SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

Dotson vs. Blake, et al
W1998-00710-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: William B. Acree
This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Weakley County, which refused to permit the jury in a personal injury case to allocate fault to tortfeasors who successfully asserted a statute of repose defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. We granted review to decide whether fault may be attributed to tortfeasors who cannot be held liable because of a statute of repose. After examining the record, considering the arguments of the parties, and analyzing the applicable law, we conclude that the courts below erred in not allowing fault to be assigned to the tortfeasors who successfully asserted a statute of repose to the claims against them. Accordingly, for the reasons explained hereafter, the lower courts are reversed.

State vs. Dimarko Bojere Williams
M1997-00113-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Jim T. Hamilton
Dimarko Bojere Williams was convicted of second degree murder and was sentenced to the Department of Correction for twenty-five years. Williams appealed, contending, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for second degree murder because he and the victim had been engaged in "mutual combat" at the time of the killing. In cases in which a victim is killed during mutual combat, he asserted, the defendant may be convicted of voluntary manslaughter only. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction for second degree murder but modified Williams's sentence on other grounds. We hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for second degree murder. In so doing, we reject the defendant's contention that a killing which occurs during mutual combat is, as a matter of law, voluntary manslaughter. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is, therefore, affirmed.

State vs. Henry
M1995-00005-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman
We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in admitting statements made by the co-defendant following the arrest of the defendant and the co-defendant for first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder and related offenses. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that although the conspiracy to commit the offenses had ended, the co-defendant's statements were made during the course of and in furtherance of a separate conspiracy to conceal the offenses and were admissible pursuant to the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule set out in Tenn. R. Evid. 803(1.2)(E). After reviewing the record, we conclude that the co-defendant's statements were made after the conspiracy had ended and, therefore, were not admissible under Tenn. R. Evid. 803(1.2)(E). We further conclude, however, that the error was harmless, and we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Martin, et al vs. Coleman
E1998-00739-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: John A. Turnbull

ATS Southeast, Inc., et al vs. Carrier Corp.
M1999-02658-SC-R23-CQ
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Aleta A. Trauger

State vs. West
E1997-00166-SC-R11-PD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: John K. Byers

Yvonne McCann, et al., v. Glen Hatchett, et al.
W1998-00808-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor D. J. Alissandratos

In this workers’ compensation case the sole issue is whether the death of a traveling employee by
drowning is compensable as arising out of and in the course of employment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer. We granted the employer’s motion for review filed pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(5)(1999) and have determined that the employee’s death may have arisen out of and in the course of the employment. It results that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer is error, and the cause is remanded.

State of Tennessee v. Roy D. Nelson
E1997-00021-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lynn W. Brown

This is an appeal from the Criminal Court for Washington County which convicted the
defendant of aggravated arson. The defendant appealed and argued that the aggravated arson statute applies only when an individual other than the arsonist sustains serious bodily injuries. Accordingly, because he was the individual who sustained serious bodily injuries, the defendant contended that the aggravated arson statute was inapplicable. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and we granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal. We hold that where a defendant sustains serious bodily injuries as the result of an arson he or she committed, that defendant may be convicted of aggravated arson pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39- 14-302(a)(2) (1997). Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Donald E. Griffin v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Company
M1997-00042-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. McCoy

The appellant, Donald E. Griffin, brought suit seeking damages for injuries he sustained when his vehicle was struck from the rear in Maury County by a car driven by Richard Vaughn. After obtaining a judgment against Vaughn in the amount of $225,000, Griffin learned that Vaughn had only $50,000 of liability insurance coverage. Griffin then requested that his uninsured motorist carrier, the appellee Shelter Mutual Insurance Company (“Shelter”), pay the remainder of the judgment up to its policy limit of $100,000. When Shelter refused the claim, Griffin brought this action against Shelter in the Chancery Court for Davidson County. The Chancellor granted summary judgment to Shelter, finding that Griffin had failed to comply with the notice provisions of the insurance policy and with the service provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1206(a). The Court of Appeals agreed that Griffin had failed to comply with the service provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1206(a) and thus affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Shelter. This Court thereafter granted Griffin’s application for permission to appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed DROWOTA, J.,

Kenneth L. Storey v. Randall E. Nichols, et al.
E1998-00851-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor David H. Cate

The dispositive issue in this case is whether an appeal as of right from a trial court’s judgment in an attorney-disciplinary proceeding initiated pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 23-3-201–2041 lies in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court. Because we hold that jurisdiction over an appeal as of right in a statutory disciplinary proceeding lies in the Court of Appeals, we reverse the intermediate appellate court’s order transferring the case to the Supreme Court, and we transfer the case to the Court of Appeals for its review on the merits. Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Transfer Order of the Court of Appeals Reversed; Case Transferred to Court of Appeals
 

Brown vs. Bd. of Professional Responsibility
E1999-02636-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Howell N. Peoples

Lavin vs. Jordon
M1997-00259-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Barbara N. Haynes

Lavin vs. Jordon
M1997-00259-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Barbara N. Haynes

Crabtree vs. Crabtree
M1997-00262-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Muriel Robinson

State et al vs. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. et al vs. Gregory Bennett Perry and Steve Lloyd Champion, et al
M1999-00455-SC-R11-CV
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy

State vs. Carter
W1997-00248-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood

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X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

State vs. Keen
W1997-00147-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: John P. Colton, Jr.

State vs. Keen
W1997-00147-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: John P. Colton, Jr.

Maestas vs. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc.
W1998-01907-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.
The plaintiffs alleged that defendants' products, surgically implanted in their backs, were defective. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants on grounds that the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiffs appealed, contending that: 1) genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the "discovery rule"; and 2) under the doctrine of "cross-jurisdictional tolling," the statute of limitations was tolled during the period in which the plaintiffs sought class certification in a class action filed in federal court. We decline to adopt the doctrine of cross-jurisdictional tolling. As the plaintiffs have conceded a "universal date of discovery" that is outside the applicable statute of limitations, our rejection of cross-jurisdictional tolling renders the plaintiffs' claims time-barred. Accordingly, we need not address the "discovery rule" issue raised by plaintiffs. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment, is hereby affirmed.

State vs. Culbreath, et al
W1999-01553-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: L. Terry Lafferty

State vs. Chalmers
W1997-00174-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Carolyn Wade Blackett

State vs. Chalmers
W1997-00174-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Carolyn Wade Blackett

State vs. Beauregard
W1997-00060-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
In this appeal, we consider whether the constitutional principle of either double jeopardy or due process is violated and therefore bars separate convictions for both rape and incest when the offenses arise from a single act committed against the same victim. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the defendant's convictions for rape and incest. After our review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the separate convictions for rape and incest did not violate double jeopardy principles under the United States or Tennessee Constitutions because the offenses require different elements, different evidence, and have different purposes. We also conclude that the convictions for rape and incest did not violate due process under the United States or Tennessee Constitutions because neither offense was "essentially incidental" to the other. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Lipscomb vs. Doe
W1997-00132-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey