Michelle Benson Smith v. Christopher D. Smith
This appeal arises from a divorce proceeding. The trial court designated the mother as primary residential parent of the parties' young son in its temporary and permanent parenting plans. After a subsequent hearing, the trial court found the mother in criminal contempt of the permanent parenting plan for failing to engage in joint decision-making with Father on certain issues. The trial court fined the mother fifty dollars and ordered both parties to pay their own attorney's fees. The father appeals, raising various issues regarding the parenting plans and the contempt proceedings. We affirm. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Joe Mosley v. State of Tennessee
Plaintiff, a former inmate with the Tennessee Department of Correction, filed suit in the Tennessee Claims Commission against the State of Tennessee for monetary damages. Plaintiff alleged that the State held him in custody longer than the term of his sentence and improperly applied certain sentence-reducing credits. He titled his cause of action as one for “negligent care, custody, and control” of which he asserted the Claims Commission had jurisdiction pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 9-8-307. The State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff's claim was one for the “negligent deprivation of statutory rights,” and that the relevant statutes did not provide a private right of action. The Claims Commission granted the State's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Duane Hall
The Defendant, Kenneth Duane Hall, was found guilty by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of rape, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-503 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twelve years’ confinement at 100% service as a violent offender. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) the trial court erred by admitting evidence related to domestic violence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jamar Siler v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jamar Siler, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder, for which he is serving a thirty-year sentence. He contends that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because it was induced by the ineffective assistance of his counsel in the conviction proceedings. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
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Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stuart H. Kaplow, et al. v. City of Gatlinburg Board of Adjustments and Appeals, et al.
Housing units belonging to the property owners were cited by a city official for condemnation. The property owners appealed to the city’s Board of Adjustments and Appeals. After the board agreed with the city official and condemned the property, the property owners filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari seeking judicial review of the board’s decision. The trial court determined that the decision of the board was supported by material evidence and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The property owners appeal. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tarojee M. Reid
Appellant, Tarojee M. Reid, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, and as part of the plea, the parties agreed to submit the issue of restitution to the trial court. Following the hearing, the trial court ordered that appellant pay $6,895 in restitution to the victim. Appellant now challenges that order on the following grounds: (1) the trial court failed to order a presentence report prior to the restitution hearing; (2) the trial court failed to make specific findings with regard to appellant’s ability to pay restitution; and (3) the trial court improperly included the value of property that was not listed in the indictment when some items of property were specifically listed. Following our review, we reverse the award of restitution and remand for another restitution hearing consistent with this opinion. |
Stewart | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rodney Bates
The Petitioner, Rodney Bates, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion. The State concedes that this case should be reversed and remanded to the trial court. Upon review, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Richard Masingo
The Defendant, Jerry Richard Masingo, was convicted by a Union County Criminal Court jury of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-211 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to six years’ confinement. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a six-year sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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Union | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Brian Brown
The Defendant, William Brian Brown, pleaded guilty to one count of theft of property valued more than $10,000, and one count of vandalism valued over $1,000. In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court placed the Defendant on judicial diversion for six years, to be served on supervised probation. The Defendant agreed to pay restitution to the victims at a minimum of $250 per month. Almost a year later, the State filed a motion to set aside and terminate the order of judicial diversion, which the trial court granted. The trial court revoked the Defendant's judicial diversion, held a sentencing hearing, and sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of five years of probation and to pay $100 per month in restitution. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court did not follow proper procedure when it revoked his judicial diversion and that the trial court erred when it revoked his judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgments. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
P. Michael Huddleston v. Kenneth L. Harper et al.
P. Michael Huddleston (Plaintiff) brought this action against his former business partner, Kenneth L. Harper, and also against Jerry L. Hurst, the person to whom Plaintiff sold his one-half interest in the partnership. Plaintiff alleged that the primary asset of the partnership is a large building in Maryville, and that Defendants fraudulently concealed the fact that partnership had filed an insurance claim for damage to the buildings roof. The insurance claim was an asset that turned out to be worth over one million dollars. The insurance company paid this amount to the partnership shortly after Plaintiff sold his interest. Plaintiff claimed that Defendants fraudulently represented that the value of the building was about a million dollars less than its actual value because of the damage to the roof. As a consequence, Plaintiff alleged that he was fraudulently induced to sell his one-half interest for substantially less than its actual value. Plaintiff also alleged that partner Harper fraudulently endorsed Plaintiff's name to a check from the insurance company without his permission, and that the Defendants committed promissory fraud by inducing Plaintiff to endorse a second insurance check with the promise “to make things right with” him. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Clayton Arden v. Kenya I. Kozawa, M. D. et al
The primary issue presented is whether a health care liability case must be dismissed because the plaintiff sent the health care defendants pre-suit notice of the claim via a commercial carrier, FedEx, instead of using certified mail, return receipt requested, through the United States Postal Service. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121(a)(3)(B) and (a)(4) (2012). The defendants did not allege they failed to receive notice or were prejudiced by the plaintiff’s method of service. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that strict compliance with the manner and proof of service requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121(a)(3)(B) and (a)(4) was required. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that substantial compliance was sufficient to satisfy the statutory content requirements of the notice, but that the plaintiff’s failure to send the notice by certified mail constituted deficient service. We hold that the manner and proof of service prescribed by Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121(a)(3)(B) and (a)(4) may be achieved through substantial compliance. The defendants received notice and were not prejudiced by the manner of service. Therefore, the use of FedEx to deliver the notice and the filing of proof of service with the complaint constituted substantial compliance with the manner and proof of service requirements of the pre-suit notice statute. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Monroe | Supreme Court | |
Linda J. Russell, administrator of the Estate of Milford R. Russell, Jr. v. Illinois Central Railroad Company
Linda Russell brought a Federal Employers Liability Act action against Illinois Central Railroad Company to recover for the death of her husband from throat cancer; she alleged the cancer was caused by Mr. Russell‘s exposure to carcinogens while he worked in the Illinois Central maintenance shops in Memphis, Tennessee. A jury found in her favor and awarded damages of $4,255,000.00; on Defendant‘s motion to offset the judgment in the amount of medical expenses paid on behalf of Mr. Russell, the trial court reduced the judgment to $3,335,685.00. On appeal, Illinois Central asserts the trial court erred in admitting the causation opinions of three of Plaintiff‘s medical experts; in approving the jury‘s finding of causation; in making certain evidentiary rulings prior to and during trial; and in denying Defendant‘s post-trial motions based on the statute of limitations and Plaintiff‘s counsel‘s alleged violations of pretrial rulings. In her cross appeal, Mrs. Russell appeals the reduction of the verdict. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel J. Velez v. Christy M. Velez
This is the second appeal arising from the parties’ divorce and post-divorce filings. In the first appeal, we affirmed the division of marital property and the parenting schedule but reversed the award of child support and remanded with instructions to impute Mother’s income based on the minimum wage. We reversed the award of alimony in solido and remanded with instructions to award Mother rehabilitative alimony in an amount and for a duration to be determined by the trial court. We also found that Mother was entitled to recover attorney’s fees incurred in the first appeal in an amount to be determined by the trial court. Prior to conducting hearings on remand, both parties filed petitions and motions with the trial court seeking additional relief in a variety of forms, including petitions to modify the parenting plan. Upon conclusion of the hearings on remand, the trial court set child support, awarded Mother rehabilitative alimony for 39 months at $800 a month, denied both parents’ petitions to modify the parenting plan, and awarded Mother $2,600 for attorney’s fees incurred in the first appeal. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Tonya D. Thornley v. U. S. Bank, N.A., et al.
Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her complaint on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The complaint stemmed from a foreclosure on plaintiff‘s home. Plaintiff claimed that the foreclosing lender had no right to enforce the deed of trust because the underlying promissory note had been "sold into a securitized trust contemporaneously with the origination of the loan." She also alleged certain irregularities in connection with the foreclosure sale. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Corey Alan Bennett v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Corey Alan Bennett, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief without the opportunity to present evidence at a hearing. The petitioner pled guilty to two counts of attempted especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and four counts of aggravated stalking. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received a ten-year Range I sentence in the Department of Correction. The petitioner filed an untimely post-conviction petition asserting an involuntary guilty plea based on the ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence in the form of recanted testimony of a witness. He contends that the post-conviction court erred in its summary dismissal because due process requires that he be afforded a hearing. Following review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frederick Anderson
The Defendant, Frederick Anderson, was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping; three counts of aggravated robbery; one count of aggravated burglary; two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; and one count of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony. He received an effective sentence of sixty years’ incarceration. The Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial judge should have recused himself from the Defendant’s sentencing; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the charge of especially aggravated kidnapping as mandated by State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012); (3) whether the trial court erred by not merging the Defendant’s convictions for aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous offense; (4) whether the trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce excerpts of the jailhouse phone calls between the Defendant and his wife; (5) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant to an effective sixty years’ incarceration; and (6) whether the cumulative effect of the errors deprived the Defendant of a fair trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frederick Anderson - concurring
The Defendant, Frederick Anderson, was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping; three counts of aggravated robbery; one count of aggravated burglary; two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; and one count of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony. He received an effective sentence of sixty years’ incarceration. The Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial judge should have recused himself from the Defendant’s sentencing; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the charge of especially aggravated kidnapping as mandated by State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012); (3) whether the trial court erred by not merging the Defendant’s convictions for aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous offense; (4) whether the trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce excerpts of the jailhouse phone calls between the Defendant and his wife; (5) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant to an effective sixty years’ incarceration; and (6) whether the cumulative effect of the errors deprived the Defendant of a fair trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kassy Janikowski
The Defendant, Kassy Janikowski, pleaded guilty to second degree murder, and agreed to a sentence of thirty years, to be served at 100%. The Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed her motion because her sentence contravenes the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989. After review, and for the reasons stated below, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Terry L. Glenn v. Brenda Jones, Warden
The Petitioner, Terry L. Glenn, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Courts summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1989 convictions for first degree burglary and grand larceny and his effective twenty-five-year sentence. He contends that the judgments are void. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Andrew R. Lunn, DDS v. Carole Michelle Lunn
The appeal in this divorce litigation presents issues regarding proper valuation of the parties' business, proper division of marital assets, alimony, child support, attorney's fees, and court costs. The parties were married for seventeen years, with three children being born of the marriage. The husband is a dentist, who started his own practice during the parties' marriage. Much of the testimony at trial focused upon the proper value to be assigned to this marital asset. The trial court adopted the value assigned by the wife's expert of $430,376. The trial court then ordered that all of the marital assets be divided equally between the parties. Further, the trial court awarded Wife rehabilitative alimony, transitional alimony, and alimony in solido. The husband has appealed the trial court's final judgment. We reverse the trial court's valuation of the dental practice, and we remand this matter to the trial court for a proper determination of the value of such asset. The trial court will also be required to redistribute the parties' marital assets as necessary, in accordance with its redetermined valuation of this asset, in order to effectuate the trial court's decision to make an equal division of marital property between the parties. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Muller v. Dennis Higgins, et al.
This is a personal injury action in which Plaintiff sued Defendant for injuries he sustained as a result of a two-vehicle accident. The jury allocated fifty percent of the fault for the accident to each party, and the trial court entered judgment on the jury's verdict. On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the jury was not fair and impartial and that the evidence presented does not support the jury's verdict. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher M. Mimms v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Christopher M. Mimms, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his Montgomery County Circuit Court jury convictions of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine within a drug-free school zone, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Andrew R. Lunn, DDS v. Carole Michelle Lunn - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur in the majority’s opinion with the sole exception that I cannot agree with the majority that the amount of alimony in futuro awarded to Wife should be increased from $500 per month after eight years to $2,288. I agree with the majority that the transitional alimony must be changed to another type of alimony to comply with Tennessee law, and that the only other type that fits under the statutes is alimony in futuro. My only disagreement is with the majority’s sua sponte changing of the amount ordered by the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Joann Luna v. White County, Tennessee, et al.
Suit against the Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff of White County, as well as White County, to recover damages for Plaintiff’s asserted causes of action for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and violations of the Tennessee Constitution, arising out of her arrest and incarceration. The Defendants sought summary judgment on the grounds, inter alia, that the Governmental Tort Liability Act and public duty doctrine barred certain of the claims against the County and that the claims against the Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff were barred by the Governmental Tort Liability Act and by common law qualified immunity. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
In re Jacob B.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of Father’s petition to modify custody. Following a one-day trial, the court found that Father had failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstance as necessary for either a change in primary residential parent or parenting time. Because we find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding of no material change in circumstance for purposes of modification of residential parenting time, we vacate and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Jackson | Court of Appeals |