State of Tennessee v. Kenzie Anderson
A Davidson County jury found Defendant, Kenzi Eugene Anderson, guilty on two counts each of aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and aggravated robbery, for which the trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-three years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Defendant’s motion to sever defendants and by imposing an excessive sentence and that the trial court committed plain error by failing to sever his offenses for trial. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Wayne Bunch
The Appellant, Gary Wayne Bunch, pled guilty to two counts of theft under $1,000. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of ten years for each offense, and he was placed on supervised probation. Upon finding that the Appellant violated the conditions of his probation, the trial court revoked the Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the ruling of the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Wayne Bunch - Concurring Opinion
I concur fully with the conclusion reached by the majority that there was evidence to support the trial court’s decision to revoke Defendant’s probation and to order Defendant to serve the balance of his original sentence in incarceration. I write separately to affirm my belief expressed in my concurring opinion in State v. Craig Dagnan, No. M2020- 00152-CCA-R3-CD, 2021WL 289010, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 28, 2021), perm. app. filed, that once a determination is made that a defendant has violated the conditions of his or her probation, neither an additional hearing nor any additional findings are statutorily mandated of a trial court to determine the manner in which the original sentence should be served. Thus, there is no opportunity for an abuse of discretion when a “second exercise of discretion” is not required by either sections 40-35-310 or 40-35-311 of Tennessee Code Annotated. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Department of Finance And Administration, Division Of TennCare v. The Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority D/B/A Erlanger Health System
This appeal concerns an administrative judge’s decision to exclude several exhibits in a contested case between a hospital and the TennCare Division of the Tennessee Department of Finance and Administration. At issue in the contested case is the validity of two TennCare rules that regulate payment for emergency services provided to Medicaid beneficiaries when the hospital has no contract with the beneficiaries’ managed care provider. The exhibits contain out-of-court statements made by industry representatives and federal agency employees about the meaning and application of federal and state law. TennCare asserts that the exhibits are necessary to show the reasonableness of its decision-making process. The healthcare services provider argues that the exhibits contain irrelevant, inadmissible hearsay. Having determined that the exhibits are not admissible under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, we affirm the administrative judge’s ruling. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nathaniel Shawn Declue
The Defendant, Nathaniel Shawn Declue, pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell, two counts of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, driving on revoked license, violation of the vehicle registration law, simple possession of a Schedule VI substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged multiple convictions and imposed an effective sentence of twenty years in confinement. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to apply a mitigating factor and by failing to consider the economic resources available to state prisons in its decision to impose a twenty-year effective sentence. After review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kelly Lee Pitts
The Defendant, Kelly Lee Pitts, was convicted by a jury of seven counts each of attempted first degree murder and possessing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony. Thereafter, the trial court imposed an effective fifty-one-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for attempted first degree murder, specifically, challenging the element of premeditation; (2) the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive sentencing based upon the dangerous offender criterion; (3) and the trial court erred in imposing Class C felony convictions for employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony when he was convicted only of possessing such a firearm, a Class D felony.1 The State concedes that the sentences and judgments for employment of a firearm were in error, and we agree. In all other respects, we affirm. Accordingly, though we affirm the Defendant’s convictions, we vacate and modify certain judgment forms and sentences consistent with this opinion. The case is remanded. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Judy Morrow Wright, et al. v. Matthew G. Buyer, et al.
After their case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiffs moved for relief from the judgment claiming that the trial judge should have recused herself. The court denied the motion for relief, and this appeal followed. We previously considered the plaintiffs’ claims of the judge’s “appearance of a predispositional bias” in an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. In that appeal, we determined that the plaintiffs had waived their right to challenge the judge’s impartiality. So based on the law of the case, we affirm the denial of plaintiffs’ motion for relief from the judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jazmine D. Et Al.
The appellant, Juanita D., filed a motion to accept late-filed notice of appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Aaron J. Cryer, et al. v. City of Dyersburg, et al.
City employees brought action against the city upon its amendment of the pension plan. The trial court ruled in favor of the city. The employees appeal. We affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eli Kea
The Defendant, Eli Kea, was convicted by a jury of four counts of attempted aggravated robbery, four counts of aggravated assault, one count of reckless aggravated assault, and two counts of reckless endangerment of another by discharging a firearm into an occupied habitation. Thereafter, the trial court merged several of the convictions and imposed an effective ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, arguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop of his vehicle based solely on a general description of the vehicle; (2) the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the episode involving four counts of attempted aggravated robbery and four counts of aggravated assault; and (3) the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach a co-defendant with a prior statement because the jury was unlikely to consider the prior statement only for credibility purposes given the prejudicial nature of the statement. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alfred Lee Boykin, III
Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, the defendant, Alfred Lee Boykin, III, appeals two certified questions of law related to the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss his case due to excessive delay in prosecuting the case. Because the defendant failed to establish prejudice flowing from the more than two-year delay in this case, the trial court did not err by denying his motion to dismiss. The judgments of the trial court are, therefore, affirmed. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Trenton Jermaine Bell
Trenton Jermaine Bell, Defendant, was arrested and charged with first degree premediated murder, tampering with evidence, and abuse of a corpse in connection with the death of the victim, Sydney Green. A Wilson County jury convicted Defendant as charged on all counts, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective life sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error by failing to issue a curative instruction when a police detective offered improper lay testimony. He also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for first degree premeditated murder and that he was denied a jury venire comprising a fair cross section of the community. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Dominic B.
This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights case. The trial court determined that three grounds for termination had been established as to the child’s mother: abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36- 1-102(1)(A)(ii), persistence of conditions pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(3), and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(14). The court further determined that the termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Although we vacate two of the termination grounds due to insufficient findings, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that there is clear and convincing evidence to support its finding of abandonment and its determination that the termination of the mother’s rights is in the child’s best interests. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Jesus Baltazar Diaz Ramos v. State of Tennessee
The pro se Petitioner, Jesus Baltazar Diaz Ramos, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shalonda Weems
This case examines a trial court’s decision to grant, in part, a motion for judgment of acquittal in a criminal case. A Davidson County jury convicted Shalonda Weems of aggravated child neglect and reckless homicide following the death of her six-month-old daughter, Kar’mn. The autopsy investigation determined that Kar’mn’s primary cause of death was malnutrition and dehydration and that the circumstances of her death were neglect. Ms. Weems was adamant in her statements to law enforcement that she fed Kar’mn, and medical records showed Ms. Weems took Kar’mn to all of her regularly scheduled doctors’ appointments. After the jury’s verdict, Ms. Weems filed a motion for judgment of acquittal as to both charges. The trial court granted the motion as to the aggravated child neglect charge but denied the motion as to the reckless homicide charge. The State appealed the trial court’s decision to partially grant the acquittal, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Because we conclude that a reasonable jury could have found all the necessary elements of the crime of aggravated child neglect, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-15-402 (2003), beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and vacate the trial court’s decision to grant the motion for judgment of acquittal as to the aggravated child neglect charge. As a result, Ms. Weems’ conviction for aggravated child neglect is reinstated. We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Neal Olive
The Defendant, Jeffrey Neal Olive, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of second-degree murder, a Class A felony, and was sentenced to twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that his sentence is excessive and contrary to law. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tommie Phillips v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Tommie Phillips, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2011 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of felony murder, reckless homicide, attempted first degree murder, aggravated rape, aggravated sexual battery, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated burglary. He argues that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Edward Seaton
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Robert Edward Seaton, was convicted of facilitation of theft of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, a Class E felony, and one count each of vandalism, evading arrest, and driving with a revoked license, second offense, Class A misdemeanors. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-11-403, -14-103, -14-105, - 14-408, -16-603, 55-50-504. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion for a mistrial when a court officer, who was acting as jury custodian, was called and sworn as a rebuttal witness; (2) that the court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion for a mistrial after the court elicited from a defense witness the name of the witness’s father-in-law, who was “a notorious criminal and murderer”; (3) that the court erred by admitting reputation or opinion evidence from three law enforcement officers regarding a defense witness’s character for truthfulness; (4) that plain error occurred when the State cross-examined a defense witness regarding prior criminal behavior not resulting in a conviction; and (5) that the cumulative effect of these errors deprived the Defendant of a fair trial. Following our review, we conclude that the admission of reputation and opinion evidence from law enforcement officers constitutes reversible error such that the Defendant is entitled to a new trial. Alternatively, we conclude that the Defendant would be entitled to relief due to cumulative error. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Craig Rickard
The Defendant, Craig Rickard, was convicted by a Cheatham County Circuit Court jury of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced pursuant to a pleabargained sentencing agreement to an effective term of twenty-five years at 100% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by admitting the video recordings of the victim’s forensic interviews, in not conducting a jury out hearing to determine the victim’s qualifications as a witness, and by suggesting to the prosecutor the manner in which a question could be posed in order to avoid the Defendant’s hearsay objection. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Cheatham | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Julie C. W. v. Frank Mitchell W. Jr.
This appeal arises from a divorce. Julie C. W. (“Wife”) sued Frank Mitchell W. Jr. (“Husband”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the Trial Court divided the marital estate, set child support and alimony, and entered a parenting plan. Wife appeals, raising a number of issues. In one issue, Wife argues that the Trial Court placed inordinate weight on the fact that Husband is 16 years older than her in awarding him roughly 59% of the marital estate, even though his earning power is substantially greater than hers. We agree. We vacate the Trial Court’s division of the marital estate and remand for a new and equitable division that is as close to a 50/50 division as possible, based upon the specific facts of this case. However, on all other issues, we discern no reversible error by the Trial Court. We thus affirm, in part, and vacate, in part, the Trial Court’s judgment, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Julie C. W. v. Frank Mitchell W. Jr. - Concurring
I agree with the analysis and result of the majority opinion. I write separately to address one troubling issue—the Trial Court’s findings regarding Wife’s spending $2,000 per month on food for herself and her two teenagers. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jeremy C. Et Al.
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Jeremy C. and Jessica C., the minor children (“the Children”) of Grace C. (“Mother”) and Jonathan H. (“Father”). The Children were originally removed from Mother’s home in December 2014 upon an emergency petition filed by Mother’s cousin in the Hickman County Juvenile Court (“juvenile court”). At the time of removal, Father had been incarcerated for approximately two years. The Children were then placed with Mother’s cousin and her husband while also receiving services from the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). In March 2015, the juvenile court adjudicated the Children dependent and neglected. Upon a petition for relinquishment subsequently filed by the cousin and her husband, the Children were taken into DCS’s protective custody via an order entered by the juvenile court in March 2016. Following a hearing and upon DCS’s allegations that the Children had been severely abused while in the care of Mother and while residing with Mother’s former paramour, the juvenile court entered an agreed order in September 2016, adjudicating the Children dependent and neglected and severely abused. In July 2017, DCS filed a petition in the Hickman County Circuit Court (“trial court”) to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father to the Children. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition as to both parents. As pertinent to this appeal, the trial court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights upon its finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had (1) abandoned the Children by willfully failing to visit them, (2) failed to substantially comply with the reasonable responsibilities and requirements of the permanency plans, (3) severely abused the Children, and (4) failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of or financial responsibility for the Children. The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michelle Bennington
Defendant, Michelle Bennington, filed a pro se motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 to correct an alleged clerical error in a July 22, 2019 probation revocation order. The motion sought entry of a corrected order providing 827 days of postjudgment jail credit. The trial court determined that there was no clerical error in the revocation order and denied the motion. However, the trial court determined that there was a clerical error in the May 23, 2016 judgments of conviction and entered corrected judgments providing two additional days of pretrial jail credit. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffery D. Strong
A Macon County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Jeffery Dewayne Strong, of selling a Schedule III, controlled substance, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court erred by allowing the State to play an audio recording of the controlled drug buy. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and that the Appellant waived the issue regarding the audio recording because he failed to raise it in his motion for a new trial or at the hearing on the motion. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Macon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shelby County Board of Education, et al. v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association
In this appeal, we conclude that the original legal controversy was extinguished as moot prior to the trial court’s entry of judgment. As such, we vacate the trial court’s order as advisory and dismiss the appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |