COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

In Re Zoey L.
E2022-01067-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge William Talley Ridley

In a private petition for terminationof parental rights, the petitioner alleged multiple grounds for termination: (1) abandonment for failure to visit; (2) abandonment for failure to support; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court found the Father’s parental rights should be terminatedbased upon thesethree groundsand that termination was in the child’s best interest. We affirm the trial court’s ruling as to the termination grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support. Because the trial court did not make findings of factconcluding that placing legal and physical custody withFather would pose a risk of substantial harm tothe physical or psychological welfare of the child, we must vacatethe trial court’s ruling as to the failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody ground. We affirm the trial court’s conclusionthat termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child.

Court of Appeals

Nikita R. Thomas v. Donald L. Smith
E2022-00964-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson II
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ronald Thurman

In this real property dispute, the petitioner brought an action to quiet title to and remove
the respondent from a parcel of improved real property located in Cumberland County.
Following a bench trial, the trial court ordered that the title of the property be fully vested
in the petitioner. The trial court also ordered the respondent to vacate the premises within
ten days. Following a damages hearing, the trial court entered an order awarding to the
petitioner $8,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000 in attorney’s fees. The
respondent has appealed, and the petitioner has raised an issue alleging that this is a
frivolous appeal. Because we are unable to discern from the trial court’s judgment any
consideration of the Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5
factors (“RPC 1.5 factors”), we vacate the award of attorney’s fees and remand for the
trial court to make a new determination of a reasonable attorney’s fee award to the
petitioner based on the RPC 1.5 factors. We deny the petitioner’s request for damages on
appeal. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

Court of Appeals

Lynne S. Cherry et al. v. Del Frisco’s Grille of Tennessee, LLC et al.
M2022-00969-COA-R10-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael Binkley

In this premises liability case concerning a customer’s fall inside of a restaurant, video surveillance footage from a security camera in the restaurant was not preserved, precipitating the filing of a sanctions motion by the Plaintiffs for spoliation. Although several sources of evidence existed pertaining to the condition of the restaurant flooring where the customer fell, and although the trial court concluded that the Plaintiffs were not prevented from proving fault in this case in the absence of the video evidence, the trial court ultimately entered significant sanctions against the Defendants, including holding that it was conclusively established for purposes of trial that the Defendants had actual or constructive notice that the floor where the fall occurred was “slick” because of a substance or because of a general and continuing condition, as well as striking the Defendants’ affirmative defenses of comparative fault. Upon the filing of an application by the Defendants, we granted an extraordinary appeal under Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the trial court’s sanctions order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Williamson Court of Appeals

Heather R. Wilder v. Joseph C. Wilder
E2022-00990-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gregory S. McMillan

This appeal concerns a long-running domestic matter. Heather R. Wilder (“Mother”) and
Joseph C. Wilder (“Father”) were issued a final judgment of divorce by the Circuit Court
for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) in 2010. Issues concerning child support have
persisted since then. In the most recent chapter, the Trial Court allowed Mother’s attorney
to withdraw five days before trial but denied her request for a continuance. The Trial Court
subsequently entered its final order. Mother appeals. We find that the Trial Court abused
its discretion in denying Mother a reasonable continuance. We vacate the Trial Court’s
judgment and remand for a new trial to be conducted after Mother has had a reasonable
continuance in which to try to retain counsel or otherwise prepare for trial pro se.

Court of Appeals

Felicia Willett, et al. v. Olymbec USA, LLC
W2022-00028-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor JoeDae L. Jenkins

Tenant appeals the trial court’s decision to grant landlord a judgment under a holdover
provision in a commercial lease. Because we conclude that landlord voluntarily
relinquished its claim under the holdover provision, we reverse the trial court’s judgment
of damages, late fees, and attorney’s fees, but affirm the trial court’s decision to deny
tenant’s motion to amend her complaint. We remand this case for the determination of the
sole issue agreed to be heard by the parties.

Shelby Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Michael L. Bailey
M2022-01386-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

The State of Tennessee sought the enforcement of a prior administrative order against the Appellant related to the Appellant’s violations of the Tennessee Water Quality Control Act of 1977, requesting civil penalties, damages, and injunctive relief. The State filed a motion for summary judgment, and the Appellant sought a continuance based on parallel criminal proceedings. The trial court denied the motion for a continuance and granted summary judgment to the State. On appeal, the Appellant asserts that the chancery court and administrative tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction and that the chancery court erred in denying his motion for a continuance. We conclude that any challenge to personal jurisdiction has been waived and that the chancery court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a continuance. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Yakima Marks Green v. Derrick Lamar Green
M2021-00955-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phillip R. Robinson

A father petitioned to change the primary residential parent and for immediate physical custody of his child based on the mother’s allegedly inappropriate behavior. The court granted Father an ex parte order of immediate physical custody. At the show cause hearing, the court determined that the mother had engaged in a pattern of emotional abuse of the father and the child such that her parenting time should be limited. After a final hearing on the father’s petition, the court found a material change of circumstances had occurred and that it was in the child’s best interest to modify the permanent parenting plan. The court then adopted a modified parenting plan that named the father the primary residential parent and limited the mother’s parenting time. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Kim Renae Nelson v. Loring E. Justice
E2021-01398-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Senior Judge William B. Acree

The trial court found Appellant/Father in civil contempt for alleged failure to comply with discovery propounded by Appellee/Mother. The trial court also dismissed Father’s petition to modify visitation and child support on the ground that Father’s petition constituted an abusive civil lawsuit. We reverse the trial court’s findings of civil contempt and abusive civil lawsuit. However, because the parties’ child has reached majority, we conclude that Father’s petition to modify is moot. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Father’s petition on the ground of mootness.

Court of Appeals

Rachel Karrie Bryant Ramsey v. Nathan Lynn Bryant Et Al.
E2022-01503-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Douglas T. Jenkins

The notice of appeal filed by the appellants, Nathan Lynn Bryant and Melissa Bryant, stated that appellants were appealing the judgment entered on September 27, 2022. Inasmuch as the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Court of Appeals

Holston Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Bethany Presbyterian Church
E2022-01337-COA-R3-CV

A congregation within the Presbyterian Church sought to disaffiliate from its presbytery while retaining ownership of its real property. The presbytery argued that the congregation did not own the real property outright but rather held it in trust for the benefit of the national body of the Presbyterian Church. Following a hearing on competing motions for summary judgment, the trial court determined that the congregation owned the property outright. Thus, it denied the presbytery’s motion and granted the congregation’s motion. The presbytery timely appealed to this Court. Following careful review, we reverse.

Court of Appeals

Benjamin McCurry v. Agness McCurry
E2023-00827-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas J. Wright

Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court
lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Washington Court of Appeals

In Re Skylar M.
E2023-00875-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ronald Thurman

The appellant filed a notice of appeal more than thirty days from the date of entry of the
order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not
timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee, ex re., Commissioner of the Department of Transportation v. Pagidipati Family General Partnership, et al.
W2022-00078-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jerry Stokes

This is an eminent domain case in which the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department
of Transportation (“the State”) condemned two portions of the defendant’s eighteen-acre
property in Shelby County. Prior to a jury trial to determine the fair market value of the
condemned property, the State filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of or reference
to a prior sale of a portion of the defendant’s real property to a neighboring fireworks
business. The State argued that the previous sale was not an arm’s-length transaction or a
comparable sale. The trial court granted the State’s motion in limine, excluding the prior
sale from the jury’s consideration. The defendant has appealed. Determining that the
defendant has failed to properly cite to the record in its appellate brief or provide us with a
sufficient record on appeal, we conclude that the defendant has waived its challenge to the
trial court’s exclusion of evidence. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Linda C. Black as next of kin of Robert Junious Black v. State of Tennessee
M2022-00399-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Commissioner James A. Haltom

This is a wrongful-death health care liability action against a skilled nursing facility, the Tennessee State Veterans’ Home in Clarksville (“TSVH-Clarksville”), which is owned and operated by the State of Tennessee. The claimant, Linda Black (“Claimant”), is the surviving spouse of Robert Junious Black, deceased, who was a resident of TSVHClarksville from December 16, 2016, through January 9, 2017. Claimant asserted that TSVH-Clarksville proximately caused Mr. Black’s death by failing to monitor and report his symptoms under the applicable standard of care. In particular, Claimant alleged that the staff at TSVH-Clarksville (1) failed to follow Mr. Black’s care plan for risk of dehydration; (2) failed to prevent Mr. Black from developing a urinary tract infection; (3) failed to notify Mr. Black’s physician of a significant changes in his clinical status; and (4) failed to properly assess Mr. Black. Following a two-day bench trial, the Claims Commissioner found that Claimant failed to establish a health care liability claim because, inter alia, the State complied with the applicable standards of care and Claimant failed to establish causation. This appeal followed. We affirm.

Court of Appeals

In Re Anthony N.
M2022-01360-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge M. Wyatt Burk

A juvenile appeals the decision to re-commit him to DCS custody for treatment and
services. We conclude that this appeal is moot in light of post-judgment facts.

Bedford Court of Appeals

Tricon Construction, Inc D/B/A Tricon 3 Construction, Inc. v. Michelle Perry Et Al.
M2022-00664-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Brothers

Husband and wife appellants, acting pro se, appeal the trial court’s decision to pierce the corporate veil of husband’s construction company to hold husband individually responsible for the corporation’s breach of contract, as well as the judgment against both husband and wife for contemptuous conduct. We do not reach the merits of the case due to the appellants’ failure to comply with the briefing requirements set out in Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee and dismiss the appeal.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Carolyn Cruise v. Brittany Byrd
M2022-01578-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clifton David Briley

This appeal arises out of a dog bite incident that occurred at a dog park within an apartment complex. The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant who owned the dog that bit her. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court entered an order granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissing the plaintiff s complaint with prejudice. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Paul W. Chrisman, Jr., Trustee v. SP Title, LLC, Et Al.
M2022-00944-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph A. Woodruff

This appeal arises out of a third-party complaint asserting claims arising from the sale of real property. The trial court entered an order granting in part and denying in part the thirdparty defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Afterward, the third-party plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal as to his remaining claim, which was then dismissed without prejudice by the trial court. The third-party plaintiff appeals. We reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Williamson Court of Appeals

Andrew Hasley v. Harleigh Lott
M2022-01141-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael Meise

This appeal arises from a juvenile court’s determination of a permanent parenting plan, in which the trial court found all best interest factors to be equal between the parents, granted Mother and Father equal parenting time, and designated them as “Joint Primary Residential Parents.” Mother raises several issues. Generally, she contends that the evidence preponderated against the trial court’s findings that all applicable best interest factors were equal between Mother and Father and that the trial court abused its discretion in crafting the permanent parenting plan. We find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings concerning two of the best interest factors. We also find that the court erred, as a matter of law, by designating the parties as joint primary residential parents in the absence of an agreement to do so. In accordance with these findings, we designate Mother as primary residential parent, affirm the trial court’s parenting plan in all other respects, and remand to the trial court for entry of judgment in accordance with this opinion.

Dickson Court of Appeals

Emergency Medical Care Facilities, P.C. v. Bluecross Blueshield of Tennessee, Inc., et al.
M2021-00174-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Anne C. Martin

Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s decision to dismiss its class action allegations against two defendants on the basis of collateral estoppel. Specifically, the trial court ruled that while a prior determination that Appellant was not entitled to class action certification was not a final judgment on the merits, due to a dismissal of that case without prejudice, the ruling was “sufficiently firm” to have preclusive effect, citing the Restatement (Second) Of Judgments. Because Tennessee law requires a final adjudication on the merits for a judgment to be entitled to preclusive effect, we reverse.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Christine L. Manion Et Al. v. The Baldini, Pryor, and Lammert Partnership
M2022-00384-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Joseph A. Woodruff

The owners of certain real property sought a prescriptive easement over the parking lot of an adjacent neighbor. The trial court granted the prescriptive easement over the entirety of the neighbor's parking lot. The neighbor appealed. Discerning that the record contains clear and convincing evidence of all the requirements for a prescriptive easement, we affirm. We modify the trial court's judgment, however, by limiting the scope of easement to the route followed when the route was first established. 

Williamson Court of Appeals

George Gary Ingram v. Dr. Michael Gallagher, Et Al.
E2020-01222-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Jeffrey Hollingsworth

This is a health care liability case. George Gary Ingram ("Ingram") filed a health care
liability action in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County ("the Trial Court") against, among
others, Dr. Michael Gallagher ("Dr. Gallagher') and Chattanooga-Hamilton County
Hospital Authority d/b/a Erlanger Health System ("Erlanger") ("Defendants,"
collectively). Plaintiff later filed an amended complaint naming Dr. Gallagher as the sole
defendant. He thus removed the other defendants, including Erlanger, from the lawsuit.
Dr. Gallagher then filed an answer asserting, as a defense, that his governmental employer,
Erlanger, was not made a party to the action. Consequently, Plaintiff filed a motion to alter
or amend the Trial Court's order of dismissal as to Erlanger, which was denied. Plaintiff s
claims were dismissed. In Ingram v. Gallagher, No. E2020-01222-COA-R3-CV, 2021
WL 3028161 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 19, 2021) ("Ingram I"), we reversed the Trial Court,
holding that the Trial Court erred in denying Plaintiff s motion to revise the order of
dismissal. We pretermitted all other issues. The Tennessee Supreme Court then reversed
this Court, holding that Erlanger was removed from the lawsuit when Plaintiff filed his
amended complaint and that the order of dismissal had no legal effect so there was no order to amend. Our Supreme Court remanded for us to address the remaining issues. We hold, inter alia, that the savings statute is inapplicable as the Governmental Tort Liability Act
("the GTLA") is implicated; that the Trial Court did not err in dismissing Erlanger for lack
of pre-suit notice and a certificate of good faith; and that the Trial Court did not err in
granting summary judgment to Dr. Gallagher as his governmental employer, Erlanger, was not made a party. We affirm.

Court of Appeals

In Re N.M.
E2022-01398-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kenneth N. Bailey, Jr.

This appeal arises from the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child
upon the juvenile court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence of the statutory grounds
of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, abandonment by failure to visit,
abandonment by failure to support the child, abandonment by wanton disregard for the
child’s welfare, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent
conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the
child.1 The juvenile court further found that termination of the mother’s parental rights
was in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Court of Appeals

Denise Phillips Jones v. Kelvin Dominic Jones
M2022-00624-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Lee Davies

This appeal arises from a divorce. Prior to the marriage, the parties signed an antenuptial agreement that included a provision whereby Husband’s son from a prior marriage would be entitled to one-fourth of the value of the marital property upon divorce. During proceedings in the trial court, Husband filed a petition to hold Wife in criminal contempt. The trial court dismissed Husband’s petition for contempt, granted Husband a divorce on the uncontested ground of adultery, found the provision regarding Husband’s son to be unenforceable, and equitably divided the parties’ marital property. The trial court also declined to award Husband his requested discretionary fees. Primarily based on Husband’s failure to follow briefing requirements, we affirm the trial court’s judgment on all issues.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Madeline Luckett Nolan v. Gregory Stewart Nolan
W2021-01018-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rhynette N. Hurd

The circuit court, finding that Father committed twenty-one counts of criminal contempt,
imposed a jail sentence and awarded Mother attorney’s fees. Father appeals, arguing that
the court’s holding violates the prohibition against double jeopardy, that the evidence is
insufficient to support thirteen of the counts, and that the court erred in awarding attorney’s
fees. We conclude that double jeopardy is not implicated in the findings of contempt and
that Father has not presented an argument entitling him to relief regarding the attorney’s
fees award. However, because the evidence is insufficient to support the finding of
contempt on Counts 9, 16, 36, and 40, we reverse the circuit court’s finding of contempt
on these counts. In addition, we conclude that Count 12 must be vacated because the
factual predicate of the trial court’s findings appears to potentially rest upon an unsupported
basis. The remaining 16 counts are affirmed and the case is remanded for further
proceedings.

Shelby Court of Appeals