State of Tennessee v. Lonnie K. Cody
E2023-01535-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jill Bartee Ayers
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Goodwin, Jr.

Defendant, Lonnie K. Cody, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probationary
sentence for aggravated burglary, vandalism of $1,000 or less, and unauthorized use of a
motor vehicle. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In Re Bobby B. Et Al.
E2024-00730-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kenneth N. Bailey, Jr.

In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights to the minor children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1); (2) persistent conditions, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3); and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). Because there is clear and convincing evidence to support the grounds relied on by the trial court and its determination that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests, we affirm.

Erin Mishkin v. Robert Cole Gordon
M2024-01397-COA-T10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Deanna B. Johnson

Appellant filed this petition for recusal appeal after the trial court denied a motion to recuse. Because we can find no evidence in the record of any bias that would require recusal, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

Robert E. Lee Flade v. City of Shelbyville, Tennessee et al.
M2022-00553-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Jeffrey S. Bivins
Trial Court Judge: Judge M. Wyatt Burk

In this appeal, we examine the intersection of the rule governing the voluntary dismissal of a civil action, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01, and the statutory scheme of the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-17-101 to -110 (2021). Robert E. Lee Flade filed suit against several defendants over what he considered to be disparaging remarks that were made on social media. Two of the defendants, Stephanie Isaacs and the Bedford County Listening Project (“the BCLP”), each filed not only a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, but also a petition to dismiss pursuant to the TPPA. The TPPA petitions sought dismissal of the complaint with prejudice, an award of attorney’s fees and costs, and an award of sanctions. Mr. Flade filed responses, and both the motions and the petitions were set for hearing. However, before the trial court conducted the hearing, Mr. Flade voluntarily nonsuited his complaint. As a result, the trial court entered an order of dismissal without prejudice. Ms. Isaacs and the BCLP sought to have the trial court adjudicate their TPPA petitions notwithstanding the dismissal of the complaint. The trial court determined that Mr. Flade’s nonsuit concluded the matter and declined to adjudicate the TPPA petitions. On appeal as of right, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Flade v. City of Shelbyville, No. M2022-00553-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2200729, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2023), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Aug. 9, 2023). We granted permission to appeal. Based on our review of applicable law, we conclude that although the right to take a voluntary nonsuit is subject to certain limitations, the mere filing of a TPPA petition is not among them. Thus, we hold that the trial court correctly declined to adjudicate the pending TPPA petitions after Mr. Flade voluntarily nonsuited his complaint. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

State of Tennessee v. Sidarius Jackson
E2023-01384-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kyle A. Hixson

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Sidarius Jackson, of multiple drug, gang,
and gun related felonies, including murder. Before trial, the Defendant filed a motion to
sever his offenses into four separate trials, and the trial granted in part and denied in part
the motion. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied
his motion to suppress evidence found as the result of a warrantless search; (2) the trial
court erred when it denied his motion to sever the offenses, (3) the State’s gangenhancement
presentment was insufficient; (4) the criminal gang statute was not properly
applied to his conspiracy and unlawful possession of a firearm conviction; (5) the trial court
improperly considered acts he committed while a juvenile during sentencing; and (6) the
evidence presented is insufficient to sustain his conviction for conspiracy to possess with
intent to sell a controlled substance. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Quincy D. Scott v. State of Tennessee
E2023-00339-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter
Trial Court Judge: Judge Sandra Donaghy

In 2016, Petitioner, Quincy D. Scott, was convicted by a McMinn County jury of
aggravated robbery, for which he received a sentence of seventeen years’ incarceration as
a Range II, multiple offender at eighty-five percent to be served consecutively to sentences
for convictions in other counties. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, and the
Tennessee Supreme Court denied review. Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief,
alleging the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Following a bifurcated
hearing only on Petitioner’s appellate counsel claim, the post-conviction court granted a
delayed appeal, finding that Petitioner had received the ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel. A panel of this Court reversed and remanded, concluding that the post-conviction
court had failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. On remand, the
post-conviction court again heard Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel as well as his trial counsel claims. The post-conviction court denied relief, and
this appeal followed. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel ineffectively crossexamined
the State’s witnesses, that trial counsel failed to file motions to suppress several
pieces of evidence, that trial counsel failed to appeal the general sessions court’s bind over
of his charges to the grand jury, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction,
that newly discovered evidence proves his actual innocence, and that appellate counsel
failed to file a reply brief on appeal.1 After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of
the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Sanquez Keshawn Jones and Deion Jamaar Glover
M2023-00799-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Kyle A. Hixson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

In this consolidated appeal, the Defendants, Sanquez Keshawn Jones and Deion Jamaar Glover, appeal their convictions for aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, attempted carjacking, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. For these convictions, both Defendants received an effective sentence of twenty-four years’ incarceration. Relative to Defendant Jones’s appeal, he contends the trial court violated Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b)’s general prohibition on propensity evidence by admitting a photograph depicting him possessing a firearm as a juvenile because such behavior is a criminal act. As to Defendant Glover, he first argues the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the State’s proof failed to establish his identity as one of the perpetrators of these offenses. He further alleges the trial court erred by admitting a photograph showing him possessing a firearm, arguing this photograph was irrelevant under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 402, unfairly prejudicial under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403, and propensity evidence violative of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). Next, Defendant Glover contends he is entitled to plain error relief because his right to confrontation was violated when his cell phone data was extracted by a non-testifying Federal Bureau of Investigation agent and admitted against him at trial. Finally, he challenges the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing based upon the dangerous offender classification of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b). After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court in all respects.

Darlene Ann Price Et Al. v. The Center for Family and Implant Dentistry, PLLC
E2023-01100-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge John S. McLellan, III

A dental patient brought this negligence action against the dentist who performed implant procedures on her and his dental practice. After the patient voluntarily dismissed the case against the dentist, the trial court granted the dental practice’s motion for summary judgment. We have determined that genuine issues of material fact exist as to when the dental patient reasonably should have discovered that the dentist had acted wrongfully. We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s decision.

Siskin Hospital for Physical Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Dr. James P. Little
E2023-01328-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jeffrey M. Atherton

This appeal concerns the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s claims for the return of funds held by the plaintiff hospital as untimely filed. We reverse the dismissal, holding that the plaintiff was estopped from pleading the statute of limitations as a defense and that the plaintiff revived the obligation throughout its repeated negotiations with the defendant.

State of Tennessee v. Tanya Ilic
E2023-01322-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Matthew J. Wilson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Andrew Freiberg

Following a bench trial on April 8, 2022, Defendant, Tanya Ilic, was found guilty of one count of aggravated child abuse. Defendant was sentenced to sixteen years and six months of confinement at a rate of 100 percent service. On appeal, Defendant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain her conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jeffrey L. Roberts v. Barry Lynn Carter, et al.
W2023-01316-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bruce Irwin Griffey

This is an appeal concerning the application of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, specifically to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-20-203, 29-20-204, and 29-20- 205 of the Act. At issue is the trial court’s entry of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claims against a county government for damages sustained from an automobile accident allegedly caused by the washout of a road maintained by the county. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s action.

State of Tennessee v. Johnathan James Gilley
E2023-01795-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge Alex E. Pearson

A Hawkins County jury convicted the Defendant, Johnathan James Gilley, of aggravated
assault for which he received a fifteen-year sentence of imprisonment. In this direct appeal,
the sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the
element of serious bodily injury to sustain an aggravated assault conviction. We affirm.

In Re Estate of Joe Richard Estes
M2023-01742-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge A. Ensley Hagan, Jr.

This appeal concerns the statute of limitations for a will contest. David Estes (“Petitioner”) filed a will contest in the Probate Court for Wilson County (“the Probate Court”) seeking to set aside the will of Petitioner’s father, Joe Richard Estes (“Decedent”). Jennifer Brooke Estes Little, Executrix of the Estate of Joe Richard Estes (“Respondent”), Petitioner’s sibling, filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the applicable two-year statute of limitations had expired by the time of day that Petitioner filed his will contest. The Probate Court granted Respondent’s motion. Petitioner appeals to this Court. Petitioner’s will contest was filed two years from the date that Decedent’s will was admitted to probate; thus, it was timely filed. The exact hour and minute of the day the will contest was filed is immaterial. We, therefore, vacate the judgment of the Probate Court, and remand for this case to proceed.

State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Union County, Tennessee v. Michelle Cole
E2023-00818-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Elizabeth C. Asbury

Pro se litigant sought to receive part of the proceeds of a delinquent tax sale. The trial court found that she failed to prove her case. She appealed. We dismiss the appeal due to her failure to follow Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.

Larry McKay v. State of Tennessee
W2023-01207-CCA-R9-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Paula L. Skahan

This is an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s order granting the motions of Defendant, Larry McKay, (“Defendant”) and Shelby County District Attorney General, Steven J. Mulroy, (“DA Mulroy”) to disqualify the Office of Attorney General and Reporter (“Attorney General”) from representing the State during Defendant’s capital error coram nobis proceeding. The trial court concluded that a recently enacted statute, which gave the Attorney General “exclusive control over the [S]tate’s defense of the request for collateral review” in capital cases, see 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 182 (“Public Chapter 182”), violated Article VI, § 5 of the Tennessee Constitution. The Attorney General obtained permission from the trial court and this court to file an interlocutory appeal on behalf of the State to address this constitutional issue of first impression. After thoroughly considering the briefs and arguments of the parties and amici curiae, this court concludes that the trial court erred in finding that Public Chapter 182 was unconstitutional. Accordingly, the order of the trial court is reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings.

State of Tennessee v. Anthony Cornelius Baylis
E2023-00886-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway
Trial Court Judge: Judge Andrew Mark Freiberg

Defendant, Anthony Cornelius Baylis, appeals his Monroe County Circuit Court jury conviction of trafficking a person for a commercial sex act, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; that the trial court erred in affirming his conviction as the thirteenth juror; that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of the grand jury foreperson’s signature attesting that witnesses were sworn; that the trial court erred by admitting certain testimony; that the State wrongfully commented on Defendant’s election to not testify; and that the trial court erred by imposing a fully-incarcerative sentence. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Antwan Jacques Whitehead
M2023-01458-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jill Bartee Ayers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Brody N. Kane

Defendant, Antwan Jacques Whitehead, was convicted by a Wilson County jury for second degree murder by unlawful distribution of fentanyl, for which he received a twenty-three year sentence. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting certain text messages and that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he knew the substance was fentanyl. After review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

State of Tennessee v. Triston Robert Milke
E2024-00519-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert H. Montgomery, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gary McKenzie

The Defendant, Triston Robert Milke, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C
felony, in the Cumberland County Criminal Court and was placed on judicial diversion
with a probationary period of three years. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (Supp. 2023)
(aggravated assault). The trial court revoked the Defendant’s diversion and entered a
judgment of conviction imposing an effective sentence of three years to be served in
confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by revoking his
judicial diversion and ordering confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

David Hayes v. Extreme Excavation, LLC
E2023-01435-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Suzanne Cook

A property owner filed suit against a contractor, asserting that a driveway built by the contractor was defective. The contractor filed a counterclaim against the property owner, seeking compensation for the balance owed for the driveway and additional work the contractor had done on the property. Prior to trial, the contractor made a motion to enforce a purported settlement agreement between the parties. The trial court denied the motion. After a trial on the merits, the court awarded the property owner the cost of repairing the driveway and dismissed the contractor’s counterclaim. The contractor appealed the court’s order. Because we conclude that the trial court should have granted the contractor’s motion to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement, we reverse.

David Hayes v. Extreme Excavation, LLC
E2023-01435-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Suzanne Cook

The majority opinion adopts Extreme Excavation’s position on appeal that the email exchanges between the parties’ attorneys contained all the material terms of the settlement, making the correspondence an enforceable contract. I must respectfully disagree. I believe that the parties here made an agreement to agree. Agreements to agree are unenforceable in Tennessee because their terms lack the definiteness required for performance. Four Eights, LLC v. Salem, 194 S.W.3d 484, 486-87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Contracts must have terms of sufficient definiteness to allow courts to give them exact meanings. United Am. Bank of Memphis v. Walker, 1986 WL 11250, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 1986).

David Ashley Leonard v. Kimberly Champion Leonard
E2023-01002-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jerri Bryant

In this divorce action, the wife appeals the trial court’s distribution of the marital estate, the duration of the transitional alimony awarded to her, and the denial of her request for attorney’s fees and expenses as alimony in solido. The husband challenges the trial court’s decision to award any transitional alimony to the wife. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We deny the parties’ respective requests for attorney’s fees on appeal.

Kisha Dean Trezevant v. Stanley H. Trezevant, III
W2023-00682-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary L. Wagner

This is a post-divorce criminal contempt case. The trial court found Appellant guilty of four counts of criminal contempt based on Appellant’s violations of the trial court’s order. Discerning no error, we affirm

State of Tennessee v. Diann Marie Hicks
W2024-00068-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Ross Dyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bruce Irwin Griffey

The defendant, Diann Marie Hicks, appeals the order of the trial court revoking her probation and ordering her to serve the remainder of her ten-year sentence in confinement. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the revocation and disposition of the defendant’s probation.

State of Tennessee v. William McDaniel
E2024-00141-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jill Bartee Ayers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Amanda B. Dunn

Petitioner, William McDaniel, appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal
sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Following our
review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.

Jennifer A. Seiber v. David S. Seiber
E2024-01331-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor James W. Brooks, Jr.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on July 25, 2024. The notice of appeal was not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until September 3, 2024, more than thirty days from the date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.