Randall Thompson v. Herbert Hamm
Plaintiff brought a malicious prosecution action against defendant. Defendant moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In re Hope A.
This appeal concerns a father's parental rights to his daughter. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of the father's parental rights on the statutory ground of abandonment when he willfully failed to visit the child for the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition. The court also found termination of the father's rights was in the best interest of the child. The father appeals. We affirm as modified. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Tony Hall v. Gaylord Entertainment Company, et al.
This is a negligence action. While attending a holiday-themed ice exhibit, the plaintiff slipped and fell at the top of an ice slide attraction that was a feature of the exhibit and sustained injuries to his arm. The plaintiff subsequently filed suit against the company that constructed the ice slide asserting various theories of negligence. After the company filed a motion for summary judgment in which it demonstrated that the plaintiff had not presented any evidence to support his claims, the plaintiff conceded that the company was entitled to summary judgment on all of his claims except those related to negligent design of the ice slide. In support of his assertion that the company breached a standard of care in designing the ice slide, the plaintiff relied solely on American Society of Testing Materials safety standards for children’s playground equipment. The trial court determined that because the standards were not applicable to the ice slide, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate how the company was negligent in designing the ice slide. The trial court granted the company’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gunnar C. Skarbrevik, et al v. Personal Representative of Estate of Carolyn E. Brown
An employee, who was injured in an accident with an uninsured motorist while on company business and while driving an automobile owned by his wife, sought to recover for his injuries through the uninsured motorist provision of his employer's business automobile policy. The insurer denied coverage, asserting that the policy only provided coverage for automobiles owned by the company. The trial court granted the employee's motion for partial summary judgment, holding that an endorsement to the policy which added employees using non-company vehicles on company business to the liability coverage operated to make those employees “insured” for purposes of the uninsured motorist coverage. Insurer appeals; finding no error in the trial court's interpretation of the policy, we affirm the judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Oneida Farms Development, Inc. v. Town of Huntsville
This case involves a quo warranto action challenging the validity and reasonableness of an annexation ordinance. The trial court determined that, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-58-111, the plaintiff failed to prove that (1) the annexation ordinance was unreasonable for the overall well-being of the communities involved or (2) the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens and property owners of the municipality and territory would not be materially retarded in the absence of such annexation. The court therefore dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff timely appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Pursuant to an issue raised by the defendant, we also determine the plaintiff’s complaint to have been timely and properly filed. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Marino v. Board of Administration City of Memphis Retirement System
We granted an application for an interlocutory appeal in this case to consider whether the Board of Administration of the City of Memphis Retirement System is exempt from the contested case procedures of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act because the City of Memphis is organized as a home rule charter form of government. We hold that the Board is not exempt from the contested case procedures and therefore affirm the trial court's order granting partial summary judgment to the petitioner. This matter is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
William Thomas McFarland v. Michael S. Pemberton et al.
This case involves a challenge by a candidate for circuit judge to the qualifications of the winning candidate. William Thomas McFarland and Michael S. Pemberton were the only candidates in the August 7, 2014 election for Ninth Judicial District Circuit Judge.2 In March 2014, an eligible voter in the Ninth District, who is not a party to this suit, filed a complaint with the local election commission challenging Pemberton's eligibility to run for circuit judge, alleging he did not meet the residency requirement. The local election commission held a public hearing, and ultimately determined that Pemberton was eligible. Accordingly, his name was reflected on the ballot. He won the election. McFarland, who had knowledge of the March 2014 complaint and subsequent actions by the local election commission, then filed this election challenge, seeking to void the election results on the ground that Pemberton failed to satisfy the residency requirement. The trial court dismissed McFarland's claim as an untimely review of a quasi-judicial determination under Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102 (Supp. 2015). McFarland appeals. We affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
In re Thomas T.
This appeal involves the termination of a father's parental rights to his seven-year-old son. In 2011, the son was adjudicated dependent and neglected due to his parents' substance abuse and was placed in the custody of his paternal great-aunt and great-uncle. In 2013, the same great-aunt and great-uncle filed a petition, as prospective adoptive parents, seeking to terminate the father's parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment and persistent conditions. The trial court found that the grounds of abandonment and persistent conditions were proved by clear and convincing evidence. The father appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re S. S.-G.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Father/Appellant appeals the termination of his parental rights on grounds of severe child abuse pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(4) and persistence of conditions pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(3). The child was found to be dependent and neglected by order of the Juvenile Court, and Appellant appealed the dependency and neglect finding to the Circuit Court. The ground of persistence of conditions requires a prior finding of dependency and neglect. However, our record does not reflect the status of Appellant’s appeal of the dependency and neglect order. In the absence of proof of full adjudication of the dependency and neglect appeal, we hold that the trial court erred in applying the ground of persistence of conditions. Accordingly, we reverse the termination of Appellant’s parental rights on that ground. Concerning the termination of Appellant’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse, the trial court’s order states only that Appellant “has sexually abused the child . . . pursuant to T.C.A. § 37-1-602 and that this sexual abuse constitutes severe abuse pursuant to T.C.A. § 37-1-102(b)(2[1]).” Because the code sections that the trial court relies upon contain numerous definitions of “child sexual abuse” and “severe child abuse,” in the absence of specific citation to the exact definition(s) relied upon, we cannot make a meaningful review of the trial court’s decision. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s termination of Appellant’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse and remand with instructions for the trial court to make specific findings as required under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(k). |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Brookside Homeowners Association v. Stan Vaught
A party who failed to file a de novo appeal of a general sessions judgment filed the instant petition for writ of certiorari. The trial court dismissed the writ on the grounds that the petitioner had a “plain, speedy and adequate remedy” provided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-727(b), a de novo appeal. We agree and affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Kristi L. Boren v. Daniel P. Rousos
Mother filed a petition seeking to have Father held in criminal contempt for violating the parties’ parenting plan and mutual restraining order. The trial court found Father guilty of two of ten counts of criminal contempt and sentenced him accordingly. Father appeals, arguing the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In re The Estate of Ola Irene Tucker
Dianna Lynne Johnson Allen appeals an order of the Probate Court for Loudon County (“the Trial Court”) holding that Ms. Allen lacked standing to assert pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-2-105 a claim of inheritance by intestate succession to the Estate of Ola Irene Tucker (“the Estate”). We find and hold that Ms. Allen qualifies as a person born out of wedlock for purposes of Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-2-105(a)(2)(B). We, therefore, reverse the Trial Court's order holding that Ms. Allen lacked standing and remand this case to the Trial Court for a determination of whether Ms. Allen proved by clear and convincing evidence that Ewell Stephens Johnson was her father, which, if so proven, would allow Ms. Allen to inherit by intestate succession from the Estate. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Howard Lubell v. Deborah Jo Lubell
This is a divorce action involving a long-term marriage between parties whose primary source of income throughout the marriage was their respective employment by a nonprofit corporation they had co-founded. The wife alleged that the nonprofit corporation was the husband's alter ego and should therefore be classified as the parties' marital asset. The trial court found, inter alia, that the nonprofit corporation could not be classified or distributed as a marital asset. The wife appeals this finding, as well as the trial court's (1) capping of the husband's child support obligation in combination with an award to the wife of transitional alimony, (2) denial of her requests for alimony in futuro and in solido, (3) allocation of certain marital debts to the wife, and (4) inclusion of extraordinary educational expenses in the calculation of the husband's income for child support purposes. Having determined that the trial court placed an improper cap on child support by linking it to the transitional alimony award and improperly considered extraordinary educational expenses as an adjustment to the husband's gross income rather than as a deviation, we vacate the trial court's determination of the husband's child support obligation. We remand for recalculation of the husband's child support obligation. We modify the award of transitional alimony to an award of alimony in futuro and separate the amount from the calculation of child support. Having also determined that the wife is entitled to an award of alimony in solido to more equitably adjust the distribution of the marital estate, we reverse the trial court's denial of alimony in solido and remand for the trial court to determine the amount to be awarded. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all other respects. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Khadijeh Naraghian v. Darryle K. Wilson
In this case, Appellant sued to recover for injuries she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Shelby County, Tennessee. Following a trial of the case, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Appellant but also found her to be partially at fault for the accident. The trial court reduced the awarded damages by the percentage of Appellant's comparative fault as found by the jury, and a judgment on the jury's verdict was entered. Although Appellant subsequently filed a motion for new trial, asserting various errors, that motion was denied by the trial court. Appellant then appealed to this Court reiterating the same concerns that she raised in her motion for new trial. Because we conclude that the jury's damages award is not supported by material evidence, we vacate the trial court's judgment and remand for a new trial. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mildred S. Draper v. Donald Mark Draper
This is a divorce action in which the husband appeals the trial court's classification of separate property and the division of marital property. We affirm the court's classification of property and reverse the court's division of marital property. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Michael David Martin v. Franklin Cool Springs Corporation, et al.
Plaintiff filed suit against the company providing billing services for the water and sewage utilities at his apartment; the complaint alleged that the company’s fee for late payments violated, among others, the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Defendant moved for dismissal pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), which was granted by the trial court. Defendant then sought recovery of the attorney’s fees it incurred in defending the TCPA claim and Plaintiff’s motions for sanctions. The court granted Defendant’s motion, awarding one-half of the amount sought. Plaintiff appeals the award of attorney’s fees; Defendant appeals the amount awarded. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects; concluding that an award of fees incurred by Defendant on appeal is appropriate, we remand the matter to the trial court for determination of the amount to be awarded. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Victor S. Johnson, III, et al. v. Mark Gwyn, et al.
This appeal arises from a lawsuit seeking access to the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“the TBI”) file concerning former Knox County Criminal Court Judge Richard Baumgartner (“Baumgartner”). The plaintiffs, Gary Christian, Deena Christian, Hugh Newsom, and Mary Newsom (“Plaintiffs”), sued TBI Director Mark Gwyn (“Gwyn”) in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”), both in their individual capacities and in the name of the State of Tennessee, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, Plaintiffs sought a declaration that Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-504(a)(2)(A) is unconstitutional, as well as an order requiring the TBI to turn over its records concerning its investigation of Baumgartner. Gwyn filed a motion to dismiss, asserting lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of standing, and failure to state a claim. The Trial Court granted Gwyn’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court, raising a number of issues. In view of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in State v. Cobbins, No. E2013-02726-CCA-WR-CO (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 4, 2015), Rule 11 appl. perm. appeal denied August 13, 2015, we hold that the doctrine of res judicata serves to bar Plaintiffs’ claims. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court on the basis of res judicata. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Addison M.
This appeal arises out of juvenile delinquency proceedings in Knox County Juvenile Court. Due to numerous deficiencies in the proceedings below, we vacate the delinquency adjudication and remand for dismissal of the petition. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Battery Alliance, Inc. v. T & L Sales, Inc., et al.
Plaintiff brought suit after defendant-company defaulted on its obligation to pay for goods it received on credit. Plaintiff also brought a claim for breach of contract against defendant-president and defendant-employee of the defendant-company pursuant to an individual guaranty agreement signed by both. A default judgment was entered against the president of the company, but the employee disputes that he signed the individual guaranty in his individual capacity. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, concluding that the individual guaranty was unambiguous and the employee was thus liable in his individual capacity. We vacate the trial court‘s decision granting summary judgment because the individual guaranty is ambiguous and remand with instructions to consider parol evidence. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Amy Diane Riggs v. Farmers Mutual Of Tennessee
This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in an action on a homeowner’s insurance policy. The home of the insured party was damaged by a fire on May 29, 2011. The insured submitted proof of loss to the insurer pursuant to her homeowner’s insurance policy. The insurer requested additional information from the insured to complete the proof of loss, which the insured provided. The insurer subsequently denied coverage. The insured party filed suit against insurer. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer, finding that the insured party’s claims were barred by the one-year contractual limitations period. We reverse. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Niuklee, LLC v. Commissioner, TN Dept. of Revenue
The Commissioner of Revenue assessed a tax based on the taxpayer’s use of an aircraft purchased out of state. Taxpayer sought review from the Tennessee Department of Revenue but was denied relief following an informal hearing. Taxpayer paid the tax and filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a refund on the ground that it qualified for the sale for resale exemption in the Tennessee Retailers’ Sales Tax Act because it provided the seller with a certificate of resale and immediately leased the aircraft to third party users. The Department responded, arguing that the leases did not satisfy the exemption’s “bona fide sale” requirement. Following a non-jury trial, the Chancery Court reversed the Department’s assessment, concluding that the exemption applied because (1) the leases were legitimate and not illusory and were not chiefly motivated by tax avoidance, (2) the economic substance doctrine has not been adopted in Tennessee to analyze the “bona fide sale” requirement, and (3) the Department failed to present proof sufficient to pierce the corporate veil of the taxpayer. The Department appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
CBS Outdoor, Inc. v. Tennessee Department of Transportation
Owner of back-to-back billboards filed a petition for review challenging the decision of the Tennessee Department of Transportation (“TDOT”) to revoke his billboard permits on the ground that the billboards were not in compliance with the TDOT spacing requirements. We find substantial and material evidence to support the decision of the TDOT Commissioner and, therefore, affirm the chancellor’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby McEarl v. City of Brownsville
This is a premises liability case. The plaintiff alleges he slipped and fell in a leaf-filled gutter maintained by defendant. Plaintiff filed suit against the defendant, alleging that the defendant failed to properly maintain and warn pedestrians of a dangerous condition. Because the trial court granted defendant summary judgment without making findings of fact or stating the legal basis for its decision before instructing defendant to prepare an order, we vacate the trial court’s order of summary judgment and remand. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
Charlotte D. Culpepper v. Brandon K. Culpepper
This appeal arises from an action for divorce wherein the trial court ordered the parties’ marital debt to be divided in a nearly equal fashion. The trial court awarded child support to the wife, who was designated primary residential parent and who received a greater share of co-parenting time with the children. The court also awarded child support retroactive to the date of the filing of the divorce complaint. In addition, the court allocated both federal tax exemptions for the children to the wife. The husband has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment with a slight modification in the amount of the child support arrearage award. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
SNS Electrical Inspections, P.C., et al v. State of Tennessee
This is an appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission involving a contract dispute. The Claims Commissioner concluded that the Appellants were not entitled to damages other than for services rendered because their services contract with the State was terminated for cause. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals |
