Opinions
Demario Quintez Driver v. State of Tennessee
A Cheatham County jury convicted the Petitioner, Demario Quintez Driver, of rape and coercion of a witness. On appeal, this court affirmed the trial court’s judgments. State v. Driver, No. M2021-00538-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 1284978, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. April 29, 2022), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 29, 2022). The Petitioner filed a timely post-conviction petition, and after a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that the cumulative errors of his trial counsel warrant relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Cheatham | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Justin Rivers
The Defendant, Justin Rivers, was convicted of aggravated child neglect and received a sentence of fifteen years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) his motion for judgment of acquittal should be treated as a prematurely filed motion for new trial; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; and (3) the aggravated child neglect statute is unconstitutionally vague. After review, we dismiss the appeal due to its untimeliness. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alton Earl Ingram v. Lisa Marie Glode
The appellant filed an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of a recusal motion pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. However, the trial judge has presented this case to the presiding judge of his district, pursuant to local rule, for another judge to hear the matter by interchange. Thus, we determine that the appellant’s Rule 10B appeal is moot and dismiss the appeal. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Calvin Bryant, III v. State of Tennessee
State employee received proton beam radiation therapy for prostate cancer. Insurance company denied authorization of the treatment as “investigational” and not “medically necessary” pursuant to the insurance plan and its medical policy. After exhausting administrative remedies, the employee submitted an appeal to the Tennessee Claims Commission, alleging breach of contract. The Claims Commission found that the treatment was not a covered expense, granting summary judgment in favor of the State. We now affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Bradford H.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to one of her five children. After a five-day termination trial, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that two grounds for termination were proven and that termination was in the best interest of the child. We vacate one ground for termination but otherwise affirm the termination of parental rights. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy McKinney v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Timothy McKinney, of one count of attempted second degree murder, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. State v. McKinney, No. W2016-00834-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 1055719, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 23, 2019), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 19, 2018). The Petitioner also pleaded guilty to three counts of being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a repeat violent offender to life without the possibility of parole. The Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed his convictions and sentence. Id. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, amended by appointed counsel, in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective in multiple ways. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal ensued. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
CCD Oldsmith Henry, LLC et al. v. Town of Nolensville
This appeal concerns individual liability in the context of a limited liability company. John Olderman (“Olderman”) and Christopher Smith (“Smith”) are manager members of CCD Oldsmith Henry, LLC, and Oldsmith Group, LLC (“Oldsmith,” collectively). Oldsmith asked the Town of Nolensville (“the Town”) to rezone certain property so it could develop residential units on the property. This development would increase traffic at a nearby intersection. At a hearing before the Nolensville Board of Mayor and Aldermen (“the BOMA”), Smith said that Oldsmith could help pay to improve the intersection. The Town subsequently rezoned the property. Oldsmith later declined to pay what the Town said it owed, asserting it never agreed to pay so much. In response, the Town refused to issue building permits. Oldsmith sued the Town in the Circuit Court for Williamson County (“the Trial Court”). The Town filed a counterclaim and a motion to join Smith and Olderman. The Town alleged that Smith and Olderman fraudulently and negligently misrepresented what Oldsmith was willing to pay. The Trial Court denied the motion, ruling that the Town could obtain complete relief without Smith and Olderman. The Trial Court also ruled that Smith and Olderman could not be held individually liable based on these allegations. The Town appeals. We hold that the Town alleged nothing actionable against Olderman; that the Town sufficiently alleged promissory fraud against Smith; that Smith’s status as manager member of an LLC does not insulate him from liability for his own acts or omissions; and that the Trial Court’s denial of joinder as to Smith was an abuse of discretion. We affirm the denial of joinder as to Olderman. Otherwise, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shenessa L. Sokolosky
The Tennessee Supreme Court has remanded this case for consideration of the Defendant’s appeal from the Smith County Criminal Court’s probation revocation of her two consecutive eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentences for her guilty-pleaded misdemeanor convictions for marijuana possession and possession of drug paraphernalia. See State v. Shenessa L. Sokolosky, --- S.W.3d. ---, No. M2022-00873-SC-R11-CD, 2025 WL 2016420 (Tenn. July 18, 2025) (reversing State v. Shenessa L. Sokolosky, No. M2022-00873-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 1780085 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2024)). This court concluded in its previous opinion that the Defendant’s appeal was moot because she had fully served her sentence and was no longer constrained by confinement or probation supervision. The Tennessee Supreme Court disagreed and concluded that the mootness doctrine does not apply because a probation revocation may result in future adverse consequences, even after completion of a sentence. Upon further review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further findings of fact pursuant to State v. Wade, 863 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Tenn. 1993). We, likewise, remand for the entry of a corrected judgment form in Count 6 to reflect consecutive service with Count 5 and for the entry of judgment forms, if necessary, reflecting a dismissal of the charges in Counts 2, 3, 4, and 7. |
Smith | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dalton Bryce Patterson
The Defendant, Dalton Bryce Patterson, filed a motion through counsel seeking review of the Blount County Criminal Court’s June 4, 2025, order revoking his release on his own recognizance bond and imposing a monetary bond in the amount of $100,000. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-144; Tenn. R. App. P. 8. He contends that the trial court’s use of “hold without bond” warrants for violations of pretrial release supervision violated his due process rights, see State v. Burgins, 464 S.W.3d 298, 306 (Tenn. 2015), and that the court improperly modified his bond based on alleged violations of his release conditions. The State opposes the motion, asserting that the trial court’s actions were consistent with due process. Upon our review, we respectfully deny the Defendant’s motion. |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
Dennis N. Etheredge et al. v. Estate of Doris Etheredge
This is the second appeal arising from this declaratory judgment action. The defendant died during the pendency of this action. After a suggestion of the defendant’s death was filed with the trial court, the defendant’s probate estate was substituted as the defendant. More than one year after the defendant’s death, the defendant’s estate filed a motion to dismiss on the ground the plaintiffs failed to properly revive the action against the defendant’s estate as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 30-2-320. The trial court agreed and dismissed the action on the ground the plaintiffs did not follow the procedures of Tennessee Code Annotated § 30-2-320 because they filed “neither an order of revivor nor the complaint [from] this case in the Decedent’s probate proceeding, In re Estate of Doris Etheredge, Putnam Co. Probate Court No. 20739 at any time, much less within one (1) year of the Decedent’s date of death.” We affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shenessa L. Sokolosky (Dissenting)
I respectfully dissent. This case comes to us on a probation revocation where, even taking the State’s evidence at face value, the proof does not establish a violation. The trial court found absconsion and failure to pay fines and costs, but the record supports neither finding. And because the probation warrant was already admitted and considered, a remand to supply a “good cause” hearsay finding cannot cure the problem. Whether the hearsay is excluded or admitted again, the result is the same: the State’s proof remains insufficient to sustain the revocation. |
Smith | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Nathan Allen Wallace v. State of Tennessee
Nathan Allan Wallace, Petitioner, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a review, we determine Petitioner failed to demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective or that any of the alleged deficiencies were prejudicial. Consequently, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
MARY WALKER TOWERS (CHA) v. INDUGU "JABBO" JAMEEL ABDUL-HAKIM
A tenant was evicted by a housing authority for failure to permit access to his unit and failure to pay rent. The tenant appealed. Because the tenant’s pro se brief has severe deficiencies under the Rules of Appellate Procedure and because we are unable to determine the nature of the error asserted by the tenant, the appeal is dismissed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Koalis Peete
The Defendant, Koalis Peete, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Quadarius Deshun Martin v. State of Tennessee
Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the Appellant, Quadarius Deshun Martin, pled guilty to seven offenses on April 4, 2024, and received an agreed-upon sentence of twelve years’ incarceration. Eighteen days later, the Appellant filed an unsigned, untitled, handwritten pleading in which he stated he wished to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing that he pled guilty under duress and that trial counsel failed to investigate his case. The trial court entered an order construing the filing as a petition for post-conviction relief and appointing counsel. At the subsequent evidentiary hearing, the trial court stated that it would hear both the Appellant’s request to withdraw his guilty pleas and his petition for post-conviction relief. Following the hearing, the trial court denied post-conviction relief but did not rule upon the Appellant’s request to withdraw his guilty pleas. The Appellant appealed, arguing the trial court erred by failing to find he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs to address whether the trial court erred by construing the Appellant’s filing as a petition for post-conviction relief despite his request to withdraw his guilty plea. Following our review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for consideration of the Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
IN RE KATALEYA F.
This appeal involves a petition to terminate the parental rights of a father to his young daughter. The trial court found that the ground of failure to manifest an ability or willingness to assume custody of the child had been proven by clear and convincing evidence and that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The father appeals. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jason A. McCain
The Defendant, Jason A. McCain, pled guilty in the Henry County Circuit Court to reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to six years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court should have sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender because the State did not file its notice of intent to seek enhancement punishment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-202(a) until the day of his sentencing hearing and that his six-year sentence is excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Henry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Leonard Harrison Beard, Jr.
The Defendant, Leonard Harrison Beard, Jr., was convicted by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of two counts of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor; unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class B felony; reckless endangerment involving a habitation, a Class C felony; vandalism valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt); 39-13-202 (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree murder); 39-13-103 (2018) (reckless endangerment); 39-17-1307 (2018) (felon in possession of a firearm); 39-14-408 (Supp. 2024) (vandalism); 39-14-105 (2018) (subsequently amended) (grading); 39-17-1324 (2018) (subsequently amended) (employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony). The trial court imposed an effective fifty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial on the basis that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dwight Mitchell v. State Farm Insurance Company et al.
This is an appeal from a final judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claims against a doctor as time barred and for failure to comply with the Health Care Liability Act. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Appellate Court within thirty days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Trousdale | Court of Appeals | |
Quadarius Deshun Martin v. State of Tennessee - Dissent
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion reversing the trial court’s judgment and remanding for consideration of Appellant’s pleading as a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(f) because I conclude that Appellant abandoned any claim of relief on appeal based on Rule 32(f). |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Raymond Cacciatore
Defendant, Joseph Raymond Cacciatore, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for a reduction of sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 in which Defendant sought a reduction of his effective ten-year sentence of incarceration resulting from his guilty pleas to two counts of solicitation of a minor, three counts of coercion of a witness, and one count of attempted especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. On appeal, Defendant contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered, and that he was arrested and confined without being properly indicted. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Mark Hall
The Defendant, John Mark Hall, appeals his Knox County jury conviction of domestic assault, for which he received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days on unsupervised probation after service of 192 hours in jail. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments, that the sufficiency and weight of the evidence was lacking, and that the trial court erred by failing to rule on his renewed motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
In Re Skyler M.
Mother appeals the trial court’s findings that (1) termination of Mother’s parental rights is supported by the grounds of persistence of conditions, mental incompetence, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, and (2) termination is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Malik Tashaw Brown
The Defendant, Michael Malik Tashaw Brown, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of filing a false police report, possession of marijuana, and leaving the scene of an accident. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in admitting irrelevant and prejudicial evidence about a shotgun found in his vehicle, and that the State failed to establish that he possessed illegal marijuana rather than legal hemp. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
THE WEATHERBY GROUP, LLC v. HERITAGE TRUST COMPANY
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the present action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The plaintiff concedes that the order in the previous action filed in circuit court satisfied the first three of the four elements of the doctrine of res judicata but denied that the prior action had been adjudicated on the merits. As for the fourth element, the chancery court ruled that the judgment in the circuit court action constituted an adjudication on the merits because the dismissal was “with prejudice.” On this basis the chancery court dismissed the action at bar. The plaintiff appeals. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals |