The Coal Creek Company v. Anderson County, Tennessee, Et Al.
This appeal concerns whether a tax on certain property containing oil and gas deposits constitutes an unlawful additional severance tax. The Coal Creek Company (“Coal Creek”) appealed the tax assessments of various county property assessors (“Assessors”). After administrative proceedings and appeals, the Tennessee Assessment Appeals Commission reinstated the original assessments. Coal Creek filed suit in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) seeking judicial review of the Appeals Commission’s decision. Following a bench trial, the Trial Court entered an order dismissing Coal Creek’s complaint. Coal Creek appeals to this Court. We hold, inter alia, that the taxes assessed upon Coal Creek’s property relative to oil and gas remaining in the ground are property taxes, not a severance tax. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Demarcus Jones v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Demarcus Jones, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2015 guilty pleas in case number 14-02150 to especially aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, aggravated burglary, theft of property, and setting fire to property and in case number 14-02151 to especially aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and his effective forty-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Terrell Shipp
The Defendant, Christopher Terrell Shipp, was convicted by a jury of one count of criminally negligent homicide, one count of felony murder, two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of attempted second degree murder, and he received an aggregate sentence of life in prison. The surviving victim of the crimes identified the Defendant as the perpetrator during her testimony at the preliminary hearing, but she died of natural causes prior to trial. The recorded testimony from the preliminary hearing was used to establish the identity of the Defendant at trial. The Defendant appeals his convictions, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to uphold the verdicts and that the victim’s testimony was admitted in error because at the time of the preliminary hearing, he had not had access to a police report which could have impeached her testimony. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to uphold the verdicts and that the testimony was properly admitted, and we affirm the trial court’s judgments. We remand for merger of the criminally negligent homicide conviction into the felony murder conviction. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bobbie Harjo Caudill, et al v. Clarksville Health System, GP
The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant medical provider based upon the expiration of the statute of limitations. On appeal, the appellant asserts that the statute of limitations was tolled because at the time the cause of action accrued, the decedent had been “adjudicated incompetent,” as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1- 106. We conclude that the appellant failed to meet her burden to show that the decedent was adjudicated incompetent at the time required to toll the statute of limitations. The trial court’s ruling is therefore affirmed. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of William C. Link
Plaintiff, the successor administrator for the decedent’s estate, brought a negligence suit against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County based on the probate clerk’s failure to cite the prior administrator in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 30-2-602. Following the Metropolitan Government’s filing of a motion for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that the asserted claims were barred by the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act’s one-year statute of limitations. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jamarius Deon Gant
The Defendant, Jamarius Deon Gant, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, and facilitation of burglary of a vehicle, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-402 (2014) (aggravated robbery), 39-13-304 (2014) (aggravated kidnapping), 39-11-403 (2014) (facilitation of a felony), 39-14-402 (2014) (burglary of a vehicle). The Defendant also pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1307 (2014) (amended 2017). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to consecutive nine-year terms for the aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping convictions. The Defendant received concurrent sentences of four years for the firearm convictions and eleven months, twentynine days for the facilitation of burglary of a vehicle, for an effective eighteen years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated kidnapping, and (2) the trial court erred during sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Henderson
We granted the application for permission to appeal of the Defendant, Antonio Henderson, in this case to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction for especially aggravated robbery. The Defendant contends that the serious bodily injury to the victim occurred after the robbery was complete and that, as a result, he could have committed only an aggravated robbery. We hold that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, the victim’s serious bodily injury was inflicted before the Defendant had completed robbing the victim with a deadly weapon. Accordingly, the evidence supports the Defendant’s conviction of especially aggravated robbery. Therefore, albeit for different reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. David Roger Petty
Defendant, David Roger Petty, was indicted for aggravated burglary and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more, but less than $10,000. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. The trial court ordered concurrent sentencing for an effective sentence of 15 years in confinement. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; 2) the trial court erred in sentencing him; 3) the trial court erred by allowing a State’s witness to testify last despite having been present during the testimony of the two preceding witnesses; and 4) the trial court erred by allowing the State to use evidence of Defendant’s prior theft convictions for impeachment purposes. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
DeKalb | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re The Estate of Jimmy L. Smith
In this appeal, the trial court determined that the woman who claimed to be the decedent’s common law wife had failed to establish her status as his wife and heir. The alleged widow asserts that she presented satisfactory evidence to prove that she was the common law spouse. As modified, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Liam S., Et Al.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother and father’s parental rights to their two minor children. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of each parent’s parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan, and the persistence of conditions which led to removal. Relative to Mother, the court found clear and convincing evidence existed to support the additional grounds of abandonment for failure to visit and to pay child support. The court further found that termination of each parent’s rights was in the best interest of the children. The parents appeal. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as to grounds for termination but vacate the trial court’s judgment as to the best interest of the children and the trial court’s judgment terminating the mother and the father’s parental rights. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Kristina Abolins, Et Al. v. Frank Santas, Et Al. - Concurring In Part and Dissenting In Part
I concur in the majority’s holding that the trial court was within its discretion to place a condition on the grant of the motion to set aside the default judgment. I also concur in the conclusion that the attorney’s fees and expenses assessed by the trial court were reasonable. But I respectfully dissent from the grant of an additional thirty days for Frank Santa and Alta Horizon, Inc. (“Defendants’) to comply with the trial court’s January 10, 2017 order. Although the conduct of counsel might justify such relief, in my view, this Court lacks that authority. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Isabella G., Et Al.
Parents appeal the termination of their parental rights to their two children. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence of five grounds against the father and three grounds against the mother and that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interest. DCS concedes on appeal that persistence of conditions was not an appropriate ground for terminating mother’s parental rights and that abandonment by failure to visit was not an appropriate ground for terminating father’s parental rights. We agree. As to the remaining grounds, we conclude that DCS failed to prove abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and persistence of conditions as to the father. But the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the grounds of abandonment for wanton disregard for the welfare of the children and substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plans as to both parents. We further conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the children’s best interest. Thus, we affirm the termination of parental rights. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brian Robert Lawson
The State of Tennessee appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order dismissing the indictment, which charged the Defendant with domestic assault by causing bodily injury. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred by dismissing the indictment. We conclude that the trial court erred by dismissing the indictment. The order of the trial court is reversed, the domestic assault charge is reinstated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kristina Abolins, Et Al. v. Frank Santas, Et Al.
This appeal concerns an order to set aside a default judgment. Kristina Abolins and Christopher Heath Hawkins (“Plaintiffs”) sued Frank Santas (“Santas”), doing business as Gunner Inc., and Alta Horizon, Inc. (“Defendants,” collectively), asserting a number of causes of action arising out of Defendants’ work on a renovation project at Plaintiffs’ home. After several months with no responsive filing from Defendants, Plaintiffs moved for default judgment. The Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) granted Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment. Defendants filed a motion to set aside default judgment, raising certain defenses and taking issue with service of process. The Trial Court entered an order granting the motion to set aside on the condition that Defendants pay Plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees and expenses. Defendants did not pay, and instead appealed to this Court. We find no abuse of discretion by the Trial Court. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brijesh Mukesh Desai
Brijesh Mukesh Desai, the Defendant, entered a negotiated guilty plea to Class C felony issuing or passing a worthless check in the amount of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. The plea agreement provided that the Defendant would be sentenced as a Range I standard offender; the sentence would be between three and six years; there would be a possibility of diversion; restitution would be $18,871.34; and the manner of service was to be determined by the trial court at a later hearing. Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years’ probation following the service of forty-five days in jail. The Defendant now appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in accepting his plea of guilty. However, the Defendant did not reserve the right to appeal a certified question of law or seek review of his sentence, nor do any other grounds for direct appeal under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b) exist. Because the Defendant has no right to a direct appeal from his guilty plea, the appeal is dismissed. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gabriel Toban
The Defendant, Gabriel Toban, was convicted by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of third offense driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §55-10-401 (2012). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his DUI conviction, (2) the trial court erred by rejecting a negotiated plea agreement, (3) the indictment was invalid, and (4) the trial court erred by denying a motion to dismiss. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Douglas H.
The legal custodians of Mother’s two children filed this petition to terminate her parental rights to the children on grounds of abandonment and severe child abuse. We affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights to both children on at least one ground, but reverse as to some of the grounds found by the circuit court. We agree with the circuit court’s decision that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Patrick R. Miller v. Vanderbilt University
In this health care liability action, after the plaintiff presented his case-in-chief, the trial court granted a directed verdict for the defendant hospital first on the claim for punitive damages and second on all remaining issues. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court erred: (1) in ruling that he had failed to produce material evidence that a specific agent of the defendant hospital had deviated from the standard of care and that deviation had caused an injury that would not otherwise have occurred; (2) in denying his motion to reopen the proof; and (3) in excluding evidence that he was uninsured. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Patrick R. Miller v. Vanderbilt University - Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
I concur in so much of the majority opinion that affirms the trial court’s exclusion of testimony regarding Mr. Miller’s health insurance status and grant of a directed verdict on the claim for punitive damages. I dissent from the grant of a directed verdict on the remaining claims, however, because I believe the proof introduced was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of liability. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joe Mitchell v. State of Tennessee
Joe Mitchell (“Mitchell”) appeals the July 22, 2016 order of the Claims Commission for the Middle Division (“the Claims Commission”) granting summary judgment to the State of Tennessee (“the State”) on Mitchell’s claim for negligence. We find and hold that the State made a properly supported motion for summary judgment negating an essential element of Mitchell’s claim, i.e., injury or loss, and that Mitchell failed to produce evidence showing a genuine disputed issue of material fact. We, therefore, affirm the grant of summary judgment. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Michael Lee Givens v. Tristine Ann Givens
Michael Lee Givens (“Husband”) sued Tristine Ann Givens (“Wife”) for divorce. The case was tried, and the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) entered its order on January 12, 2016, inter alia, granting a divorce and distributing the marital property. Wife appeals raising issues regarding the classification and distribution of the marital property. We find and hold that the Trial Court erred in categorizing the real property located on Taggart Drive (“Taggart”) as Husband’s separate property. We, therefore, modify the categorization of Taggart to reflect that Taggart is marital property and remand this case for an equitable distribution of the marital estate taking Taggart into account as a marital asset. We affirm the remainder of the Trial Court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Terrence McDonald v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Terrence McDonald, was convicted of four counts of aggravated rape and one count of reckless endangerment. He appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief and argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan David Patterson
This is a matter that involves cross appeals. Defendant, Jonathan David Patterson, entered an open guilty plea to multiple offenses in four separate cases. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of thirty-one years. Defendant filed a notice of appeal. Subsequently, Defendant also filed a motion for reduction of his sentence under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35. The trial court granted the motion, reducing Defendant’s effective sentence to eighteen years. The State appealed the reduction of Defendant’s sentence. The appeals were consolidated by this Court. After a review, we determine that the trial court abused its discretion in granting relief under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 because Defendant did not present post-sentencing information or developments that warranted an alteration in the interest of justice. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court as to the Rule 35 motion are reversed and remanded. Additionally, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its original sentencing decision imposing an effective thirty-one-year sentence and that Defendant failed to show he was entitled to plain error relief as a result of an alleged breach of the plea agreement by the State. On remand, the trial court should reinstate the original judgments and sentences. The trial court shall also enter a judgment form for Count Thirty-seven of case number 2015-CR-731. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan David Patterson - Concurring
I concur in the majority opinion in this case. I write separately to express a policy reason for affirming the trial court’s original sentence. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Gabriella D., Et Al.
The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed three children from the custody of their parents and placed them with foster parents in March 2012 because one of the children, an infant, was severely malnourished. By July 2012, the children’s mother was cooperating with DCS and complying with a permanency plan that set the goal for the children as reunification with their mother or another relative. The mother continued to comply with the permanency plan for the next sixteen months that the children were in foster care. On the day the children were scheduled to begin a trial home visit with the mother, July 31, 2013, the foster parents filed a petition in circuit court seeking to terminate the mother’s parental rights and to adopt the children. After the foster parents filed their petition in circuit court, the juvenile court, which had maintained jurisdiction over the dependency and neglect proceeding, ordered DCS to place the children with the mother for the trial home visit. The circuit court trial on the foster parents’ petition did not occur until September 2015. By that time, the children had resided with the mother on a trial basis for two years without incident. The mother, DCS, and the guardian ad litem appointed by the juvenile court in the dependency and neglect proceeding opposed the foster parents’ petition. The foster parents and a guardian ad litem appointed by the circuit court sought termination of the mother’s parental rights. After the multi-day trial, the trial court dismissed the petition, finding that the foster parents had proven a ground for termination by clear and convincing proof but had failed to establish by clear and convincing proof that termination is in the children’s best interests. The foster parents appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. We granted the mother’s application for permission to appeal and now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment dismissing the foster parents’ petition. We conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the proof does not amount to clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court |