Ulyes Williams v. City of Knoxville

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The City of Knoxville contends (1) the claim is barred by the statute of limitations and (2) the trial court erred in not accepting the opinion testimony of the treating physician. The claimant contends the trial court erred in allowing credit for overpaid temporary total disability benefits. The panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The claimant, Williams, has less than an eighth grade education, little or no reading or writing skills and no vocational training. He was 39 years old at the time of the trial. He has worked for the city since about 1988, first as a laborer and later as tractor-mower operator. In 1992, he suffered a compensable back injury, was temporarily disabled and returned to work until September 18, 1995, when he re-injured his back at work. Back surgery was performed on or about November 18, 1995 and he returned to work around March 1, 1996 for a few weeks, quit because of post-surgical problems, then returned again around July 1, 1996. He has since been terminated. This civil action was commenced on March 29, 1996. The defendant filed and served its answer on April 26, 1996, but did not aver therein that the claim was barred by any statute of limitations. That a claim is so barred is an affirmative defense and the facts constituting such defense must be set forth in short and plain terms in a defendant's answer. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.3. Moreover, the record fails to establish that the claimant had fair notice of the employer's intention to assert the statute of limitations as a defense. The defense was thus waived. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.8. Additionally, the panel finds the defense to be without merit. The first issue is resolved in favor of the appellee. As the employer insists, citing Orman v. Williams Sonoma, Inc., 83 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tenn. 1991), the trial judge must choose which of conflicting expert medical opinions to accept. We are aware of no rule which 2