Martha Elaine Weaver Carter v. David Ray Carter
Mother appeals the trial court’s decision on her petition to modify parenting time. While we find no error in the trial court’s ruling on parenting time, we have concluded that the trial court erred in disqualifying mother’s attorney from representing her in future proceedings and in ordering mother to produce bank records. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth L. Anderson
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Kenneth L. Anderson, was convicted of one count of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twelve years as a Range III, persistent offender. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that his right to confront one of the State’s witnesses was violated; (2) that his right to present witnesses in his defense was violated; (3) that one of the State’s witnesses, Penny Webber, was not competent to testify at trial; (4) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress a recorded phone conversation between himself and Ms. Webber and video recordings of the drug buy; (5) that he was denied his right of access to the courts; (6) that the jury venire did not represent a fair cross-section of the community; (7) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (8) that he was entitled to a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence; and (9) that his sentence was excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marco Blanch
In 2011, the Shelby County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Marco Blanch, for aggravated rape based upon bodily injury sustained by the victim. A jury convicted Appellant of the lesser included offense of rape. Appellant was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to an eleven-year sentence at 100 percent. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence presented by the State at trial was insufficient to support his conviction because the victim consented to sexual activity. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Malcolm McKoy
The Defendant, Malcolm McKoy, pled guilty to theft of property valued over $500 and burglary. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent four-year and six-year terms, suspended to be served on unsupervised probation. These sentences were to run consecutively to another sentence unrelated to this appeal. After two subsequent probation violations based on new arrests, the Defendant was arrested for aggravated assault. A probation violation warrant was issued based upon this arrest, and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a revocation of his probation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Mary E. P. et al
The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the mother and father on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistence of conditions, and willful abandonment by failure to visit, and upon the determination that termination of their parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Both parents appeal. Finding the evidence clear and convincing, we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Mark A. L.
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Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darrell Johnson
The defendant, Darrell Johnson, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of facilitation of attempted aggravated robbery and facilitation of aggravated burglary, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the length of his sentences. We affirm the convictions and sentences. On remand, however, we direct the trial court to correct the judgments to properly effectuate merger of the alternative counts of aggravated burglary. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Pamela Moses v. Jayanta K. Dirghangi, MD
This case involves allegations of medical battery and medical malpractice surrounding an exam performed on a patient while she was admitted to a hospital to give birth. The trial court dismissed any allegations for medical battery for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, finding that the patient’s complaint failed to include allegations that the exam was performed without the patient’s authorization. The trial court further dismissed any remaining malpractice claims for failure to comply with the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act notice requirements. Discerning no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Johnie Jefferson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Johnie Jefferson, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. He argues that he is entitled to coram nobis relief because the State suppressed exculpatory evidence that became known to him after the limitations period had expired. After review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Amanda Turner (Short) v. Jessie Lee Short, Jr.
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Clarence D. Schreane v. State of Tennessee
In this consolidated appeal, the pro se appellant, Clarence D. Schreane, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s orders denying relief from his 2004 convictions of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Prior to this court’s consolidation of the case, the State filed motions to dismiss the appeals or, alternatively, to affirm the trial court’s denials of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. In light of the complexities of the issues raised in this appeal, we conclude that the State’s motions should be treated as responsive briefs. Following our review, we affirm the orders of the Hamilton County Criminal Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ray Junior Turner v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Ray Junior Turner, was convicted of one count of conspiracy to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine and one count of delivery of 300 grams or more of cocaine. Each of the offenses is a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(j). The trial court sentenced petitioner to sixty years for each conviction as a career offender to be served concurrently. He unsuccessfully appealed his convictions and sentences. See State v. Kenneth Miller and Ray Junior Turner, No. M2008-02267-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 1644969, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 22, 2010). Petitioner filed the current petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel: (1) failed to properly investigate petitioner’s case and communicate with petitioner; (2) failed to file a motion to suppress wiretap evidence; and (3) failed to properly inspect all discoverable evidence introduced at trial. Following our review of the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andre L. McKinney
Defendant, Andre L. McKinney, pled guilty to criminal simulation, a Class E felony, and received a negotiated sentence of two years. On the same day, he pled guilty to possession with intent to sell over 0.5 grams of cocaine and received a negotiated sentence of eight years, consecutive to the sentence of two years. Ultimately, the effective ten-year sentence was suspended, and he was placed on supervised probation. Following the filing of a probation violation warrant, the trial court conducted a hearing where Defendant and his probation officer testified. Defendant admitted that he had used marijuana multiple times while on probation, that he had been charged with and pled guilty to misdemeanor possession of marijuana while on probation, and that he knew he was supposed to report any new charges to his probation officer but failed to do so. The trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered the ten-year sentence to be served by incarceration. Defendant asserts in his appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christa Gail Pike v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Christa Gail Pike, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from her conviction for attempted first degree premeditated murder of a fellow inmate. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Franklin Robinette
A Greene County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, William Franklin Robinette, of two counts of soliciting first degree premeditated murder. For each conviction, the trial court sentenced the appellant to twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, with the sentences to be served consecutively to each other and to a previously imposed sentence for a total effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, the admission of a recording and transcript of the solicitation, the trial court’s failure to dismiss count two because of a violation of the Confrontation Clause, and the sentence imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the appellant’s convictions. However, the record reflects that no presentence report was prepared prior to the appellant’s sentencing hearing. Therefore, the case must be remanded for a new sentencing hearing. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Terry Mullins v. Alfred L. Locke, et al
This is a suit by Terry Mullins seeking a declaration that the Defendants, the Lockes (who are brothers) and the Gillespies (who are husband and wife) – whose properties lie near to, and south of, the Plaintiff’s property – have no right to the use of a driveway across the Plaintiff’s property to Vera Drive in Rhea County. The Defendants claim that they have a prescriptive easement, measuring some 47 feet long and 50 feet wide, enabling them to access Vera Drive over the Plaintiff’s property. This matter was before us at an earlier time. Because the statement of the evidence presented to us on the first appeal was, in our words, “a one-sided argumentative presentation of the evidence favorable to the Plaintiff,” we remanded this case to the trial court, pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-3- 128 (2000). (Emphasis in original.) In our remand, we advised the parties that we were taking this action “so a proper statement of the evidence c[ould] be prepared.” (Footnote in original omitted.) Such a statement has now been filed. Upon consideration of the very thorough statement prepared by the trial court, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the court’s judgment finding and holding that the Defendants have a prescriptive easement over the property of the Plaintiff. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Sharon Clayman Sitz v. William Grant Sitz
After some 16 years of marriage, Sharon Clayman Sitz (“Wife”) sued William Grant Sitz (“Husband”) for divorce. Following a bench trial, the court awarded Wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. The court adopted Wife’s proposed parenting plan, which made Wife the primary residential parent of their minor child and divided the marital property. The court further determined that Husband was voluntarily underemployed and imputed additional income to him in order to calculate his child support obligation. Husband appeals. We affirm with one modification. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jeremiah I. R.
Spenser R.S. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to his minor son, Jeremiah I.R. (“the Child”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed the Child from his mother’s custody after a babysitter took the Child and two siblings to the emergency room for injuries to the siblings. Father’s whereabouts were then unknown and his paternity of the Child had not yet been established. The Child’s mother entered into an agreed order with DCS stipulating that the Child was dependent and neglected in her care. Thereafter, the mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights. Some 18 months later, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father’s rights. The trial court granted the petition based on its findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the best interest of the Child. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Clendenon
This case involves a claim filed against the Estate of Todd Clendenon. Elite Oncology Medical Group filed the claim seeking payment for medical treatment and services rendered to the decedent. Barbara Jean Clendenon, the decedent’s wife and his Personal Representative, moved the probate court to designate as “exempt funds” the monies paid to the decedent under his health insurance policy. The payments included those pertaining to the treatment and services the decedent received from Elite. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion. The court determined that payments made by the health insurance carrier that were deposited into the Estate’s bank account after the death of the decedent were exempt from the claims of creditors pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-1-110 (2010). Elite appeals. We affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
FirstBank v. Landview Construction, LLC, et al.
Firstbank (“Plaintiff”) sued Landview Construction, LLC, Winston D. Cox (“Defendants”), and Beverly Linkous with regard to promissory notes secured by deeds of trust on three parcels of real property located in Knoxville, Tennessee. The parties attempted to enter into stipulations in lieu of presenting testimony at trial and informed the Trial Judge of these purported stipulations. After what passed as the trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiff be awarded a judgment in the amount of $149,192.22 against defendants Landview Construction, LLC and Winston D. Cox jointly and severally. Defendants appeal to this Court alleging that the Trial Court misconstrued the stipulations and as a result erred in the amount of the judgment. We find and hold that the purported stipulations were insufficient to show that the parties reached any agreement as to the stipulations. We, therefore, vacate the Trial Court’s judgment and remand this case for a new trial. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Ann Bell v. James Dale Trull
This appeal arises from Defendant’s erection of barricades between Plaintiff’s property and Johnson Street in Benton County, Tennessee in order to block Plaintiff’s access to the street from her property. Defendant contends that Johnson Street does not extend to Plaintiff’s property and that he owns the land between the two. Plaintiff contends that Johnson Street does extend to her property and that she has a right of unimpeded access to it. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment establishing Plaintiff’s right of access to Johnson Street, compensatory relief for damage caused to her land as a result of Defendant’s barricades, and that punitive damages be assessed against Defendant. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted Plaintiff unimpeded access to Johnson Street, awarded her $5,100 in compensatory damages, and assessed punitive damages of $10,000 against Defendant. Defendant appealed. On appeal, we are unable to effectively review the record and must remand for further findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. |
Court of Appeals | ||
S.A.M.D. v. J.P.D.
Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s post-divorce modification of Appellee/Father’s child support obligation, and its finding that Appellant was guilty of various acts of criminal contempt. Appellant/Mother also appeals the trial court’s admission of certain evidence. We conclude that the trial court erred in addressing, sua sponte, the issue of modification of Appellee/Father’s child support obligation in the absence of a petition for modification as required by Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-5-101(f)(1). Accordingly, we reverse the modification of child support. The order of the trial court is otherwise affirmed. Father’s request for attorney’s fees incurred in defense of this appeal is granted based upon provisions in the parenting plan and marital dissolution agreement. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lewis Young v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Lewis Young, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
4215 Harding Road Homeowners' Association v. Stacy Harris
In suit brought by condominium Homeowner’s Association, former owner of condominium unit which was ordered sold after being determined to constitute a nuisance, appeals the trial court’s order granting the Association’s application for attorneys’ fees. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making the award, we affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tonya Andrews, As Admin. for the Estate of James Christopher Sprinkle & Jacob Colton Sprinkle a minor by next friend and Guardian Tonya Andrews v. Amy Sprinkle and Frank Wray
The basic issues in this appeal involve the valuation of a decedent’s business at the time of his death. After the decedent died, the decedent’s mother was appointed administratrix of his estate. She filed this lawsuit against the decedent’s wife and the decedent’s wife’s brother, alleging that they had wrongfully disposed of virtually all of the decedent’s property after his death, including his business assets, therebyrendering a proper administration of the estate extremely difficult if not impossible. Following a four-day bench trial, the trial court concluded that the defendants had wrongfully taken possession of the decedent’s business assets and converted them to their own personal use. Relevant to this appeal, the court valued the decedent’s business at $75,000, and it held that the defendants were jointly and severally liable to the estate for that amount. The defendants appeal, challenging only the amount of damages awarded by the trial court for the value of the business. After a careful review of the record, we affirm |
Maury | Court of Appeals |