Jeremy Flax, et al. v. Daimler-Chrysler Corporation, et al.
The plaintiffs filed this products liability case against Daimler-Chrysler seeking damages for the wrongful death of their son and for emotional distress suffered by the mother. The plaintiffs also sought punitive damages. We granted review to determine: 1) whether a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim brought simultaneously with a wrongful death claim is a “stand-alone” claim that requires expert medical or scientific proof of a severe emotional injury; 2) whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support an award of punitive damages; 3) whether the punitive damages awarded by the trial court were excessive; and 4) whether the trial court erred by recognizing the plaintiffs’ second failure to warn claim. We hold that the simultaneous filing of a wrongful death suit does not prevent a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim from being a “stand-alone” claim. Therefore, negligent infliction of emotional distress claims brought under these circumstances must be supported by expert medical or scientific proof of a severe emotional injury. In addition, we conclude that the punitive damages awarded by the trial court were adequately supported by the evidence and were not excessive. Finally, we hold that the trial court erred by recognizing the plaintiffs’ second failure to warn claim but conclude that the error did not prejudice the judicial process or more probably than not affect the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the compensatory and punitive damage awards based on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim and reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision to overturn the punitive damage award related to the plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Jeremy Flax, et al. v. Daimler-Chrysler Corporation, et al. - Concurring/Dissenting
The heart-wrenching facts of this wrongful death/emotional distress case, which are adequately set forth in the majority opinion, need not be restated here. The tragedy visited upon this family is indeed great. The record, like the trial itself, is lengthy. The trial testimony is extensive and, at times, contradictory. The fact that the members of this Court disagree as to how to resolve some of the difficult legal issues–which are hotly contested–is no surprise. The case is complex on multiple levels and resolving the issues presented while attempting to achieve a just result has proven to be no easy task. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Jeremy Flax, et al. v. Daimler-Chrysler Corporation, et al - Dissenting
The Court has decided to uphold a judgment for $18,367,345 in compensatory and punitive damages arising out of the death of an eight-month-old child in a collision between a minivan and a truck. While the parents’ loss of their child is heart-wrenching and tragic, I cannot concur in affirming the awards of either compensatory or punitive damages against the manufacturer of the minivan in which the child was a passenger. The child’s parents are not entitled to $13,367,345 in punitive damages because they have failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the manufacturer acted recklessly in the design, construction, or marketing of the minivan. They are likewise not entitled to recover $5,000,000 in compensatory damages because of the erroneous admission of evidence regarding twenty-five “similar incidents” occurring after the date that the minivan was sold. Accordingly, rather than approving the award of $18,367,345 in compensatory and punitive damages, I would remand the case for a new trial on the issue of compensatory damages only. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Jeremy Flax, et al. v. Daimler-Chrysler Corporation, et al. - Concurring
I concur with Justice Holder and Chief Justice Barker as to the propriety of the award of $5 million for the wrongful death of Jeremy Flax, apportioned one-half to the fault of the DaimlerChrysler Corporation [the “Defendant”] and the other one-half to Lewis Stockell. I further concur in their affirmance of the trial court’s reduction of punitive damages against the Defendant regarding the wrongful death action from $65,500,000 to $13,367,345. Finally, I agree that the $2.5 million in compensatory damages awarded Rachel Sparkman for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, one-half of which was adjudged against the Defendant, and the punitive damages of $6,632,655, all of which was assessed against the Defendant, should be set aside. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Dennis J. Hughes v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee - Concurring/Dissenting
Although I concur in much of the majority opinion, I write separately to express my disagreement with the majority’s expansion of the scope of our standard of review in Board of Professional Responsibility (“BPR”) cases. Under its revised standard, the majority fails to give proper deference to the panel’s conclusion that Mr. Hughes clearly and convincingly demonstrated that his reinstatement would not be detrimental to the integrity of the bar, the administration of justice, or the public interest. Because the outcome of this case turns upon the proper application of our standard of review, I will explain my views on that standard in some detail. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Dennis J. Hughes v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
This is a direct appeal from a judgment of the trial court, which set aside a decision by a hearing panel designated by the Board of Professional Responsibility granting a disbarred attorney’s petition for reinstatement of his law license. The issue presented is whether the attorney, who was convicted of bribing a witness and conspiracy to bribe a witness in a criminal trial, has met the criteria for immediate reinstatement to the practice of law. Although the panel properly determined that the evidence clearly and convincingly proved the moral qualifications of the attorney and his knowledge of state law, we hold that the evidence failed to so meet the threshold as to the third requirement–that reinstatement would not be detrimental to the standing of the bar, the administration of justice, and the interest of the public. The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, affirmed. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
Lacay Crew v. First Source Furniture Group D/B/A Anderson Hickey Company
In 2004, the plaintiff, Lacay Crew, filed a workers’ compensation claim alleging injuries to her left and right hands, wrists, and arms, while in the course and scope of her employment. In response, the defendant, First Source Furniture Group, d/b/a Anderson Hickey Company, denied the claim on issues of causation. The trial court found that Crew sustained a compensable, gradual injury to both upper extremities and awarded a permanent partial vocational disability of 25% to each upper extremity equating to a judgment award of $25,479.00. Discretionary costs in the amount of $150.00 were awarded for reimbursement to Crew for a doctor’s completion of a Tennessee Department of Labor Form C-32 on Crew’s behalf. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel found that there was insufficient evidence of causation and dismissed the case. We affirm the decision of the Appeals Panel. |
Lauderdale | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Allen and State of Tennessee v. Eric Lumpkin
We granted permission to appeal in these consolidated cases to determine whether Tennessee’s consecutive sentencing scheme passes constitutional muster under the holdings of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). We also address the “physical facts rule” in Defendant Lumpkin’s case. We hold that the trial courts’ imposition of consecutive sentences in these cases did not violate the Defendants’ federal constitutional rights. We also hold that the physical facts rule does not require the reversal of Defendant Lumpkin’s convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeals in both cases. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Adam Hannah, et al.
We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal in order to construe Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-8-154(a) (2004), the impeding traffic statute. The trial court held that the driver of a slow-moving vehicle does not impede traffic, unless other traffic is made to come to a stop. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Upon review, we hold that the trial court based its decision on an erroneous interpretation of the statute. Therefore, we reverse the trial court and remand for a new suppression hearing. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Kathleen R. Caldwell, BPR #9916
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred in staying a disciplinary proceeding pending before a hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility. We hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to stay the disciplinary proceeding. Accordingly, we reverse the stay order issued by the trial court, and we dismiss the respondent’s motion for a stay. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Billy Overstreet v. TRW Commercial Steering Division et al. - Concurring
I concur with the Court’s conclusion that, in the context of litigation regarding a claim under the Workers’ Compensation Act, the employer and the employer’s lawyer are not entitled to have ex parte communications with the physician treating the employee. However, I base my conclusion on legal principles that differ from the “contract implied in law” theory relied upon by the Court. |
Smith | Supreme Court | |
Billy Overstreet v. TRW Commercial Steering Division et al.
In this claim for workers’ compensation, the defendant/employer filed a motion seeking permission to have an ex parte interview with the treating physician regarding the medical condition of the plaintiff/employee. The employer also sought an order requiring the employee to submit to an independent medical evaluation. The trial court denied each motion, and we granted the employer’s application for extraordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Upon review of the record and consideration of the applicable law, we hold that (1) the employer may not communicate ex parte with the employee’s treating physician without first obtaining a waiver of the implied covenant of confidentiality from the employee; and (2) the employer’s request for the worker to undergo a medical evaluation should be granted unless the trial court determines that the request is unreasonable. |
Smith | Supreme Court | |
Duell Wayne West v. Vought Aircraft Industries, Inc., et al. and Terry Thompson v. Peterbilt Motor Company and/or Paccar Inc.
We granted review of these workers’ compensation cases to decide when a case becomes “pending” for purposes of the prior suit pending doctrine. We conclude that a lawsuit becomes “pending” when the complaint is filed. Although the filing of the complaint initiates the pendency of the case, a subsequent case will be subject to dismissal under the prior suit pending doctrine only if the court in the prior case has acquired personal jurisdiction over the parties. Accordingly, the lawsuit filed by the employer in West v. Vought Aircraft Industries, Inc. was entitled to priority, and the employee’s lawsuit is remanded to the trial court for dismissal. The employee’s lawsuit in Thompson v. Peterbilt Motor Co. has been rendered moot and is dismissed. |
Smith | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Carri Chandler Lane
The defendant pled guilty to two counts of theft in excess of $60,000 after embezzling over $630,000 from her employer. The trial court imposed a sentence requiring a term of confinement and probation. As a condition of her probation, the trial court ordered the defendant to make monthly restitution payments of approximately $1,500 to her former employer upon her release from confinement. After her release, the defendant petitioned the trial court to modify the conditions of her probation by reducing her monthly restitution payments to $500 per month. The trial court denied her motion to modify, and the defendant appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the defendant could not appeal as of right the trial court’s decision to deny her motion to modify under Tennessee’s rules of appellate procedure. Nevertheless, a majority of the intermediate appellate court reviewed the defendant’s challenge as a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari and concluded that the trial court’s decision constituted a “plain and palpable abuse of discretion.” The State appealed. Upon review, we hold that the defendant does not have an appeal as of right to challenge the trial court’s denial of her motion to modify. Furthermore, we conclude that the intermediate appellate court erred in granting the defendant a common-law writ of certiorari and in finding that the trial court’s decision was erroneous. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand with instructions that the trial court’s order be reinstated. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Amanda Lynn Dewald, et al., v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, et al.
In this medical malpractice appeal, the trial court denied the hospital’s motion for summary judgment finding that a factual dispute exists as to whether the hospital may be held vicariously liable for the alleged negligence of an independent contractor radiologist based on a theory of apparent agency. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and granted summary judgment to the hospital on all grounds. We granted permission to appeal and consolidated this case for argument with Boren v. Weeks, No. M2007-00628-SC-R11-CV, — S.W.3d — (Tenn. May 6, 2008). In Boren, in an opinion filed contemporaneously herewith, we adopted the analysis derived from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 429 for determining when a hospital may be held vicariously liable for the negligence of independent contractor physicians. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ grant of summary judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings and for reconsideration of the hospital’s motion for summary judgment consistent with the analysis and new standard adopted in Boren. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Kacy Dewayne Cannon - Concurring
I concur in the result reached by the majority, particularly the excellent analysis pertaining to the confrontation clauses of the federal and state constitutions; however, I would have affirmed that portion of the opinion by the Court of Criminal Appeals holding that the article of clothing containing semen identified as that of the defendant was properly admitted as evidence, despite any weakness in the chain of custody. In my view, the majority places an inordinate degree of emphasis on the initial link in the chain and falls short of affording the trial judge adequate deference under our limited scope of review. Because, however, other evidence offered by the State violated constitutional principles, and the errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, I agree that a new trial is warranted. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Kacy Dewayne Cannon
Defendant was convicted of aggravated rape. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction but remanded for re-sentencing. Thereafter, we granted permission to appeal to consider the following issues: 1) whether the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody for the admission into evidence of pantyhose the victim was allegedly wearing at the time of the rape; 2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; 3) whether the trial court erred in denying the defense motion to suppress the identification of his DNA profile from a DNA database; 4) whether admission of the victim’s statements into evidence through third parties violated Defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation; 5) whether the friendship between the trial court and one of the prosecuting attorneys created a serious appearance of impropriety and biased the trial court against Defendant; and 6) whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by remanding this case for re-sentencing. After considering these issues, we conclude that the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody for the admission into evidence of the pantyhose and that the victim’s statements describing the assault to the police officers and her statements to the sexual assault nurse examiner were testimonial and admitted in violation of Defendant’s right of confrontation. We further hold that the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress and Defendant’s motion for recusal. Because the error in admitting the pantyhose into evidence was not harmless, however, we reverse Defendant’s conviction for aggravated rape and remand for a new trial. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Andre Dotson
The Defendant, Andre Dotson, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of robbery. On direct appeal of right, the Court of Criminal Appeals modified one robbery conviction to theft based upon insufficient evidence of the element of fear on the part of a victim, but otherwise affirmed. We granted permission to appeal in order to consider several issues, including those related to the consolidation of the four indictments in a single trial. We hold that (1) the consolidation of the four charges constituted reversible error; (2) while the trial court did not abuse its discretion by severing the two indictments against a co-defendant, that would have been unnecessary had the Defendant been afforded separate trials; (3) the co-defendant’s statements to police did not fall under the “against interest” exception to the hearsay rule and were properly excluded as evidence; and (4) the evidence at trial was sufficient to establish fear on the part of one of the victims, an essential element for the offense of robbery. Because the trial court erroneously refused to order separate trials on each of the four indictments and the error cannot be classified as harmless, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the Defendant is granted new trials on each indictment. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Judge Brooks
This case involves the applicability of the forfeiture by wrongdoing hearsay exception. We hold that the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception requires a showing that a defendant’s actions were intended, at least in part, to prevent a witness from testifying. The prosecution in this case failed to prove that a motive for the murder was to make the victim unavailable as a witness. Admission of her hearsay statements, therefore, violated Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6). We further conclude that the error affected the result of the trial. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case for a new trial. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Lisa Dawn Green, et al. v. Vicki Renee Johnson, et al.
We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether an uninsured motorist carrier may reduce amounts owed under an uninsured motorist provision by the amount of settlement proceeds an insured receives from a non-motorist defendant. Because the uninsured motorist statutes, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated sections 56-7-1201 to -1206, unambiguously allow an uninsured motorist carrier to limit its liability by “the sum of the limits collectible under all liability and/or primary uninsured motorist insurance polices, bonds, and securities applicable to the bodily injury or death of the insured,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1201(d), and to receive an offset or credit for “the total amount of damages collected by the insured from all parties alleged to be liable for the bodily injury or death of the insured,” id. §1206(i), we conclude that the uninsured motorist carrier in this case is entitled to an offset for the monies the insured received from the non-motorist defendants. Accordingly, we affirm the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority d/b/a Erlanger Health System v. Bradley County, Tennessee, et al.
Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority, conducting its operations as Erlanger Health System, filed suit against Bradley County for the medical expenses of a suspect injured in a shooting at a bar in Cleveland. The trial court awarded judgment for a part of the claim, and the Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, affirmed. We granted review under Rule 11 of Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure in order to construe the statute governing the obligation of counties to pay the medical expenses of a prisoner confined in a jail or otherwise in police custody. Because the statute does not extend the obligation of the county to these circumstances, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the complaint is dismissed. |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Dale Rimmer
The Defendant, Michael Rimmer, was convicted of one count of premeditated murder, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of theft of property. In the penalty phase of the trial, the jury imposed a sentence of death for the first degree murder. On appeal as of right, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions, reversed the sentence of death, and remanded to the trial court for a second sentencing hearing. State v. Rimmer (Rimmer I), No. W1999-00637-CCA-R3-DD, 2001WL 567960 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 25, 2001). At the conclusion of that proceeding, a different jury imposed the death penalty based upon one statutory aggravating circumstance, i.e. that the defendant had a previous conviction for a felony with statutory elements involving violence to the person. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2) (1997). As required for the imposition of a sentence of death, the jury also concluded that the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. This sentence was affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals. State v. Rimmer (Rimmer II), No. W2004-02240-CCA-R3-DD, 2006 WL 3731206 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec.15, 2006). Our review is mandatory. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1) (2006). Upon careful review of the entire record, we hold as follows: (1) although the trial court erred during the sentencing hearing by excluding evidence solely on the grounds of hearsay, the evidence was either introduced through other means or lacking in relevance or reliability, so the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) for a waiver of his right to testify to have been valid, a defendant need not state on the record that he was informed by counsel of our ruling in State v. Cazes, 875 .W.2d 253, 266 (Tenn. 1994); (3) the jury instruction defining reasonable doubt does not offend due process; (4) references by defense counsel and a defense witness that the defendant previously had been on “death row” did not, under these circumstances, entitle the defendant to a new sentencing hearing; and (5) the sentence of death satisfies the proportionality guidelines. As to the remaining issues, we agree with the conclusions reached by the Court of Criminal Appeals. The relevant portions of the opinion are appended. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is, therefore, affirmed. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Bill Walker et al. v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc.
We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal in this case to determine whether a class action may be certified in a claim brought under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), Tennessee Code Annotated sections 47-18-101S125 (2001), or in a claim for common law misrepresentation and fraud. The plaintiff, on his own behalf and on behalf of similarly situated individuals, filed a complaint against Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., challenging sales transactions in which buyers were charged “dealer incurred costs” as part of the purchase price. The complaint alleged class action claims for, among other things, Tennessee Consumer Protection Act violations and common law misrepresentation and fraud. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the class certification of the TCPA, misrepresentation and fraud claims. The court granted the defendant’s motion for a Rule 9 interlocutory appeal and to stay discovery. The Court of Appeals denied the motion for a Rule 9 appeal on the basis that we would soon be addressing the same issues in a different case.1 We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal when the issue remained unresolved. Upon thorough review of the record and the legal issues presented, we hold that class certification is unavailable under the TCPA and that class certification was not appropriate in the plaintiff’s claims for common law fraud and misrepresentation due to the individual nature of those claims. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Dorothy Owens, as Conservator of Mary Francis King, an incapcitated person, et al. v. National Health Corporation, et al.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPELLEES’ PETITION TO REHEAR The appellees, NHC/OP, L.P., National Health Realty, Inc., NHC, Inc., a/k/a NHC, Inc., Tennessee, and National Health Corporation, have filed a petition to rehear the opinion of this Court filed on November 8, 2007. By order of January 4, 2008, appellant, Dorothy Owens, was ordered to file a response to the petition to rehear. Appellant’s response was filed on January 16, 2008. In their petition, the appellees allege that the Court improperly allowed discovery as to the principal’s competence to sign the power of attorney. Upon due consideration, the Court concludes that appellees’ petition to rehear is well-taken as to this issue and should therefore be granted. The petition to rehear is denied as to the remainder of the issues . It appearing to the Court from appellees’ Petition to Rehear and appellant’s response that footnote 4 of its Opinion filed November 8, 2007, should be modified, IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the attached Opinion be and the same is hereby substituted for that Opinion filed in this cause on November 8, 2007, without change to this Court’s judgment entered contemporaneously with the filing of the original Opinion on November 8, 2007, and without the further taxing of costs. PER CURIAM |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. R. D. S. - Concurring/Dissenting
I concur in the majority’s analysis of the alleged Miranda violations in Parts I and II (A). I respectfully dissent, however, as to the majority’s conclusions in Part II (B) concerning the motion to suppress the evidence discovered in R.D.S’s truck. |
Williamson | Supreme Court |
