Mitchell Lloyd MaGill v. Mary R. MaGill
This is a divorce case. The trial court granted Mary R. MaGill ("Wife") a divorce based upon the inappropriate marital conduct of her spouse, Mitchell Lloyd Magill ("Husband"); awarded Wife rehabilitative alimony of $600 per month for four years, plus attorney's fees of $600; and divided the parties' marital property. Husband appeals the trial court's award of rehabilitative alimony. In a separate issue, Wife contends that the trial court failed to divide marital assets in the form of two businesses, i.e., MaGill Electric and C&M Lounge. She also seeks an award of damages for a frivolous appeal. We affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Ceciel Ros Halpern v. Laurence Halpern
This is an appeal by the appellant-father from an order awarding the appellee-mother child support arrearage and setting prospective child support obligations. Because the support orders appear to deviate from the child support guidelines without specific findings by the trial court, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of Kathleen Meade, Deceased, L. Grady Lee, v. Helen Jo Gilliam
A typewritten document and a handwritten document prepared later in time were offered for probate. The Trial Court rejected the handwritten document and admitted the typewritten document to probate as the Last Will and Testament of Deceased. On appeal, we reverse. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Community Bank of East Tennessee v. Tennessee Department of Safety
The Claim Commissioner held Commission was without jurisdiction to entertain claim on appeal. We vacate Judgment and remand. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Ron Colquette v. Peter Zaloum
Ron Colquette (“Plaintiff”) sued Peter Zaloum (“Defendant”) claiming, in part, that Defendant made fraudulent misrepresentations in connection with the sale of his business and the lease of his land to Plaintiff, and that Defendant violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After a bench trial, the Trial Court entered a Final Judgment holding, inter alia, that Plaintiff was entitled to damages in the amount of $70,054.35, plus pre-judgment interest; that Plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages in the amount of $15,000; and that the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act was not applicable to this case. Defendant appeals, and Plaintiff raises additional issues concerning the applicability of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act to the facts of this case, and the amount of punitive damages awarded to him. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re: Estate of Angula Wilson Whitehorn Turner
Beneficiary of will appeals the order of the chancery court awarding attorney fees, executor fees, and other expenses. Both factual and legal objections are made to the awards made by the court. The legal objections are without merit, and the factual objections are not well-taken, because there is no transcript or statement of the evidence. We affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Richard A. Jones and Richard A. Jones, Jr. v. Jody W. Henderson
This case arises from the discovery of an extramarital affair. The Appellants brought suit against |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Helen Gleason v. Daniel P. Gleason, III
The trial court awarded Petitioner alimony arrearages of $7,250 plus interest. Respondent appeals, asserting the statute of limitations and the defense of laches. We modify the judgment of the trial court and remand. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Snell v. City of Murfreesboro
Plaintiffs appeal from trial court's dismissal of complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Plaintiffs allege that trial court erred in finding that Plaintiffs had no standing to challenge annexation ordinance passed by City of Murfreesboro. Finding that the trial court was correct in determining that Plaintiffs were not entitled to challenge the annexation ordinance under Tennessee declaratory judgment statute, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Mitchell v. William Henegar, D/B/A Henegar Realty Company; and Geneva Brown, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Fred Brown
Plaintiff sought rescission of a purchase of real property, and damages pursuant to the Consumer Protection Act. The Trial Court held plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proof on the issues presented. On appeal, we affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Luke N. Gibson, et al. v. Chrysler Corporation, et al.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict for Defendant/Appellee. Plaintiff/Appellant, a minor, was allegedly injured when an integrated car seat in a vehicle manufactured and sold by Defendant/Appellee malfunctioned. Plaintiff/Appellant asserts that: (1) the jurors conducted unauthorized experimentation with certain exhibits, which constituted extraneous prejudicial information under Tenn. R. Evid. 606(b); (2) that there is no material evidence on which the jury could have based its verdict; (3) that the trial judge failed to properly perform her duty as thirteenth juror; (4) that the trial court erred in allowing an expert to testify outside the scope of his expertise in violation of McDaniel v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn. 1997); and (5) that the trial court erred, either under Tenn. R. Evid. 702 and 704 or on the theory of judicial estoppel, in excluding a portion of the testimony of a second expert. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
The City of Humboldt, et al. v. J.R. McKnight, et al.
This lawsuit is about the operation and funding of public schools educating the children in Gibson County. Since 1981 the county has not operated a county school system, and all K-12 students have been in schools operated by the municipal and special school systems. The county ceased operating schools when a 1981 Private Act created the Gibson County Special School District. This arrangement was ratified by a 2002 Public Act stating that where all K-12 students are eligible to be served by city and special school systems, the county is not required to operate a separate county school system or have a county board of education. The trial court held that the 2002 Act was unconstitutional as special legislation and that the 1981 Act, though constitutional, was illegal. It ordered the dissolution of the Gibson County Special School District and that the county undertake operation of the schools not included in the other municipal or special school systems within the county. The court further found that the county was required to levy a countywide property tax to fund the local share of education costs and divide the proceeds among all school systems in the county. We hold that the 2002 Act does not violate Article XI, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution and, consequently, there is no obligation for the county to operate a county school system. We also conclude that the facts do not establish any disparity of educational opportunity among the school systems in the county and, consequently, the principles and holdings in the Small Schools cases do not apply to require a specific organizational structure and do not preclude the method used in Gibson County. Finally, we conclude the county is not required to levy a countywide property tax for schools. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sheryl Heggs v. Wilson Inn Nashville-Elm Hill, Inc.
This appeal involves a dispute between a hotel and a guest who slipped on a wet tile floor as she was making her way to an elevator on one of the hotel's guest floors. The guest filed a negligence action against the hotel in the Circuit Court for Davidson County, and the hotel answered and filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the hotel's motion after determining, as a matter of law, that the hotel had satisfied its duty to the guest by setting out a yellow "wet floor" warning sign and that the guest was fifty percent or more at fault for her injuries. The guest has appealed. We have determined that the hotel has not demonstrated that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law and, therefore, we vacate the summary judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Chales and James Charles v. Ruth Latham and Ralph Latham
In a dispute over an easement, the Trial Court awarded damages to plaintiffs for interference with use of easement, nuisance and punitive damages. On appeal, we affirm the award of compensatory damages, but vacate the award of punitive damages and remand to assess punitive damages in accordance with Hodges v. Toof & Co., 833.S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992). |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Donnie Wayne Johnson, Jr., v. City Roofing Company
This case is an appeal from an order granting Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Appellant argues, as he did at trial, that this case involves genuine issues of material fact, rendering summary judgment inappropriate for this action. For the following reasons, we affirm. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
St. Paul Reinsurance Co., LTD, v. Robert Williams and Sherrod Jackson, Individually and D/B/A Pure Passion, Pure Passion, Inc. and Eugene Pugh
This case arises from events surrounding the shooting death of Decedent, Appellant’s son. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment claiming its policy of insurance did not apply to the |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rocky Garner v. Phil Breeden & Associates
Appellant sued Appellee for breach of contract or in the alternative for quantum meruit value of services rendered. At the conclusion of Plaintiff's proof the trial court sustained a motion for a directed verdict on behalf of Defendant as to the quantum meruit claim and further sustained that motion on a large portion of the contract claim. As to remaining portions of the contract claim the motion for a directed verdict was overruled, and Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the remaining claims without prejudice. We hold that the trial court erred in granting the motion for a directed verdict as to the contract case but correctly granted a directed verdict as to quantum meruit. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for trial on the contract issues. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Kendall Broadbent v. Shari Katherine Langhi Broadbent
This appeal involves a dispute over the responsibility for investment losses incurred by a spouse before and during the parties’ marriage. After only one year of marriage, the husband filed suit for divorce in the Circuit Court for Davidson County. The wife counterclaimed for divorce and, among other relief, sought alimony in solido to offset the loss of her separate property resulting from the husband’s aggressive stock market trading. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct and then, employing a comparative fault analysis, determined that the husband should pay the wife $51,500 in alimony in solido to reimburse her for her separate property lost in the stock market. The husband has appealed. We have determined that the wife is not entitled to be reimbursed for the losses caused by the husband’s investments. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jamie Edward Hines v. Terrell Lynn Simms
This appeal involves a custody dispute triggered by a paternity action. The trial court fashioned a permanent parenting plan which named Father the primary residential parent during the school year and Mother the primary residential parent during summer vacation. Mother appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Bobbi Jo Fisher v. Tennessee Insurance Company - Concurring
While I concur in the majority’s decision to reverse and dismiss this case, I feel it necessary to concur separately to state my understanding that our holding in this case is limited to an insured’s claim for collision damage coverage only. I believe there may be public policy considerations that would need to be considered in a case involving liability, as opposed to collision, coverage. That question is not now before us, and I do not believe those public policy considerations are applicable in a case such as the one now before us involving an insurance claim solely for collision damage coverage. I, therefore, concur in the majority’s decision to reverse and dismiss. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Bobbi Jo Fisher v. Tennessee Insurance Company
The defendant issued a policy of automobile insurance to the plaintiff which provided coverage for liability claims and for collision damage, but each of these insuring agreements was subject to an exclusion of coverage if the insured automobile was being operated by a non-licensed driver at the time of the accident giving rise to the claim. The plaintiff loaned her Pontiac to a non-licensed driver under the mistaken belief that he was properly licensed. The trial judge found that the plaintiff reasonably believed that her permittee had a valid driver’s license and allowed recovery. We reverse and dismiss. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Kyle Ann Wiltse v. Christopher Allen Wiltse
This case involves issues arising out of the parties’ divorce. The trial court divided the parties’ marital assets, awarded Appellee alimony in futuro, ordered Appellant to pay Appellee’s attorney’s fees, and ordered Appellant to pay for Appellee’s health insurance premiums. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, modify in part, and remand for any further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth A. Brasel, Sr., v. John Stanley Brasel, Sr. et al.
This is a child custody case. Father/Appellant appeals from the trial court’s Order, which |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John Whitney Evans III v. Dinah Petree Evans
In this appeal, Husband seeks to be relieved from his obligation to pay alimony in futuro to his former wife. In support of his request, Husband asserts that his former wife’s cohabitation with another man terminated his obligation since Wife was being supported by that third person and was in no need of alimony. The trial court denied Husband’s petition finding Wife was not living with a third person, had rebutted presumption that she does not need the alimony, and that no material change in circumstances had occurred to warrant modification of the initial award of alimony. We affirm those holdings. However, we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Wife. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
John Whitney Evans III v. Dinah Petree Evans - Concurring
I concur with the results of the court’s opinion. However, I have elected to file this separate |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals |
