State of Tennessee v. R. D. S. - Concurring/Dissenting Correction
R.D.S. v. STATE OF TENNESSEE |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. R. D. S.
This appeal arises out of a finding of delinquency following a denial of a motion to suppress |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
J. O. House v. Estate of J. K. Edmondson - Dissenting
I agree with the majority that the trial court did not err by approving the special litigation committee’s report. For a variety of reasons, however, I must respectfully dissent with regard to the holding that a minority shareholder suing on behalf of a for-profit corporation can never recover attorney fees under the common fund doctrine. First, I do not believe that failure of the General Assembly to include the common fund doctrine in the Tennessee Business Corporation Act (“TBCA”) abrogates our holding in Grant v. Lookout Mountain Co., 28 S.W. 90 (Tenn. 1894). Secondly, the common fund doctrine is not analogous to Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-17-401(d), which authorizes an award of attorney fees against the opposing party. Finally, from a policy standpoint, the application of the common fund doctrine to shareholder derivative suits is desirable to promote corporate accountability. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
J. O. House v. Estate of J. K. Edmondson
A minority shareholder in a closely held Tennessee corporation filed a derivative suit claiming that the company’s majority shareholder, who also served as the corporation’s president and chairman of its board of directors, misappropriated corporate funds. The minority shareholder also filed an individual claim against the majority shareholder alleging that he breached a pre-incorporation agreement in which the majority shareholder agreed to offer available stock to the corporation and other shareholders before purchasing the stock himself. A litigation committee appointed by the corporation to investigate the allegations against the majority shareholder found merit to the charges. The litigation committee recommended to the corporation that the company either settle the derivative claim or proceed with the litigation if the majority shareholder was unwilling to resolve the lawsuit in accordance with terms proposed by the committee. The trial court found that the litigation committee’s findings and recommendations were in the corporation’s best interests and that, once a settlement was reached, the derivative suit would be dismissed. The trial court also granted summary judgment to the majority shareholder on the individual breach of contract claim and denied the minority shareholder’s request for attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s acceptance of the litigation committee’s report and the denial of attorney’s fees to the minority shareholder, but reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the majority shareholder on the breach of contract claim. We accepted review to determine: (1) whether a plaintiff in a shareholder’s derivative suit brought on behalf of a for-profit corporation may recover attorney’s fees; and (2) whether the trial court was correct in adopting the findings of the litigation committee’s report. We hold that Tennessee law does not authorize an award of attorney’s fees to a plaintiff in a shareholder’s derivative suit brought on behalf of a for-profit corporation. We also hold that the trial court did not err in approving the sufficiently independent, thoroughly researched report of the litigation committee. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals as to those issues is affirmed. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Randy L. May v. Howard W. Carlton
Incident to a conviction for first degree murder, the petitioner was declared infamous, a status which involves the loss of rights of citizenship, including the right to vote. At the time of the offense, homicide was not listed as an infamous crime under the statute. We granted permission to appeal to determine whether the judgment could be corrected through the writ of habeas corpus. Because the illegal disenfranchisement of the petitioner qualifies as a “restraint on liberty,” a threshold requirement under our statute, we grant limited habeas corpus relief but uphold the underlying conviction and the term of incarceration. The opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for modification of the judgment. |
Johnson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Susan Marie Gilliam Campbell
We granted review to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly determined that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support dual convictions of criminally negligent homicide and facilitating escape. Because the defendant, who was charged with the care of the five-year-old victim, took him swimming at a lake without notifying his parents, drank beer and used marijuana, and dared the victim into the water and then failed to supervise his activities, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of criminally negligent homicide. Because the defendant, after discovering the disappearance of the victim, discouraged immediate contact with the authorities so that her son, a fugitive from justice, could avoid the police, the evidence was also sufficient to support the conviction of facilitating escape. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Hawkins | Supreme Court | |
Randy L. May v. Howard W. Carlton - Dissenting
I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the portion of the 1981 judgment declaring Randy L. May infamous is contrary to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2712 (1975) (amended 1981).1 However, I cannot concur with the Court’s dramatic expansion of the application of the “great and efficacious” writ of habeas corpus in this case. Until today, it had been well settled that the writ did not apply to collateral consequences of a criminal conviction or to circumstances that did not involve imprisonment or a “restraint of liberty” as that concept had been understood at common law. Rather than recognizing a brand new classification of collateral consequences in order to provide Mr. May relief, this Court should simply leave Mr. May to pursue his other, well-established plain, adequate, and speedy remedies. |
Johnson | Supreme Court | |
Timothy Wade Keyt v. Nanci Suzanne Keyt - Dissenting
|
Putnam | Supreme Court | |
Timothy Wade Keyt v. Nanci Suzanne Keyt
We granted the application for permission to appeal in this divorce case to address two issues presented by Husband: (1) whether the increase, if any, in value of his separately-owned stock interest in the family-owned company for which he worked qualifies a marital property; and if so, (2) whether the chancellor correctly assessed the increase in value. Because we find that Husband’s employment with the company in which he owned stock did not substantially contribute to the preservation and appreciation of the stock, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Putnam | Supreme Court | |
Health Cost Controls, Inc. v. Ronald Gifford
This case comes before us on an appeal of the trial court’s finding that the injured party was not |
Weakley | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Edwin Gomez, et al.
This matter is before us upon remand by the United States Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of that Court’s decision in Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S.__, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007). In our |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Nora Elizabeth Kilby Moore v. Ronnie Dale Moore
We granted permission to appeal to determine whether income from a nonrecurring capital gain may be considered in determining a parent’s gross income for purposes of modifying child support. We hold that income from an isolated or “one-time” capital gain must be included in calculating gross income and that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition to modify child support. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for calculation of child support pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed; Case Remanded |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
Nora Elizabeth Kilby Moore v. Ronnie Dale Moore
We granted permission to appeal to determine whether income from a nonrecurring capital gain may be considered in determining a parent’s gross income for purposes of modifying child support. We hold that income from an isolated or “one-time” capital gain must be included in calculating gross income and that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition to modify child support. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for calculation of child support pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed; Case Remanded |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
Jerry T. Troup, Jr. v. Fischer Steel Corporation
The plaintiff in this case suffered an on-the-job injury and filed a tort claim against the third-party defendant. We granted review to determine whether the third-party defendant is entitled to argue the comparative fault of a principal contractor who is an employer for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Law. We conclude that the third-party defendant may not argue the comparative fault of a principal contractor even if the principal contractor does not have a subrogation interest in the plaintiff’s recovery. The third-party defendant may, however, argue that the principal contractor was the sole cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injuries. We also conclude that the jury instruction provided by the trial court accurately and adequately explained the jury’s ability to consider whether the actions of the principal contractor were the cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injuries. Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the issues pretermitted by its opinion. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth C. Dailey, III
The Defendant, Kenneth C. Dailey, III, pleaded guilty to second degree murder and reserved a certified question of law regarding the admissibility of his statements of confession to the crime. Disagreeing with the trial court, the prosecutor, and the defense that the question was dispositive of the case, the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the appeal. We hold that, on the record before us, the certified question is dispositive of the case. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this matter to the Court of Criminal Appeals for its review of the certified question on its merits. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Simpson Strong-Tie Company v. Stewart, Estes & Donnell
We accepted a question of law certified by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee to determine whether the absolute litigation privilege applies to what may be defamatory communications made by an attorney prior to a proposed judicial proceeding when the communications are directed at recipients unconnected with the proposed proceeding. We hold that an attorney is privileged to publish what may be defamatory information prior to a proposed judicial proceeding even when the communication is directed at recipients unconnected with the proposed proceeding. In order for the privilege to apply, (1) the communication must be made by an attorney acting in the capacity of counsel, (2) the communication must be related to the subject matter of the proposed litigation, (3) the proposed proceeding must be under serious consideration by the attorney acting in good faith, and (4) the attorney must have a client or identifiable prospective client at the time the communication is published. |
Supreme Court | ||
UT Medical Group, Inc. v. Val Y. Vogt, M.D.
We granted review in this case to determine whether UT Medical Group, Inc. presented a justiciable case or controversy to the trial court when it alleged that Dr. Vogt anticipatorily breached an employment contract covenant. Because the record fails to show that Dr. Vogt committed an anticipatory repudiation of the non-competition covenant found in her employment agreement, Dr. Vogt is entitled to summary judgment. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for the entry of an order dismissing the case. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Alexander C. Wells v. Tennessee Board of Regents, et al.
We accepted review of this case to decide whether a tenured university professor whose employment by the State was wrongfully terminated may recover back pay and lost benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-8-304. While the trial court initially found there was no statutory authority to grant monetary damages, the plaintiff was awarded back wages, lost benefits, and interest. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Because there is no statutory authority for the award, however, the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals must be reversed and the cause dismissed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Tino Vernell Rodgers (A Minor)
We granted review to answer two questions: (1) whether the trial court erred by dismissing a petition for post-commitment relief from a probation violation in juvenile court; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred by dismissing the appeal as moot because the Petitioner had reached the age of nineteen. Because an oral directive by the juvenile court placing a minor under house arrest is not a valid court order, the trial court erred by dismissing the petition for post-commitment relief. Because a probation violation in juvenile court may have adverse consequences after the completion of a term of commitment, the doctrine of mootness does not apply. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the order of juvenile commitment is set aside. |
Gibson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric Berrios
The defendant, Eric Berrios, was charged with one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver more than three hundred grams of cocaine. After the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the cocaine seized during the traffic stop, the State was granted an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the suppression of the evidence. We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether the officer’s actions amounted to an unconstitutional seizure and, if so, whether the defendant’s consent to search the vehicle was sufficiently attenuated from that illegal act. Because the seizure violated constitutional safeguards and because the consent to search was not sufficiently attenuated from the violation, we affirm the suppression of the evidence. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is, therefore, affirmed. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Michael Wilhelm v. Kroger's d/b/a Peyton's Southeastern
In 2004, the plaintiff, Michael Wilhelm, filed a workers’ compensation claim alleging an injury to his back and left hip. In response, the defendant, Krogers d/b/a Peyton’s Southeastern, denied the claim, asserting that the injuries did not arise out of his employment. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court awarded the plaintiff a 35% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed the judgment. Because, however, the injuries do not qualify as work-related and an earlier workers’ compensation settlement bars recovery, the judgment must be reversed and the case dismissed. |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
Richard Schneider et al. v. The City of Jackson
We granted this appeal primarily to determine whether Tennessee common law includes a law enforcement investigative privilege (“law enforcement privilege”) which operates to exempt from disclosure governmental records that would otherwise be accessible via the Tennessee Public Records Act (“Public Records Act”). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503 (Supp. 2006).1 We hold that Tennessee common law does not include the law enforcement privilege and that it should not be adopted herein. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which adopted the law enforcement privilege and applied it as an exception to the Public Records Act. However, we remand this case to the trial court to determine whether any of the police department records at issue are part of a pending, open, or ongoing criminal investigation and thus exempt from disclosure. We also reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and reinstate the judgment of the trial court permitting Petitioners to recover their attorneys’ fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-505(g) (1999). On remand, the trial court shall calculate and award Petitioners the attorneys’ fees they have incurred on appeal. Finally, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the permanent injunction issued by the trial court requiring the City of Jackson (“City”) to respond in writing to future Public Records Act requests of The Jackson Sun or its agents. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
In Re D.Y.H.
The father was granted custody of his minor child in juvenile court after the court found the daughter to be dependent and neglected. Three years after the order was entered, the mother filed a petition for change of custody in juvenile court, which was denied. The mother appealed the juvenile court’s order to circuit court. The circuit court dismissed the appeal concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the petition filed by the mother was not a part of the dependency and neglect proceeding. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and hold that the subsequent custody decision was a part of the dependency and neglect proceeding so that it is properly appealable to circuit court for a de novo hearing. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Arthur T. Copeland
The Defendant, Arthur T. Copeland, was convicted of one count of first degree murder and sentenced to death. The jury found a single aggravating circumstance, that the Defendant previously had been convicted of one or more felonies involving violence to the person, see Tenn. Code Ann.§ 39-13-204(i)(2) (1997), and further found that the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(g)(1) (1997). The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court properly excluded expert testimony on eyewitness identification but committed plain error by failing to conduct a hearing pursuant to Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 157 (Tenn. 1999), and ordered a remand for a determination of whether the error was harmless. Further, the Court of Criminal Appeals set aside the sentence of death as disproportionate. We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal in order to resolve the dispositive issues. We first hold that the trial court erred by prohibiting the Defendant from offering expert testimony regarding eyewitness testimony and overrule State v. Coley, 32 S.W.3d 831 (Tenn. 2000). Because the exclusion of the testimony cannot be classified as harmless under these circumstances, the Defendant must be granted a new trial. Although the trial court failed to conduct a Momon hearing, consideration of that issue is not necessary because of the grant of a new trial. Finally, we conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by finding that the death sentence was disproportionate; thus the State may choose to seek the death penalty upon remand. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for a new trial. |
Blount | Supreme Court | |
Joseph Faulkner, A/K/A Jerry Faulkner v. State Of Tennessee
In this case, we granted permission to appeal to determine whether a prisoner serving concurrent state and federal sentences in a federal correctional institution may attack his state convictions pursuant to a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in this state. We hold that the petitioner, who is incarcerated in a federal correctional institution serving concurrent state and federal sentences, is not barred from challenging his state convictions by a state writ of habeas corpus. Because the petitioner has failed to attach the requisite documentation in support of his claim that his sentences are illegal, however, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition but do so on different grounds than either the trial court or the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Shelby | Supreme Court |
