State of Tennessee v. Deborah Morton
A Loudon County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Deborah Morton, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced the Appellant to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining her conviction. The Appellant also contends that the trial court erroneously excluded and erroneously admitted certain lay and expert testimony, that the trial court erroneously denied her request for a jury instruction concerning the State’s failure to preserve evidence, that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct, and that these cumulative errors deprived her of her right to a fair trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Loudon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Lily C.
The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Elizabeth R.1 (“Mother”) and David C. (“Father”) to their child Lily C. (“Child”). DCS alleged that Father was guilty of severe child abuse by, among other things, raping her. As grounds against Mother, DCS alleged (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home for the Child in the first four months following removal; (2) persistence of the conditions that led to the Child’s removal; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the Child. The trial court found that DCS established the alleged grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence, and that termination of parental rights was in Child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
Mindy Donovan v. Joshua R. Hastings
We granted permission to appeal in this case to consider awards of attorney fees and costs after dismissal of a claim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-119(c). The plaintiff homeowner entered into a contract with the defendant contractor. The homeowner sued the contractor, and the contractor filed a countercomplaint alleging breach of contract. After his motion to amend was granted, the contractor filed an amended countercomplaint asserting the same breach of contract claim with revised damages. The trial court later granted the homeowner’s motion to dismiss the countercomplaint for failure to state a claim. The homeowner then sought attorney fees and costs pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-119(c). The trial court granted the motion but excluded fees and costs incurred prior to the date the amended countercomplaint was filed. After the homeowner appealed the amount of attorney fees awarded, a split panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal, we hold that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the homeowner’s award of attorney fees and costs under Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-119(c) was limited to those incurred after the date the amended countercomplaint was filed. We reverse the Court of Appeals, vacate the trial court’s award, and remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the award of reasonable attorney fees and costs. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Gina G. Gianopulos Cruz et al. v. Wilhoit Properties et al.
This is an appeal from a Final Order of Dismissal and Order Approving Minor’s Settlement. Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final order as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Delrick Blue et al. v. Church of God Sanctified, Inc. et al.
This case involves a church property dispute. The plaintiffs are trustees of a local church congregation who were attempting to establish their congregation as separate from the church’s national governing body and from a local congregation, with which the plaintiffs had previously been joined, that desired to remain affiliated with the national church body. Naming as defendants the national body and trustees of the congregation desiring to remain with the national body, the plaintiffs sought, inter alia, declaratory judgment that real property upon which the local church building was located belonged to their congregation and was not held in trust for the national body as the national body’s written policy dictated. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment, asserting in part that pursuant to our Supreme Court’s decision in Church of God in Christ, Inc. v. L. M. Haley Ministries, Inc. 531 S.W.3d 146 (Tenn. 2017), the national body’s written policy governed ownership of the property, which had therefore been held in trust for the national body. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precluded the court’s hearing any claims except the property dispute and that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment declaring the national body as the owner of the property and associated personalty and the congregation aligned with the national body as entitled to use and possession of the property and associated personalty. Upon the plaintiffs’ appeal to this Court and motion to the trial court for a stay, the trial court granted a stay of the judgment pending appeal and entered an order, inter alia, directing the plaintiffs to pay expenses related to the property while the stay remained in effect. The defendants filed a Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 7(a) motion seeking review of the trial court’s stay order, which this Court denied. The plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion to supplement the record with their response to the Rule 7(a) motion, which, upon limited remand, was granted by the trial court. The defendants then filed a motion requesting that this Court strike the references to the supplemented materials in the plaintiffs’ principal brief and disregard post-judgment facts in the supplemented materials. Discerning no reversible error in the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, we affirm the trial court’s summary judgment order in its entirety. However, because the supplemented materials included documents not reviewed by the trial court at the summary judgment stage, we grant the defendants’ motion to disregard the supplemental materials and strike the plaintiffs’ references to them. We deny the defendants’ request for attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
John Meyer v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, John Meyer, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his conviction of theft of property valued at $1,000 or less, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jonathan Gutierrez v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jonathan Gutierrez, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his convictions of first degree premeditated murder and four counts of aggravated assault and resulting effective sentence of life plus sixteen years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress statements he made in response to a custodial interrogation after he had invoked his right to remain silent and because trial counsel failed to intervene when he made incriminating statements during an interview for a television show. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Maycee J. Stine v. Isaiah M. Jakes et al.
This appeal arises from Appellant/Mother’s January 2020 petition to modify the visitation provisions in an agreed parenting plan entered by the juvenile court in December 2017. Following proceedings before a juvenile court magistrate, Mother filed a timely request for a de novo hearing by the judge pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-107(d). In lieu of an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court considered the matter on the parties’ briefs and argument of counsel. The court determined it could not make factual findings without conducting a de novo trial and advised the parties that, in lieu of a hearing, a direct appeal to this Court was “a remedy for either party.” Mother did not set a hearing, and the juvenile court affirmed the magistrate’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Mother appeals. We vacate the juvenile court’s order and remand this matter for a de novo hearing before the juvenile court judge. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Relyant Global, LLC v. Royden Fernandez Et Al
Plaintiff, a Tennessee limited liability company headquartered in Blount County, sued defendants, a former employee and a limited liability company both residents of the U.S. territory of Guam, alleging breach of a non-compete agreement. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the action under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court erred by failing to enforce the non-compete agreement’s forum selection clause and its express waiver of the inconvenient forum defense. We reverse, holding that the forum selection clause dictates the proper forum. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Edward Earl Killgo
The Appellant, Edward Earl Killgo, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to statutory rape, a Class E felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received a six-year sentence as a Range III, persistent offender with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence, including his request for judicial diversion, and whether he would be placed on the sex offender registry. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the Appellant be given credit for time served in jail, that he serve the balance of his six-year sentence on supervised probation, and that he be placed on the sex offender registry. On appeal, the Appellant claims that the trial court erred by denying diversion and by ordering that he register as a sex offender. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s denying judicial diversion and ordering that the Appellant be placed on the sex offender registry and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Destiny C.
This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that four grounds for termination as to the mother were proven: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) persistent conditions; (3) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility. The juvenile court also found that termination was in the best interests of the child. The mother appeals. We affirm. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Adam J. Rothberg v. Fridrich & Associates Insurance Agency, Inc. et al.
This is an interlocutory appeal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the Appellant’s recusal motion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Guy A. Cobb
The Defendant, Guy A. Cobb, was convicted of one count of possession with intent to sell more than one-half gram of methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to eight years’ probation. See T.C.A. § 39-17-434 (2018). Subsequently, the trial court found the Defendant violated conditions of his probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Cardell Coman, Jr.
The pro se defendant, Brandon Cardell Coman, Jr., appeals his Madison County Circuit Court jury conviction of aggravated robbery, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence, excluding certain evidence, denying a motion to suppress certain evidence, denying the defendant’s request for new counsel, denying a motion to dismiss the charges; that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and that his trial was tainted by prosecutorial misconduct. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Wayne Newson
The Defendant, Kevin Wayne Newson, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, attempted first degree premeditated murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and convicted felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court merged the first degree murder convictions and sentenced the Defendant to an effective term of life plus sixty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s sentencing determinations, the trial court’s denial of the Defendant’s request that the jury be instructed on aggravated assault resulting in death as a lesser-included offense of premeditated murder, the trial court’s grant of the State’s request that language regarding the Defendant’s duty to retreat be included in the jury instruction on self-defense, and various other rulings of the trial court. With respect to the self-defense instruction, the Defendant argues that duty to retreat language was prejudicially erroneous because the only criminal activity in which the Defendant was involved at the time of the shooting, i.e, being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, had no nexus to the events that gave rise to the shooting. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Vana Mustafa
Defendant, Vana Mustafa, was convicted by a jury of first-degree premeditated murder and received a life sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that: the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; the trial court failed to fully charge the jury as to the law concerning self-defense; the trial court erred by requiring him to provide his list of witness’s statements to the State at the close of the State’s proof; that he was denied the constitutional right to present a defense because the trial court excluded testimony by his expert witness; the trial court erred by excluding his expert witness from the courtroom during trial; the trial court erred by limiting impeachment of a State’s witness; the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial; he should be granted a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; his life sentence is unconstitutional; he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; and he is entitled to a new trial because the cumulative effect of errors denied him a fair trial. Following our review of the entire record, oral argument, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Verchaunt J. Williams v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Verchaunt J. Williams, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of first degree murder, tampering with evidence, and abuse of a corpse, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Toby Michael Holmes
A Grundy County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Toby Michael Holmes, for voluntary manslaughter. A jury convicted him of the lesser-included offense of criminally negligent homicide. The Defendant sought judicial diversion. The trial court denied judicial diversion and sentenced the Defendant to three years of probation, with 1,768 hours of community service to be performed at a local drug recovery center. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) he was not properly convicted of the lesser-included offense of criminally negligent homicide; (2) the trial court improperly denied judicial diversion; and (3) the amount of community service was excessive. After review, we conclude that the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion and grant the Defendant’s request. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects. |
Grundy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony E. Barnett v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Anthony E. Barnett, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. Because the record establishes that the incarcerated petitioner did not submit his petition to the appropriate prison official for mailing within one year of the final action of the supreme court on his direct appeal, we affirm the ruling of the post-conviction court. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Henry Russell v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Henry Russell, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2012 Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convictions of three counts of rape and three counts of statutory rape by an authority figure, arguing that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Myron Lorenzo Johnson v. State of Tennessee
A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Myron L. Johnson, of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to confinement for life plus sixty years. State v. Myron L. Johnson (“Johnson I”), No. M2008-02198-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 521028, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 12, 2010),perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 12, 2010). The Petitioner subsequentlyfiled and adjudicated multiple post-conviction petitions and a habeas corpus petition, for all of which he was not granted relief. In his appeal of his most recent filing, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition. He contended below that his convictions could not stand because there was no fingerprint evidence to corroborate the eyewitness testimony. After review, we conclude the post-conviction court properly summarily dismissed the petition and affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Clark McKenzie
Defendant, James Clark McKenzie, was convicted by a jury of possession with the intent to sell, deliver, or manufacture more than 0.5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a drugfree zone, unlawful possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony drug offense, unlawful possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a violent felony, possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, and tampering with the evidence. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of fifteen years. On appeal, Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for possession with the intent to sell more than 0.5 grams of cocaine within a drug-free zone and that the trial court erred in sentencing him under the 2019 version of the Drug-Free School Zone Act. Following our review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we conclude that the trial court erroneously sentenced Defendant in count two, possession of a firearm by a person with a previous felony drug conviction, and remand for entry of an amended judgment as to that count only. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State Of Tennessee v. Michael Shepard
The defendant, Michael Shepard, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence imposed for his 2017 Wilson County Criminal Court Jury convictions of statutory rape by an authority figure. Discerning no error, we affirm the ruling of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Otto Karl Appelt
The Appellant, Otto Karl Appelt, was convicted in the Bradley County Criminal Court of vandalism of property valued more than $1,000 but less than $2,500, a Class E felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to two years to be served as four months in confinement followed by supervised probation and ordered that he pay $2,000 in restitution. On appeal, the Appellant contends that he was denied his right to counsel because the trial court failed to consider whether his waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent; that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; that the trial court erred by sentencing him to the maximum punishment in the range and by not granting his request for full probation; and that the trial court erred by setting his amount of restitution at $2,000 and by not considering his ability to pay. The State concedes error in the trial court’s restitution order. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the trial court’s order that the Appellant pay $2,000 in restitution and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in all other respects. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Barbara Cunningham v. Fresenius Medical Care, Inc. et al.
In this appeal arising out of a negligence action, the plaintiff died while the litigation was pending, and no motion for substitution of the plaintiff was filed within the ninety-day period following the filing of the suggestion of death as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 25.01. After the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion to enlarge the time, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 6.02. The trial court found no excusable neglect warranting enlargement of the ninety-day period and dismissed the action pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 25.01. The plaintiff appealed the trial court’s denial of its motion to enlarge and the dismissal of the suit. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |