Anglin G. Wright v. Lisa Robison
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered on April 5, 2023. Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal with the clerk of the appellate court within thirty days after entry of the final order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Edward Ronny Arnold v. Deborah Malchow et al.
This is the second appeal in this matter involving a motor vehicle collision that occurred on October 23, 2019, in Nashville. Upon remand, following dismissal of the first appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the absence of a final judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the individual tortfeasor and subsequently dismissed the plaintiff’s claim against his underinsured motorist insurance carrier. The plaintiff has appealed. Determining that the plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his negligence claim, we vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the tortfeasor. We further vacate the dismissal of the plaintiff’s underinsured motorist claim against his automobile insurer. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela Diane Stark v. Joe Edward Stark
This appeal arises from a divorce action filed in 2018. The wife appeals from the trial |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy L. Morton v. Davidson County Government
The plaintiff made a claim for the return of bond money he paid to a private bonding company to secure his release from jail for charges that were pending and then nolled nearly 22 years before the filing of the present cause of action. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court held that the complaint, giving it the benefit of all reasonable inferences, fails to articulate any facts or legal authority showing a right to relief against the defendant. Further, the court determined that if the gravamen of the claim is a tort action for conversion, the claim was also properly dismissed because it would have accrued long ago and is therefore barred under the applicable one-year statute of limitations. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Toby S. Wilt, Jr. v. ESPACES Franklin, LLC et al.
This appeal arises from a lawsuit filed by a former CEO seeking funds owed to him from his company and two of its subsidiaries. The trial court awarded summary judgment to the plaintiff. The defendants appeal. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
City of Memphis v. The Pension Board of The City of Memphis, et al.
This appeal arises out of the chancery court’s affirmance of the decision of the administrative law judge granting a Line of Duty Disability (“LODD”) pension to a Memphis Firefighter. The appeal hinges on a question of law concerning the meaning of Memphis Code of Ordinances § 25-1(27), which states that an employee is eligible for a LODD pension if:
[A] physical . . . condition arising as the direct and proximate result of an accident sustained by a participant, . . . while in the actual performance of duties for the city at some definite time and place . . . which totally and permanently prevents him or her from engaging in the duties for which he or she was employed by the city. The determination of the line-of-duty disability of a participant shall be made on medical evidence by at least two qualified physicians.
City of Memphis Code of Ordinances, § 25-1(27) (emphasis added).
Three qualified physicians testified, but only one of them found that both factors were established. In ruling in favor of the firefighter, the administrative law judge and the chancellor both held that it was not necessary that each qualified physician state that the injuries were caused while in the actual performance of duties for the City at a definite place and time and that he was permanently disabled from continuing in his chosen role as a consequence of that injury. The City of Memphis insists that this was error, contending that “the ordinance clearly requires at least two physicians to opine that the employee sustained a work-related injury which caused his/her disability.” Based on the plain language of the ordinance, we agree with the City’s interpretation of the evidentiary requirements for a LODD pension; we therefore reverse and remand with instructions to reinstate the decision of the Pension Board of the City of Memphis, which denied the application for a LODD pension. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Ervin Jack Quinn
A surviving spouse brought this action against the estate of her deceased husband and his ex-wife and children. The surviving spouse sought to set aside the decedent’s inter vivos transfer of three properties to the ex-wife and children and/or to have the value of the transferred property included in the decedent’s net estate under Tennessee Code Annotated § 31-1-105, which applies when a decedent transferred property “with an intent to defeat the surviving spouse’s elective or distributive share.” The decedent conveyed the properties within three days of his death by quitclaim deed for no consideration other than love and affection. One of the deeds was executed by the decedent, and the other two deeds were executed by the decedent’s attorney-in-fact, his daughter. The chancellor referred all issues in dispute to a special master who found that the properties conveyed by the attorney-in-fact were conveyed with the intent to defeat the plaintiff’s elective share but that the third tract, which was conveyed by the decedent, was not. The chancellor adopted the report and recommendations of the special master. This appeal followed. After considering the factors identified in Finley v. Finley, 726 S.W.2d 923 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) and the totality of the circumstances, we hold that all three properties were conveyed with the intent to defeat the plaintiff’s elective share. Thus, we reverse, in part, the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion, including a recalculation of the surviving spouse’s elective share based on a net estate that includes all three properties at issue. |
Houston | Court of Appeals | |
Sharon Weatherly v. Eastman Chemical Company
The plaintiff brought an action seeking damages for diminution of real property value, |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Andrew L.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother appeals the trial court’s order |
Court of Appeals | ||
Erroll Sherrod v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.
This products-liability case is dismissed with prejudice on the parties’ joint stipulation of |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jessica Garvin v. Mariah Shelton
The plaintiff filed a complaint for a restraining order against the defendant, the wife of the |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Estate of Dariel Blackledge Washington
Decedent’s siblings filed a document they alleged to be decedent’s last will and testament. Decedent’s husband, the personal representative of her estate, moved to declare the alleged will invalid for lack of an effective signature. The trial court concluded that the will was ineffective due to the lack of decedent’s signature, and declined to admit it to probate. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Charlee N. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated the parental rights of the parents to two children, finding that there was clear and convincing evidence as to both parents regarding the ground of severe child abuse and that termination of the parents’ rights was in the children’s best interest. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm. |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Serenity S. et al.
Heather B. 1 (“Mother”) and John S., III (“Father”) are the biological parents of Serenity S. Mother and Raymond R. are the biological parents of Harmony R., Mellody O., and Angel O. Tina S. (“Grandmother”) and John S., Jr. (“Grandfather” or, together with Grandmother, “Petitioners”) petitioned the Chancery Court for Giles County (the “trial court”) for termination of Mother’s and Raymond R.’s parental rights in April of 2021 and for adoption of the children. Father voluntarily surrendered his parental rights as to Serenity S. As for the grounds for termination, Petitioners alleged: substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody of the children. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that Petitioners proved all three statutory grounds for termination and that termination was in the Children’s best interests. Mother appeals to this Court. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court’s order must be vacated and remanded. Because Petitioners proved no statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence, we need not consider whether termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interests. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
Mazie F. White v. Thomas Gray Miller
The trial court found Father to be willfully underemployed and imputed income to him for calculation of child support. Mother appeals the juvenile court’s determination, arguing the trial court erred as to the amount of income imputed to Father for the purposes of setting child support and also as to its determination of the amount of retroactive support. We affirm the trial court’s income imputation. However, we conclude the trial court erred in its calculation of retroactive support owed by Father. Therefore, this Court affirms the judgment of the trial court in part and reverses in part. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Michael C. Et Al.
The appellant challenges the trial court’s termination of her parental rights. The trial court |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Zoey L.
In a private petition for terminationof parental rights, the petitioner alleged multiple grounds for termination: (1) abandonment for failure to visit; (2) abandonment for failure to support; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court found the Father’s parental rights should be terminatedbased upon thesethree groundsand that termination was in the child’s best interest. We affirm the trial court’s ruling as to the termination grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support. Because the trial court did not make findings of factconcluding that placing legal and physical custody withFather would pose a risk of substantial harm tothe physical or psychological welfare of the child, we must vacatethe trial court’s ruling as to the failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody ground. We affirm the trial court’s conclusionthat termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Pam Holzmer v. The Estate of James F. Walsh, Jr.
This is an appeal from a jury verdict awarding damages to a plaintiff injured in a car accident. The plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of her medical bills. Because the plaintiff failed to present expert proof that her medical expenses were necessary, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the bills. The jury verdict is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Harvey, et al. v. Shelby County, Tennessee, et al.
Plaintiffs filed this inverse condemnation suit against numerous defendants, alleging that |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Nikita R. Thomas v. Donald L. Smith
In this real property dispute, the petitioner brought an action to quiet title to and remove |
Court of Appeals | ||
Lynne S. Cherry et al. v. Del Frisco’s Grille of Tennessee, LLC et al.
In this premises liability case concerning a customer’s fall inside of a restaurant, video surveillance footage from a security camera in the restaurant was not preserved, precipitating the filing of a sanctions motion by the Plaintiffs for spoliation. Although several sources of evidence existed pertaining to the condition of the restaurant flooring where the customer fell, and although the trial court concluded that the Plaintiffs were not prevented from proving fault in this case in the absence of the video evidence, the trial court ultimately entered significant sanctions against the Defendants, including holding that it was conclusively established for purposes of trial that the Defendants had actual or constructive notice that the floor where the fall occurred was “slick” because of a substance or because of a general and continuing condition, as well as striking the Defendants’ affirmative defenses of comparative fault. Upon the filing of an application by the Defendants, we granted an extraordinary appeal under Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the trial court’s sanctions order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Heather R. Wilder v. Joseph C. Wilder
This appeal concerns a long-running domestic matter. Heather R. Wilder (“Mother”) and |
Court of Appeals | ||
Kim Renae Nelson v. Loring E. Justice
The trial court found Appellant/Father in civil contempt for alleged failure to comply with discovery propounded by Appellee/Mother. The trial court also dismissed Father’s petition to modify visitation and child support on the ground that Father’s petition constituted an abusive civil lawsuit. We reverse the trial court’s findings of civil contempt and abusive civil lawsuit. However, because the parties’ child has reached majority, we conclude that Father’s petition to modify is moot. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Father’s petition on the ground of mootness. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Yakima Marks Green v. Derrick Lamar Green
A father petitioned to change the primary residential parent and for immediate physical custody of his child based on the mother’s allegedly inappropriate behavior. The court granted Father an ex parte order of immediate physical custody. At the show cause hearing, the court determined that the mother had engaged in a pattern of emotional abuse of the father and the child such that her parenting time should be limited. After a final hearing on the father’s petition, the court found a material change of circumstances had occurred and that it was in the child’s best interest to modify the permanent parenting plan. The court then adopted a modified parenting plan that named the father the primary residential parent and limited the mother’s parenting time. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Felicia Willett, et al. v. Olymbec USA, LLC
Tenant appeals the trial court’s decision to grant landlord a judgment under a holdover |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
