Benjamin McCurry v. Agness McCurry
The appellant, Agness McCurry, has appealed the September 29, 2022 order of the Circuit Court for Washington County (“the Trial Court”). Because the September 29, 2022 order does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Justin Michael Banning
The Defendant, Justin M. Banning, was originally sentenced to a term of four years and placed on probation. Thereafter, the Defendant committed a new criminal offense, engaged in unlawful substance use, and violated a no-contact order with the victim. As a consequence, the trial court revoked the suspended sentence and ordered that the Defendant serve the original four-year sentence in custody. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his suspended sentence in its entirety. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Kendall K.
A father and stepmother sought to terminate the parental rights of a mother to her child. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence that the mother had abandoned her child by willful failure to visit during the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition. But the court found the evidence less than clear and convincing that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kailyn B.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. In addition to disputing the grounds for termination and best interest, Mother argues that the petition was fatally flawed, and Petitioners should not have been allowed to amend after the close of their proof. We conclude that the trial court did not err in deciding the case on its merits because the amendments were not prejudicial to Mother and remedied the petition’s deficiencies. We further conclude that clear and convincing evidence was presented of both the grounds for termination and that termination was in the child’s best interest. As such, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Leedy v. Hickory Ridge, LLC
This appeal concerns a breach of contract claim. Mark Leedy (“Plaintiff”) and Hickory Ridge, LLC (“Defendant”) executed the Real Estate Land Installment Contract (“the Contract”) under which Plaintiff would purchase real estate from Defendant located at 195 Derby Drive, Kingsport, Tennessee (“the Property”). Although Defendant accepted money from Plaintiff to be applied toward insurance, Defendant opted to “self-insure.” Sometime later, severe storms damaged the Property. Defendant failed to properly assess or repair the damage. Plaintiff spent another 18 months living on the Property all the while making payments before he left. Plaintiff sued Defendant in the Circuit Court for Sullivan County (“the Trial Court”) for breach of contract. Defendant filed a counterclaim. After a bench trial, the Trial Court ruled in favor of Plaintiff. Defendant appeals, arguing, among other things, that Plaintiff assumed the risk of loss. We hold, inter alia, that Defendant was obliged to insure the Property pursuant to the Contract and associated documents. However, we reverse the Trial Court’s award to Plaintiff of attorney’s fees and expenses as there is no provision in the Contract for such an award to Plaintiff. Otherwise, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Jeffrey Pike v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Steven Jeffrey Pike, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his post-conviction petition, wherein he challenged his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that (1) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to impeach a witness for the State with the witness’s prior statement to police; (2) appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to raise on appeal the trial court’s limitation of defense expert’s testimony; (3) appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to raise on appeal that the Petitioner’s involuntary statements constituted a due process violation not subject to harmless error analysis; and (4) the multiple errors committed by trial counsel and appellate counsel constituted prejudicial error in the aggregate.1 After review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Wayne Eady
Defendant, David Wayne Eady, was convicted by a jury of eleven counts of aggravated robbery and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a repeat violent offender and imposed eleven concurrent sentences of life without the possibility of parole. The trial court ran the life imprisonment sentences concurrently with a fifteen-year sentence for the attempted aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, Defendant contends 1) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever the offenses; 2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress his statements; 3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to disqualify the District Attorney General’s Office, 4) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated robbery as charged in count eight of the indictment; and 5) his convictions for aggravated robbery as charged in counts one and two of the indictment violate Double Jeopardy as a matter of plain error. Because the facts and circumstances support only one conviction for aggravated robbery as charged in counts one and two, we merge the two counts, and remand for entry of amended judgments in counts one and two reflecting the merger. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Travionna W., et al.
This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to four of her children. The trial court found that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) established several grounds for terminating the mother’s parental rights and that termination of her rights was in the children’s best interests. On appeal, the mother contends that the trial court erred when it terminated her rights because the evidence is insufficient to prove any ground for termination or that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interests. We have determined that DCS proved grounds for termination and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Wayne Eady
For the reasons that follow, I am compelled to dissent from the section of the majority opinion affirming the decision of the trial court to deny severance of the offenses in this case. I agree that the trial court correctly determined that permissible joinder, pursuant to Rule 8(b)(2), was proper because of the similar nature of the crimes alleged in this case. In these circumstances, a defendant has an absolute right under Rule 14(b)(1) to have offenses separately tried unless the prosecution shows (1) that the offenses are part of a common scheme or plan, and (2) evidence of each crime would be admissible in the trial of the others. State v. Garrett, 331 S.W.3d 392, 401 (Tenn. 2011); State v. Toliver, 117 S.W.3d 216, 228 (Tenn. 2003); see also State v. Moore, 6 S.W.3d 235, 239 n. 7 (Tenn. 1999) (“[A] common scheme or plan for severance purposes is the same as a common scheme or plan for evidentiary purposes.”). To justify consolidation here, the State relied upon the second category of common scheme or plan evidence, that each of the offenses committed and to be joined were part of a larger, continuing plan or conspiracy. State v. Garrett, 331 S.W.3d at 404 (observing that there are three types of common scheme or plan evidence: (1) offenses that reveal a distinctive design or are so similar as to constitute signature crimes; (2) offenses that are part of a larger, continuing plan or conspiracy; and (3) offenses that are all part of the same criminal transaction) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Because there was no proof that the offenses were part of a larger, continuing plan, I would have concluded that the trial court erred in denying the severance request under Rule 14(b)(1). Garrett, 331 S.W.3d at 403 (the prosecution bears the burden of producing evidence to establish that consolidation is proper). |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Emily Daily Fuller v. Christopher Mark Fuller
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Micah Transou v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Micah Transou, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his guilty plea was not made knowingly or voluntarily because “it created an illegal sentence” and that it was not entered with the effective assistance of counsel. Following oral argument, our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jason C. Johnson v. Tennessee Department of Corrections et al.
This is an appeal from an order dismissing an inmate’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Nash M.
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Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Herron, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
This is a consolidated appeal involving two breach of contract actions filed against the Tennessee Department of Human Services in the Tennessee Claims Commission. Following the presentation of the claimant’s proof, the Commissioner dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm the dismissal. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Columbia Housing & Redevelopment Corp. v. Kinsley Braden
This is a detainer action brought by a landlord to evict its tenant for possessing a firearm in his apartment in contravention of the lease agreement. The landlord, Columbia Housing & Redevelopment Corporation (“Columbia Housing”), provides subsidized housing for the City of Columbia pursuant to the Housing Authorities Law, Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-20-101 to -709, and operates Creekside Acres, a multifamily, low-income public housing complex in Columbia, Tennessee. The tenant voluntarily entered into a lease agreement with Columbia Housing that contained a prohibition against firearms on the premises; nevertheless, the tenant defended the detainer action, contending that the lease agreement violated his rights under the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution. The circuit court ruled in favor of the landlord on the ground that the lease agreement was a valid and enforceable contract, and the tenant voluntarily waived any rights he may have had to possess a firearm on the leased premises. This appeal followed. Significantly, the landlord is a governmental entity “acting as a landlord of property that it owns.” See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 135 (2002). As such, its actions must comply with the Constitution, see Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982), and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine “prevent[s] the government from coercing people into giving” up constitutional rights. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 604 (2013). Although laws “forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings” do not violate the Second Amendment, see D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008), not “all places of public congregation” are “sensitive places.” See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2134 (2022). Moreover, although public housing is government-owned, the leased premises at issue is the tenant’s private home, which is not the kind of “sensitive place” where the government may categorically ban firearm possession. See id. at 2128. Further, complete prohibitions on possession of handguns in the home for self-defense are “historically unprecedented.” See id. Therefore, we hold that Columbia Housing’s prohibition against handguns in the tenant’s “home” is an unconstitutional lease condition. As a consequence, the tenant’s possession of a handgun in his apartment, his home, did not constitute a breach of the lease agreement. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Williams v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Michael Williams, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Hardeman County Circuit Court, arguing the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his petition because his sentence is illegal. After our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Randall R. Ward v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Randall R. Ward, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joe L. Ford v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Joe L. Ford, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Buddy Davis v. Tennessee Board of Appeals
A preferred service employee appealed the termination of his employment. After failing to obtain relief at the Step I and Step II reviews, the employee requested a Step III hearing before the Tennessee Board of Appeals. The Board determined that the employee engaged in conduct unbecoming of an employee in state service but termination was too harsh a punishment. So it modified the employee’s discipline to a one-step demotion and recommended that he be transferred. The employee sought judicial review of the Board’s decision. The chancery court reversed, finding that the decision to demote the employee was not supported by substantial and material evidence. We reverse the chancery court and affirm the decision of the Board.
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mandon Rogers v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Mandon Rogers, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Kansas B., et al.
The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a dependency and neglect petition with respect to four children, two of whom are the eldest children of the mother and her first husband and two of whom are the youngest children of the mother and her current husband. DCS filed the petition upon receiving a referral that the mother’s sevenyear- old daughter from her first marriage had been sexually abused by her stepfather, the mother’s current husband. The stepfather sought to call the seven-year-old child as a witness during the trial, but the trial court denied his request upon balancing the probative value of the child’s testimony with the potential emotional and psychological harm the child could suffer from testifying. The mother and stepfather have appealed. Upon thorough review, we conclude that the trial court erred in utilizing this balancing test and precluding the stepfather from calling the child as a witness. We therefore vacate the trial court’s final judgment adjudicating the children dependent and neglected and remand the case so that the trial court may hear the child’s testimony, provided that the child is competent to testify and that the court does not exclude the testimony pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403. If the child is allowed to testify, the trial court should consider utilizing the accommodations set forth in Tennessee Rule of Juvenile Practice and Procedure 306 to ameliorate any potential harm that testifying may cause the child. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Burkes v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jerry Burkes, appeals from the Greene County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for money laundering, theft of property valued at $60,000 or more, and twelve counts of sales tax evasion. On appeal, he argues he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Petitioner also contends that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by withholding records relevant to his tax liability; that he was convicted upon an invalid presentment; that he was deprived of a fair and impartial grand jury in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; that the trial court admitted evidence at trial in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for money laundering.1 After reviewing the record, we conclude that the Petitioner failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance from appellate counsel and that the remainder of the Petitioner’s claims have been previously determined, waived, or do not entitle him to relief. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Clifton Lawrence Still
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant-Appellant, Clifton Lawrence Still, entered a guilty plea to one count of kidnapping, a Class C Felony, and received an eight-year sentence, with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s application for alternative sentencing and ordered the eight-year sentence to be served in confinement in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Adam S. Massengill v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Adam S. Massengill, entered a guilty plea to sixteen counts of aggravated statutory rape, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-five years’ incarceration pursuant to the plea agreement. Thereafter, the Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. |
Claiborne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Phillip David Daniel
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Phillip David Daniel, Defendant, violated the terms of his probation by incurring new criminal charges and ordered the execution of the sentence as originally entered. On appeal, Defendant concedes that he violated his probation but claims that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence. Following a de novo review of the record, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals |