Eric Best v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
Appellant, an inmate in the custody of Appellee, the Tennessee Department of Correction, filed a pro se petition for common law writ of certiorari in the trial court, seeking review of a prison disciplinary board’s decision finding him guilty of possession and use of a cell phone. Appellees moved to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the petition was not verified as required by the Tennessee Constitution and Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 27-8-104(a) and 27-8-106. The trial court granted the dismissal, and Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Willie Johnson v. Turney Center Disciplinary Board, et al.
An inmate of the Tennessee Department of Correction filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari seeking review of his prison disciplinary conviction. The trial court dismissed the petition on the grounds that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review his petition because the petitioner failed to file the documents required under Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102, and failed to comply with the filing requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-805 and § 41-21-807. This appeal followed. We affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Nicole Aquino Williamson v. Paul Landon Lamm
This case involves the modification of a permanent parenting plan under which the parents exercised equal parenting time. The mother, who was designated the primary residential parent in the original plan, filed a petition to modify and alleged a material change had occurred in that the child had reached school age and the distance between the parents made the parenting schedule unworkable. The father did not file a counter-petition but filed a competing parenting plan. After a hearing, the trial court changed the primary residential parent for the upcoming school year to the father, established a new residential parenting schedule, and invited the mother to file a new modification petition for the following school year. The mother appealed. We conclude the preponderance of the evidence does not establish a material change in circumstance sufficient to modify the primary residential parent but does establish a material change sufficient to meet the lower standard for modification of the residential parenting schedule. Consequently, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for a determination of a residential parenting schedule that is in the best interest of the child. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Murray Owen Wilhoite, Jr. v. Brenda Ruth Wilhoite, et al.
Husband filed a breach of contract action against his Wife while their divorce was pending. When the parties settled the divorce, Husband voluntarily dismissed his breach of contract action. Husband later filed a motion to reinstate his breach of contract action against Wife, which the trial court denied. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Damian M.
This is a dependency and neglect action involving the respondent mother’s two minor children, ages five and six at the time the incident giving rise to this action occurred. After it was discovered that the older child suffered, inter alia, a liver laceration as a result of physical abuse, the Hamilton County Juvenile Court determined that both children were dependent and neglected in the care of their mother. The juvenile court also determined that the older child was a victim of severe child abuse. The mother perfected a de novo appeal to the Circuit Court for Hamilton County. The circuit court likewise found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the children were dependent and neglected and that the mother committed severe child abuse against the older child. The mother appeals the circuit court’s finding of severe child abuse. We have determined that the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the circuit court’s findings that the children are dependent and neglected, and that the mother severely abused the older child. Thus, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In re Quadayvon H., et al.
This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to two of his children. The children’s mother’s rights were previously terminated. In 2010, the older child was adjudicated dependent and neglected due to his mother’s drug use; the father was incarcerated at the time. In 2012, both children were adjudicated dependent and neglected and removed from their mother’s home after an altercation involving the father and another child resulted in father’s arrest and mother’s arrest for drug use. In 2015, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition seeking to terminate the father’s parental rights on the statutory grounds of persistence of conditions and mental incompetence. The juvenile court found that both grounds were proved by clear and convincing evidence and also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the father’s rights was in the children’s best interests. The father appeals. We reverse. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
James A. Long, et al. v. Charles D. Ledford, et al
James A. Long and Patricia Long (“Plaintiffs”) sued Charles D. Ledford and Vivian Ledford (“Defendants”) with regard to a promissory note. After a trial, the Circuit Court for Unicoi County (“the Trial Court”) entered a Final Order granting Plaintiffs a judgment against Defendants for $21,296.01. Defendants appeal to this Court. The record on appeal contains no transcript and no statement of the evidence. We must assume that the record had it been preserved would contain sufficient evidence to support the Trial Court‟s factual findings. We, therefore, affirm |
Unicoi | Court of Appeals | |
In re Scott H.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving a ten-year-old child, Scott H. (“the Child”). On August 8, 2011, the Shelby County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) granted temporary legal custody of the Child to the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (“DCS”). The Child was immediately placed in foster care, where he has remained since that date. DCS subsequently filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the Child's mother, Jill H. (“Mother”), and his father, William H. (“Father”), on April 17, 2015.1 Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to the Child after determining by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mother failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plans, (2) the conditions that led to the removal of the Child from Mother's custody still persisted, and (3) Mother was mentally incompetent to adequately care for the Child. The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Mother has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
George Campbell, Jr. v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
This is a prisoner complaint filed under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (TGTLA) against the Tennessee Department of Correction, the Commissioner of Correction, Corrections Corporation of America, the correctional facility where the prisoner was housed, and several prison employees, seeking arrearages for unpaid wages, as well as punitive and compensatory damages. The complaint was filed in the Chancery Court of Davidson County. The trial court dismissed the prisoner’s complaint because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. The prisoner now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Adrianna S.
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. In 2011, Father was sentenced to serve concurrent fifteen-year and four-year prison sentences. Thereafter, the Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6), which provides grounds for termination when the parent is imprisoned under a sentence of ten or more years and “the child is under eight (8) years of age at the time the sentence is entered by the court.” Father argued that this statute does not provide grounds for termination in this case because the child was not born at the time of Father’s sentencing; therefore, the statutory requirement that there be a “child” under the age of eight at the time of the parent’s sentencing has not been met. The juvenile court determined that the statutory language includes a child in utero at the time of the parent’s sentencing and the evidence clearly and convincingly established grounds for terminating Father’s parental rights. The juvenile court also determined that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interests of the child. After review, we affirm the holding of the juvenile court. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Dallas K. Hurley, Jr. v. Ryan B. Pickens, M.D., et al
Dallas K. Hurley, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) sued Ryan B. Pickens, M.D. and University Urology, P.C. (“Defendants”) alleging claims for health care liability. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. While the motion to dismiss was pending, Plaintiff filed a notice of and motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41. The Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) granted Plaintiff a voluntary dismissal without prejudice. Defendants appeal to this Court raising issues regarding whether Plaintiff had the right to take a voluntary dismissal without prejudice when a motion to dismiss was pending and whether Plaintiff failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122 requiring dismissal of Plaintiff’s suit with prejudice. We find and hold that Plaintiff had the right to take a voluntary dismissal even while a motion to dismiss was pending. Our resolution of this issue renders Defendants’ second issue moot. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s order granting Plaintiff a voluntary dismissal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
William S. Nickels, et al v. Metropolitan Government Of Nashville And Davidson County
Two dentists filed this action against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) under the Governmental Tort Liability Act to recover damages caused by the allegedly dangerous condition of the sewer and stormwater system behind their office. The trial court dismissed all of the plaintiffs’ claims. We have concluded that the trial court erred in several respects. The trial court erred in concluding that the combined line did not present a dangerous condition pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-29-204(a), and in applying Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205(a)(1) to the dentists’ claims. Moreover, the trial court erred in concluding that Metro did not have a duty to repair a known dangerous condition in the combined line. We further find that the trial court erred in concluding that the dentists were not at fault in constructing the addition to their office. We agree with the trial court that some of the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations and the Act of God defense. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Dwight Douglas et al v. Charlotte Cornwell
At issue is whether an easement for ingress and egress exists. Plaintiffs commenced this action to enjoin the adjacent property owner from using Plaintiffs’ driveway for ingress and egress. Defendant filed a counterclaim asserting that she had an easement by implication; alternatively, she claimed Plaintiffs purchased the property subject to an easement because the easement was apparent upon inspection. The dispositive issue concerning the alleged easement by implication is whether the easement is essential to Defendant’s beneficial enjoyment of her property. The trial court found that Defendant failed to establish that she would incur an unreasonable expenditure to create another means of ingress and egress to her property; therefore, the easement was not a necessity. The court also found that the claimed easement was not apparent upon inspection. Accordingly, the court enjoined Defendant from using the driveway for ingress and egress. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Tom Seaton v. Mona Johnson
The appellee brought a detainer warrant against the appellant. The general sessions court granted the warrant and the appellant appealed to the circuit court, but did not post the required bond. The circuit court dismissed the case and the appellant appealed. We find that appellant’s brief does not meet the argument and citation requirements of Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7) and, therefore, consider appellant’s issues waived. The circuit court’s decision is affirmed. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In re Dustin L. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on the six minor children of Tonya F. (“Mother”) and Joshua F. (“Father”). On February 9, 2015, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. DCS alleged as a basis for termination the statutory grounds of (1) failure to provide a suitable home, (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, and (3) persistence of the conditions leading to removal of the children. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition upon its determination by clear and convincing evidence that DCS had proven all three statutory grounds alleged. The court further determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Mother and Father have appealed. Inasmuch as DCS has conceded that the elements of abandonment through failure to provide a suitable home were not proven as to either party, we reverse this statutory ground. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the children. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Clark v. John Werther, et al.
The plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a complaint in this health care liability action without attaching a certificate of good faith. Several defendants filed motions to dismiss based on the missing certificate. The plaintiff responded to the motions and filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit. Some of the defendants objected to the voluntary dismissal, arguing the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against the non-objecting defendants without prejudice but dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against the objecting defendants with prejudice. The plaintiff appealed all of the court’s dismissal orders on numerous grounds. Upon review, we conclude that Rule 41.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure afforded the plaintiff the right to a voluntary dismissal without prejudice as to all defendants. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
David H. McCord v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, Inc.
Surgeon brought suit against a hospital alleging multiple causes of action, two of which were dismissed upon the hospital’s motion for dismissal for failure to state a claim for relief. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-12-119(c), the hospital filed a motion seeking recovery of costs and attorneys’ fees related to the dismissal of the two claims; the trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff appeals. We find no error in the award and, accordingly, affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph H. Johnston v. Tennessee State Election Commission, et al.
This appeal requires us to consider whether the plaintiff can bring a declaratory judgment action against the Tennessee State Election Commission in chancery court. We have reviewed the relevant authorities and have determined the plaintiff is not entitled to a declaratory judgment under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act or the Declaratory Judgment Act. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Penny Arvidson Richards v. Neil Kingsland Richards
In this divorce action, Penny Arvidson Richards (Wife) argues that the trial court’s judgment granting her a divorce and incorporating the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (MDA) should be set aside. Among other things, Wife alleges that she signed the MDA under duress and/or while she lacked the requisite mental capacity to do so. The trial court ruled that Wife failed to prove her defenses to the enforcement of the MDA. Wife appeals. We affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly E. Lapinsky v. Janice E. Cook et al.
Kimberly E. Lapinsky (“Plaintiff”) appeals the order of the Chancery Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”) granting summary judgment to Janice E. Cook, Kevin D. Cook (“the Cooks”) and Brenda Brewster (“Brewster”) in this lawsuit that arose from the sale of a house by the Cooks to Plaintiff. Plaintiff raises issues on appeal with regard to whether the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment and whether the Trial Court erred in failing to allow Plaintiff to conduct additional discovery prior to ruling on the motions for summary judgment. The Cooks raise an issue regarding whether the Trial Court erred in denying their motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-109. We find and hold that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow further discovery, that the defendants made properly supported motions for summary judgment, and that Plaintiff failed to show that there is a genuine disputed issue of material fact. As the Cooks and Brewster made properly supported motions for summary judgment and are entitled to summary judgment, we affirm the grants of summary judgment. We further find and hold that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for attorney’s fees. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Caney Fork Electric Cooperative, Inc., et al. v. Tennessee State Board of Equalization
The Tennessee Attorney General opined that a tax exemption in favor of electric cooperatives found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 65-25-122(a) violates Article II, Section 28 of the Tennessee Constitution. The Board of Equalization began proceedings to recalculate the taxes of the electric cooperatives. Several electric cooperatives objected and maintained that the exemption under Tenn. Code Ann. § 65-25-122(a) was valid. The Board recalculated their taxes anyway. The electric cooperatives appealed. Although the Board of Equalization cannot rule on the constitutionality of the statute, we can. We find that Tenn. Code Ann. § 65-25-122(a) violates Article II, Section 28 of the Tennessee Constitution. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In re: Beckwith Church Of Christ
In this case, two former members of a dissolved church filed a petition seeking permission to sell the improved real property formerly occupied by the church and donate the money to a nonprofit Bible school or, in the alternative, to convey the property directly to the school. The petitioners filed suit against unknown former members of the church and obtained permission to serve the unknown respondents by publication in a local newspaper. After publication of the action, no responsive pleadings were filed, and the petitioners obtained a default judgment. Before the default judgment became final, a descendant of the original owners of the real property filed a motion to set aside the default judgment and dismiss the petition based on insufficient service of process. The court granted the motion, set aside the default judgment, and dismissed the petition with regard to the descendant. On appeal, the petitioners argue: (1) the chancery court erred in finding constructive service insufficient; (2) that the descendant waived his objections to service of process by filing a notice of appearance; and (3) that the descendant should be estopped from setting aside the judgment because he delayed asserting his rights. Upon review of the record, we conclude that service of process on the descendant was insufficient and that the descendant’s conduct did not preclude him from setting aside the void judgment. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the chancery court. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
In re: Jason S., et al.
This case involves termination of the parental rights of a mother and father to their three children. Following a report of drug exposure and environmental neglect, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) obtained emergency temporary custody of the children. Approximately nine months after the children were removed from the parents’ home, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and severe child abuse. The petition also sought to terminate the mother’s parental rights on the additional ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit, and it sought to terminate the father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent. The juvenile court found all grounds were established by clear and convincing evidence and that termination of both parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Although we conclude that DCS did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the mother abandoned the children by willful failure to visit, we affirm the termination of parental rights. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
James F. Logan, Jr. et al. v. The Estate of Mildred Cannon et al.
This case involves a one-quarter ownership interest in an unimproved 7.18-acre tract of real property located in Bradley County, Tennessee (“the Property”). The plaintiff, attorney James F. Logan, Jr., asserts that he purchased a one-quarter interest in the Property from Sam and Mildred Cannon in 1974. Sam and Mildred Cannon were divorced in 1979, and Mr. Cannon remarried. Upon Mr. Cannon’s death in 2002, he was survived by his second wife, Yvonne, and two adult children from his marriage to Mildred Cannon. Prior to commencement of this action, Yvonne Cannon conveyed any interest she had in the disputed property to Mr. Logan via quitclaim deed. Mr. Logan, together with co-plaintiffs, who are co-tenants of the Property not participating in this appeal, subsequently filed this action in February 2011, seeking declaration of ownership in Mr. Logan’s name and clear title concerning his claimed one-quarter interest in the Property. They named as defendants Mildred Cannon; her daughter, both individually and in her capacity as trustee for Sam and Mildred Cannon’s son; and a successor trustee. The plaintiffs acknowledged that no deed reflecting Sam and Mildred Cannon’s purported conveyance to Mr. Logan had been recorded or could be produced. In the alternative, the plaintiffs pled adverse possession. Mildred Cannon died in September 2011, and her estate was substituted as a party in this action. The parties subsequently filed competing motions for summary judgment, with the defendants alleging that Mr. Logan’s claim could not satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds and the plaintiffs amending their complaint to add alternative equitable theories of constructive trust and/or resulting trust. Following hearings, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Mr. Logan appeals. We affirm the trial court’s findings that the evidence cannot satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds or give rise to a constructive or resulting trust. We determine, however, that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding Mr. Logan’s claim of adverse possession, and we remand for further proceedings concerning this claim. We also determine that the trial court improperly found statements in an affidavit presented by an employee of Mr. Logan’s law firm to be inadmissible. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Elizabeth D.
The custodians of a child filed a petition in Greene County Circuit Court to terminate the parental rights of the Father to the child, who had resided with the Custodians since birth; at the time of the hearing on the petition, the Father was incarcerated in Florida. Following a three-day hearing extending over one month, the court entered an order holding that Father failed to visit or support the child within the four months preceding his incarceration and terminating Father’s rights on the grounds of abandonment. Father appeals, asserting that the conduct of the hearing denied him his due process right to meaningfully participate in the termination proceeding and that the record does not support the determination that he willfully failed to visit or support his child. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Greene | Court of Appeals |
