Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: W. Neil Thomas, III
This is an interpleader bill filed by Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company against four named Beneficiaries in a policy of insurance issued to their father, Arnold Joe Johnson. Two of the Beneficiaries were children by a former marriage of Mr. Johnson, who were added as such shortly before his death. The two Beneficiaries by a subsequent marriage insisted that the provisions of a divorce decree precluded Mr. Johnson from adding his other two children as Beneficiaries. The Trial Court found that all four should share in the proceeds of the policy equally and entered a summary judgment to that effect. We vacate and remand.
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Samuel H. Payne
Catherine Dean Jackson ("Plaintiff") filed a Complaint for divorce against her husband, Bruce Lane Jackson ("Defendant"). The parties entered a stipulation, which was approved by the Trial Court, in which they agreed both parties were entitled to a divorce and agreed that Plaintiff be granted custody of their minor child. The parties, however, did not agree on the remaining issues of alimony and the division of marital property and liabilities. Over approximately four years, the Trial Court referred these issues to a Special Master on three occasions. Upon each referral by the Trial Court, the Special Master held a hearing in which he heard arguments and, during the first two hearings, heard testimony from the parties and witnesses. After each hearing, the Special Master filed his report, but did not file a transcript of the hearing with the report as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 53.04(1). Among other findings, the Special Master recommended that Plaintiff receive "rehabilitative alimony for life . . . " in the amount of $1,000 per month and that Defendant pay the parties' entire 1994 tax liability. With the exception of modifying the Special Master's alimony recommendation to alimony in futuro, the Trial Court adopted the Special Master's recommendations which precipitated Defendant's appeal. Due to the Special Master's failure to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 53.04(1), we vacate the portion of the the Trial Court's judgment relative to alimony and the 1994 tax liability, affirm the remainder of the judgment, and remand.
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Barbara N. Haynes
This is a malicious prosecution case. The defendants obtained a warrant against the plaintiff after observing a man matching the plaintiff's description attempting to break into a car on the defendants' property. After a jury trial, the plaintiff was found not guilty. Subsequently, the plaintiff instituted a lawsuit against the defendants for malicious prosecution. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, finding that the defendants acted with probable cause and without malice in obtaining the warrant.
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace
In this negligence action, Plaintiff sued Defendant for damages in connection with the rupture of a gas line. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for Plaintiff. Defendant appeals. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
Three civil service employees sued Nashville Electric Service and the individual members of the civil service board primarily for violation of the age provision of the Tennessee Human Rights Act resulting in their denial of promotions. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant, and plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Childers
This appeal involves a grant of summary judgment, which dismissed loss of parental consortium claims brought by the children of a parent injured in an automobile accident. The children seek review of existing Tennessee precedent that fails to recognize loss of parental consortium causes of action resulting from the personal injury of a parent. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court and decline to create a new cause of action.
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: J. Steven Stafford
This case involves child visitation with a prison inmate. The child's father has been incarcerated since 1994 at the Northwest Correctional Facility in Lake County, Tennessee. The child resides with his mother in Weakley County, Tennessee. In 1997, the father filed a petition in the Lake County Chancery Court seeking an order requiring the child's mother to allow the father to communicate with his child. The mother failed to respond to the petition. In April 1999, the Lake County Chancery Court sua sponte dismissed the petition, finding that it should have been filed in Weakley County. This Court reversed, holding that lack of venue was a defensewhich was waived when the mother failed to respond. After the case was remanded, the mother sent a letter to the Lake County Chancery Court, advising that a paternity petition had been filed in the Weakley County Juvenile Court. Thereafter, the Lake County Chancery Court transferred the father's petition to the Weakley County Juvenile Court to be determined in conjunction with the paternity petition. The father now appeals the transfer of his petition. We affirm, finding that the trial court acted within its authority in transferring the case to a court with concurrent jurisdiction.
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Don H. Allen
In a post-divorce proceeding, father filed a "motion" to increase visitation with his minor child. The trial court found that there had been no material change of circumstances since the entry of the prior visitation order and denied the "motion." Father has appealed. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman
This lawsuit arises out of a Letter of Intent entered into between two of the various parties to this action. The trial court entered judgment on the issue of which party was entitled to possession of the property, but did not rule on any of the remaining claims. Because the judgment appealed from is not a final judgment for purposes of Rule 3 of the Tenn. R. App. P., we dismiss the appeal.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: W. Dale Young
Plaintiffs alleged that defendant appraiser's negligence in making an appraisal resulted in their damage. The Trial Court granted defendant summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal the refusal of the Trial Judge to grant them additional time to defend the summary judgment motion. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: John F. Weaver
Linda Green, M.D., and Steve Ferguson, M.D. ("Plaintiffs"), who are married, filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment ("Complaint") against their automobile insurance carrier, United States Automobile Association, or USAA, regarding a dispute over the terms of their insurance policy ("Policy"). Plaintiff Green claimed coverage under their Policy's uninsured/underinsured motorist liability section for her physical injuries, medical expenses, and loss of income resulting from an automobile accident. Plaintiff Ferguson claimed coverage for loss of consortium. Defendant contends that the Policy limits Plaintiff Ferguson's loss of consortium claim to the $300,000 each person coverage already extended to Plaintiff Green. After Plaintiffs filed suit disputing this interpretation of the Policy, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which was granted by the trial court. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Daryl R. Fansler
Loue G. Manning appeals a summary judgment granted in favor of K-Trans Management, Inc., as to his suit seeking damages for violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act and intentional infliction of emotional distress as a result of his termination by K-Trans. We find there is no material evidence to support his insistence that he was terminated because of his race and affirm the judgment below.
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Bill Swann
This is a post-divorce child support dispute with a series of hearings and orders stretching over a 29-month period. Lawrence David Sadler ("Father"), the obligor parent, appeals the last order entered below, in which the trial court found him in arrears and awarded Patricia Jane Sadler ("Mother") her attorney's fees of $6,262.50. Because we find that the referee's action, as approved by the trial court in the subject order, retroactively modified Father's child support obligation and erroneously found Father to be in arrears in his child support obligation, we reverse.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Carey E. Garrett
In this custody dispute, the Trial Court gave custody to the father. The mother appealed. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, III
This appeal arises from the trial court granting a Rule 60 motion to suspend the judgment in a divorce action and allow a new trial. Husband and Wife were divorced in 1994. At that time, Wife was awarded the entirety of Company upon the condition she pay Husband $500,000 for the portion of Company awarded to him in the property division. Shortly after Wife paid Husband the money, Company sold an asset previously believed to be worthless for $1.7 million. Husband filed a Rule 60 motion in 1998 to set aside the trial court's 1994 property division on the basis that Wife had fraudulently valued the asset at $0 during the divorce hearing. The trial court granted the Rule 60 motion, setting a new trial to redetermine the value of Company at the time of the divorce. We reverse.
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Royce Taylor
When husband and wife divorced, they signed a marital dissolution agreement which was incorporated into the Final Decree of Divorce providing, inter alia, that husband would have visitation rights with wife's daughter by a previous marriage and husband would in turn pay college tuition and expenses for the child and would leave to the child by Will one-fourth of his estate. A dispute arose as to the extent of visitation, and husband filed a petition to establish visitation rights. Wife filed a petition to require husband to continue his obligations expressed in the marital dissolution agreement. The trial court felt that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties with regard to the visitation issue; therefore, there was no valid contract. Husband appeals. We reverse and remand.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Russell Heldman
The Appellant and the Appellee are the parents of three minor children. Following the Appellant and the Appellee's divorce, they shared joint legal and physical custody of the children. The Appellant filed a Petition for Modification of Custody in the Circuit Court of Williamson County seeking to relocate with the children to Illinois. Following the close of the Appellant's proof at the hearing on the Petition, the Appellee made a Motion to Dismiss. The trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss and awarded attorney's fees to the Appellee. The Appellant appeals the order entered by the Circuit Court of Williamson County granting the Motion to Dismiss and awarding attorney's fees to the Appellee. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's decision. We remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Russell Heldman
This appeal arises from a complaint for divorce filed by the Appellee in the Circuit Court of Williamson County. The trial court awarded the Appellee a divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct and adultery. The trial court divided the marital property and ordered the Appellant to pay the Appellee alimony in futuro and child support for the parties' two minor children. The trial court ordered the Appellant to maintain life insurance to secure the alimony and child support obligations. Additionally, the trial court entered a permanent injunction restraining the Appellant from taking the children in the presence of the Appellant's girlfriend.
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
This case involves a petition for writ of certiorari based on a prison disciplinary proceeding. The inmate was found guilty of a disciplinary infraction by the prison disciplinary board. After his appeal to the prison warden was denied, the inmate filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, alleging numerous violations of his due process rights. The trial court dismissed the petition and Baxter now appeals. We affirm, finding that the sanctions imposed for the infraction did not rise to the level of interfering with the inmate's protected liberty interest and, therefore, did not trigger due process protections.
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Charles D. Haston, Sr.
This is a dispute regarding the valuation of a strip mall for purposes of determining the applicability of a co-insurance penalty clause in Northgate Shopping Center's casualty insurance policy. In a bench trial, the trial court found the witness for Northgate to be more credible than the witness for State Auto Insurance Companies, and found the replacement cost of the building to be $3,068,000. Since the building was insured for $3,100,000, the co-insurance penalty did not apply. The trial court awarded Northgate judgment of $73,637.56, less a $1,000 deductible. This judgment included prejudgment interest of $16,107.00 assessed against Northgate and awarded to Plaintiff Warren Restoration, which had repaired areas of the mall damaged by fire. On appeal, State Auto challenges the trial court's acceptance of the valuation as determined by witnesses for Northgate, contends that the co-insurance penalty clause is applicable, and challenges the award of prejudgment interest. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court in all respects.
