Ward vs. Campbell
01A01-9807-CH-00350
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

Wellington vs. Ledford
01A01-9807-CH-00363
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle

Harper vs. Elliott
01A01-9809-CV-00503
Trial Court Judge: Marietta M. Shipley

Dixon vs. Lawrenceburg Beer Board
01A01-9809-CH-00484
Trial Court Judge: Jim T. Hamilton

Daniel et al vs. Fletcher Ridge, Inc.
01A01-9811-CH-00599
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy

Ralph Dean Purkey vs. State
03C01-9808-CC-00268
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Graham

State vs. Tarran Kyles
02C01-9807-CC-00203
Trial Court Judge: Whit A. Lafon

State vs. Michael Hatchell
02C01-9807-CC-00231
Trial Court Judge: Julian P. Guinn

City of Jackson vs. Jeff Butler
02A01-9812-CV-00381
Trial Court Judge: John Franklin Murchison

State vs. Scotty Walker
01C01-9805-CR-00203
Trial Court Judge: Thomas H. Shriver

Bobby L.Crum vs State
01C01-9810-CR-00432

03A01-9807-CH-00228
03A01-9807-CH-00228

03A01-9807-CH-00231
03A01-9807-CH-00231

State vs. Johnny Cruse
02C01-9810-CC-00319
Trial Court Judge: C. Creed Mcginley

State vs. Tarran Kyles
W2000-02152-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Roy B. Morgan, Jr.
The appellant, Tarran Kyles, proceeding pro se, appeals from the order of the Madison County Circuit Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court in a "Preliminary Order"dismissed Kyles' petition, finding that the only issue raised in the petition was previously determined on direct appeal. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition without an evidentiary hearing.

State vs. Robert Wilks
01C01-9708-CC-00382
Trial Court Judge: Cornelia A. Clark

State vs. Leslie Brian Willis
01C01-9802-CC-00068
Trial Court Judge: Robert W. Wedemeyer

State vs. Leslie Brian Willis
01C01-9802-CC-00068
Trial Court Judge: James Curwood Witt

State vs. Corey Lamont Radley
01C01-9803-CR-00113
Trial Court Judge: Cheryl A. Blackburn

Adrian Jones v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc.
02S01-9810-CV-00102
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Karen R. Williams,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff alleged that "on or about December 13, 1995, [he] was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome, which arose out of and in the course of his employment." The trial court found the plaintiff had failed to give timely notice of this injury or to present an adequate excuse for not doing so, as required by T.C.A. _ 5-6-21, and dismissed his complaint. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Plaintiff began working for Coca-Cola as a route salesman, driving a Coke truck, in 1992. In July, 1995, he was involved in a non-work-related automobile accident, after which he worked only one week for Coca-Cola. As a result of the auto accident, he received medical treatment from Drs. William Turner, Paul Williams and John P. Howser. EMG nerve conduction testing in December 1995 revealed carpal tunnel syndrome, which Dr. Howser thought was work-related, and he so-informed the plaintiff. Dr. Howser testified that, in his opinion, the work-related bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome pre-existed the July, 1995 automobile accident, and that the auto accident exacerbated it. Surgical correction of bilateral carpal tunnel was accomplished in April and May of 1996 and resulted in Dr. Howser's assessment of "a two percent anatomic disability rating to the body as a whole as a result of his left carpal tunnel and a two percent due to his right carpal tunnel."1 The Plaintiff testified when deposed that he first received treatment for carpal tunnel from Dr. Howser in December, 1995, but that "I had always had a little pain or aggravation in there, and I was just thinking that, you know, it was just, you know, from - - just doing the strain 1But on cross-examination, he responded "Yes" to the question, "Speaking of the 2 percent, you said 2 percent to each extremity for this more recent injury. Is that correct?" 2

Edgar Young v. Sonoco Products Co.
02S01-9807-CH-00072
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial court found that the plaintiff sustained a 4 percent permanent partial vocational disability to the body as a whole and awarded benefits accordingly. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Logan vs. Winstead
03A01-9902-CV-00057

03A01-9810-CV-00351
03A01-9810-CV-00351

Woody vs. Johnson
03A01-9811-CV-00390

Massengale vs. Massengale
01A01-9901-CV-00052