SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

Julie A. Bellamy v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., et al
M2008-00294-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Charles K. Smith

This cause was heard upon the record on appeal from the trial court and the application of
Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. and Paul Ludovissie for permission to appeal and the answer of Julie A. Bellamy. Upon consideration thereof, this Court is of the opinion that the Court of Appeals’ judgment should be vacated and the case remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to order the Chancery Court to resolve the conflicts in the parties’ statements of the proceedings and to certify and transmit a proper supplemental record to the Court of Appeals for resolution of the issues. See Tenn. R. App. P. 24(e).

Wilson Supreme Court

Robin Lee Stanfill, et al v. John T. Mountain, et al. - Concurring/Dissenting
M2006-01072-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stella L. Hargrove

I concur in most of the majority’s well-reasoned analysis. I write separately, however, to state my disagreement that Mr. and Mrs. Mountain and Mr. Brooks shifted the burden of production to the Stanfills with respect to the allegation of fraudulent concealment of mold.

Maury Supreme Court

Robin Lee Stanfill, et al v. John T. Mountain, et al
M2006-01072-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stella L. Hargrove

The buyers of real property brought this action against the sellers and the real estate agent after discovering numerous allegedly dangerous and defective conditions in the house and on the property. The issue in this case is the propriety of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants. After review, we conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiffs’ claims regarding the alleged mold infestation of the house, and that Mrs. Mountain is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claim regarding the underground fuel storage tanks. As to the remainder of the plaintiffs’ claims, we conclude that summary judgment was improper because the plaintiffs met their burden in establishing the existence of several genuine issues of material fact. We affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings

Maury Supreme Court

Robert Philip Rayburn, Sr. v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
E2008-01383-SC-R3-BP
Authoring Judge: Justice Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Senior Judge Jon Kerry Blackwood

This opinion addresses an appeal from a judgment affirming the disbarment of an attorney by a hearing panel designated by the Board of Professional Responsibility. The first issue presented is whether the panel was divested of jurisdiction when the Board approved a proposed offer of a conditional guilty plea that the attorney later accepted with modifications. A second issue is whether the attorney was entitled to a voluntary nonsuit in the trial court after filing a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of the adverse decision by the panel. Initially, the panel retained jurisdiction to enter the order of disbarment. Further, because the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure apply to our rules of disciplinary enforcement, an attorney who files a petition for writ of certiorari is entitled to a voluntary nonsuit; however, principles of sovereign immunity preclude the application of the one-year savings statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-105(a). A petition for certiorari must, therefore, be filed within sixty days of the panel judgment in order to preserve an appeal. In summary, the voluntary nonsuit is granted; however, the appeal is dismissed because a second petition for writ of certiorari was not timely filed. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court as to the denial of a voluntary nonsuit; we affirm the judgment of disbarment by the panel.

Hamilton Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Jerry Lee Hanning - Concurring
E2006-02196-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge E. Eugene Eblen

I concur, but on a different basis. “Whether the stop of a vehicle is considered ‘reasonable’  depends on whether the officer had either probable cause or an ‘articulable and reasonable  suspicion’ that the vehicle or its occupants were subject to seizure for a violation of the law . . . . The level of reasonable suspicion required to support an investigatory stop is lower than that required for probable cause.” State v. Day, 263 S.W.3d 891, 902 (Tenn. 2008). Reasonable suspicion must be supported “by specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Hughes v. State, 588 S.W.2d 296, 305 (Tenn. 1979).

Loudon Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Jerry Lee Hanning
E2006-02196-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Judge E. Eugene Eblen

This appeal involves the detention and questioning of the driver of a truck tractor and trailer based upon an anonymous tip of reckless driving from a citizen. A police officer received a dispatch that a caller had reported a black “18-wheeler” bearing a “Smith Brothers” logo was being driven recklessly in a northbound direction on the interstate and had just exited at the Highway 72 ramp. The police officer was in a parking lot very close to the exit ramp at the time he received the call. He responded immediately and observed a black “semi-truck” parked in the emergency lane of the northbound exit ramp. The officer turned his blue lights on, drove down the ramp, and pulled in front of the truck. After observing a Smith Transport logo on the door of the truck tractor, questioning the driver, and administering field sobriety tests, the officer arrested the driver for driving under the influence. The driver entered a conditional guilty plea to driving under the influence and reserved the certified question of whether the warrantless detention and questioning of the driver violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee. We hold that in this case the anonymous tip reporting reckless driving indicated a sufficiently high risk of imminent injury or death to members of the public to warrant immediate intervention by law enforcement officials and justified the brief investigatory stop because the offense was reported at or near the time of its occurrence, and the report indicated that the caller was witnessing an ongoing offense; the report provided a detailed description of the truck, its direction of travel and location; and the investigating officer verified these details within moments of the dispatch reporting the tip.

Loudon Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Charlotte Yvonne Turner - Dissenting
W2007-01590-SC-R11
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Judge William B. Acree, Jr.

I respectfully disagree with the majority. In my view, the police officers’ search of Ms. Turner’s residence without reasonable or individualized suspicion violates article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. While the United States Supreme Court has ruled in Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), that such a search, without reasonable or individualized suspicion, does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, I would hold the Tennessee Constitution provides a greater degree of protection against suspicionless searches than does the federal Constitution.

Obion Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Charlotte Yvonne Turner
W2007-01590-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Cornelia A. Clark
Trial Court Judge: Judge William B. Acree, Jr.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether the police violated the constitutional rights of the defendant, a parolee, when they searched her residence without a warrant but pursuant to a condition of her parole. We adopt the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), and hold that parolees who are subject to a warrantless search condition may be searched without reasonable or individualized suspicion. The officers who searched the defendant’s residence knew about her parole status, were aware of the warrantless search condition of her parole, and did not conduct the search in an unreasonable manner. Accordingly, the trial court erred in suppressing evidence found during the search of the defendant’s residence. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Obion Supreme Court

Iris Kay Snodgrass v. Robert H. Snodgrass - Concurring/Dissenting
E2007-00576-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge William H. Russell

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Snodgrass’s 401(k) account was not transmuted to marital property when he withdrew a portion of its funds for the purchase of a family home, as well as its holding regarding the division of the parties’ pensions. I further agree with the majority’s determination that 401(k) accounts are “retirement . . . benefit rights relating to employment” for the purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(b)(1)(B), and that the contributions made by Mr. Snodgrass and Mrs. Snodgrass prior to the marriage (the “premarital contributions”) should be classified as separate property because they did not, as the statute requires, “accrue[] during the period of the marriage.” I disagree, however, with the rationale by which the majority concludes that the increase in the value of the premarital contributions qualified as marital property. Instead, I would remand for consideration of whether the increases in value could be traced to the premarital contributions of each to their respective 401(k)s and have not been subjected to commingling (inextricably mingled with marital property) or, in the alternative, whether the increases became marital through the concept of substantial contribution (to the preservation and appreciation of the premarital contributions).

Supreme Court

In Re: Estate of Martha M. Tanner - Concurring
M2006-02640-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Randy Kennedy

I concur with the Court’s conclusion that the nonclaim statutes in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 30-2-
307(a)(1), -310(a) (2007) do not prevent the Bureau of TennCare from recovering correctly paid
medical benefits from the late Martha M. Tanner’s estate. My two-fold purpose in preparing this
separate opinion is to explain my understanding of the basis for the estate’s liability and to address the application of the statutory recovery procedures when a TennCare recipient’s family decides against probating the deceased recipient’s estate.

Davidson Supreme Court

In Re: Estate of Martha M. Tanner, deceased
M2006-02640-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Randy Kennedy

The decedent, Martha M. Tanner, died intestate while a resident of a nursing facility. Nineteen months later, the Bureau of TennCare filed a complaint in the Davidson County Chancery Court seeking the appointment of an administrator of her estate. The case was transferred to the probate court, and the decedent’s son, Thomas Tanner, was appointed administrator. The Bureau of TennCare then filed a claim seeking recovery of “medical assistance correctly paid” on behalf of the decedent pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 71-5-116 (1995 & Supp. 2002) and 42 United States Code section 1396p (2003 & Supp. 2009). The probate court dismissed the claim as untimely, and, upon direct appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted application for permission to appeal in order to consider whether the claim is procedurally barred. Because section 71-5-116 places an obligation on the representative of an estate to obtain a waiver or release from the Bureau, the claim is not subject to a one-year statute of limitations. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, reversed, and the cause is remanded to the probate court. Tenn. R. App. P. 11; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Reversed
 

Davidson Supreme Court

Mike Allmand v. Jon Pavletic, et al. - Dissenting
M2008-00459-SC-R23-CQ
Authoring Judge: Justice William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bernice Bouie Donald

This Court accepted a question of law certified by the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee regarding the authority of municipal utility boards to enter into employment contracts with at-will employees that provide for severance benefits if the employee is terminated without cause. While the Court has decided that “some form of severance compensation . . . [may be] permissible,” it has concluded that the particular severance provisions in the two employment contracts at issue in this case are not enforceable. I respectfully disagree.

Jackson Supreme Court

Mike Allmand v. Jon Pavletic, et al.
M2008-00459-SC-R23-CQ
Authoring Judge: Justice Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bernice Bouie Donald

The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee has submitted a certified question of law pursuant to our Rule 23 as to the validity of certain provisions within two separate employment contracts: “Whether a municipal utility board has the authority to enter into a contract with an appointed city official who serves at the will and pleasure of the Board of Mayor and Aldermen whereby the utility board contracts to continue to pay the official’s salary for a multiyear time period [8 and 14 years] after the official’s employment is terminated.” Because it is within our discretion to do so, we have elected to answer the question in a manner designed to fit the facts and circumstances in this particular case. Our conclusion is that neither Ripley Power and Light nor Ripley Gas, Water, and Wastewater, utility boards for the City of Ripley, Tennessee, had the authority to enter into multi-year contracts with Mike Allmand, the former superintendent of the two utilities, or to obligate the City for the payment of salary and benefits as provided by the terms.

Jackson Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Neddie Mack Lawson
E2007-00330-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge E. Shayne Sexton

The defendant was originally indicted for driving under the influence, second offense. More than one year after the arrest, the grand jury returned a second indictment, charging the defendant with driving under the influence, fourth offense, a Class E felony. The State filed a nolle prosequi as to the first indictment and, upon motion by the defendant, the trial court granted an order to expunge these records. At trial, the defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, third offense, a misdemeanor. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. This Court granted review in order to determine whether the one-year statute of limitations applicable to misdemeanors barred the prosecution. Because the trial court properly took judicial notice of the pendency of the first indictment at the time of the second, the statute of limitations, regardless of the efficacy of the order of expunction, was tolled and the prosecution was timely. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed.

Claiborne Supreme Court

Lincoln General Insurance Company v. Detroit Diesel Corporation, et al.
M2008-01427-SC-R23-CQ
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Aleta A. Trauger

We accepted the following question of law certified by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee: Does Tennessee law recognize an exception to the economic loss doctrine under which recovery in tort is possible for damage to the defective product itself when the defect renders the product unreasonably dangerous and causes the damage by means of a sudden, calamitous event? We answer this question in the negative.

Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Brandon Keith Ostein and Teresa Gale Foxx
M2007-00925-SC-R11-CO
Authoring Judge: Justice Cornelia A. Clark
Trial Court Judge: Judge Monte D. Watkins

We granted permission to appeal in this case to address the circumstances under which the identity of a confidential informant must be disclosed pre-trial to a criminal defendant. Defendants Brandon Keith Ostein and Teresa Gale Foxx were arrested and charged with drug offenses after police officers executed a search warrant at Foxx’s apartment. The affidavit in support of the search warrant referred to information provided by a confidential informant. Ostein and Foxx filed  motions for disclosure of the informant’s identity. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the confidential informant was a material witness and ordered disclosure. The State sought and obtained an interlocutory appeal, and the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court. Ostein and Foxx sought permission to appeal, which we granted. Upon our close review of the limited record before us, we hold that Ostein and Foxx have failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the confidential informant is a material witness or otherwise important to their defense. The trial court ordered disclosure based on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, resulting in reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Davidson Supreme Court

Highwoods Properties, Inc. et al. v. City of Memphis - Dissenting
W2007-00454-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Walter L. Evans

At the heart of this case is the operation of the checks and balances that influence and control a municipality’s exercise of its power to annex adjoining property. The controversy involves a duly enacted annexation ordinance that was substantially altered in a negotiated settlement of litigation between some of the affected property owners and the attorney representing the municipality. Other affected property owners filed suit in the Chancery Court for Shelby County seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of the effectively amended annexation ordinance that had not been ratified by the municipality’s legislative body. The trial court, the Court of Appeals, and now this Court have dismissed the complaint because it was not filed within the thirty-day period within which a quo warranto action challenging the reasonableness of the annexation must be filed. I respectfully dissent. The aggrieved property owners are entitled to their day in court. They are not challenging the reasonableness of the original annexation ordinance. To the contrary, they are challenging the legality of the negotiated settlement that effectively amended the original annexation ordinance without the approval of the Memphis City Council.

Shelby Supreme Court

Highwoods Properties, Inc., et al. v. City of Memphis
W2007-00454-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Walter L. Evans

The Plaintiffs filed an action for declaratory judgment seeking to set aside a consent judgment entered in a lawsuit between property owners in an area of a proposed annexation and the City of Memphis. The earlier lawsuit, which the Plaintiffs failed to timely join, was a quo warranto challenge to an ordinance purporting to annex certain territory contiguous to the boundaries of the City. The consent judgment provided for the annexation of the territory described within the ordinance in two stages, with a portion of the area having an effective annexation date in 2006 and the remainder having an effective date in 2013. The trial court dismissed the complaint and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted permission to appeal in order to determine the propriety of the challenge to the consent decree approving of the two-step annexation. We hold that (1) the Plaintiffs are not authorized to file a declaratory judgment action challenging the consent judgment as violative of the terms of the annexation ordinance; and (2) the consent judgment did not create an unconstitutional taxing structure. The judgment of dismissal is, therefore, affirmed.

Shelby Supreme Court

Steven Waters, et al. v. Reagan Farr, Commissioner of Revenue for the State of Tennessee
E2006-02225-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Frank V. Williams, III

Effective January 1, 2005, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a tax on the possession of unauthorized substances for the purpose of generating revenues to assist state and local law enforcement agencies in their efforts to combat drug crimes. Subsequently, Steven Waters was assessed with taxes, penalty, and interest in the total amount of $55,316.84 by the Tennessee Department of Revenue after purchasing nearly a kilogram of cocaine from a confidential informant. In a declaratory judgment suit in the Chancery Court of Loudon County, Waters challenged the constitutionality of the statute on grounds of self-incrimination, double jeopardy and due process. The chancellor declared the statute unconstitutional and set aside the assessment. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the enactment exceeded the General Assembly’s taxing power under article II, section 28 of the Tennessee Constitution. Initially, we hold that the statute imposing the tax on unauthorized substances does not violate the constitutional protections against self-incrimination and double jeopardy or abridge the guarantee of procedural due process. Because, however, the tax cannot be classified as either a tax on merchants, a tax on peddlers or a tax on privileges, as authorized by our state constitution, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Loudon Supreme Court

Steven Waters, et al v. Reagan Farr, Commissioner of Revenue for the State of Tennessee - Concurring/Dissenting
E2006-02225-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Frank V. Williams, III

The Court today invalidates the Unauthorized Substances Tax on the ground that it exceeds the General Assembly’s taxing power under Article II, Section 28 of the Tennessee Constitution. The Court reaches this conclusion despite the precedents requiring us to interpret statutes in a manner that sustains, rather than defeats, their constitutionality. Even though I concur with the Court’s conclusions that the Unauthorized Substances Tax does not run afoul of the state and federal constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy and self-incrimination and that it is consistent with the requirements of due process, I cannot concur with its decision that this tax cannot be imposed in a constitutional manner on persons who possess significant quantities of illegal drugs for the purpose of resale.

Loudon Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Marcus Richards - Dissenting
M2006-02179-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

The pivotal question in this case is straightforward. Did the law enforcement officers who came upon Marcus Richards and his three associates sitting at a picnic table on which residue of powder cocaine was in plain view have probable cause to search Mr. Richards incident to arresting him for the simple possession of the cocaine on the table? The Court has concluded that they did not. I respectfully disagree. Based on the essentially undisputed facts, I would affirm the trial court’s conclusion that the warrantless search incident to Mr. Richards’s arrest was valid.

Williamson Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Marcus Richards
M2006-02179-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

The issue presented in this case is whether evidence seized from the Defendant’s person following a warrantless search should have been suppressed or, conversely, whether the search was justified as a search incident to lawful arrest. After receiving a tip from a citizen informant that three individuals were involved in drug activity around a picnic table in the back yard of a house, police officers were dispatched to the scene and found the three identified persons plus a fourth person – the Defendant – seated around the picnic table. As the officers approached, they observed one participant sweep the table with his arm and drop a corner baggie to the ground, and they subsequently discovered that this person held a rolled dollar bill containing a white powdery residue. The officers also saw a white powdery residue on the surface of the table that field-tested positive for cocaine. Although the Defendant was seated at the picnic table where the police officers observed evidence of cocaine use, they did not see the Defendant engaged in any illegal or suspicious activity. An initial “pat down” search of the Defendant revealed no drugs or weapons. After a consensual search of one of the participants at the table revealed white powder on the seat of his wheelchair, the officers searched the Defendant a second time and found a bag of marijuana and a bag of cocaine in his pocket. The Defendant was indicted for misdemeanor possession of marijuana and cocaine. The trial court found that the search was proper due to exigent circumstances supported by probable cause, but the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, finding that the circumstances did not support the existence of probable cause. After review, we conclude that the search of the Defendant cannot be justified as a search incident to an arrest because, at the time of the search, the officers did not have probable cause to arrest the Defendant. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

Williamson Supreme Court

Lee Hayes v. Gibson County, Tennessee
W2007-01849-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

The issue presented in this declaratory judgment action brought by Lee Hayes, the Gibson County juvenile court clerk, is whether he should be compensated pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-24-102, as amended in 2001, which sets the Gibson County juvenile court clerk’s salary at a minimum of $50,805 per year, or pursuant to a 2000 private act that sets the salary at $32,000 per year. Gibson County argues, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the private act of 2000 creating the office of Gibson County Juvenile Court Clerk and establishing his salary at $32,000 per year, controls. Mr. Hayes argues that the General Assembly’s 2001 amendment to TennesseeCode Annotated section 8-24-102, establishing statewide salaries for county officers, including juvenile court clerks, supersedes the 2000 private act and that his annual salary should be $50,805 in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-24-102, as amended. We hold that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the 2000 private act and the 2001 public act, and that the 2001 public act, a general statutory scheme of statewide application, supersedes and repeals by implication the earlier private act. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded to the trial court.

Gibson Supreme Court

In Re: Milburn Hogue and Melanie Hogue
08-02558-GP1-13
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee

The certified question from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennesse
that we address in this case is: what amount may each member of a married couple with custody of a minor child claim as a homestead exemption, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 26-2- 301(f), in a joint petition for bankruptcy? We hold that the statute allows each individual debtor spouse with custody of a minor child to claim a $25,000 exemption for a combined exemption of $50,000, based upon the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 23 Certified Question of Law
 

Davidson Supreme Court

Helen M. Borner, et al. v. Danny R. Autrey
W2007-00731-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald H. Allen

This case involves the interpretation and application of Tennessee Code Annotated section  24-5-113(a), which provides a rebuttable presumption that medical bills itemized in and attached to the complaint are necessary and reasonable if the “total amount of such bills” does not exceed $4,000. We hold that a plaintiff may rely on section 24-5-113(a) if the total amount of the medical bills that are itemized and attached does not exceed $4,000, regardless of the total amount of  medical expenses that may have been incurred. A plaintiff is not entitled to the presumption, however, if the plaintiff relies on medical bills that have been redacted to reflect a total of $4,000 or less. The judgment of the Court of Appeals therefore is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Madison Supreme Court