Vanessa Faddoul v. Edward James Beyer

Vanessa Faddoul sought an order of protection as a stalking victim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617 against her neighbor, Edward James Beyer, in Williamson County General Sessions Court. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the general sessions court issued a one-year order of protection prohibiting Mr. Beyer from contacting or coming about the victim, Mrs. Faddoul, or her family, and restricting Mr. Beyer’s second amendment rights. Mr. Beyer appealed to the Williamson County Circuit Court. Upon a pre-trial motion of Mr. Beyer, the circuit court modified the general sessions order by restoring Mr. Beyer’s second amendment right to possess firearms. Following three days of hearings on the petition, but before the circuit court could rule on the merits of the de novo appeal, Mr. Beyer filed a “Notice of Voluntary Nonsuit and Dismissal of Appeal” to dismiss his appeal of the general sessions court ruling against him in Case No. 2022OP-176, purportedly pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41.01(1). Because Mr. Beyer dismissed his appeal, the circuit court entered an order “affirming” the judgment of the general sessions court, save the second amendment issue, dismissing the appeal, and granting Mrs. Faddoul leave to apply for an award of attorney’s fees. Thereafter, Mrs. Faddoul requested attorney’s fees in the amount of $168,112.50 under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617(a)(1), discretionary costs in the amount of $5,248.62 under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2), and $2,579.37 in “non-discretionary cost expenses.” The circuit court denied her request for attorney’s fees and discretionary costs in toto based on several findings. It found that she was not entitled to an award of mandatory attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617 because, inter alia, stalking victims are not entitled to the same “enhanced protections” as domestic abuse victims, that it did not complete the hearing on the petition, which it found to be a prerequisite for fees, and that the amount of attorney’s fees requested was unreasonable. The circuit court also declined to award Mrs. Faddoul any discretionary costs. Both parties appeal. Contrary to Mr. Beyer’s argument that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to take any action after he purportedly “nonsuited” his appeal, we find that the circuit court retained jurisdiction and that it did not err in affirming the judgment of the general sessions court and granting Mrs. Faddoul leave to request attorney’s fees. Because Mrs. Faddoul, as a stalking victim, is entitled to the same rights afforded to domestic abuse victims, and as mandated pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617(a)(1), we hold that Mrs. Faddoul is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees she incurred in the general sessions court and the circuit court proceedings. Thus, we reverse the circuit court’s decision regarding attorney’s fees and remand for the circuit court to award Mrs. Faddoul her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in the general sessions court and the circuit court proceedings under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617(a)(1). We affirm in part and reverse in part the denial of Mrs. Faddoul’s request for discretionary costs, finding that some of the court reporters’ invoices clearly delineate the discretionary costs that she is entitled to recover pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2). We also conclude that Mrs. Faddoul is entitled to her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617(a)(1).