Sara Beth Schwab v. Alfred C. Schwab, III
This is a post-divorce dispute in which the former husband seeks to terminate alimony in futuro based on the fact that a third party, not related by blood, resided with the former wife for several months. It is undisputed that the girlfriend of the parties’ son had previously resided in the former wife’s home, but that the girlfriend had moved out before the husband filed his petition to terminate alimony. The parties’ Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”) provides that “alimony shall terminate upon the death of Husband or Wife, the remarriage of Wife, o[r] Wife’s cohabitation with someone to whom she is not related by blood pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. [§] 36-5-121(f).” The trial court held that the reference to § 36-5-121(f) evinced an intent to rely on the so-called “cohabitation statute” in subsection (f)(2)(B), which creates a rebuttable presumption that an alimony recipient does not need the same level of support when they are living with a third person. However, because the son’s girlfriend was no longer residing in the wife’s home, the trial court summarily dismissed the petition. The trial court relied on a line of cases, including Woodall v. Woodall, No. M2003-02046-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2345814 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2004) and Wiser v. Wiser, No. M2013-02510-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 1955367 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2015), which stand for the proposition that “[a]n obligor spouse cannot rely on Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121(f)(2)(B) to terminate or suspend alimony payments if the alleged cohabitation ceased before the modification petition was tried.” We affirm the trial court in all respects. The MDA also contains a mandatory attorney fee provision entitling the wife, as the prevailing party, to recover her reasonable expenses incurred in defending this appeal, including attorney’s fees and court costs. Accordingly, on remand, the trial court shall make the appropriate award. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
JTM Enterprises v. Oddello Industries, LLC
The parties’ dispute centers upon whether a tenant is required to pay rent for a particular ten-month period. The landlord asserts that it delayed but did not waive payment. The tenant counters that the landlord’s agent waived rent and that the tenant forbore terminating the lease based on the agent’s representations. The trial court, after setting aside a default judgment, concluded that the landlord’s agent did not have the authority to waive rent but had the authority to modify the lease to reduce rent for three of the ten months. The tenant |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Justin N. et al.
Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to two minor children. The trial court found as grounds for termination: (1) abandonment by failure to support, (2) abandonment by failure to visit, and (3) a failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent. The trial court also found that termination was in the children’s best interests. We affirm as to the finding of abandonment by failure to support and failure to visit. Because the trial court’s order does not contain sufficient findings of fact, we vacate the trial court’s |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
Clata Renee Brewer et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County et al.
This action involves various requests directed to the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) for the release of records, pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act (“TPRA”), related to a school shooting that occurred at a private school in Nashville. Before making a determination concerning release of the records, the trial court allowed certain interested parties to intervene in the action pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24.02. The parties requesting the records have appealed that ruling pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24.05.1 Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Priscilla Smith v. Sharon Berry Et Al.
Priscilla Smith filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Hawkins County (“the Trial Court”) against multiple neighbors, including Michael and Sharon Berry. She sought access to her property by way of an undeveloped road called Hyder Lane. The Berrys’ garage was on the undeveloped road. After trial, the Trial Court determined that Hyder Lane was a public road and ordered the garage to be removed and the road opened for |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
James R. Vandergriff v. Erlanger Health Systems Et Al.
The plaintiff underwent surgery for a severe head injury. Due to various complications and infections, he required multiple follow-up procedures and treatments. The plaintiff filed medical malpractice claims against the hospital and doctors involved in his treatment over the course of an approximately five-month time period. The defendants moved to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. The trial court found that the plaintiff filed his lawsuit more than one year after his cause of action had accrued and that he was not entitled to an extension of the statute of limitations. It therefore dismissed the entire lawsuit. We conclude that the trial court did not err in its determination of the accrual date for the plaintiff’s cause of action as to his initial medical treatment; accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the plaintiff’s cause of action as to allegations of medical malpractice as it relates to the plaintiff’s initial treatment. We reverse, however, the dismissal insofar as it |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Christina N. Lewis v. Walter Fletcher, et al.
This appeal arises out of an incident where the plaintiff fell off a staircase and sustained |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
Annaliese Potter v. Paul Israel
In this breach of contract case, the trial court awarded Appellee damages for Appellant’s |
Court of Appeals | ||
Williamson County, Tennessee et al. v. Tennessee State Board of Equalization et al.
A taxpayer appealed a County Board of Equalization’s property valuation to the State Board of Equalization. The State Board reduced the valuation. The County then sought judicial review. After a new hearing in which the trial court heard testimony from competing appraisers, it affirmed the State Board’s valuation. It also determined that the County’s request to reclassify the property was untimely. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Christina K. Collins v. Tennessee Department of Health, Et Al
In the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”), Christina K. Collins sought |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Christabell B. Et Al.
Rebecca F. B. ("Mother") appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children Christabell B., Ashtynn B., Colton B., and Elan B. (Colton B. and Elan B. collectively, "Minor Children"; the Minor Children, Christabell B., and Ashtynn B. collectively, "Children").2 The Chancery Court for Maury County ("trial court") granted a default judgment against Mother and terminated her parental rights based on several statutory grounds: abandonment; persistent conditions; and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody. We conclude that the ground of abandonment was not proven by clear and convincing evidence, and therefore reverse the trial court's judgment as to that ground. However, we affirm the trial court's findings as to the other statutory grounds and its finding that termination of Mother's parental rights is in the Minor Children's best interests. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance v. William Max Ridden
The notice of appeal filed by the appellant, William Max Riden, stated that appellants were |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher B. Patton Et Al. v. Jill Marie Campoy
This is a declaratory judgment action in which the plaintiffs seek to establish that they have |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
James L. Coxwell ex rel v. Watco Communities LLC et al.
This appeal concerns the denial of a motion to intervene. John A. Watson, Jr. (“Watson”) |
Court of Appeals | ||
Reginald Hall v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, ET Al.
In April of 2018, Bank of America, N.A. (“BOA”) conducted a foreclosure sale on a piece of real property located in Anderson County, Tennessee. The property was subsequently sold to a third party. The previous homeowner, Reginald Hall (“Appellant”), initiated wrongful foreclosure proceedings against BOA, among others, in the Chancery Court for Anderson County (the “trial court”). BOA filed a motion for summary judgment on July 7, 2022. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting BOA’s motion. Appellant appeals to this Court. Because Appellant’s brief does not comply with the applicable Rules of Appellate Procedure governing briefing, the issues purportedly raised are waived. The trial court is affirmed. |
Court of Appeals | ||
John Schmeeckle v. Hamilton County, TN, Et Al.
Appellant appeals the denial of his motion to recuse the trial judge on the grounds that the trial judge refused to explain the reasons other judges recused from the case, refused to hear evidence of misconduct against an attorney involved in the case, and allegedly ruled erroneously in several respects. Because we conclude that an ordinary person knowing all the facts known to the judge would not question the judge’s impartiality, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Victor Williams et al. v. Calvin Collins et al.
This is a contract dispute. The trial court granted non-resident Appellees’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. After conducting a de novo review, we agree with the trial court that Appellees did not have minimum contacts with Tennessee that would permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Benjamin L. Folkins, Et Al. v. Healthcare Group (Hong Kong) Co., Limited, Et Al.
The defendants appeal a jury verdict rendered after several days of trial. The parties are former business associates, individuals and entities, who worked together in the manufacturing, importing, distribution, and sale of memory foam mattresses. When one of the plaintiffs withdrew from the business in 2016, he invoked a buyout provision in the parties’ operating agreement. The defendants disputed, among other things, the validity of the operating agreement and refused to pay the buyout. A protracted dispute followed, with both the plaintiffs and the defendants alleging several causes of action against one another. Following cross-motions for summary judgment in 2020, the trial court ruled that the operating agreement was not invalid for fraud or unconscionability. The case proceeded to trial on August 3, 2021. The trial lasted several days, and the jury returned a verdict largely in favor of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were awarded compensatory and punitive damages, as well as almost a million dollars in attorney’s fees. The defendants appealed to this Court, raising a host of issues. We conclude, however, that the trial court erred in refusing to grant the defendants a mistrial on the first day of trial. For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the jury’s verdict and the trial court’s judgment entered in this matter and remand the case for a new trial. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Philips North America, LLC v. KPI Healthcare, Inc. et al.
To collect on its judgment, Appellant judgment creditor served a levy on Appellee garnishee bank. Judgment creditor sought to garnish an escrow account that was subject to an escrow agreement between a third-party and judgment debtor’s representative. Garnishee bank initially responded that it did not have any funds to remit. Thereafter, garnishee bank filed an amended response and enclosed a cashier’s check for $731,598.51, the amount of funds in the escrow account; the check was made payable to the Williamson County Circuit Court. A few days later, garnishee bank filed a motion to return funds deposited into the Clerk’s Office. At trial, garnishee bank argued that it was not properly served with the levy and that, even if service was proper, judgment creditor had no right to collect the funds held in the escrow account. The trial court agreed. We conclude that garnishee bank waived any objection concerning whether the levy was properly served. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
T.J. Martell Foundation for Cancer Research v. KraftCPAs PLLC et al.
This appeal followed the trial court’s certification of a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Because we conclude that the trial court’s certification was improvidently granted, we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Angellette Batts-Richardson v. Jeremiah Richardson
This appeal involves a mother’s post-divorce petition for modification of alimony and child support. Because the trial court has not disposed of all of the claims raised in the mother’s petition, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Gray Wallace v. Jessica Tomlin Wallace
Husband and Wife divorced; the trial court divided their property. Husband appeals, asserting five errors. Two of those purported errors are related to continuances, and three are related to the trial court’s division of the couple’s property. With regard the property division, one purported error relates to the trial court’s division of certain vehicles and two purported errors relate to the trial court’s division of two parcels of real property. We conclude that both of Husband’s continuance arguments are waived. We also conclude that his property division argument as to the vehicles is waived. With regard to the real property division, we conclude the trial court made inadequate findings of fact and conclusions of law to explain its decision as to both parcels, and we vacate and remand for the trial court to render further findings of fact and conclusions of law. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Laura S. Christie, et al. v. Baptist Memorial Hospital d/b/a Baptist Memorial Hospital for Women, et al.
Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their health care liability claims against a hospital and two |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of Jessica Abeyta
This is an appeal from a final judgment in a conservatorship case. Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal with the clerk of the appellate court within thirty days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sarah Bryant v. State of Tennessee
This appeal follows the dismissal of the appellant’s claim for damages in the Tennessee |
Court of Appeals |
