Suzanne W. Butler v. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
This appeal arises from a claim under the Governmental Tort Liability Act for injuries sustained by an employee of the Metropolitan Police Department that allegedly resulted from a fall in the break room at her workplace. The employee alleged that the chair she attempted to sit in, which had caster wheels, constituted a dangerous condition because it was on an uncarpeted, tile floor. She also alleged that the Metropolitan Government had notice of the dangerous condition and was negligent in failing to provide a safe work environment and in permitting the dangerous condition to remain. Following a bench trial, the court dismissed the action finding that Plaintiff failed to prove her negligence claim by a preponderance of the evidence because the evidence did not establish that the Metro Police Department had actual or constructive notice of any dangerous condition with sufficient time to take corrective action. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Clayton Ward v. Illinois Central Railroad Company
Appellant, former employee of Appellee railroad, appeals the trial court’s grant of Appellee’s motion for summary judgment on the ground of preclusion. Appellant filed this lawsuit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, seeking damages for injuries he allegedly suffered as a result of walking on ballast in Appellant’s railyard. Appellee moved for summary judgment on the ground that Appellant’s claim concerning ballast was precluded by the Federal Railroad Safety Act regulation 49 C.F.R. § 213.103. The trial court granted summary judgment, concluding that Appellant failed to meet his burden to negate Appellee’s proof that it complied with 49 C.F.R. § 213.103. We have determined that Appellant satisfied his burden of production to negate Appellee’s proof regarding whether the ballast rock at issue provided adequate drainage in compliance with 49 C.F.R. § 213.103, making summary judgment inappropriate. Reversed and remanded. |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Larry D. Rothwell
Appellant, Larry D. Rothwell, was convicted by a Rhea County jury of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-one years in incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant has presented the following issues for our review on appeal: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by excusing a juror; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow introduction of portions of a witness’s pretrial interview; (3) whether the trial court improperly excluded evidence about how the fight between Appellant and the victim started, determining that evidence from Betty Lewis was collateral; (4) whether the trial court improperly refused to enforce a subpoena for Betty Lewis on behalf of Appellant; (5) whether the trial court improperly denied Appellant the opportunity to impeach Brandy Smith; (6) whether the trial court improperly allowed hearsay testimony; (7) whether the trial court improperly excluded Randy Rothwell’s testimony about the description of a knife removed from the victim’s body; (8) whether the trial court improperly declared Randy Rothwell a hostile witness; (9) whether the trial court improperly excluded evidence of Brandy Smith’s prior felony conviction; (10) whether the trial court improperly denied the motion to suppress; (10) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (11) whether cumulative errors of the trial court require reversal of the conviction; and (12) whether the sentence was excessive. After a review of the record, we determine that the evidence did not preponderate against the denial of the motion to suppress where the evidence supported a finding of exigent circumstances; the trial court did not err in excusing a juror; the trial court properly excluded impeachment of Brandy Smith by prior inconsistent statement where she admitted to an inconsistency in one prior statement and the other statement was not inconsistent; the trial court properly determined that the testimony of Betty Lewis was excluded by the collateral fact rule; the trial court properly admitted the statements of Randy Rothwell; the trial court properly excluded the testimony of Leo Andy about the knife on the victim’s person as hearsay; the trial court properly determined that Randy Rothwell was a hostile witness; the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the admission of Brandy Smith’s prior conviction was more prejudicial than probative; the evidence was sufficient to support the lesser included offense of second degree murder; and the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Rhea | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ledarren S. Hawkins
The defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court for Madison County of first degree murder and tampering with physical evidence. On this appeal, the defendant seeks reversal of his first degree murder conviction on the ground that the trial court declined his request for a jury instruction on defense of a third person. He also seeks reversal of his evidence-tampering conviction on the ground that his abandonment of the murder weapon did not amount to tampering with physical evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals upheld his convictions and sentences. State v. Hawkins, No.W2010-01687-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 543048 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 16, 2012). Based on this record, we have determined that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s request for an instruction on defense of a third person. However, we have also determined that the defendant did not tamper with physical evidence in violation of Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-16-503(a)(1)(2010) by tossing the murder weapon over a short fence where it could be easily observed and recovered. Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence for first degree murder and reverse his conviction and sentence for tampering with physical evidence. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry D. Rothwell - Concurring
I concur in results only. My primary disagreement with the majority’s opinion is the reliance therein upon State v. Gilley, 297 S.W.3d 739 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008) and State v. Schiefelbein, 230 S.W.3d 88 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007) for the proposition that “Appellate review of hearsay issues is guided by the de novo standard of review.” Judge Witt wrote both of these scholarly opinions, and quite candidly, I am unable to conclude that the conclusion reached therein on the issue in question is not the most appropriate legal conclusion. Nevertheless, our supreme court cited Gilley in a footnote in Pylant v. State, 263 S.W.3d 854, 871 n.26 (Tenn. 2008) and declined to adopt the de novo standard of review. After noting that Judge Witt “advocates for review of . . . rulings on whether the proffered testimony was hearsay under a de novo standard of review” in his dissent in this court in Pylant v. State, No. M2005-02721-CCA-R3-PC, 2007 WL 1890178, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2007) (Witt, J., dissenting) (emphasis added), the supreme court, in effect, declined to accept what Judge Witt advocated as the definitive standard of review and concluded the footnote by stating, |
Rhea | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, F/K/A Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Kaiser C. Taylor and All Known and Unknown Heirs of Kaiser C. Taylor and Kathy K. Taylor
This case involves a foreclosure sale that occurred while an automatic stay was in effect pursuant to the mortgagor’s bankruptcy proceeding. The mortgagee petitioned the trial court to find the foreclosure void ab initio and to reform the real estate records by voiding the successor trustee’s deed and placing the parties in their original positions as to the deed of trust. The trial court denied the relief requested by the mortgagee. The mortgagee appeals. We hold that the foreclosure sale is invalid and of no effect because it is voidable, pursuant to United States Code § 362(a)(6) and (c) (Supp. 2012) and Tennessee law, and because there existed no equitable circumstances sufficient to constitute an exception to the operation of the stay. We reverse the denial of summary judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Lewis D. Chapman, Individually and as an Employee and Deputy Sheriff of Shelby County, Tennessee v. Shelby County Government, et al.
The trial court determined that Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate an injury and accordingly lacked standing in this declaratory judgment action. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Sidney Porterfield v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Sidney Porterfield, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Porterfield, 746 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1988). After his petition for post-conviction relief was denied, the petitioner filed a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings, maintaining that he was intellectually disabled and thus ineligible to be sentenced to death. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petitioner relief, and the petitioner appealed. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Herman McKinley
The defendant, Herman McKinley, was found guilty by a Shelby County jury of second degree murder, attempted first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and unlawful possession of a handgun as a convicted felony. Following a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced to an effective term of one hundred thirty-one years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the imposition of consecutive sentencing. Following review of the record, we affirm the convictions and sentences as imposed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tera Danielle Ward v. John Patrick Ward
In this divorce case, the father appeals the trial court’s designation of the mother as the primary residential parent of the parties’ daughter. The child was born after the parties separated; at the time, the father lived in New Jersey and the mother lived in Tennessee. Divorce proceedings were initiated in Tennessee when the child was six months old; both parents asked to be designated as the child’s primary residential parent. After a trial, the trial court declared the parties divorced and designated the mother as the child’s primary residential parent; the father was granted parenting time for one week per month. The father now appeals, challenging the trial court’s decision to declare the parties divorced and to designate the mother as the child’s primary residential parent. After a careful review of the evidence, we affirm the trial court’s decision to declare the parties divorced, and reverse the designation of the mother as the primary residential parent of the child. We vacate the parenting plan approved by the trial court and remand the cause for entry of an order and parenting plan designating the father as the child’s primary residential parent, with appropriate alternate parenting time for the mother. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael T. Shelby
In this State appeal, the Defendant, Michael T. Shelby, was indicted for promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress, claiming the search warrant lacked probable cause. After a suppression hearing, the trial court granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that the search warrant was legally defective, and suppressed the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant. The State appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress because the informant provided sufficiently reliable information upon which the warrant could be properly issued. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Karen Jo Williams
Appellant, Karen Jo Williams, entered guilty pleas to forgery, two counts of theft of property valued at $500 or less, and violation of an order of protection. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court imposed an effective four-year sentence to be served in community corrections and ordered the sentence to be served consecutively to a probationary sentence from Kentucky that she was serving at the time. Subsequently, the trial court held a revocation hearing, after which it revoked appellant’s community corrections sentence and ordered execution of her four-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appealing the trial court’s judgment, appellant raises the following issues: (1) whether a community corrections revocation warrant alleging violation of a direct order was valid when appellant’s Tennessee sentence had not yet begun; (2) whether an amended warrant alleging a new criminal conviction was invalid; and (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her unserved community corrections sentence and ordering execution of her full sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Willie Beverly, Deacon of Antioch Baptist Church v. Farm Bureau Insurance and Tennessee Farmers Insurance Company
A general sessions judgment was appealed to circuit court. In the circuit court, the Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, claiming that there were errors in the Defendant’s notice of appeal and appeal bond that rendered the documents ineffective. The circuit court denied the motion, and the case was resolved on its merits. The Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the circuit court should have dismissed the appeal based on the alleged errors in the notice of appeal and appeal bond. We affirm. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Randall v. Shelby County Unified School Board (inclusive of the former Memphis City Schools Board of Education), et al.
The trial court reversed the Board of Education’s decision to dismiss a City of Memphis school teacher. We reverse the trial court and reinstate the Board of Education’s dismissal of the teacher on the ground of unprofessional conduct. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Justin E. Stinnett
The Defendant-Appellant, Justin E. Stinnett, appeals from the Sevier County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation. Stinnett previously entered a guilty plea to robbery and received a ten-year suspended sentence after service of one year “day for day.” On appeal, Stinnett argues that the trial court erred in revoking his probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry Michael Allen
The Defendant-Appellant, Terry Michael Allen, was indicted by a Hickman County Grand Jury for delivery of a Schedule III controlled substance, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2010). Pursuant to his plea agreement, Allen entered an open guilty plea to the charged offense in exchange for a sentence of two years as a Range I, standard offender, with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. The trial court subsequently ordered Allen to serve his sentence of two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Allen argues that the trial court erred in denying him a sentence of full probation or an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ramey Michelle Long v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. et al.
Motorist brought suit against multiple defendants for injuries arising out of two car accidents. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of two defendants. Because genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment, we reverse. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Casey Colbert
Casey Colbert (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder; attempted aggravated robbery; employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; two counts of bribing a witness; and two counts of coercing a witness. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment for the murder conviction. After a hearing, the trial court merged the two convictions for coercing a witness into a single conviction and sentenced the Defendant to six years for the attempted aggravated robbery conviction; six years for the firearm conviction; six years for each of the bribery convictions; and four years for the coercion conviction. The trial court ordered partial consecutive service for an effective sentence of life plus twenty-two years, all to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is not sufficient to support his murder conviction; (2) the trial court erred in consolidating the offenses against the witness with the other offenses; (3) the prosecutor engaged in improper argument; (4) cumulative errors entitle him to a new trial; and (5) his sentence is excessive. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we hold that the trial court committed error in consolidating the indictments. As to the Defendant’s convictions of first degree murder and attempted aggravated robbery, we hold that the trial court’s error was harmless. As to the Defendant’s convictions for bribing and coercing a witness, we hold that the error was not harmless. Accordingly, we reverse the Defendant’s convictions of bribing and coercing a witness and remand those charges for further proceedings. Because the Defendant did not employ a firearm during the commission of a “dangerous felony,” as that term is defined by statute, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction of that offense. We affirm the Defendant’s convictions of first degree felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery, and we remand this matter for a new sentencing hearing on those offenses. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tony Arness Degraffreed v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Tony Arness Degraffreed, appeals from the denial of his petition for post conviction relief, wherein he challenged his Tipton County Circuit Court jury conviction of rape of a child. In this appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Franda Webb, et al. v First Tennessee Brokerage, Inc., et al.
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court properly denied the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings. The defendants assert that Ms. Webb signed an agreement to arbitrate “all controversies” when she opened the brokerage account with them. The trial court determined, inter alia, that the arbitration agreement was not enforceable under state law, that Ms. Webb did not agree to arbitration, and that the account representative fraudulently induced Ms. Webb to enter into the agreement. We affirm the decision of the trial court only as to arbitration; we vacate any findings that go to the merits of the underlying case and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Robert Carrier, Jr.
Appellant, Paul Robert Carrier, Jr., who was a police officer, was indicted by the Gibson County Grand Jury for one count of reckless homicide for a shooting death that occurred while he was on duty. Following a change of venue, he was tried by a jury in Montgomery County. The jury convicted him as charged. The trial court sentenced Appellant to two years incarceration and denied his request for judicial diversion. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing certain testimony at trial and in denying his request for judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Jozie C.A.
The trial court granted Mother’s petition to modify custody and name Mother primary residential parent. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
James Gibbs v. State of Tennessee
James Gibbs (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the trial court erred in not giving him his proper community corrections credit. The habeas corpus court dismissed his petition without a hearing, stating that the Petitioner failed to allege a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief and that he failed to establish that his sentence had expired. The Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we hold that the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his sentence has expired. Accordingly, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment denying relief. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy O'Keefe and Sharon O'Keefe v. Barry Gordon, Roger Farley, and Plantation Title
Purchasers of home brought suit against sellers, purchasers’ investment advisor and real estate agent,title company,and several other parties seeking damages and other relief arising out of their purchase of the home. Jury found seller liable for intentional and negligent misrepresentation, negligence, breach of warranties, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and found purchasers’ investment advisor liable for intentional misrepresentation. Trial court ordered rescission of the sales contract and awarded purchasers damages and attorneys fees for seller’s violation of the Consumer Protection Act Seller and awarded plaintiffs damages against their investment advisor. Seller and investment advisor appeal. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel Paul Allen, et al v. The City of Newport
The City of Newport sought to annex certain properties in Cocke County, Tennessee. A number of affected parties objected to the annexation and filed a complaint against the City. The trial court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to allege that the City was barred from annexing their properties because it had defaulted on a prior plan of services from an earlier annexation. The City filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the City’s motion on the ground that the statutory amendments on which the plaintiffs relied to support their claim could not be retroactively applied. The plaintiffs appeal. We reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals |