Ashleigh Suarez Smallman v. William H. Smallman
This is a post-divorce action in which both parents seek to modify the permanent parenting plan and the father seeks to reduce his financial support obligations. The mother filed her Petition to Modify Permanent Parenting Plan in which she requested, inter alia, a reduction of the father’s parenting time and that she be awarded sole decision-making authority for the non-emergency medical and educational decisions for the parties’ two minor children. The father filed his Counter-Petition to Modify the Parenting Plan seeking, inter alia, that he be awarded the tie-breaking vote for all medical decisions for the children; that joint decision-making authority for educational decisions be maintained between the parties; that his financial obligations be modified, including child support as well as previously agreed-upon additional educational and medical expenses; and that he be awarded more parenting time. Following a trial that spanned 10 days, the trial court found in a 53-page memorandum opinion and final order that neither party proved a material change of circumstance that justified modification of the parenting schedule. However, the court found the parents’ inability to successfully co-parent under the existing joint decision-making provision adversely affected the children’s non-emergency healthcare and educational needs. The court also found that it was in the children’s best interests that the “[m]other have sole decision-making authority over their non-emergency healthcare and day-to-day education, free of any interference or delays by the father and without being required to consult with him in advance.” The court denied the father’s request to modify child support as well as his request to modify responsibility for educational, medical, and extracurricular expenses. The father appeals. We affirm the trial court in all respects. We also find that the mother is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses she incurred in defending this appeal and remand this issue to the trial court to make the appropriate award. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Oriana Y.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The trial court terminated parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for the child. The court also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. We agree and affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Diana Lynn Van Zandbergen v. Scott W. Van Zandbergen
In this divorce case, Husband/Appellant appeals the amount and duration of alimony in futuro awarded to Wife/Appellee. Husband also appeals the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Wife for Husband’s alleged failure to comply with discovery. We conclude that the amount of alimony in futuro exceeds Wife’s need. As such, the award of alimony in futuro is modified to $3,451.00 per month and shall terminate upon Wife’s death or remarriage, or Husband’s death in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-121(f)(3). We vacate the trial court’s award of $20,000.00 in attorney’s fees to Wife and remand for the trial court to enter an order containing sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding this issue pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Public.Resource.Org, et al. v. Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., et al.
This appeal concerns a petition to access public records filed against a private entity. David L. Hudson, Jr. (“Hudson”) and Public.Resource.Org filed a petition against Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a division of LexisNexis Group (“Lexis”), in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act (“the TPRA”) seeking access to and a copy of the complete and current electronic version of the Tennessee Code Annotated (“the TCA.”).1 The Tennessee Code Commission (“the Commission”) intervened on Lexis’s side in part to protect the state’s alleged copyright interest in the TCA. The Trial Court held that the TCA is exempt from disclosure because Tennessee law provides a separate avenue for publication of the TCA. In addition to its dispositive ruling, the Trial Court held that Lexis operates as the functional equivalent of a governmental entity, and that the TCA is disqualified from copyright protection. Hudson appeals. Lexis and the Commission raise issues as well. We hold, inter alia, that Lexis is a private company performing specific services for the state on a contractual basis. It has not assumed responsibility for public functions to such an extent as to become the functional equivalent of a governmental entity. We modify the Trial Court’s judgment in that respect. Otherwise, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Public.Resource.Org, et al. v. Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., et al. (concurring)
I would also affirm the dismissal of the petition for access to public records and to obtain judicial review of denial of access. But I would do so only “on the threshold issue” identified by the trial court. The trial court framed the issue as “whether Tennessee Code Annotated constitutes a document required for public access under the Public Records Act.” On that threshold issue, I reach the same conclusion as the trial court and the majority. State law otherwise provides for access to Tennessee Code Annotated, so Tennessee Code Annotated is not a “state record” subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 2023) (making all state records “open for personal inspection by any citizen of this state . . . unless otherwise provided by state law”); see also Tennessean v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 485 S.W.3d 857, 865 (Tenn. 2016) (recognizing Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7- 503(a)(2)(A) as “a general exception to the Public Records Act, based on state law”). The trial court recognized that resolving the threshold issue was “dispositive, making it unnecessary to decide the other two defenses asserted.” Yet, “in the interest of avoiding a time-consuming and expensive remand” in the event of a reversal on the threshold issue, it also ruled on the other defenses. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Nedra R. Hastings v. Larry M. Hastings, Jr.
This case involves a protracted and contentious child support action, which began when |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Nedra R. Hastings v. Larry Maurice Hastings, Jr.
This case arises from a protracted and contentious child support action, which began in |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Manola McCain v. Knoxville HMA Physician Management, LLC
A defendant employer appeals the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment in this action alleging breach of a plaintiff nurse’s employment contract. We conclude that the contract language is unambiguous and that partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff was properly granted. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Kim Covarrubias v. Gerald Edward Baker
This appeal concerns a petition to modify alimony. Gerald Edward Baker (“Petitioner”) filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) against his ex-wife Kim Covarrubias (“Respondent”) seeking to modify his alimony obligation as a result of a massive post-retirement drop in his income. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order declining to modify Petitioner’s alimony obligation despite having found that Petitioner was credible; that his decision to retire was objectively reasonable; and that a substantial and material change in circumstances had occurred. Petitioner appeals. We find, inter alia, that the Trial Court erred by failing to account for Petitioner’s ability to pay in light of all of his expenses. The Trial Court’s decision lacked a factual basis properly supported by evidence in the record; was not based on the most appropriate legal principles applicable to the decision; and was not within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions. Thus, the Trial Court abused its discretion. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for the Trial Court to modify Petitioner’s alimony obligation. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Blake V.
A mother sought to terminate the parental rights of her child’s father pursuant to the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to support. At the conclusion of the termination hearing, the trial court concluded that the mother failed to prove any termination grounds by clear and convincing evidence and dismissed her termination petition. Determining that the mother lacked standing to seek termination of the father’s parental rights pursuant to those grounds, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the termination petition. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Dorothy Elizabeth Slaughter, Jr. v. Steven William Stillwagon
In this matter, the petitioner seeks a reversal of the trial court’s decision not to recuse itself. Due to the failure of the petitioner to meet the mandatory requirements of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, § 2.03, this appeal is dismissed and the trial court’s decision is affirmed. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Natalie C. Grimsley v. Patterson Company, LLC
The Plaintiff brought suit against her former employer, alleging sexual harassment by her supervisor and claiming constructive discharge. The Employer moved to compel arbitration based on a provision in the Plaintiff’s employment agreement. The Plaintiff responded by invoking the federal Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021, which the trial court concluded invalidates the mandatory arbitration provision. We reverse the trial court’s decision because the harassment of the Plaintiff and her constructive discharge occurred prior to the effective date of the Act. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Sarah Edge Woodward v. Geoffrey Hamilton Woodward
In this ongoing divorce litigation, the father filed an interlocutory appeal from the trial |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John Doe Et AL. v. Bellevue Baptist Church
The parents of a child brought suit to personally recover for negligent infliction of |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
ALEXANDER STRATIENKO v. LISA STRATIENKO
This post-divorce action concerns the trial court’s order finding the husband in civil |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Airies S.
This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that three grounds for termination existed as to the mother: (1) abandonment by failure to support; (2) persistent conditions; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility. The juvenile court also found that the termination was in the best interest of the child. The mother appeals. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Julie Clark v. Wanda Givens, ET AL.
A homeowner, displeased with the work performed by a handyman, brought suit, seeking |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Martin Walker v. Tennessee Board of Parole
This appeal arises from a Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by Martin Walker (“Petitioner”), an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). Petitioner seeks review of the decision by the Tennessee Board of Parole (“Board”) to deny him parole. He raises numerous challenges to the propriety of the Board’s action and procedures. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jaxson F., Et al
The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights to her two children. Following a trial, the juvenile court found that six grounds for termination had been proven and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Based on these findings, the mother’s parental rights were terminated. The mother appeals. Of the six grounds the juvenile court found had been proven, we affirm four of them but reverse two. We also affirm the determination that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of her parental rights. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Madilyn B.
Father appeals the trial court’s finding of abandonment by wanton disregard as a ground for termination of his parental rights, as well as its finding that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Edward C.
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Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Cartier H. et al.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on four grounds. The Tennessee |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cory Fulghum v. Stan Notestine
The Plaintiff brought a premises liability claim after falling off his own ladder while at the Defendant’s residence. The Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing he had no duty to warn and could avoid liability under principles of comparative fault. The Plaintiff countered that the Defendant was actually his employer and that the Defendant’s decision not to provide workers’ compensation insurance prevented the Defendant from being able to raise a comparative fault defense. Furthermore, the Plaintiff argued that the Defendant did have a duty to warn. The trial court granted the Defendant summary judgment finding no duty to warn and that even if a duty existed that Plaintiff’s claim failed as a matter of law based upon comparative fault principles. The Plaintiff appealed to this Court. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Snyder, et al. v. Second Avenue Nashville Property, LLC, et al.
Neighbors sued to invalidate zoning ordinances that would allow two real estate development projects to be built at significantly taller heights than prior zoning regulations allowed. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim in part because it found that the passage of two zoning ordinances gave the developers vested property rights under the Tennessee Vested Property Rights Act of 2014 (VPRA). We conclude the trial court erred in its application of the VPRA, but we affirm the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, City of Memphis, Tennessee v. Georgette Brooks
This is an appeal from a case arising in the Shelby County General Sessions Environmental Court. For the reasons stated herein, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review this appeal. Moreover, we are unable to transfer this appeal because it was not timely filed for the appropriate court that has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and it is, therefore, dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |