Cynthia Bratton v. Michael Bratton - Concurring/Dissenting
JANICE M. HOLDER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in the majority’s conclusion that postnuptial agreements are not contrary to public policy. I respectfully dissent, however, from that portion of the majority’s opinion concluding that the agreement at issue in the present case was not supported by adequate consideration. |
Hamblen | Supreme Court | |
James Kelley v. Middle Tennessee Emergency Physicians
We granted review to determine whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants in this medical malpractice lawsuit. The trial court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that, as a matter of law, no physician-patient relationship existed. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court. After careful review of the record before us and the applicable authorities, we conclude that there are disputed issues of fact as to the existence of a physician-patient relationship, and we therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee and Department of Children's Services v. Woodrow Wilson, Jr. and Debra Wilson
We granted permission to appeal to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-151 bars the State from recovering retroactive child support more than forty-five days prior to the filing of a petition seeking such support. We hold that section 37-1-151 unambiguously requires a trial court to set child support retroactive to the date a child is placed in State custody. The statute does not include any limitation on the length of time for which retroactive support may be due, and a trial judge has no discretion to deviate from the statutorily imposed period of retroactive support. Retroactive child support is to be set according to the child support guidelines, but deviation from the guideline amount is allowable if based upon a finding that applying the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate. Thus, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court. |
Warren | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert James Yoreck, III and State of Tennessee v. Renne Efren Arellano AND State of Tennessee v. Mario C. Estrada
We granted permission to appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals had the authority to vacate convictions arising out of plea agreements when the defendants sought sentence review only. We hold that while the Court of Criminal Appeals had the authority to review issues beyond the sentencing issues raised on appeal, the court erred by finding plain error and vacating the convictions. Additionally, we find that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to accept the guilty plea agreements in these cases. Accordingly, we reinstate the convictions imposed by the trial court and remand the cases to the Court of Criminal Appeals for consideration of the defendants’ sentencing issues. |
Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Chris Cawood
The controversy here concerns certain audio and videotapes which were introduced in a bench trial and marked as exhibits. Following this Court's rejection of the State's application for Rule 11 review, the Court of Criminal Appeals, on motion of the appellee, entered an order returning this evidence to the "permanent possession" of the appellee. The issue framed and briefed by the parties requires us to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals' order returning the tapes to the appellee was consistent with statutes and regulations applicable to the retention and disposal of such evidence. At the threshold, however, we are confronted by an issue neither raised nor briefed by the parties: whether the Court of Criminal Appeals had subject matter jurisdiction to hear and decide the motion in the first place. Upon consideration, we hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear and decide the motion for the following reasons: 1. The Supreme Court was the last court to exercise jurisdiction (prior to the motion) in its rejection of the State's Rule 11 application; 2. The case was not remanded; and 3. The mandate had issued. Additionally, in response to the issue raised and briefed by the parties, we hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 18-3-111 and Records Disposition Authorization (RDA) Number 1672, which control the disposition of the evidence at issue here, do not authorize the method of record disposition sought to be accomplished in the case under review. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is vacated. |
Roane | Supreme Court | |
Richard Jolly v. Lynette Jolly
This appeal arises out of divorce proceedings brought in the District Court of Johnson County, Kansas, and the Chancery Court of McNairy County, Tennessee. In dividing the parties' real property, the chancery court reduced Husband's share by the amount of the child support arrearage and discovery-related sanction assessed by the Kansas court in its decree of divorce. We granted permission to appeal. We conclude that the chancery court erred in enforcing a decree that was not properly registered under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the chancery court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
McNairy | Supreme Court | |
Larry E. Parrish et al. v. Robert S. Marquis et al.
We granted this appeal to determine whether the one-year statute of limitations for filing a new action under Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-105(a) commenced on the date of the appellate court's judgment remanding the cause to the trial court for further proceedings or on the date of the trial court's order of dismissal following the remand. We hold that the statute of limitations commenced on the date of the trial court's order of dismissal and that the plaintiffs' re-filing of their action was therefore timely under the savings statute. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of issues pretermitted by its ruling. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Cinderella Ferrell Osborne v. Mountain Life Insurance Company
We granted review to determine whether the defendant credit life insurance company was estopped from relying on policy language which excluded coverage if an insured received medical treatment for and died from a disease within six months of the date of coverage. The trial court granted summary judgment to the credit life insurance company based on the policy exclusion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant was estopped from relying on the policy exclusion and ordering payment of the policy benefits to the plaintiff, widow of the insured. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment for the defendant and that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the defendant was estopped from relying on the policy exclusion. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court. |
Hawkins | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Tonya Jennings
In a bench trial, the defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity of the charge of stalking. Following her release from judicial hospitalization, she moved to have her public records in this case expunged under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-101(a)(1). Because the pertinent statutory language only provides for expungement upon "a verdict of not guilty returned by a jury," we find that the defendant is not entitled to expungement and affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Wilmore Hatfield
This is an appeal from the Criminal Court for Fentress County which convicted the defendant, Wilmore Hatfield, of felony reckless endangerment as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault. Relying on this Court's decision in State v. Moore, 77 S.W.3d 132 (Tenn. 2002), the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, concluding that felony reckless endangerment was not a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault. The State then sought, and this Court granted, permission to appeal on the sole issue of whether felony reckless endangerment is a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault committed by intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury to another by the use of a deadly weapon. We hold that it is a lesser-included offense under State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 1999). Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision with respect to the felony reckless endangerment conviction is reversed, and that conviction is reinstated. |
Fentress | Supreme Court | |
Shamery Blair and Titus Blair v. West Town Mall
We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's judgment granting summary judgment for Defendant. In resolving this issue, we must also determine whether Tennessee recognizes the "method of operation" theory in premises liability cases and whether Plaintiff's reliance upon that theory is appropriate, as a matter of law, in this case. We hold that plaintiffs in premises liability cases in Tennessee may attempt to establish constructive notice of the presence of a dangerous condition by showing a pattern of conduct, a recurring incident, or a general or continuing condition indicating the dangerous condition's existence. This theory is available to Plaintiff in this case to pursue at trial. Because Defendant in this case failed to affirmatively negate an essential element of Plaintiff's claim or conclusively establish an affirmative defense, Plaintiff's burden to produce evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue for trial was not triggered. Thus, the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment is affirmed. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and modified in part, and this case is remanded to the trial court. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
In The Matter of S.L.O.
This case presents an issue of jurisdiction–whether the circuit court or the Court of Appeals has the authority to hear and decide this appeal from the juvenile court. We hold that the Circuit Court for Haywood County has jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Accordingly, we remand the case to the Circuit Court for Haywood County to conduct an appeal de novo pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-159(a). The parties have also challenged the circuit court’s authority to transfer the case to the Court of Appeals. Because we hold that the circuit court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal, we do not consider the transfer issue. |
Haywood | Supreme Court | |
Linda Clark, et al. v. Nashville Machine Elevator Company Incorporated
In this workers' compensation case, the employer, Nashville Machine Elevator Co., Inc., has appealed the trial court's award of death benefits to the widow and son of the employee, Eddie W. Clark, Jr., who suffered a fatal heart attack while driving the employer's vehicle home from work. The employer contends generally that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the employee suffered an injury causally related to his employment activities, and specifically argues that the heart attack was not compensable because the employee was not physically exerting himself when he suffered the heart attack. The appeal was argued before the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3), but the appeal was transferred to the full Supreme Court prior to the Panel issuing its decision. The question before this Court is whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the employee's heart attack arose out of his employment. After carefully examining the record and the relevant authorities, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. We further hold that physical exertion or strain is not required at the instant an employee's heart attack occurs, provided there is evidence linking the physical activities of the employment with the heart attack. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Allen Blye
We granted permission to appeal in this case to consider whether the Sixth Amendment entitles the defendant to participate, through counsel, in the determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant to seize a sample of the defendant's blood. Because we find that the defendant has no such entitlement, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Sullivan | Supreme Court | |
City of Cookeville, TN by and through Cookeville Regional Med. Ctr. v. William M. Humphrey, M.D., et al.
In this declaratory judgment action, the plaintiff, a private act hospital authority established pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 7-57-601 to -604, seeks a declaration that it has the authority to enter into an exclusive contract for professional imaging services. The defendants, four radiologists who currently have clinical privileges at the Imaging Department of a hospital operated by the plaintiff, filed a counterclaim. We affirm the judgments of the lower courts, holding that Tennessee Code Annotated section 7-57-603 permits the hospital authority to enter into an exclusive provider contract, that the Board of Trustee's decision to close the staff of the Imaging Department did not violate the medical staff bylaws, and that the defendants are not legally or constitutionally entitled to a hearing if their clinical privileges are terminated upon the entry of an exclusive provider contract. |
Putnam | Supreme Court | |
Christy Renee Osborn v. Justin Chandler Marr
We granted this appeal to determine whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(6), which provides for the termination of parental rights when a parent is imprisoned for at least ten years due to a criminal act and the child is under the age of eight when the sentence is imposed, also requires a showing of substantial harm to the child before a parent's rights may be terminated. Because we hold that a parent does not have standing to file a petition pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(6), we lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear the merits of the appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this case and vacate the judgments of the lower courts. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
Robert Terry Moore v. The Town of Collierville, et al
In this workers’ compensation appeal, we must determine whether an employer is liable to a health insurer who paid necessary and reasonable medical expenses incurred by an employee but did not intervene in the workers’ compensation claim to protect its interest. Although the trial court found that the treatment was necessary and reasonable, it further found that the employer was not liable for the medical expenses paid by the employee’s health insurer because the insurer failed to intervene and prove its interest. The employee appealed to the Special Workers’ Compensation AppealsPanel, which transferred the case for full Court review without a recommendation. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we have determined that the employer is liable to the employee’s health insurer for all reasonable and necessary medical expenses and that the health insurer is not required to intervene in the workers’ compensation suit. Because the record does not fully develop the nature and extent of the expenses paid by the health insurer, we remand to the trial court for that purpose and further action consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Ginnie Leach and J.T. Hill, Jr. v. Tim Taylor and Larry Taylor, individually and doing business as Hunt Funeral Home
We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the complaint failed to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We also consider Defendants' contention that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Plaintiffs' cause of action was not time-barred because the discovery rule applies to this case. We hold that Plaintiffs' complaint is sufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The complaint alleges all the elements of the cause of action. We also hold that the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations in this case. Plaintiffs could not have been expected to know, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, that Defendants' alleged statements were false, and therefore could not have been expected to know that an injury had occurred because of the false statements. Accordingly, the holding of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this case is remanded to the trial court. |
Gibson | Supreme Court | |
Jerry Neal Carpenter v. State of Tennessee
The sole issue before the Court in this post-conviction proceeding is whether the petitioner, Jerry Neal Carpenter, was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of appellate counsel. At trial, the jury was given instructions on first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and robbery. The trial court declined trial counsel’s request to provide the jury with lesserincluded offense instructions, and Carpenter was convicted of first degree felony murder. Carpenter argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because appellate counsel failed to challenge the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on second degree murder as a lesser-included offense. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we hold that Carpenter has failed to establish his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We therefore affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment denying post-conviction relief. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Jerry Neal Carpenter v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
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Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Daryl Keith Holton - Concurring/Dissenting
I concur in the conclusion of the majority that Holton’s convictions should be affirmed. As to the sentence of death, however, I continue to adhere to my views expressed in a long line of dissents beginning with State v. Chalmers, 28 S.W.3d 913, 920-25 (Tenn. 2000) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting), and most recently elaborated on in State v. Davidson, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2003) (Birch, J., dissenting), that the comparative proportionality review protocol currently embraced by the majority is inadequate to shield defendants from the arbitrary and disproportionate imposition of the death penalty. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (1995 Supp.). I have repeatedly expressed my displeasure with the current protocol since the time of its adoption in State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn. 1997). I believe there are three basic problems with the current proportionality analysis: (1) the proportionality test is overbroad,2 (2) the pool ofcases used for comparison is inadequate3 and (3) review is too subjective4. I have previously discussed, in depth, my perception that these flaws undermine the reliability of the current proportionality protocol. See, e.g., Godsey, 60 S.W.3d at 793-800 (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion affirming the imposition of the death penalty in this case. |
Bedford | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Daryl Keith Holton
The defendant, Daryl Keith Holton, was convicted of four counts of first degree premeditated murder. The jury imposed a sentence of death on each conviction, finding that the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances2 and that the aggravating circumstances so proven outweighed any and all mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant appealed, challenging both his convictions and sentences. After fully considering the defendant’s claims, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the sentences. The case was then docketed in this Court, briefs were filed, and after considering the briefs and the record, this Court entered an Order requesting that the parties address certain issues at oral argument, including the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the constitutionality of the statutory insanity defense, the constitutionality of Tennessee’s capital sentencing scheme in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and the propriety of the death sentences in light of the mandatory review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(A)-(D) (1997). After carefully and fully considering the issues in light of the record and the relevant authority, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentences. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(a)(1); Judgments of the Trial Court and Court of Criminal Appeals Affirmed |
Bedford | Supreme Court | |
Charles Galbreath v. Board of Professional Responsibility
We have this case on direct appeal, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 1.3, from the judgment of the circuit court approving the order of a hearing committee of the Board of Professional Responsibility that suspended Charles F. Galbreath, the appellant, from the practice of law for a thirty-day period. The circuit court essentially adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the hearing committee. Galbreath does not contest those factual findings but argues that the sanction imposed is excessive. Upon review of the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the thirty-day suspension is appropriate. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Donald Wallace vs. State
We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court properly granted the defendant post-conviction relief in the form of a delayed direct appeal on the ground that counsel's failure to file a motion for new trial resulted in the waiver of all issues on direct appeal except for sufficiency of the evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the appeal after concluding that the trial court lacked the statutory authority to grant a delayed appeal and that the defendant had not suffered any prejudice from counsel's performance. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the trial court properly granted a delayed appeal based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. We therefore reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals, affirm the trial court's grant of a delayed appeal, and remand to the Court of Criminal Appeals for review of the issues presented by the defendant's motion for a new trial. |
Stewart | Supreme Court | |
Stanley Gunter vs. Labcorp, et al
We granted permission to appeal to determine the applicable statute of limitations in this action against a laboratory that analyzes blood for purposes of providing evidence in paternity cases. The trial court ruled that the case was "governed by the applicable one year statute of limitations" in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 28-3-104 and 29-26-116, which refer to injuries to the person and medical malpractice claims, and dismissed the action because the suit was filed outside the one-year limitation. The intermediate court applied the three-year statute of limitations applicable to suits for recovery of monetary damages for injuries to personal property and, thereby, reversed the trial court's ruling. We conclude that this action sounds in negligence rather than medical malpractice. Further, we conclude that the economic loss sustained by the plaintiff is an injury to property rather than to the person. Thus, we hold that the three-year statute of limitations for injury to personal property applies. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Supreme Court |
