John Whitney Evans III v. Dinah Petree Evans - Concurring
I concur with the results of the court’s opinion. However, I have elected to file this separate |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Eloris Williams Presley v. Charles Ray Sattler
This appeal involves a former wife’s efforts to recover damages from her former husband for misdeeds during their marriage and following their divorce. Approximately ten years after the parties’ divorce in Louisiana, the former wife filed a pro se complaint in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking to recover $10,000,000 from her former husband for “eight years of trauma and distress, abuse and torture.” The former husband filed a pro se “exception” to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the former wife has appealed. We affirm the dismissal of the complaint. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Finchum, individually and as Next of Kin to William Finchum, Deceased, v. Ace, USA, individually and as successor to CIGNA Ins Co., et al.
The Trial Court dismissed the Complaint on a Motion filed pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). We vacate and remand because the Motion to Dismiss did not comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Finchum, individually and as Next of Kin to William Finchum, Deceased v. ACE, USA, individually and as successor to Cigna Insurance Co, et al.- Dissenting
The majority opinion concludes that the defendants’ motion to dismiss is deficient. I agree. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Joe Rankin and wife, Brenda Rankin v. Lloyd Smith
This is a breach of contract case. The plaintiffs entered into a contract to sell their home and |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Tammy Barker v. Vernon Barker
This is a divorce case. The parties were married for three years prior to their separation, and two children were born during the marriage. The mother filed a petition for divorce, and the father filed a counterclaim for divorce. After a bench trial, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce and a parenting plan. In the plan, the father was permitted supervised visitation with the children, but was required to undergo a psychological evaluation in order to continue that visitation. The plan also provided that the children’s guardian ad litem would be the “binding arbitrator” on all matters involving the father’s visitation. The father now appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in requiring him to undergo a psychological evaluation and in appointing the guardian ad litem as the arbitrator on matters involving his visitation schedule. Because the father did not properly object to the issues raised on appeal, they are deemed to be waived. Therefore, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James A. Drake, Jr. v. JPS Elastomerics Corp.
This case involves the breach of an employment compensation contract. Under the sales employee’s compensation plan with his employer, he was to earn extra commission for any sales that exceeded his annual quota. In the compensation plan, the employer reserved the right to pay only the standard commission on “windfall” sales. For the fiscal year at issue, the sales employee exceeded his quota. The employer invoked the windfall provision of his compensation plan and paid him only the standard commission on the sales over his quota. The sales employee sued his employer, arguing that he was entitled to the extra commission on the sales over his quota. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the judge ruled in favor of the plaintiff sales employee. On appeal, the defendant employer argues that the “windfall provision” applies to all sales that were unbudgeted or unforecast and that the plaintiff sales employee’s excess sales fall in that category. We hold that the defendant employer’s interpretation conflicts with the plain meaning of the contract, and affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Norandal USA, Inc. v. Ruth E. Johnson, Commissioner of Revenue for the State of Tennessee
This is a sales tax case. The plaintiff owns an aluminum sheet and foil manufacturing plant. Located in the plant are two multi-ton roll grinders. In 1987, the defendant commissioner of revenue took the position that the roll grinders and roll grinder supplies were exempt from sales tax, because the roll grinders constituted "industrial machinery," which were exempt. In 1995, however, the department of revenue conducted an audit of the plaintiff and changed its position, concluding that the roll grinders were "equipment used for maintenance," which is an exception to the industrial machinery exemption. Accordingly, the plaintiff was assessed for sales tax on roll grinder supplies purchased between 1995 and 1998. The plaintiff paid the assessment under protest and filed the instant lawsuit, seeking to recover the sales tax paid on roll grinder supplies for the audit period. The trial court upheld the decision of the department of revenue, concluding that the roll grinders were "equipment used for maintenance." From that order, the plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, finding that the roll grinders fit within the "equipment used for maintenance" exception and that, consequently, roll grinder supplies are subject to sales tax. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald C. Teachout v. Conseco Securities, Inc.A/K/A Conseco Financial Services, Inc., Conseco Finance Servicing Corp., Conseco Bank, Inc. and Lisa M. Bynum
This is an arbitration case. The plaintiff borrower executed a note in favor of the defendant bank. The note included an arbitration clause, requiring all disputes between the "Borrower(s)" and "Note Holder" to be arbitrated. The term "Note Holder" is defined in the note as the "Lender or anyone who takes [the] Note by transfer and who is entitled to receive payments under [the] Note." The bank transferred the note and the borrower began making payments to a third party. The borrower then filed this lawsuit against the bank and others, alleging fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, promissory fraud, and violation of the Consumer Protection Act. The defendants filed a motion to stay the proceedings and to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm, holding that under the note, the bank is no longer a "Note Holder" and therefore does not have standing to invoke the arbitration clause. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Raymond LeDoux and wife, Virginia LeDoux v. Wendall Pierce
This case involves a default judgment. The plaintiffs filed a civil warrant in general sessions court against the defendant for intentional infliction of physical injuries. The defendant did not appear, and the plaintiffs obtained a judgment by default. The defendant appealed to the circuit court for a trial de novo. The circuit court set the case for trial. On the trial date, however, neither the defendant nor his counsel appeared, and the default judgment was reinstated. The defendant filed a Rule 60.02 motion to have the default judgment set aside, based on excusable neglect. The defendant's lawyer attached his own affidavit, which explained that the lawyer was in the midst of closing his law office after thirty-eight years of practice and, in the confusion, failed to put the hearing date on his calendar. The motion to set aside was denied. The defendant now appeals. We vacate and remand to the trial court to consider whether the defendant has a colorable defense to the plaintiffs' claims and to reweigh the pertinent factors in light of that finding. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Sara Beth Stovall v. The City of Memphis
This case arises from the trial court’s grant of Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment based on interpretation of T.C.A. § 36-3-103(a). Finding that T.C.A. § 36-3-103(a) requires couples to obtain a marriage license for a valid marriage in Tennessee and that Marriage by Estoppel does not apply, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mary O. McIntosh v. M. A. Blanton, III, M.D., et al.
Plaintiff appeals the award of summary judgment to defendant physician based on the statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
American Chariot, et al., v. City of Memphis, Tennessee, et al.
Plaintiffs, horse-drawn carriage operators, filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a provision of one section of an ordinance adopted by theMemphis City Council. The trial court elided the provision as an unlawful delegation of the City’s police power and enforced the remainder of the ordinance. Plaintiffs appeal, asserting the trial court erred in its application of the doctrine of elision. Defendants cross-appeal, asserting the trial court erred by finding the elided portion unconstitutional. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
B.M.M. v. P.R.M.
This is a child custody dispute. The mother and father entered into a permanent parenting plan naming the mother the primary residential parent of their daughter. Under the plan, the father had supervised visitation because the mother was concerned about sexual abuse by the father. The father later sought to modify the parenting plan to allow for unsupervised visitation. The mother then filed a notice that she intended to move to Florida with the daughter, which the father opposed. The trial court granted the father's petition for unsupervised visitation and denied the mother's request to relocate to Florida with the child. The mother and daughter then left for a scheduled trip to Florida, with the understanding that they would return for the father's scheduled visitation. The mother remained in Florida with the daughter for six weeks, asserting that she, the mother, was too ill to travel. The father was granted an emergency change of custody. The father then retrieved the daughter through a private investigator, coordinating with Florida officials. Upon return to Tennessee, the trial court found the mother in criminal contempt for interfering with the father's visitation and for moving to Florida. The father was named the primary residential parent and the mother was granted supervised visitation. The mother was also required to pay the father for the cost of the private investigator. The mother appeals the denial of her request to move to Florida with the child, the award of unsupervised visitation to the father, the finding of contempt, the change of custody, the requirement that her visitation be supervised, and the requirement that she pay the private investigator's fee. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: T.H. and J.H.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two children. The circuit court found that Mother was in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, that she failed to remedy the persistent conditions that prevented her child's return, and that termination was in the child's best interest. We affirm. The record contains numerous extraneous documents that do not pertain to the petition to terminate parental rights or the issues raised on appeal. The parties and the clerk have a responsibility to abridge the record. Tenn. R. App. P. 8A(c). Failure to abridge the record may result in a reduction of the circuit court clerk's fee for the cost of preparing and transmitting the record. |
Cannon | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa A. Martin v. Johnny L. Drinnon
This litigation arises out of a two-vehicle collision in Hawkins County. Teresa A. Martin ("the plaintiff") and her husband sued the driver of the other vehicle, Johnny L. Drinnon ("the defendant"), seeking damages and charging him with common law and statutory acts of negligence. The defendant answered and filed a counterclaim. The jury returned a verdict, finding the parties equally at fault. Judgment was entered on the jury's verdict and the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for a new trial. The plaintiff appeals, raising, in effect, three issues. We vacate the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: C.A.H.
Mother appeals termination of her parental rights. The juvenile court found that Mother was in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, that she failed to remedy the persistent conditions that prevented her child's return, and that termination was in the child's best interest. We affirm. The record contains numerous extraneous documents that do not pertain to the petition to terminate parental rights or the issues raised on appeal. The parties and the clerk have a responsibility to abridge the record. Tenn. R. App. P. 8A(c). Failure to abridge the record may result in a reduction of the juvenile court clerk's fee for the cost of preparing and transmitting the record. Tenn. R. App. P. 40(g). |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Conner v. Commissioner Michael Magill, Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, et al.
This is an unemployment compensation case in which Appellant was denied benefits by the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development. At all administrative levels it was determined that Appellant was discharged for “misconduct connected with such claimant’s work” and that he was, therefore, disqualified from receiving benefits under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-7-303. This ruling was then affirmed by the lower court. Appellant then timely filed this appeal challenging the ruling of the lower court. For the following reasons, we affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
TBC Corporation, v. Gene Wall, Geraldine Wall, Joe Wall, and Helen Wall, v. Marvin Bruce
TBC Corporation (“Plaintiff”) filed suit in the Chancery Court of Shelby County against Joe Wall, Helen Wall, Gene Wall and Geraldine Wall (collectively “The Walls” or “Defendants”) seeking a judgment for an amount due on an account secured by personal guaranties signed by defendants. The defendants filed an answer and a thirdparty complaint, the latter against Marvin Bruce, plaintiff’s president, (“Bruce”), by which they sought indemnification in the event plaintiff obtained a judgment against them. In their answer, the defendants denied that the guaranties were still in effect, and in addition, raised the affirmative defenses of release, waiver, abandonment and estoppel.1 The answer and third-party complaint also demanded a jury. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Gerald A. Ottinger v. Kimberly S. Ottinger
This is a child custody case in which both Gerald Ottinger (father) and Kimberly Ottinger (mother) filed petitions for primary residential custody of their daughter, Marlah Whitley Ottinger. The trial court granted joint legal custody to the parties and awarded primary residential custody to the father. The mother appeals, asserting that the court should have awarded her primary residential custody. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Clay Holley, v. Sherri Lynn Hufford Holley
In this divorce action, the Trial Judge granted the parties a divorce, and allocated the marital and separate assets. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Susan Pykosh, et al., v. Stephanie A. Earps, et al.
This extraordinary appeal involves a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 35.01 request for a physical examination of an opposing party. Following a vehicular collision in Wilson County, one of the drivers and her passenger filed suit in the Circuit Court for Wilson County seeking damages from the driver and owners of the other vehicle. Issues involving the extent and permanency of the plaintiff driver's injuries caused by this collision arose after the plaintiff driver was injured in another accident, and the defendants requested permission for their medical expert to examine the plaintiff driver. The trial court denied the request, and the defendants filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 application with this court. We have determined that, under the facts of this case, the trial court's denial of the defendants' Tenn. R. Civ. P. 35.01 motion departs from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings of this sort. Therefore, we grant the Tenn. R. App. P. 10 application and reverse the order denying the Tenn. R. Civ. P. 35.01 motion. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Williams Holding Company D/B/A Raleigh Hills Apartments v. Sharon T. Willis, et al.
Plaintiff, owner of an apartment complex, filed suit seeking damages caused by a fire in an apartment occupied by Defendants. The parties consented to arbitration. The parties stipulated to the damages in the amount of $73,414.64. Further, it was stipulated that Plaintiff settled with two of the three Defendants whereby the two Defendants payed 50%, $36,707.32, of the property damage. Subsequently, the arbiter ruled that the remaining Defendant was 100% at fault and liable for the total amount of damages, $73,414.64. Plaintiff filed a motion with the trial court to confirm the arbiter's award. In response, the remaining Defendant filed a motion to modify, correct, and/or to vacate the arbitration award and a motion for credit, set off and reduction of award. The trial court confirmed the arbiter's award, thereby denying Defendant's motions. Defendant appeals. For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the trial court and modify the arbitration award. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jordan Ashton Danelz v. John Gayden
Mother and husband divorced. In her complaint for divorce, mother stated that her son was born of their marriage. Husband paid son’s child support. Upon reaching the age of majority, son filed a paternity action against alleged father. Son relied upon mother’s affidavit as proof of requisite sexual contact. The alleged father filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim arguing mother was judicially estopped from making the statements contained in her affidavit in light of her statements made in her divorce complaint. The juvenile court granted the motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Robert T. Irvin, v. The Plasma Center, et. al.
Robert T. Irvin sued the defendants for refusal to continue to accept his donation of plasma to The Plasma Center. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court entered an order stating that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and, that if Mr. Irvin’s cause of action lies in medical malpractice, he failed to meet his requisite burden in responding to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The motion for summary judgment was granted and Mr. Irvin appeals. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals |
