Billy Butler, et al. v. Malvin Carvin Pitts, Jr., et al. v. Marilyn James Morris, et al.
This is an easement case. Appellants, the servient land owners, appeal the trial court‟s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Appellees, the former owners of both the dominant and servient tracts of land. Based on the fact that the disputed easement was recorded prior to the sale to the Appellants, the trial court determined that there was no dispute as to any material fact and that Appellees were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Riley C.
This appeal arises from the termination of Father’s parental rights. The minor child was removed from his parents, placed in state custody, and adjudicated dependent and neglected after the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) received a referral alleging that Father and the child’s mother were using and possibly manufacturing methamphetamines in the home. Thereafter, DCS developed permanency plans with the goal of reuniting the family. The mother died shortly thereafter of a drug overdose. DCS subsequently filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights alleging that Father failed to comply with most of the permanency plan’s requirements, that he failed numerous drug screens, failed to provide a suitable home. It also alleged that the abandoned the child by only visiting the child three times and merely providing token support for the child after she was taken into state custody. The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights finding that DCS has proven the grounds of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan and abandonment, and that termination of his parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Dennis Miracle v. Roger Murray, et al.
This is an appeal from a Final Order and Judgment in a case arising out of a dispute over real property located in Roane County, Tennessee. There was no court reporter present for the trial. The Chancellor recused himself from the case post-judgment but before the record was prepared and transmitted for this appeal. The Circuit Court Judge accepted the case by interchange for purposes of resolving the parties' dispute regarding a statement of the evidence for inclusion in the record. The Circuit Court Judge concluded that he was unable to resolve the parties' dispute pursuant to Rule 24(f) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and granted a new trial. As a result, there is no longer a final judgment in the proceedings below, and this Court no longer has jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Auto-Owners Insurance Company v. Vanessa Holland, et al.
An insurance company which issued a commercial general liability policy to the owner of a lawn care business sought a declaratory judgment that the policy did not provide coverage for a claim brought by the parent of a child who was injured by the gate on a trailer which was used to transport lawn care equipment. The company appeals the denial of its motion for summary judgment. Having determined that the insurance policy does not provide coverage for the claim at issue, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to grant summary judgment in favor of the insurance company. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
David C. Jayne v. Bass Annie Cosmetic Boat Repair
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
William Goetz v. Donel Autin, et al.
This is an appeal from the trial court‘s grant of a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss. In the proceedings below, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging that false and defamatory statements made about him by the defendants, along with the defendants‘ subsequent lawsuit against him, caused him to suffer severe physical and emotional distress and incur $150,000 in attorney‘s fees. The trial court dismissed the amended complaint after determining that it fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Having reviewed the amended complaint and thoroughly considered the arguments raised on appeal, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
David Hughes v. Meridian Property Management LLC
Appellant rented property managed by Appellee. Appellee filed a forcible entry and detainer action in the Shelby County General Sessions Court and was awarded possession of the rental property and past due rents. Appellant did not appeal this judgment. Rather, Appellant filed a separate civil warrant in general sessions court, seeking to be restored to possession of the property. Appellee filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss on the ground that the question of possession of the property was res judicata based on the general sessions court‘s prior adjudication. The general sessions court granted Appellee‘s motion, and Appellant, relying on the civil warrant filed in the second general sessions‘ case, appealed to the Shelby County Circuit Court. Again, Appellee moved for dismissal. The trial court granted Appellee‘s motion, finding that it did not have jurisdiction to address the question of possession of the rental property as this question was res judicata. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda Osunde, et al v. Delta Medical Center
This interlocutory appeal concerns the trial court's partial dismissal of a case concerning alleged negligence committed against Plaintiff/Appellee Brenda Osunde (“Mrs. Osunde”). Mrs. Osunde filed a complaint in the trial court alleging a medical malpractice claim against DMC-Memphis, Inc. (“DMC”), as well as a claim for common law negligence, after she sustained a fall while at DMC's hospital, Delta Medical Center. When Mrs. Osunde failed to disclose any experts pursuant to the trial court's scheduling order, DMC moved for summary judgment. In adjudicating DMC's motion, the trial court drew a distinction between Mrs. Osunde's “health care liability action,” which it dismissed for her failure to produce an expert, and Mrs. Osunde's common law negligence claim, which it ruled should proceed to trial. After ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the trial court stayed further proceedings and granted DMC leave to pursue interlocutory review in this Court. Although we agree with DMC that all of Mrs. Osunde's asserted claims give rise to a “health care liability action” within the meaning of the Tennessee Code, we disagree with DMC's assertion that expert testimony is required to prove Mrs. Osunde's allegations of negligence. As such, we reverse the trial court's order to the extent that it purports to dismiss Mrs. Osunde's health care liability action, and we affirm the trial court's decision to allow this case to proceed to trial. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State Ex Rel, Maria Brown v. Andrew Brown
Mother filed a post-divorce petition seeking an increase in child support. Father opposed the petition, insisting that Mother was voluntarily underemployed. The trial court found that there was a significant variance between the current obligation and the obligation set by the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines. The trial court further found that Mother was not voluntarily underemployed and ordered an increase in Father’s child support obligation. Father appealed. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Mother is not voluntarily underemployed, we affirm. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Nancy M. Houston v. Rocky J. Houston
This appeal arises out of a divorce case. Due to the deficiencies in Defendant’s brief on appeal, we conclude that he waived any consideration of any issues on appeal. The appeal is dismissed. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Charles E. Webster, et ux. v. The Estate of P. H. Dorris, et al.
Plaintiffs purchased a home from two of the Defendants; one defendant was the contractor whose construction company built the home and the other was his wife, who had marketed the home for sale. Before and after the closing, Plaintiffs identified several defects which they desired to have corrected; some defects were remedied while others were not. Plaintiffs brought suit and, following trial, the court awarded judgment for $2,000 in favor of Plaintiffs against the construction company for breach of contract and judgment for $40,184 against the estate of the contractor and the construction company for breach of warranty; the court held that the contractor’s wife was not liable for either judgment in her individual capacity. Plaintiffs appeal, asserting that contractor’s wife was liable as partner or joint venturer with the other Defendants for breach of contract and implied warranty of workmanship and that the court erred in its award of damages and in failing to award prejudgment interest. We modify and affirm the judgment. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company v. Shaun Dunlap et al.
This case presents a question regarding insurance coverage under liability and umbrella policies issued by plaintiff Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company to Jerry Dale Robertson and Sherry Ann Robertson. In July 2012, the Robertsons‘ house sitter and close family friend, Shaun Dunlap, used Dale Robertson‘s 2011 Ford Ranger pickup truck (the insured vehicle), on a personal errand to pick up a friend. On the return trip, the insured vehicle crossed the center line of the road, causing a head-on collision that killed three members of the Dembla family. Tennessee Farmers brought this declaratory judgment action seeking a judicial finding of no coverage under the policies because Dunlap was operating the insured vehicle without the permission of the insured. Defendant Kanika Dembla, the lone survivor in the Demblas‘ car, who had brought an underlying tort action against Dunlap, answered and argued that although Dunlap had no express permission to drive the insured vehicle, he had implied permission under the circumstances. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment to Tennessee Farmers, finding that Dunlap did not have implied permission to drive the insured vehicle while housesitting. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Brett Patterson v. State of Tennessee
The State of Tennessee (“the State”) appeals the decision of the Tennessee Claims Commission (“the Claims Commission”) awarding Brett Patterson (“Patterson”) $439.10 for arts-and-crafts supplies that Patterson was required either to mail out of the prison or donate pursuant to a policy of the Turney Center Industrial Complex (“Turney Center”) where Patterson is an inmate. We find and hold that the Claims Commission does not have jurisdiction over intentional torts, and as no negligence was alleged or shown, the Claims Commission lacked jurisdiction over this case. We, therefore, vacate the decision of the Claims Commission and dismiss this case. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Mamie D. Fuller v. Joan C. Banks, et al.
This is a premises liability case. Appellant had rented property from Appellees for approximately one year when Appellant was injured as a result of a fall when the railing along the stairs of the premises allegedly collapsed. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees based upon its conclusion that Appellees had negated the essential element of Appellant's claim that, in order for Appellees to have been negligent in the accident, any defect in the stairs or supporting structure must have existed at the time of the execution of the lease. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
Janet Wynn Snyder v. First Tennessee Bank, N.A.
This case involves the trial court's award of litigation costs, inclusive of attorney's fees, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-119(c) (Supp. 2015), upon granting the defendant's Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the defendant in the amount of $10,000, the statutory maximum, against the plaintiff and her surety. The plaintiff appeals the portion of the ruling holding the surety liable for the $10,000 judgment of litigation costs in the event the principal fails to satisfy the judgment. Having determined that the surety's cost bond explicitly referred to “costs” as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-120 (2009), rather than as defined in subsection -119(c), we reverse the trial court's judgment as to the surety. We affirm the trial court's judgment against the principal and remand for enforcement of that judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Eric Tidwell v. Alicia Ann Tidwell
This appeal results from a divorce proceeding between Christopher Eric Tidwell (“Father”) and Alicia Ann Tidwell (“Mother”). On appeal, Father challenges the trial court’s determination of Mother’s income for child support purposes, the trial court’s award of rehabilitative alimony to Mother, and the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Mother. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us, we affirm the trial court’s determination of Mother’s income, vacate a portion of the awarded rehabilitative alimony, and modify the award of attorney’s fees. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
City of Jackson v. Barry Walker
This appeal involves an allegedly unsafe building in the City of Jackson. After a hearing, the City of Jackson’s environmental court ordered the property owner to demolish the building. The property owner appealed to circuit court. After another hearing, the circuit court declared the property a public nuisance and also ordered it demolished. The property owner appeals. He argues that the City of Jackson failed to follow the correct procedures under the city code, and therefore, he should not be required to demolish the structure. Discerning no merit in this assertion, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin Lee Carnett v. PNC Bank, NA
Plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant-bank to halt foreclosure proceedings. When the bank did not answer the complaint, the plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment. The trial court denied the motion for default judgment and, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint. We affirm the denial of plaintiff‟s motion for default judgment but vacate the dismissal of his complaint. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
Randy L. Fielder v. Southern Health Partners et al.
The plaintiff filed the instant action regarding injuries he allegedly received while in the custody of the Robertson County Detention Center. The trial court dismissed the action sua sponte based on multiple grounds, including untimeliness pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations. The plaintiff filed a motion seeking alteration of the order of dismissal. The trial court denied the request by a handwritten notation supplied on the face of the motion. The plaintiff appealed. Having determined that there is no valid, final order in this matter, we conclude that the appeal must be dismissed due to this Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Kyle Kernan v. Beverly J. Kernan Nabors et al.
Post-divorce, a guardian was appointed for two minor children while their mother received treatment for substance abuse. The guardian, the half-brother of the minors, sought child support from both parents. The guardian alleges, inter alia, the trial court abused its discretion by adjusting for tax deductions before calculating the mother's gross income for child support due and by allowing her credit for support in kind and purchases of necessities. We affirm the trial court's findings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Theresa A. Green v. William Phillip Green
In this divorce case, the wife proceeding pro se appeals the division of marital property and the trial court’s denial of her request for alimony. She also appeals the trial court’s award of court costs. She elected not to file a transcript or a statement of the evidence. Because the wife’s first two issues are factual in nature, the lack of transcript or statement of evidence prevents us from reaching the substance of the issues raised by the wife. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in assessing court costs. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. We also find that the appeal is frivolous. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Fit2Race, Inc., et al v. Janson Miles Pope, et al.
Defendants in a federal civil conspiracy case that was voluntarily dismissed filed a malicious prosecution case in state court against the plaintiff and his attorney. The plaintiff and his attorney filed motions for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The defendants appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. When a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a lawsuit, the dismissal does not constitute a “favorable termination” for purposes of satisfying the third element of a malicious prosecution lawsuit. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Magdi Mikheil et al v. Nashville General Hospital at Meharry et al.
In this health care liability action, the plaintiffs disagree with a number of the trial court’s rulings upon which it based its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The trial court excluded the plaintiffs’ life care planner due to their failure to provide a complete disclosure of the life care planner’s opinions in a timely manner. The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs’ sole standard of care expert, a neurosurgeon, was not competent to testify as to the standard of care of the defendant nurse practitioner. Furthermore, the trial court precluded the plaintiffs’ standard of care expert from testifying at all due to the plaintiffs’ repeated failure to comply with the court’s orders regarding discovery. We find no abuse of discretion with respect to the trial court’s decisions and affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Richmond v. Vanguard Healthcare Services, LLC et al.
The former administrator of an assisted living facility appeals the summary dismissal of his claim for retaliatory discharge under the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304, and common law. Plaintiff contends he was fired in retaliation for initiating an internal investigation and submitting an internal report to his supervisors concerning an incident that arose when the son of an elderly resident observed an old bandage stuck to the bottom of his mother’s foot, which was revealed when her sock was removed in order to check the dressing for a wound on her ankle. Defendants contend Plaintiff’s claims are legally deficient because there was no neglect or illegal activity to report, and that Plaintiff grossly overreacted after being informed that an old bandage was found on the ball of a resident’s foot in a sock when the resident’s wound, which was on her ankle, was properly dressed and bandaged. Defendants also rely on the fact that Plaintiff did not file a qualifying internal or external report of neglect until after he was fired. The trial court summarily dismissed the TPPA claim stating “leaving a bandage in a sock, where a patient’s wound is in fact otherwise sufficiently bandaged, is not illegal activity as defined by the statute. Leaving the bandage in the sock is not ‘abuse and neglect’ as defined in the statute.” The court dismissed the common law whistleblower claim because Plaintiff did not show that Defendants engaged “in illegal conduct or in any way . . . posed a threat to an important public policy of the State when all that was done was to leave an old bandage in a patient’s sock.” Plaintiff appeals the summary dismissal of his claims under the TPPA and common law. We affirm. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Richmond v. Vanguard Healthcare Services, LLC et al - Dissenting
The majority Opinion concludes that a reasonable juror (1) could not find that Mr. Richmond had reasonable cause to believe the presence of the soiled bandage was connected to “illegal activity,” as required by the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), and (2) could not find that Mr. Richmond could demonstrate that his termination for reporting the incident violated any clear public policy under his common law claim. Because I conclude that a reasonable juror could conclude that Mr. Richmond had reasonable cause to believe that the presence of the soiled bandage stemmed from neglect of the patient, I must respectfully dissent. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals |
