State of Tennessee v. Douglas E. Linville
A jury convicted the Defendant, Douglas E. Linville, of possession of 0.5 grams or less of methamphetamine with intent to deliver in a drug-free zone, possession of Oxycodone with intent to deliver in a drug-free zone, possession of Xanax with intent to deliver in a drug free zone, simple possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He received an effective twelve-year sentence. The Defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court committed plain error by allowing a witness to testify about information the trial court previously ruled inadmissible. We affirm the trial court’s judgments, and we remand to the trial court for correction of the judgment form in count three in accordance with this opinion. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Weylin Trent Strode
The Defendant, Weylin Trent Strode, appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that his plea should not be allowed to stand due to uncertainties regarding his mental competency at the time of the plea. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court denying the motion. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jennifer Murray Jewell
The Defendant, Jennifer Murray Jewell, appeals the trial court’s order revoking her ten-year probationary sentence for theft of property valued at more than $60,000 but less than $100,000 after determining that she violated the conditions of her probation by committing a new theft. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that the evidence was sufficient to support her probation revocation and when it ordered her to serve her original sentence in confinement without making “explicit findings about the efficacy of a probationary term with modified conditions.” After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Phillip Burgess v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Phillip Matthew Burgess, appeals as of right from the Marshall County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donnie Bridges
The Appellant, Donnie Bridges, was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of driving under the influence (DUI) per se, third offense, a Class A misdemeanor; simple possession of cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor; and driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days for DUI to be served as 120 days in jail followed by supervised probation; eleven months, twenty-nine days for simple possession to be served on supervised probation consecutive to the DUI sentence; and six months for violating the driver’s license law to be served on supervised probation concurrently with the DUI sentence. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the presentment or suppress his blood test results because the State failed to preserve his blood sample, that the trial court committed plain error by admitting the results of his blood test into evidence because the State failed to establish a chain of custody for his blood sample, and that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of DUI per se, third offense, and driving on a revoked license. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Pryority Partnership v. AMT Properties, LLC, Et Al.
In this action involving a commercial lease, the trial court granted judgment in favor of the lessee, determining that the lessor had materially breached the lease. The court further determined that the lessor was liable for negligent misrepresentation, due to its misrepresentations concerning the condition of the roof on the leased building and its intent to repair the roof, and constructive eviction, due to its failure to timely repair the building and render it tenantable. The court awarded compensatory damages to the lessee in the amount of $193,006.35 as well as attorney’s fees in the amount of $69,002.68. The lessor has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In re Isabella S., et al.
This appeal concerns a disposition in a dependency and neglect case. Leslie S. (“Mother”) is the mother of the subject minor children Isabella S., Macie S., and Gabriel S. (“the Children,” collectively). The Children’s maternal grandparents Sheila W. and Richard W. (“Grandparents”) filed a petition for dependency and neglect in the Juvenile Court for Williamson County (“the Juvenile Court”). The Juvenile Court adjudicated the Children dependent and neglected. In the disposition phase, the Juvenile Court awarded Grandparents permanent guardianship of the Children, with Mother to exercise only supervised visitation. Mother appealed to the Circuit Court for Williamson County (“the Circuit Court”), which reached the same result. Mother now appeals to this Court, arguing that the Children should be returned to her custody or, alternatively, that her visits be unsupervised. The Circuit Court found, among other things, that Mother’s fiancé Allen M. (“Fiancé”) had engaged in sexually predatory behavior, and that Mother was in denial about the threat Fiancé posed to the Children. The evidence does not preponderate against that or the Circuit Court’s other factual findings. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Vera Elaine Clark v. City of Mount Juliet
The plaintiff commenced this action by alleging that the City of Mount Juliet failed to adequately light a public park and neglected to make the park safe for walking at night, conditions which caused her to fall and sustain severe personal injuries. The City responded by filing a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss, claiming it was immune from suit under the Governmental Tort Liability Act. Following numerous filings by the plaintiff in opposition to the motion and after a hearing, the court granted the motion on the basis that the complaint did not plead facts sufficient to remove immunity from the City. Therefore, the court dismissed all claims. This appeal followed. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Kelly L. Phelps v. State of Tennessee
Plaintiff Kelly Phelps brought this action for sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation under the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”) against her employer, the State of Tennessee. Plaintiff worked as a server at the restaurant at Paris Landing State Park (“the park”). She alleged that Josh Walsh, the assistant park manager who was described as “second in command” at the park, sexually assaulted her at an “after-party” on State property that immediately followed a Halloween party hosted by the park at the restaurant and inn. She further alleged that after she reported the incident, Defendant, among other retaliatory actions, allowed Walsh to continue working around her at the park as usual, and to continue harassing and threatening her. Following extensive discovery, Defendant moved for summary judgment. The trial court found that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Walsh was Plaintiff’s supervisor; whether he “sexually harassed women at Paris Landing State Park prior to the Halloween party” and Defendant was aware of it; and whether “a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Mr. Walsh’s action in grabbing [Plaintiff] by the neck and thrusting his body against her in a sexual manner was ‘extremely serious’ and sufficient to impose liability on the Defendant.” However, the trial court granted summary judgment to Defendant because it found that the sexual assault did not occur “in the workplace.” Regarding the retaliation claim, the trial court held that Plaintiff did not establish that Defendant took a “materially adverse action” against her after she reported the assault. We hold that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the alleged harassment and discrimination affected a term, condition, or privilege of Plaintiff’s employment, and whether Defendant unlawfully retaliated against her. We vacate the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kim Renae Nelson v. Loring E. Justice
This appeal concerns the trial court’s entry of judgment on an appeal bond for attorney fees. We affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
State, ex rel., Tynesha April Dior Moody v. Damond Julian Roker
Mother filed a petition under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, seeking establishment of paternity and a child support order against Father, who is incarcerated. The State of Tennessee is acting on Mother’s behalf, and Father is acting pro se. Father filed multiple pretrial motions in the trial court, which the trial court did not rule on before the trial on Mother’s petition. Additionally, the trial court’s order fails to comply with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and is apparently not based on any properly admitted evidence. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for a new trial. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Sheila Renee Grissette v. Don Edwin Grissette
Upon a review of the record, we have determined that the notice of appeal was not timely filed in accordance with Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) entered its judgment on November 15, 2019. Both parties timely filed motions to alter or amend pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.01. The Trial Court entered its order addressing the motions to alter or amend on February 21, 2020. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Christopher Schubert
A jury convicted the Defendant, John Christopher Schubert, of aggravated robbery, robbery, theft, tampering with evidence, resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct. The Defendant received an effective eighteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the State presented insufficient proof regarding his identity, that his convictions for resisting arrest and disorderly conduct violate the prohibition against double jeopardy, that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence, and that the trial court erroneously gave an instruction on flight. After a thorough review of the record, we discern no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Zachary J. Pence v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Zachary Pence, was convicted of aggravated rape of a child, aggravated child abuse, and child abuse. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-531, -15-401, -15-402. He was subsequently sentenced to sixty years. Following denial of his direct appeal, the Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective based on the following grounds: (1) failing to prepare for trial and to prepare the Petitioner to testify at trial; (2) failing to investigate; and (3) failing to provide the Petitioner with audio recordings until the day prior to trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Larry E. Parrish
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Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennessee v. Morris L. Long, II
Defendant-Appellant, Morris Long, was convicted by a Dickson County jury of first-degree premeditated murder, Tenn. Code Ann. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eric D. Wallace v. Tony Parker, Et Al.
This appeal arises from the summary dismissal of an inmate’s petition for declaratory judgment pertaining to the calculation of his release eligibility date. The inmate was convicted of two felonies and ordered to serve a life sentence for the first felony and a 15-year sentence for the second, with the sentences to be served consecutively. When calculating his release eligibility date, the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) applied the inmate’s pretrial jail credits to the life sentence but not to the 15-year sentence. The inmate claimed that TDOC erred by failing to apply the credit to both sentences because the criminal court included the credit on both sentencing orders. While the inmate’s petition was pending, the criminal court issued a corrected sentencing order for the 15-year sentence, in accordance with Rule 36 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, removing the pretrial jail credits. Thereafter, TDOC filed a motion for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion, determining that TDOC complied with the criminal court’s judgment and the applicable law. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Rochelle Yvonne Lillard v. Robert Walter Lillard
This appeal arises from a post-divorce Petition to Modify Child Support and Declare Child to be Severely Disabled. After an evidentiary hearing, the court determined the parties’ daughter had a severe disability and ordered the father to continue paying child support beyond the age of 21. The father raises three issues on appeal: (1) Did the trial court err in determining that the parties’ daughter had a severe disability; (2) Did the trial court err in awarding child support beyond the age of 21 without making specific factual findings that the daughter was living under the care and supervision of the mother and it was in the daughter’s best interest to remain in the mother’s care; and (3) Did the trial court err in determining the amount of child support the father owed? We find the preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court’s determination that the daughter has a severe disability, and it is in the daughter’s best interest to remain in her mother’s care. As for the amount of the child support award, the father primarily argues the daughter is underemployed; therefore, the court should have imputed additional income to her. We have determined that the trial court correctly identified and applied the relevant legal principles, the evidence supports the trial court’s determination regarding the daughter’s ability to earn income, and the award of child support is within the range of acceptable alternatives. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision in all respects |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jessica Meeks Conine, Et Al. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc.
This appeal arises from the summary dismissal of an inmate’s petition for declaratory judgment pertaining to the calculation of his release eligibility date. The inmate was convicted of two felonies and ordered to serve a life sentence for the first felony and a 15- year sentence for the second, with the sentences to be served consecutively. When calculating his release eligibility date, the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) applied the inmate’s pretrial jail credits to the life sentence but not to the 15-year sentence. The inmate claimed that TDOC erred by failing to apply the credit to both sentences because the criminal court included the credit on both sentencing orders. While the inmate’s petition was pending, the criminal court issued a corrected sentencing order for the 15-year sentence, in accordance with Rule 36 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, removing the pretrial jail credits. Thereafter, TDOC filed a motion for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion, determining that TDOC complied with the criminal court’s judgment and the applicable law. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Phi Air Medical, LLC v. Corizon, Inc.
PHI Air Medical brought suit based on unjust enrichment and action on sworn account against Corizon for air ambulance services it provided without a contract after Corizon paid only a portion of the billed amount, citing its practice of paying according to statutory caps and Medicare rates. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the preemption clause of the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713, which provides that a state “may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air transportation,” preempts PHI’s claims. We affirm the trial court’s finding that PHI’s claims are preempted and that summary judgment was proper. We reverse the trial court’s grant of PHI’s voluntary nonsuit of a claim that PHI did not plead. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Regina Jackson
The defendant, Regina Jackson, appeals her Cheatham County Circuit Court jury conviction of second offense driving under the influence (“DUI”), arguing that the trial court erred by denying her motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause and by denying her a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Cheatham | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re River L. et al.
A mother appeals the juvenile court’s decision to terminate her parental rights based on four statutory grounds. She also challenges the juvenile court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children. We affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
Terrell B. Johnson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Terrell B. Johnson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Pamela Salas v. John David Rosdeutscher, M.D, et al.
A Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B petition for recusal appeal was filed in this Court following the denial of a motion that sought the disqualification of the trial court judge. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jon Vazeen v. Martin Sir
This appeal involves a fraud claim filed against an attorney by his former client. The attorney conceded that the client had been double-billed for some charges and repaid the client for those matters prior to trial. However, the client, now pro se, continued to pursue his claim for fraudulent billing, insisting that fraud extended to the entire invoice. He also claimed that the attorney had charged a higher hourly rate than agreed. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the client failed to demonstrate that the attorney intentionally misrepresented the amounts owed by the client and failed to present sufficient evidence of fraud. As such, the trial court dismissed the claim and granted the attorney’s request for discretionary costs. The client appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |