Hon. Frank v. Williams,

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In March 1995, the plaintiff in this case brought suit against Superior Steel, Inc. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ("the defendants") and the Second Injury Fund1 claiming that he was entitled to recover workers' compensation benefits for two work related injuries: a knee injury and an occupational disease. First, the trial judge found that the plaintiff had sustained a ten percent permanent partial disability to his right leg. Second, the trial judge found that the plaintiff was 1 percent permanently and totally disabled as a result of a chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder which he classified as an occupational disease because the plaintiff's condition was exacerbated by breathing diesel fumes during his employment with the defendant. The trial judge merged the two injuries and thereby awarded the plaintiff 1 percent disability benefits. The defendants appeal the trial court's findings regarding the plaintiff's occupational disease, contending that the trial judge erred (1) in ruling that the statute of limitations had not expired, (2) in ruling that notice had been properly given, and (3) in finding that the plaintiff's condition was an occupational disease which arose out of and in the course of his employment with the defendant. The defendants do not appeal the trial court's findings of disability to the plaintiff's leg, but a brief reference to the knee injury is necessary for a proper discussion of the facts. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. BACKGROUND The plaintiff, 48 years of age, worked as an oiler and crane operator for most of his working life -- approximately 28 years. For almost 32 years of his life, the plaintiff smoked two packs of cigarettes per day. The plaintiff quit smoking in June 1992. 1 The trial judge dismissed the Second Injury Fund from this case and we find the dismissal was proper. By reason of Tenn. Code. Ann. __ 5-6-28(a) and (b), the Second Injury Fund is not liable to the plaintiff. 2