Wright vs. Hull
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Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
Hartsville Hospital vs. Bay Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
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Trousdale | Court of Appeals | |
Huffer vs. State
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Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Johnson vs. Allstate
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Grundy | Court of Appeals | |
American Airlines vs. Johnson
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mills vs. Solomon
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Cannon | Court of Appeals | |
Union Planters vs. Island Management
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Emmanuel Page vs. Doctor R. Crants
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Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Alfaro Munday vs. William Mark Munday
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Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Alvin Herring vs. Interstate Hotels
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
J.C.Bradford vs. Southern Realty
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Ray Stanfill vs. Karen Elaine Wright Stanfill
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Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth L. Storey vs. Randall Nichols, et al
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Knox | Court of Appeals | |
William P. Henderson, et al vs. Henry Clay Hart, Jr.
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Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Bernie Riggs
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Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Judd's Inc. vs. Dors L. Muir, et al
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Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
LeCroy-Schemel vs. John Cupp, Sheriff
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Dickson County, Tennessee, v. H. Clyde Jennette, et al.
This case involves the use of certain property in Dickson County in light of a 1988 zoning ordinance which provides that mining and quarrying on this property are permitted as a special exception only. When the county attempted to enjoin the property owners from mining or quarrying their property, the property owners argued that their property was being used as a quarrying operation prior to October 1988 when the city passed the zoning ordinance. Thus, it is the property owners' position that their quarrying operation constitutes a pre-existing nonconforming use and may continue pursuant to both the Dickson County zoning ordinance and Tennessee Code Annotated section 13-7-208(b). In addition, the county enjoined the property owners from hauling rock in violation of a fifteen-ton weight limit on local roads. The property owners argued below that the enforcement of this local rule against them constitutes selective enforcement. The trial court found that the property owners had failed to show a nonconforming use, and it dismissed their claim for selective enforcement. On appeal, we find that the trial court was correct in its conclusion that the property owners' operation was not a nonconforming use at the time of the adoption of the zoning ordinance. In light of that finding, the temporary injunction regarding the fifteen-ton weight limit is dissolved, and the selective enforcement issue does not need to be addressed. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
JoeTrammell and Karen Trammell v. George W. Pope, Jr., Individually and d/b/a Achieva Homes
This appeal arises out of a default judgment rendered against the Appellant. The underlying cause of action was for the breach of a construction contract. After the Appellant did not answer the complaint or otherwise defend the action, the Chancery Court of Williamson County granted the plaintiffs’ motion for default and entered judgment accordingly. A subsequent damage hearing was held at which the Appellant did not appear. The Appellees obtained a judgment for $918,073.15. The Appellant filed an application to set aside the default judgment which was denied by the trial court. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Willie Perry v. Cold Creek Correctional Facility Disciplinary Board, et al.
This case arises from the decision of the Cold Creek Correctional Facility Disciplinary Board finding the Appellant guilty of attempting to intimidate an employee and being under the influence of alcohol. The Appellant filed a Petition for Common Law and Statutory Writ of Certiorari with the Chancery Court of Davidson County challenging the Disciplinary Board's decision. The trial court affirmed the decision of the Board and dismissed the Appellant's claim. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
William Andrew Dixon v. Donal Campbell, Commissioner Tennessee Department of Correction
A prisoner serving a life sentence petitioned the court to order the Department of Correction to restore sentence reduction credits it had deleted from his record after determining that his sentence was to be served without the possibility of parole. The trial court dismissed the petition. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
South Central Tennessee Railroad Authority, et al., v. Andre Harakas, et al.
Plaintiffs, the owner and lessee of property on which a railroad track was located, obtained a temporary injunction prohibiting Defendants, owners of adjacent property, from building a house on what Plaintiffs alleged was their right-of-way. After Defendants presented evidence that Plaintiffs possessed only an easement as needed for railroad operations, rather than a right of-way, the court dissolved the temporary injunction and denied a permanent injunction. Defendants then filed a motion to assess damages and enforce liability of surety on injunction bond pursuant to Tenn.R. Civ. P. 65.05, seeking recovery for the losses resulting from the issuance of the temporary injunction. Defendants appeal the trial court's denial of their motion. We reverse. Tenn. R. App. P. 13 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed and Remanded. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Nancy D. Bracken, v. Richard Earl, D/B/A Financial Services Company
Plaintiff sued to recover monies paid to defendant. Defendant defended on the grounds that the monies were paid to a trust fund for which he was not liable. The Trial Court held the trust had no validity and entered judgment against the defendant. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee-American Water Company, v. City of Chattanooga, Tennseess, et al.
The City of Chattanooga asserted, by counter-claim, that the franchise rights of a state-franchised water company had terminated when the original stated corporate existence of ninety-nine years expired. The Hamilton County Chancery Court found that the water company's franchise was separate from the incorporation, that perpetuity of the franchise is the appropriate interpretation when there exists no limiting language in the franchise grant itself, and that the water company had not trespassed by continuing to operate in Chattanooga past the expiration of the original ninety-nine year grant of corporate existence. The judgment of the Chancellor is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa Miles vs. Earl Pace
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Madison | Court of Appeals |