In Re Dorothy Elizabeth Sprinkle McSpadden
Lloyde Susanne McSpadden Marcum (“Daughter”) appealed the judgment of the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) appointing Katie Loftin and Emily McSpadden (“Granddaughters”) as co-conservators of Dorothy Elizabeth Sprinkle McSpadden (“Mother”). Mother died during the pendency of this appeal. We find and hold that Mother’s death rendered this appeal moot. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal, decline to address whether the appeal is frivolous, and decline to award either party attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Laney T. Efferson, et al v. Barbara R. Stephens
Plaintiffs, two grandchildren of the decedent who are executors of their deceased mother‟s estate, brought this action on behalf of the decedent contending that Barbara Stephens, one of the decedent‟s three daughters, unduly influenced the decedent to name Ms. Stephens as the sole beneficiary of her estate, to the exclusion of her other children and grandchildren. The decedent died in 2009, this action was commenced in August 2012, and the decedent‟s will was admitted to probate in January 2013, without contest. Thereafter, Ms. Stephens filed a motion for summary judgment for lack of standing and two motions to dismiss under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) for lack of standing and lapse of the three-year statute of limitations. The trial court granted all three motions. Plaintiffs appeal contending, inter alia, they have standing because their mother‟s estate suffered a financial loss when Ms. Stephens deprived their mother, and her estate, of the substantial economic interests (her inheritance), and their claims are not time-barred, because the statute of limitations was tolled due to the decedent‟s incompetence under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106. Because the decedent‟s will was admitted to probate and Plaintiffs did not attempt to contest the validity of the decedent‟s will until after summary judgment was granted, it was undisputed, when the trial court ruled on this matter, that the decedent died testate, and Ms. Stephens was the sole beneficiary of the decedent‟s estate. Therefore, neither Plaintiffs, individually, nor their mother‟s estate suffered a “distinct and palpable injury” for which the court could grant relief; as a consequence, they do not have standing. See Lynch v. City of Jellico, 205 S.W.3d 384, 395 (Tenn. 2006). We, therefore, affirm the summary dismissal of this action. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of William Daniel Oakley
This appeal arises from the denial of a petition to establish a lost will. Following a bench trial in which the opportunity and motive of key witnesses to destroy the original will were at issue, the trial court failed to “find the facts specially” as mandated by Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The only findings of fact made by the trial court read: “The evidence in the case was relatively undisputed so this court will not reiterate a lot of the facts. The dispute between the parties is over how the evidence is to be interpreted.” Whether or not the evidence was “relatively undisputed” is debatable; nevertheless, we have concluded thatconflictinginferencescan be drawn from undisputed evidence concerning the dispositive issue, that being whether persons who had access to the original will had the motivation to destroy the original will. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the trial court to make findings, even on stipulated or undisputed facts. See Lovelace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 35 (Tenn. 2013). Because the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact to afford this court a clear understanding of the basis of its decision, and realizing that the credibility of two key witnesses who may have had the opportunity and motive to destroy the original will was at issue at trial, we are unable to conduct an effective de novo review. Under these circumstances, we would generally remand a case such as this to afford the trial court the opportunity to state its findings of fact and conclusions of law and enter judgment accordingly; however, the judge who tried this case retired in August of 2014. Therefore, we have no choice but to vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Malaysia C.
This is a termination of parental rights case brought by Appellees, who are the prospective adoptive parents. Although Mother/Appellant initially joined in the petition to terminate her parental rights and for adoption, she later withdrew her consent. Appellees moved forward with the termination of Mother’s parental rights on their own petition, which the trial court granted. Mother now appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support the child. Mother also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support both the ground for termination of Mother’s parental rights and the trial court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best interest, we affirm and remand. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Eastman Credit Union v. Chadwick D. Hodges
On November 19, 2012, Eastman Credit Union (“Eastman”) filed suit against Chadwick D. Hodges (“Hodges”) seeking recovery for indebtedness owed by Hodges pursuant to two separate credit agreements. Eastman’s complaint noted that it had declared all amounts owed under the agreements to be due and payable and prayed that a judgment be entered in its favor for all monetary advances made under the agreements. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Savage v. City of Memphis
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether an Assistant City Attorney of the City of Memphis was an agent properly authorized to settle a dispute with a former employee. The former employee sued the City to enforce a settlement agreement he purportedly reached with the Assistant City Attorney for an amount in excess of $500.00. His complaint alleged that although he was never informed that the agreement was contingent on the Mayor’s approval, the Mayor subsequently rejected the agreement, and the City, based on the Mayor’s rejection, refused to honor it. The Memphis City Charter provides that the City Attorney has independent authority to settle claims against the City for amounts less than $500.00, but settlements for amounts exceeding $500.00 must be entered “by and with the approval of the Mayor.” After a period of discovery, the City filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the former employee’s evidence was insufficient to establish that the Assistant City Attorney acted with authority to bind the City to the settlement agreement. The former employee opposed the City’s motion and filed his own motion for summary judgment, in which he argued that evidence established the Mayor either actually or apparently authorized the Assistant City Attorney to enter the settlement agreement. The trial court granted the former employee’s motion for summary judgment after finding that the Assistant City Attorney acted with apparent authority to enter the settlement agreement. On appeal, we find that the record does not contain evidence sufficient to establish that the Assistant City Attorney acted with either actual or implied authority to bind the City. In light of our findings, we reverse the trial court and hold that summary judgment should be granted in favor of the City. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Judy Woodard v. Farmers Family Restaurant, et al.
Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer for sexual discrimination, employer retaliation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring, retention and supervision practices, and workers’ compensation retaliation. The parties entered into an agreement which settled Plaintiff’s claims; pursuant to the terms of the agreement,the parties submitted an agreed order dismissing the case which was entered by the court. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the order of dismissal, and her former employer filed a motion to enforce the settlement. After a hearing on the motions, the court entered an order dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff filed a motion for relief, which the court denied. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Bill Morris
This is a will contest. Appellants, Bill Morris, Jr., and Cheryl Morris, appeal the trial court‟s determination that their Father‟s will was properly executed pursuant to the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 32-1-104. We conclude that the witnesses to the will only signed the affidavit of attesting witnesses and not the will itself. Accordingly, we reverse and remand. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Tracy Diane Bolton v. William Jeff Bolton
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Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Furnas Coleman v. Marty Alan Coleman
This is an appeal of attorney’s fees in a post-divorce matter. The mother filed a petition to modify the permanent parenting plan suspend the father’s parenting time with the parties’ two minor children. The mother incurred around $16,000.00 in legal expenses litigating her petition and then changed attorneys. The parties eventually settled the petition with respect to the visitation issues, reserved the issue of attorney’s fees. Finding that the mother’s legal expenses of over $350,000.00 were not reasonable, the Master recommended that the father only be required to reimburse the mother for approximately $124,000.00. The trial court the award further, awarding the mother approximately $42,000.00. Mother appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion because all of her attorney’s fees were reasonable. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Joy Littleton, et al v. TIS Insurance Services, Inc.
During a prior lawsuit, a construction company – in exchange for a covenant not to execute against the company’s assets – assigned to the entity that obtained a judgment against it the company’s insurance coverage claims. The plaintiffs in the previous action thereafter assigned those rights to the current plaintiffs to allow them to step into the shoes of the construction company and bring suit against the insurance broker. The trial court entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of the insurance broker on the ground that the current plaintiffs would not be entitled to recover any compensatory damages at trial. The plaintiffs appeal. We reverse. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Aalyah P.
The Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, and we therefore have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Consequently, this appeal is dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Robert C.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellant/Father’s parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment; (2) substantial non-compliance with the permanency plan; and (3) persistence of conditions. Because the grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights are met by clear and convincing evidence, and there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child, we affirm and remand. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Diana L. Powell, et al v. Penny D. Clark
This appeal involves a limitation of liability in an insurance policy. Appellant Allstate Insurance Company seeks reduction of its uninsured motorist liability by amounts paid by Appellee insured’s automobile insurance carrier. In light of the legislative intent that offsets should be limited to monies received from legally responsible parties or entities, and the limiting language used in the Allstate policy, we conclude that the trial court correctly denied the offset in this case. Affirmed and remanded. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Carolyn Ann Farley v. Roger Dale Farley, Sr.
In this post-divorce action, Father filed a petition to modify the permanent parenting plan to make him the primary residential parent. The trial court found a material change of circumstance but concluded that it was not in the child’s best interest to change the primary residential parent. We find no error in the trial court’s decision and affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Frederick Zahn v. Margaret Zahn Logan
In this post-divorce action, Father filed a petition to modify the permanent parenting plan to make him the primary residential parent. The trial court found a material change of circumstance but concluded that it was not in the child’s best interest to change the primary residential parent. We find no error in the trial court’s decision and affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Suntrust Bank v. Walter Joseph Burke a/k/a Walter Joseph Burke, Jr.
This is a garnishment case. Appellee bank served a writ of garnishment on the Appellant realty company for the wages of Appellee’s debtor, Walter Burke. Appellant answered the garnishment stating that Mr. Burke was an independent contractor, and that Appellant owed him no funds at the time of the garnishment. During the six-month period after the garnishment was served, Appellant paid Mr. Burke commissions totaling $10,671.23, but paid no monies pursuant to the garnishment filed by Appellee. Appellee later filed a motion for judgment against Appellant for its failure to honor the garnishment for the statutory six-month period. Appellant responded to the motion, arguing that it was not subject to continuous garnishment because Tennessee Code Annotated Section 26-2-214 only applies to employers. The trial court held that the Appellant was subject to the six-month, continuous garnishment period and awarded Appellee bank judgment in the amount of $2,667.81, representing twenty-five percent of commissions paid to Mr. Burke. Appellant appeals. We reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Leon Williams v. Jannie Williams
In this post-divorce proceeding, Wife filed a petition for civil contempt to compel Husband to comply with the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”) by either refinancing, paying in full, or selling real property mortgaged in her name in order to remove her from any liability on the indebtedness. Husband responded by filing a series of petitions for contempt, contending, inter alia, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, unclean hands, breach of contract, and abuse of process for Wife’s alleged failure under the MDA to execute certain documents which would have facilitated Husband’s “assumption” of the existing mortgage. On the eve of the evidentiary hearing on Wife’s petition for contempt, Husband paid off the indebtedness. At the hearing that followed, the trial court ruled that the issue of Husband’s civilcontempt was moot due to the fact that he belatedlycomplied with the MDA; nevertheless, the court also ruled that Wife was entitled to recover her reasonable attorney’s fees, pursuant to the enforcement provision of the MDA, because she was the prevailing party. The enforcement provision of the MDA states: “In the event it becomes reasonably necessary for either party to institute legal proceedings to procure the enforcement of any provision of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall also be entitled to a judgment for reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred in prosecuting the action.” Husband appeals contending Wife was not the prevailing party because there was never a ruling on the merits of her claim, and, therefore, she is not entitled to recover any of her attorney’s fees; he also challenges numerous other rulings by the trial court. For her part, Wife seeks all of her attorney’s fees incurred in the trial court, as well as attorney’s fees related to this appeal. We affirm the trial court’s determination that Wife was the prevailing party because, as the trial court correctlyfound,it was reasonablynecessaryfor Wife to institute legal proceedings to enforce Husband’s compliance with the MDA, and even though there was no hearing or ruling on the merits of her enforcement claim, “but for” Wife’s petition, Husband would not have fulfilled his obligation under the MDA to remove Wife from all liability on the mortgage debt. See Fannon v. City of LaFollette, 329 S.W.3d 418 (Tenn. 2010). We also affirm the trial court’s discretionary decision to award Wife a portion of her attorney’s fees. As for Husband’s remaining issues, we find that these are moot or they have been waived. Finally, we have determined that Wife is entitled to her attorney’s fees on appeal because she is the prevailing party on appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Leon Williams v. Jannie Williams - Dissent
Because I disagree with the Court’s interpretation of the term “prevailing party” as used in the parties’ Martial Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”), I respectfully dissent. Citing Fannon v. City of LaFollette, 329 S.W.3d 418 (Tenn. 2010), the majority concludes “a party may be recognized as the prevailing party if that party achieves the primary benefit sought in instituting the legal proceeding and/or if the action modifies the opposing party’s behavior in a way that provides a direct benefit, regardless of the fact there was no hearing or judgment on the merits.” In my view, Fannon does not stand for such a proposition, and Fannon does not represent a departure from the interpretations of the term “prevailing party” by the United States Supreme Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Travelers Casualty And Surety Company of America v. City of South Pittsburg,Tennessee
In a suit arising out of a construction project at a wastewater treatment facility, the City of South Pittsburg brought an action against an engineering firm and a construction firm for breach of contract, negligence and professional negligence. The insurance company which issued a performance bond covering the project was added as a partyand moved for summary judgment on the ground that the City had not instituted a proceeding to recover under the bond within the two year period specified in the bond for doing so. The insurance company appeals the denial of its motion. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
Patrick Richard Moorcroft v. Flora Templeton Stuart v. Natalie Talmage Moorcroft
This case began as an action for legal separation between a husband and wife. The two quickly entered into an agreed temporary parenting plan providing for the custody of their children. However, the children’s maternal grandmother intervened, seeking registration and enforcement under the Tennessee Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act of a Kentucky grandparent visitation order. The circuit court granted registration and enforcement of the order. The parents appealed. Because we conclude that the grandmother was required to seek visitation under the Tennessee Grandparent Visitation Statute, we reverse the trial court’s decision. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra Lynn Hobbs v. Lisa Hobbs Nottingham, et al.
The quasi-parties in this matter had their bids accepted at a judicial sale, but they failed to carry out their purchases and close on the properties. After a re-sale was conducted, the trial court charged the quasi-parties with the difference between the amount of the original bids and the amount received for the properties at the re-sale. They were also assessed the expenses resulting from the re-sale. The quasi-parties appeal. We affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Nathan B. Overton et al. v. Westgate Resorts, LTD., L.P. et al.
This case involves the propriety of an award of punitive damages in the amount of $600,000. The plaintiffs sued the defendant timeshare developer, seeking to rescind a contract for purchase of a timeshare interest. The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the defendant was guilty of fraud and misrepresentation, as well as violations of the Tennessee Time-share Act and the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Following the hearing, the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and allowed them to rescind the contract, ordering repayment of their purchase money. The trial court found that the defendant had violated the respective statutory provisions and was guilty of fraud and misrepresentation. The trial court thus determined that an award of punitive damages was proper, and following a second hearing regarding the amount of the punitive damage award, set such award at $600,000. The defendant has appealed this award. While we affirm the determination of the trial court that $600,000 represents a reasonable award of punitive damages considering all applicable factors, we must order remittitur of that award to $500,000 in accordance with the statutory cap found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-39-104(a)(5). |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
American Heritage Apartments, Inc. v. The Hamilton County Water and Wastewater Treatment Authority, Hamilton County, Tennessee
The plaintiff, American Heritage Apartments, Inc. (“American Heritage”), commenced this lawsuit to protest a monthly flat charge in the amount of $8.00 per unit imposed by the defendant, The Hamilton County Water and Wastewater Authority (“the County WWTA”), on all of its sewer customers. The charge was instituted to fund a program designed to repair and refurbish private service laterals, defined as pieces of pipe that connect private property to the sewer lines. American Heritage sought declaratory judgment that the County WWTA, inter alia, had exceeded its authority by imposing an unjust and discriminatory charge. The County WWTA filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the trial court initially denied. Upon the County WWTA’s amended motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment, American Heritage’s motion for partial summary judgment, and supplemental briefs submitted by both parties, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the County WWTA. The court found that because the Utility District Law of 1937, Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 7-82-101 to -804, provided an administrative procedure for contesting utility charges, no private right of action was available. The court further ruled that in the alternative, if a private right of action were allowed by this Court on appeal, American Heritage’s complaint could be certified as a class action lawsuit. American Heritage has appealed. Having determined that the trial court erred by applying the Utility District Law of 1937 to a non-utility district water and wastewater treatment authority, we reverse the grant of summary judgment. We affirm the trial court’s ruling regarding the class action certification. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State Ex Rel Commissioner, Department of Transportation v. Ilya Dyskin et al.
The question presented on this appeal is whether a covenant, i.e., a promise, by a grantor to pay – in a deed conveying an undivided one-third interest in a piece of property – all property taxes and other expenses associated with the 100% interest in the property is binding on successor grantees of her remaining two-thirds interest. Sonja Taylor conveyed an undivided one-third interest in the property to Fred T. Hanzelik. Taylor agreed to pay “all taxes, expenses and obligations regarding” the property, including those on Hanzelik’s portion. Taylor later conveyed her remaining two-thirds interest to Shane Coughlin, who later conveyed it to Fifth Project, LLC, which later conveyed it to defendants Ilya Dyskin and Tatiana Dyskin. Hanzelik argues that Taylor’s covenant to pay property taxes for the entire ownership interest, including Hanzelik’s one-third interest, is binding on the Dyskins. The trial court agreed and ordered the Dyskins to pay the entire property tax bill. After examining the deeds in the chain of title, we find no evidence of an intention that Taylor’s covenant would run with the land and bind successor grantees of the two-thirds interest. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals |
