Video recordings of oral arguments heard in Nashville before the Tennessee Supreme Court are available to view approximately 21 days after the oral argument. You may access the video by clicking on the case number listed below.
Cases were live-streamed to the TN Courts YouTube page.
November 6th, 2024
State of Tennessee v. Pervis Tyrone Payne - W2022-00210-SC-R11-CD
In 1988, a jury convicted Pervis Tyrone Payne of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of assault with intent to commit murder. He was sentenced to death for the murder convictions. The trial court imposed a thirty-year sentence for the assault conviction and ordered all sentences to run consecutively based on a finding that Mr. Payne was a dangerous offender. The convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. Later, in 2021, the General Assembly amended Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(g) to provide a process for showing that a death row inmate is ineligible for the death penalty due to an intellectual disability. Mr. Payne filed a petition under the amended statute for a determination of intellectual disability. After its expert conducted an evaluation, the State conceded that Mr. Payne meets the statutory definition of intellectual disability and is no longer eligible for the death penalty. The parties agreed that Mr. Payne must receive two life sentences but disagreed whether the sentences should be served consecutively or concurrently. Over the State’s objections, the trial court ordered a new sentencing hearing to determine the issue. After the hearing, the trial court found that Mr. Payne was no longer a dangerous offender and ordered the murder sentences to run concurrently. The State appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the State’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether a trial court has jurisdiction to reconsider the consecutive alignment of a defendant’s original sentences after a determination of intellectual disability pursuant to a petition under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(g).
October 4th, 2024
Gary Wygant and Francie Hunt v. Bill Lee et al. - M2023-01686-SC-R3-CV
This direct appeal arises from a challenge to the maps of state legislative districts implemented after the 2020 census. In 2022, Plaintiffs Gary Wygant of Gibson County, Francie Hunt of Davidson County, and Telise Turner of Shelby County filed the operative complaint in this action challenging the maps as unconstitutional. Ms. Turner was later dismissed from the lawsuit. The case was tried before a three-judge panel, which reached a split decision in November 2023.
Mr. Wygant alleged that the House of Representatives map violated Article II, § 5 of the Tennessee Constitution by dividing more counties than necessary. The panel unanimously found that Mr. Wygant only had constitutional standing to challenge the split of Gibson County, where he is from, and dismissed all claims relating to other Tennessee counties. A majority of the panel judges then concluded the House map did not violate the Constitution because the State established the legislature acted in good faith. One panel judge dissented, disagreeing on which party bears the burden of proof, and finding that the State had not proven that the House map split as few counties as possible.
Ms. Hunt alleged that the Senate map violated Article II, § 3 because the districts in Davidson County are not consecutively numbered. The State offered no defense on the map’s constitutionality but argued that Ms. Hunt lacked standing to bring her challenge. A majority of the panel judges found that Ms. Hunt satisfied the requirements for constitutional standing and struck down the map as unconstitutional. One panel judge dissented, finding that Ms. Hunt had failed to demonstrate how the non-consecutive numbering of the Davidson County senatorial districts had caused her an injury sufficient to establish constitutional standing.
Both parties appealed the panel’s decision directly to this Court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-18-105.
September 5th, 2024
Payton Castillo v. David Lloyd Rex M.D. Et Al. E2022-00322-SC-R11-CV
The plaintiff filed this healthcare liability action against several healthcare providers following the death of her husband. We granted this interlocutory appeal in which the defendants request review of the trial court’s denial of their motion for a protective order to prohibit further inquiry into a meeting held between the defendant hospital and the decedent’s family. We affirm the trial court.
September 5th, 2024
Robin M. McNabb v. Gregory Harrison E2022-01577-SC-R11-CV
his case involves an election contest filed by the plaintiff based on the defendant’s residency eligibility for the office of Lenoir City Municipal Court Judge. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that the defendant had complied with article VI,section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution because the clause required, inter alia, that he be a resident within the judicial district, not necessarily within the city limits, to preside over the municipal court, which has concurrent jurisdiction with a general sessions court. The plaintiff has appealed. Upon review, we determine that the language of article VI, section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution requiring a judge elected to an inferior court to have been a resident of the “district or circuit” to which he or she is assigned means, under these circumstances, that the Lenoir City Municipal Judge must have been a resident of Loudon County for at least one year prior to the judge’s election because the Lenoir City Municipal Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Loudon County General Sessions Court. Accordingly, inasmuch as the defendant had been a resident of Loudon County for at least one year prior to the election, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s election contest. However, we modify the trial court’s judgment to state that the defendant complied with the residency requirement at issue because he had been a resident of Loudon County for at least one year rather than because he had been a resident of the Ninth Judicial District for the prescribed time period.
May 29st, 2024
Clayton D. Richards v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center M2022-00597-SC-R11-CV
On December 12, 2014, Plaintiff-Appellant Clayton Richards filed a healthcare liability action against Vanderbilt University Medical Center (VUMC) related to a procedure that was performed on August 15, 2013, with inpatient care following until Mr. Richards was discharged to an inpatient rehabilitation facility on August 29, 2013. The complaint was timely under the applicable one-year statute of limitations combined with the 120-day extension following pre-suit notice. Mr. Richards voluntarily dismissed the action on October 4, 2019. He then filed the instant action on January 28, 2021, relying on the one-year saving statute in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105 and again relying on the 120-day extension in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c). The trial court granted VUMC’s motion to dismiss, finding that Mr. Richards could not rely on the statutory 120-day extension a second time. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the 120-day extension provided in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) extends the refiling period in the saving statute for a plaintiff who provided presuit notice prior to filing the initial complaint.
May 29st, 2024
Charles Youree, Jr. v. Recovery House of East Tennessee, LLC, et al. M2021-01504-SC-R11-CV
In 2019, the Plaintiff-Appellant, Charles Youree, Jr., filed a lawsuit against Recovery Solutions Network, LLC (RSN) for breach of a commercial lease agreement. Mr. Youree obtained a default judgment against RSN for $50,000. After RSN failed the pay the judgment, Mr.Youree filed a lawsuit against the Defendant-Appellees, Recovery House of East Tennessee, LLC and RHT Holdings, LLC, seeking to pierce the corporate veil and hold the Defendants-Appellees liable for the default judgment against RSN. After a default judgment was entered against the Defendants-Appellees, they motioned to have the judgment set aside on the basis that the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for piercing the corporate veil. The trial court denied the motion to set aside, and the Defendants-Appellees appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the second default judgment was not properly granted because the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to articulate a claim for piercing the corporate veil to hold Defendants-Appellees liable for RSN’s debt. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the application for permission to appeal to determine: (1) whether a defaulting a defaulting party may have a default judgment set aside when it concedes that it cannot show excusable neglect for failing to respond to the complaint, and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the complaint stated a claim for relief sufficient to pierce the corporate veil.
May 29st, 2024
Emergency Medical Care Facilities, P.C. v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc. et al.
M2021-00174-SC-R11-CV
In August 2014, Plaintiff Emergency Medical Care Facilities (EMCF) brought its first putative class action against Defendants BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee (BCBS) and Volunteer State Health Plan, Inc. (VSHP) in the Madison County Circuit Court. After a formal class-certification hearing, the Circuit Court denied EMCF’s motion for class certification. EMCF appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. On remand, the trial court permitted EMCF to voluntarily dismiss its claims without prejudice. EMCF refiled its putative class action against BCBS and VSHP in Davidson County Chancery Court. The Chancery Court dismissed the claims on the basis that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred EMCF from relitigating the class certification issue. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the Chancery Court’s judgment and held that collateral estoppel does not apply because EMCF ultimately nonsuited its claims in the prior action on remand before any final judgment was entered, vitiating the interlocutory class-certification holding for collateral-estoppel purposes. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the Defendants’ application for permission to appeal to determine whether collateral estoppel bars a plaintiff from refiling a putative class action if the plaintiff’s motion for class certification was previously denied in the trial court and affirmed on appeal prior to the plaintiff’s voluntary nonsuit.
May 22st, 2024
Heather Smith v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tennessee E2022-01058-SC-R11-CV
Plaintiff-Appellee Heather Smith was an employee of Defendant-Appellant BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee. Ms. Smith filed this lawsuit against BlueCross BlueShield for common law retaliatory discharge, alleging she was terminated in retaliation for exercising her constitutional right to contact her legislators regarding employer vaccine mandates in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic. BlueCross BlueShield moved to dismiss Ms. Smith’s case for failure to state a claim, asserting that there is not an applicable public policy exception to Ms. Smith’s at-will employment. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding “that Article I, Section 23 of the Tennessee Constitution, which guarantees the right of citizens to petition the government, is a clear and unambiguous statement of public policy representing an exception to the doctrine of employment-at-will.” The Tennessee Supreme Court granted BlueCross Blueshield’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether the right to petition the government in Article I, Section 23 of the Tennessee Constitution represents a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.
May 22st, 2024
State of Tennessee v. William Rimmel, III M2022-00794-SC-R11-CD
On August 12, 2018, the Defendant, William Rimmel, III, was involved in a road rage incident on Interstate 24 near Chattanooga. At the time of the incident, Mr. Rimmel was riding a Ninja motorcycle, and the victim was driving a Honda civic. Each accused the other of forcing their respective vehicles off the road. After both vehicles came to a rest at the side of the interstate, the victim drove forward into the back end of Mr. Rimmel’s motorcycle. Mr. Rimmel approached the passenger side window of the victim’s car and used a steel object to break the window. Unknown to the victim at the time, the steel object used to break the window was a handgun slide. After a trial, Mr. Rimmel was convicted of attempted aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, vandalism, and attempted burglary of a vehicle. The trial court sentenced Mr. Rimmel to eleven months and twenty-nine days of incarceration followed by two years of probation. Mr. Rimmel appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his convictions and sentence. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted Mr. Rimmel’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions for attempted aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon where the victim was unaware of the deadly weapon during the incident.
April 3rd, 2024
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Oberton Curry, Jr. M2022-00899-SC-R11-CD
Christopher Oberton Curry was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony crime of violence, along with several other offenses. At trial, the State introduced a certified judgment of conviction for a July 2017 robbery, a Class C felony. The trial court determined that robbery was a crime of violence and instructed the jury to determine the defendant’s guilt as to “convicted felon in possession of a firearm after being convicted of a felony crime of violence, that being robbery.” The jury convicted Mr. Curry on all counts. The trial court imposed a 10-year sentence for the firearm conviction, a Class B felony, and aligned the other sentences to be served concurrently. Mr. Curry appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for being a felon in possession of a handgun because the State failed to establish that his previous felony (robbery) was a crime of violence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court, concluding robbery is a crime of violence even if not contained in the statutory list of violent crimes. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted Mr. Curry’s application for permission to appeal to consider (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to support Mr. Curry’s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm, and (2) whether the trail court’s jury instructions properly defined the term “crime of violence.”
April 3rd, 2024
Leah Gilliam v. David Gerregano, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Revenue et al.
M2022-00083-SC-R11-CV
In January 2011, Plaintiff Leah Gilliam applied for and obtained a vanity license plate bearing the registration characters “69PWNDU.” The Department of Revenue, which administers the State’s vanity license plate program, revoked the registration more than ten years later, determining the registration sequence could be read to signify sexual acts or sexual domination. Ms. Gilliam brought this action against the Commissioner of the Department of Revenue, challenging the revocation under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, the Due Process Clause, and void-for-vagueness doctrine. The case was assigned to a three-judge panel, which unanimously dismissed Ms. Gilliam’s claims. The three-judge panel concluded Tennessee’s vanity plates are not protected by the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause because they constitute government speech. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the three-judge panel’s decision, concluding that the personalized character sequencing on vanity plates conveys an individualized message and the public overwhelmingly perceives vanity plates as conveying a personal, not governmental, message. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the Commissioner’s application for permission to appeal to consider whether Tennessee vanity plates constitute government speech or personal speech under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.
April 3rd, 2024
State of Tennessee v. Andre Jujuan Lee Green. M2022-00899-SC-R11-CD
In February 2020, an officer completed a traffic stop on a vehicle for operating on high beams. Andre Jujuan Lee Green was a passenger in the vehicle. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer indicated that he could smell a strong fragrance. The officer conducted an open-air sniff of the vehicle using a service dog, which alerted on the vehicle. The officer searched a backpack found with Mr. Green in the vehicle and found below one ounce of marijuana, a loaded Smith & Wesson 9mm handgun, Ziploc bags, and a working scale. Mr. Green was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to manufacture, sell or deliver, possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained by law enforcement, arguing the canine sweep was not valid to provide probable cause to search because a canine cannot distinguish between the smell of legalized hemp and illegal marijuana. The trial court granted the motion to suppress and dismissed the charges against Mr. Green, but the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, concluding the smell of marijuana provides probable cause for a search. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted Mr. Green’s application to appeal to consider whether the scent of marijuana detected by a canine during a protective sweep can provide probable cause for a warrantless search where the canine cannot distinguish between the illegal marijuana or the legal hemp, which are indistinguishable by smell.
February 21st, 2024
Robert E. Lee Flade v. City of Shelbyville, Tennessee et al. M2022-00553-SC-R11-CV
Plaintiff-Appellee Robert E. Lee Flade filed this action against multiple defendants, including Defendants-Appellants Stephanie Isaacs and the Bedford County Listening Project (“BCLP”). Mr. Flade alleged that Ms. Isaacs, acting on behalf of BCLP, helped coordinate a public campaign to harass him regarding the condition of a rental house he owned. The complaint asserted that this conduct “amounted to libel per se, intentional interference with business, intentional infliction of emotional distress, stalking and harassment.” In response to the complaint, Ms. Isaacs and BCLP filed petitions to dismiss pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). Before the petitions were heard, Mr. Flade filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. Defendants filed notices of intent to proceed with their petitions despite the dismissal. The trial court declined to adjudicate the TPPA petitions in light of the nonsuit, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted review to address whether a defendant’s TPPA petition survives a plaintiff’s nonsuit.
February 21st, 2024
Annie J. Jones, By and Through Her Conservatorship, Joyce Sons a/k/a Calisa Joyce Sons v. Life Care Centers of America d/b/a Life Care Center of Tullahoma M2022-00471-SC-R11-CV
Annie Jones was a resident of Life Care Center of Tullahoma. A Life Care employee was assisting Ms. Jones with taking a shower when the employee received a video call from her incarcerated boyfriend. When the employee answered the video call, Ms. Jones’s nude body was visible to the caller. Ms. Jones’s daughter, acting as Ms. Jones’s conservator, initiated this action against Life Care alleging that that “[a]s a direct and proximate result of the grossly negligent, willful, wanton, reckless, malicious and/or intentional misconduct of defendant, plaintiff’s privacy and dignity were violated.” While the action was pending, Ms. Jones died. Life Care moved for summary judgment, asserting a lack of injury and damages. The trial court granted Life Care’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the Plaintiff could not prove the existence of any cognizable injury or damages. Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals instructed the parties to file additional briefing addressing whether an action for invasion of privacy can be maintained after the death of the individual whose privacy was invaded. After each party filed briefs on the issue, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the issue of injury and damages and further held that the claim for invasion of privacy based on intrusion upon seclusion survived the death of Ms. Jones. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted Life Care’s application for permission to appeal to address the issue of whether a claim for invasion of privacy for intrusion upon seclusion survives the death of the individual whose privacy was invaded.