Eric L. Tate Davis v. Kristin A. Hood
This appeal arises from post-divorce efforts to modify a permanent parenting plan. The father filed a petition to modify child support and subsequently amended his petition to include a request to modify the residential parenting schedule. The mother filed a counter-petition, seeking to limit the father to supervised visitation. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the father’s petition to modify the residential parenting schedule because the father failed to prove a material change of circumstance. The court, however, found that the mother did prove a material change of circumstance and that modification of the residential parenting schedule to restrict the father to supervised visitation was in the best interest of the child. The trial court also modified child support and awarded the Mother one-half of her attorney’s fees. Both parties appeal the trial court’s decision. The father appeals the trial court’s findings with regard to material changes of circumstance, child support, and the award of attorney’s fees. The father also appeals the trial court’s decision to limit his pretrial discovery. The mother appeals the trial court’s award of only half of her attorney’s fees and decision to divide the costs of supervised visitation between the parties. Upon reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision and remand this case for a determination of the amount of Mother’s reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Victoria Hope Mashburn v. Tyler David Mashburn
In this divorce action, Tyler David Mashburn (Father) argues that the trial court erred by including certain provisions in the permanent parenting plan, i.e., (1) a requirement that his residential parenting time with the parties’ son be supervised; (2) a provision prohibiting Father’s girlfriend from staying overnight during Father’s parenting time; (3) a provision that Father shall have no additional residential parenting time for holidays or vacations unless Victoria Hope Mashburn (Mother) agrees; and (4) a provision that all major decisions regarding the child shall be made exclusively by Mother. We modify the plan by deleting all of these provisions. Furthermore, we reverse the trial court’s decision to award Mother attorney’s fees of $5,000. |
Meigs | Court of Appeals | |
Chuck's Package Store et al. v. City of Morristown
This case originated when six retail wine and liquor stores filed suit against the City of Morristown seeking a refund of a portion of inspection fees that had been erroneously calculated by the City. The fees were assessed by the City on the purchases at wholesale of alcoholic beverages. The City failed to use the correct percentage mandated by Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-3-501 (2013). It is undisputed that the plaintiffs overpaid the City; since the plaintiffs were understandably unaware of the error, they failed to state that they were paying the fees under protest. The City moved to dismiss the case, citing the plaintiffs' failure to pay “under protest.” |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
In re Addison E., et al.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother's parental rights to two minor children. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of her rights on the statutory ground of severe child abuse. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
The Estate of Blake B. Cunningham, by and through Barbara Cunningham v. Epstein Enterprises, LLC, et al.
In this premises liability case, the plaintiff appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the manager and owner of an apartment complex. The trial court concluded that the defendants owed no duty to a security guard, who was fatally shot while working at the apartment complex. Although a premises owner generally owes a duty to provide independent contractors with a safe workplace, under the facts of this case, we conclude that the defendants owed no duty to protect the security guard from the criminal acts that resulted in the loss of his life. Therefore, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Additionally, we affirm the award of discretionary costs to the defendants. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
The Estate of Blake B. Cunningham, by and through Barbara Cunningham v. Epstein Enterprises, LLC, et al. - CONCUR
I concur in the result reached by the majority Opinion with regard to whether the Epstein Entities owed a duty to Mr. Cunningham, but I write separately to address a concern with how the majority reaches this conclusion. I also concur with the majority Opinion‘s holding that the Service Agreement cannot be relied upon by Ms. Cunningham in this case, albeit for a different reason. Thus, I respectfully file this concurrence and will address each of my concerns in turn. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John F. Manning, Sr. v. Crystal Joan Manning, et al.
This appeal involves the interpretation of a marital dissolution agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, the husband and wife agreed to waive any interest in the other party's retirement account upon the dissolution of the marriage. The husband failed to effectuate the change to his retirement account. Upon his death, the wife refused to sign documentation waiving her right to the benefits. The administrator of the estate filed suit. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the wife. The administrator appeals. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and direct entry of summary judgment in favor of the administrator. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Jody Pendergrass, et al. v. Brandon Ingram
This case arises from a contract dispute. The parties orally contracted for Appellees to perform grading and other work on Appellant's property for the price of $2,500.00. After Appellees began the work, Appellant requested additional work. The parties did not discuss any additional payment for this work. After the work was complete, Appellees sent Appellant an invoice for $9,073.00. Appellant told Appellees he would not pay that amount and sent them a cashier's check marked “pd in full” for $1,500.00, which was the balance due on the original $2,500.00 price. Appellees marked through the “pd in full” notation on the check, cashed the check, and then notified Appellant that they considered the check to be a credit against the total amount owed. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Commerce Union Bank Brentwood, Tennessee D/B/A Reliant Bank v. Kelly D. Bush, et al.
This is a post-foreclosure action in which the lender seeks to recover a deficiency judgment, interest, and the costs of collection. In their answer, the borrowers asserted that the loan was a nonrecourse debt; thus, they were not liable for the deficiency. Alternatively, they asserted that the property sold at foreclosure for an amount materially less than its fair market value. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the loan was a full recourse debt as to both borrowers. This determination was based on the finding, inter alia, that all parties intended the borrowers to be personally liable. The trial court also concluded that the lender was entitled to a deficiency judgment, finding that the borrowers failed to overcome the rebuttable presumption that the foreclosure sale price was equal to the fair market value of the property at the time of the foreclosure sale. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-5-118. The trial court awarded the lender a judgment of $640,783.41, plus interest and attorney’s fees, against the borrowers jointly and severally. As the foregoing indicates, our review is benefited by the trial court’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 findings of facts and conclusions of law, which disclose the reasoned steps by which the trial court reached its ultimate conclusion and enhance the authority of the trial court’s decision. Having reviewed the trial court’s findings of fact in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d), we have concluded that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings and that the trial court identified and properly applied the applicable legal principles. For these reasons, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Tonya Halleen Blackwell v. Christopher S. Blackwell
In this post-divorce action, the mother sought modification of the father’s child support obligation due to a material change of circumstances. The trial court increased the father’s child support obligation but declined to order such modification effective as of the date the mother filed her petition to modify. The mother has appealed. Having determined that the trial court erred in failing to modify the father’s child support obligation effective as of the date of the petition’s filing, we reverse the trial court’s judgment in that regard and remand for entry of a modified judgment retroactive to the date the mother filed the petition. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Rebecca Creswell Henegar v. Jason Adam Henegar
This appeal is from a final decree of divorce. The wife challenges several of the trial court’s rulings regarding the grounds for the divorce, the division of marital property, the parenting plan, the calculation of child support and educational expenses, and attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Estate of Tandy Nathan Dalton
In this probate action, the executrix proposed to distribute the decedent’s real and personal property in a manner that she claimed was in accordance with the decedent’s Last Will and Testament (“Will”). One beneficiary, one of the decedent’s three adult children, objected, claiming that the decedent had granted her an option to purchase one parcel of real property owned by the decedent. The trial court determined that the real property in question was an asset of the probate estate and that the executrix could administer it in accordance with the decedent’s Will. The trial court also determined that a settlement agreement executed by the decedent’s three children precluded the claim of an option to purchase. The beneficiary appealed. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 30-2-301, we vacate the trial court’s denial of the beneficiary’s requests for an inventory and accountings and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
Vanessa Young Colley v. John S. Colley, III
In this post-divorce action, Vanessa Young Colley (“Mother”) filed a petition for modification of the Permanent Parenting Plan (“Parenting Plan”) entered in connection with the parties’ Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”) seeking to change the decision-making authority with regard to educational decisions for the parties’ minor children. After a hearing, the Circuit Court for Davisdon County (“the Trial Court”), inter alia, modified the Parenting Plan to change joint decision-making with regard to education to Mother having sole decision-making authority with regard to education. John S. Colley, III (“Father”) appeals the decision of the Trial Court raising issues with regard to the change in decision-making authority, the denial of Father’s petition for recusal, and the award to Mother of attorney’s fees, among other things. We find and hold that some of Father’s issues seek an advisory opinion, and we refuse to address those issues. With regard to the issue of recusal, we find no error in the Trial Court’s resolution of this issue. We further find and hold that Mother proved a material change in circumstances justifying a change in decision-making authority with regard to education and further proved that it was in the children’s best interest for Mother to have sole decision-making authority with regard to education. We, therefore, affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Terry K. King, et al v. Stephen S. Kelly
Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court’s order denying their motion to enforce two offers of judgment offered serially by the defendant. Because the trial court improperly certified its judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Paul M. Martin v. Perma-Chink Systems, Inc.
This appeal arises from an age discrimination lawsuit brought under the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA"). Paul M. Martin ("Martin") sued his former employer Perma-Chink Systems, Inc. ("Perma-Chink") in the Circuit Court for Knox County ("the Trial Court"). Martin alleged that he had been fired as a sales representative for Perma-Chink because of his age, then 60. The matter was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Martin. Perma-Chink filed an appeal to this Court, and Martin raises his own issues on appeal. Perma-Chink argues, among other things, that the Trial Court erred in admitting a chart ("the Chart") containing raw data of employee ages at their date of termination, and that Martin failed to prove a prima facie case of age discrimination. We, inter alia, affirm the age discrimination judgment for Martin. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Charlotte Pickel Wilson v. Jeremiah Pickel
This case involves a purportedly forged deed. Appellant appeals the trial court’s decision to set aside a quit claim deed that was allegedly executed in favor of Appellant by his now deceased grandfather. The trial court found the signature on the deed was forged and not that of the grandfather. In so ruling, the trial court applied the preponderance of evidence standard. Because the correct standard is clear and convincing evidence, we vacate and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
John Richardson, et al. v. Trenton Special School District
This is a negligence case involving the alleged sexual assault of a six-year-old boy by another six-year-old boy in the bathroom of an elementary school. The trial court determined that the Appellee school district was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because the assault was not foreseeable. We conclude that there are disputes of material fact, which preclude the grant of summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Brentwood Chase Community Association v. Triet Truong, et al.
Suit to enforce restrictive covenants in a residential subdivision. The homeowners association filed suit alleging that a resident was conducting commercial activity in violation of the restrictive covenants. The trial court granted the association’s motion for summary judgment in part, enjoining the resident from conducting the activity and awarding the association attorneys fees. On appeal, the resident seeks a reversal of the determination that the activity in which she was engaged violated the covenant; the association appeals the denial of summary judgment on the additional ground on which the motion was based. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Williams v. City of Jamestown, Tennessee
This appeal involves a visitor to a county courthouse who slipped and fell on ice in the parking area. Because the portion of the parking area where the visitor fell was owned by the city, the visitor filed suit against the city under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. Following a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the suit, finding that the city did not breach a duty of care to the visitor. The trial court also found that, even if there had been a breach of duty, the visitor was more than fifty percent at fault for his injuries. The visitor appeals, claiming that the trial court’s written order does not accurately reflect its oral ruling, that the city breached a duty of care by creating a dangerous condition that it did not remedy in a reasonable manner and time, and that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s factual finding that he was more than fifty percent at fault. We affirm. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
Andrea Renea Hopwood v. Corey Daniel Hopwood
This appeal concerns several issues relative to a divorce. We agree with the trial court that Mother is a candidate for rehabilitative alimony. We reverse the trial court as to the duration of the award, however, reducing the award to eight years. We also vacate the trial court’s ruling with regard to the amount of the alimony award and remand to the trial court for reconsideration of Father’s ability to pay alimony consistent with his other obligations. Finally, we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees anticipated to be incurred on appeal and vacate the trial court’s award of all of Mother’s requested attorney’s fees, instead remanding to the trial court for a determination of only those fees attributable to child custody and child support. All other issues are affirmed. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
The Estate of Carlene C. Elrod v. Michael S. Petty et al.
Plaintiff appeals the summary dismissal of this action based on the statute of frauds and judicial estoppel, the award of expenses and attorney’s fees as a discovery sanction, and the award of discretionary costs. In April 2005, Carlene Elrod, now deceased, signed four quitclaim deeds conveying real property in fee simple to her grandson, Michael Petty. In April 2011, Mrs. Elrod filed a verified complaint to set aside the conveyances on tort grounds including mistake, fraud, and deceit, claiming she was under the influence of prescription medications at the time of the conveyances, which deprived her of the mental capacity to contract. Mrs. Elrod died while the action was pending and her estate was substituted as plaintiff. The estate filed an amended complaint in which it dropped all tort claims and asserted a breach of contract claim. Specifically, the estate alleged that the conveyances were based on an oral contract pursuant to which Mr. Petty agreed to pay all rental income from the properties to Mrs. Elrod until her death, and that Mr. Petty honored this agreement for five years but breached the agreement by retaining all rental income thereafter. Following discovery, the defendants, Mr. Petty and his wife, filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint finding: (1) the claims were barred by the Tennessee Statute of Frauds because they were based on a purported oral contract pertaining to the transfer of real property, and (2) the claims were barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel given the factual inconsistencies between the initial verified complaint and the amended complaint. The court also assessed expenses and attorney’s fees against the plaintiff as a sanction for failing to comply with discovery, and discretionary costs. We affirm the grant of summary judgment based on the statute of frauds. We also affirm the award of expenses and attorney’s fees pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37.01 and discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Patricia Sue Kuhlo v. Ernest Charles Kuhlo
In this divorce action, Husband contends the trial court erred by denying his request for “assistance of an attorney,” in valuing his minority partnership interest in a real estate venture, in the division of the marital estate, by ordering the sale of real estate without assuring the sale would be for fair market value, by awarding Wife transitional alimony, and by awarding Wife her attorney’s fees. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael G. McConnell v. Armed Services Mutual Benefit Association
Employee brought action against former Employer alleging wrongful termination under the Tennessee Disability Act (“TDA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-50-103; the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-21-101–102; impermissible disclosure of medical information in violation of the TDA; breach of contract; and misrepresentation in violation of the Tennessee Employment Security Law, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-7-711. The trial court granted the Employer’s motion to dismiss all claims, and the Employee appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Aiden R., et al.
This case arises from the dismissal after trial of a petition to terminate the parental rights of a mother and father. The juvenile court concluded that, although the Department of Children's Services had proven grounds for terminating the parents' rights, termination was not in the best interest of the children. On appeal, we find the Department of Children's Services did not prove by clear and convincing evidence statutory grounds for termination of the father's rights. We further find clear and convincing evidence supports only two statutory grounds for terminating the mother's rights. Because clear and convincing evidence does not support a finding that termination would be in the children's best interest, we affirm the decision of the juvenile court to dismiss the petition to terminate parental rights. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
In re M.B.R.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of B.L.R. (Father) with respect to his child, M.B.R. (the Child). The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of four grounds supporting termination. The court also found, by the same quantum of proof, that termination is in the best interest of the Child. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals |
