed. The judgment is reversed.
Blount
Court of Appeals
Donna Winstead, et al v.Claiborne County Hospital and Nursing Home E2000-02214-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Conrad E. Troutman, Jr.
In this wrongful death action, the Trial Court held that defendant's nurses met the standard of care required of them in the treatment and care of the deceased, and dismissed the case. On appeal, we reverse and enter Judgment for damages.
Claiborne
Court of Appeals
Terry Hahn vs. Thomas Hahn, et al E2000-00330-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Telford E. Forgerty, Jr.
An intra-family business transaction which occurred nearly 30 years ago fomented this litigation involving an undisclosed interest in a hotel in Gatlinburg. The original parties are former spouses; the intervenors are their children. The complaint was dismissed on motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
Knox
Court of Appeals
Melanie Conger vs. Timothy Gowder, M.D. E2000-01584-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.
In this medical malpractice case arising out of surgery, the trial court granted the defendant summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims of surgical negligence and lack of informed consent. The plaintiff appeals, arguing (1) that disputed issues of material fact exist that make summary judgment inappropriate and (2) that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the plaintiff to take the depositions of the defendant and another physician pending a hearing on the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Because we find that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the plaintiff to take the subject depositions, we vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Anderson
Court of Appeals
City of Church Hill vs. Patrick Reynolds, III E2000-01376-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: John K. Wilson
Patrick H. Reynolds, III ("Defendant") was issued a Misdemeanor Citation alleging violations of multiple city ordinances of the City of Church Hill ("Plaintiff") over a one-month period. Defendant was found guilty in the Church Hill City Court of violating these ordinances. Defendant appealed to the Hawkins County Circuit Court which likewise found the Defendant guilty of violating the ordinances. The Circuit Court, however, found Defendant guilty of several violations on days for which the Defendant was tried by the City Court with no finding of guilt by the City Court. Because Defendant cannot be placed in double jeopardy for violations of these municipal ordinances, we reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court finding Defendant guilty for violations on days for which Defendant was tried by the City Court with no finding of guilt made by the City Court. We affirm the Circuit Court's determination with regard to the remaining violations.
