Reliant Bank v. Kelly D. Bush, Et Al.
This is the fourth appeal involving this particular dispute. In this case, the trial court dismissed a motion filed by the defendants seeking relief from a final judgment as an independent action under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Because we conclude that an independent action was improper under the circumstances of this case, we affirm the trial court’s ruling on different grounds. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Abbie Joseph Howell v. Lauren Elizabeth (Bond) Howell
This appeal concerns a prenuptial agreement that protected each spouse’s premarital property and waived the right to alimony. The couple signed the agreement on the day it was drafted, 11 days before their wedding. Seven years later, after the husband filed for divorce, the wife sought to set aside the agreement, asserting that she did not sign it knowledgeably and freely. The wife alleged that the husband took her to the attorney’s office without notice or an opportunity to seek independent counsel. The trial court concluded that the agreement was valid because the couple lived together for six years before getting engaged, the wife knew the husband would not marry her without a prenuptial agreement, and the wife was not pressured or coerced into signing the agreement. We affirm. |
Cannon | Court of Appeals | |
Sarah Perkins Chambers v. Joshua Timothy Chambers
This appeal arises from the modification of a parenting plan in a post-divorce action, upon a petition filed by the minor child’s father. We reverse the trial court’s finding that the mother moved more than fifty miles from the father and find that the parental relocation statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-108, does not apply in this case. We have determined that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that there was a material change of circumstances under Tennessee Code Annotated |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
David Chase v. Chris Stewart, Et Al.
A trial court held two attorneys in contempt, assessing damages and sanctions against them. Shortly before another hearing in which the court was to consider a supplemental award of attorney’s fees, the judge of the trial court made comments in an unrelated case about one of the attorneys held in contempt. That attorney moved to recuse based, in part, on the judge’s comments. The trial court denied the motion to recuse and later entered a supplemental order of damages against the attorneys. Because the judge’s comments provide a reasonable basis for questioning his impartiality, we reverse the denial of the motion to recuse. And because retroactive recusal is appropriate, we also vacate the contempt and damages orders. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Checkan v. Southern Towing Company, LLC, et al.
This is a defamation case that was dismissed by the trial court on a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff, a former riverboat captain, predicated his defamation claim on a letter sent by a lawyer for the owner of a drawbridge to the riverboat captain’s former employer. The purpose of the letter was to put the employer on notice that damage had been caused to the drawbridge by one of the employer’s towboats. In its oral ruling, which was incorporated into its dismissal order, the trial court identified several grounds which it concluded supported dismissal. Not addressed by the trial court were several procedural defenses raised by the defendant, including a defense based on an alleged lack of personal jurisdiction. Notably, the defendant has not waived its personal jurisdiction defense on appeal. Because jurisdiction is a prerequisite to an adjudication on the merits of the case, we vacate the trial court’s dismissal order and remand the matter for a consideration of the defendant’s personal jurisdiction defense. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Department Of Environment And Conservation v. Thomas Marlin Robert, Et Al.
This appeal concerns the authority of an administrative judge when sitting with the Tennessee Underground Storage Tanks and Solid Waste Disposal Control Board during its review of an initial order in a contested case. In 2016, the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation issued an order pursuant to the Tennessee Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Act to recover funds spent for investigating and closing a petroleum site. The Department alleged that petroleum was released from three underground storage tanks on the respondents’ property. The respondents filed a petition for review and sought a contested case hearing. Following the hearing before an administrative judge sitting alone, the administrative judge issued an initial order that upheld the assessment. The judge concluded that the respondents were “responsible parties” because they owned the site in 2010 when the tanks were removed. The respondents then filed a petition for appeal, seeking a review hearing before the Board. A different administrative judge was assigned to sit with the Board for the hearing. After the parties submitted their briefs but prior to the hearing, the second administrative judge issued an order independent of the Board that reversed several substantive rulings in the initial order and prohibited the Department from making certain legal arguments to the Board. Instead of proceeding with the review hearing, the Department obtained a stay from the Board to file a petition for judicial review to challenge the intermediate order issued by the second administrative judge. The trial court reversed the intermediate order, finding that inter alia, the administrative judge’s decisions were “in excess of his authority and an abuse of discretion” because the statutory interpretation issue was a substantive matter for the Board to consider. The trial court also remanded the matter to the Board for a hearing with the burden of proof assigned to the respondents. This appeal followed. We respectfully disagree with the trial court’s ruling as to the burden of proof because it is the duty of an administrative judge who “sits with” a Board to advise the Board on the applicable law. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re F.S. Et Al.
This case involves a petition to terminate the parental rights of the parents of two minor children. After a trial on the petition, the trial court granted the petition and terminated the parents’ parental rights. The trial court found that the ground of “severe child abuse” was proven by clear and convincing evidence and that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate the parents’ parental rights. Both of the parents appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision and remand. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Mount Hopewell Missionary Baptist Church v. Foundation Capital Resources, Inc
A church filed a complaint in 2019 against a lending institution asserting causes of action for fraud and breach of contract based on conduct that occurred in 2008 and 2009. An earlier complaint the church filed in 2009 was dismissed in 2017 for failure to prosecute, and the church voluntarily dismissed a second complaint it filed in 2018. The lending institution moved to dismiss the 2019 complaint based on the running of the statute of limitations. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and the church appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the complaint. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jefferson County, Tennessee v. Wilmoth Family Properties, LLC, Et Al.
This action concerns the trial court’s dismissal of a complaint for injunctive relief in which Jefferson County sought to enforce its zoning ordinance as applied to a commercial wedding event venue operated in a rural residential area. We affirm the trial court’s holding that the activities are immune from the County’s authority to enforce its zoning powers by virtue of the agricultural use of the property. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Brandon H.
In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to the minor child on the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent the child, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). While Appellant does not appeal the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interest, we are required to review that question. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Brianna B. Et Al.
In terminating a mother’s parental rights, the trial court concluded that there were two statutory grounds for termination: abandonment by willful failure to visit and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody and financial responsibility. The trial court also concluded that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Because we conclude that the evidence of the grounds for terminating the mother’s parental rights was less than clear and convincing, we reverse. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Antaveon Waller v. Varangon Corporation d/b/a Varangon Academy, et al.
This case stems from injuries suffered by a minor while he was a resident at a juvenile treatment facility. The plaintiff initially filed suit against the former owner and operator of the facility. Nearly a year later, the plaintiff amended his complaint to include the party that owned and operated the facility during the relevant time period. Both of the defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment for the original defendant, in part, because it found that the original defendant did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff at the time the alleged injuries occurred. The court granted summary judgment for the second defendant because the plaintiff failed to include the party in the suit within the applicable statute of limitations. After the trial court denied the plaintiff’s |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rania Anwar Al Qaisi v. Diab Mahmoud Alia
This appeal arises from a divorce proceeding after a short-term marriage. The husband challenges the trial court’s decisions regarding his parenting time, the calculation of his income, and its award of alimony to the wife. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Brianne Marie (Lane)Baker v. Kenneth Dean Baker
A father challenges the trial court’s child support determination, property division, and attorney fee award. In its calculation of gross income for child support purposes, the trial court properly declined to give the father credit for retirement benefits awarded as part of the property division. If the value of the father’s retirement benefits has significantly appreciated since the time of the divorce, the father may bring a petition to modify the child support award to reflect an increase in the mother’s gross income. We affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
REGINALD M. YOUNGER v. KIBREAB KIDANE OKBAHHANES
This appeal arises from a personal injury action. The plaintiff filed this action more than one year after the vehicle collision from which the cause of action accrued. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff’s action was untimely. The plaintiff filed a response arguing that the statute of limitations for personal injury actions was extended to two years, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104(a)(2), due to the traffic citation issued to the defendant for failure to exercise due care in violation of section 55-8-136 as a result of the vehicle collision. The Trial Court found that section 28- 3-104(a)(2) was applicable to extend the statute of limitations to two years because the defendant had been charged with a criminal offense and a criminal prosecution had been commenced against him. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Nathaniel J. Lee v. Amber F. Lee
In this appeal from a final decree of divorce, Husband challenges the trial court’s division of the marital estate and the award of alimony in futuro. He also raises issues concerning the court’s denial of his request to rescind a mediated settlement agreement and to pay the alimony in solido award in installments. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Raun Swafford v. Caprice Wofford
The appellee, Ruan Swafford (“Appellee”), filed a motion to dismiss this appeal alleging that the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Tina Vaughn v. DMC-Memphis, LLC
Plaintiff filed a claim in general sessions court for injuries she allegedly received when she fell in standing water on the defendant’s premises. Judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed to circuit court. The defendant then filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that it owed no duty to the plaintiff and that she was at least 50% at fault for her injuries. In support, the defendant relied on plaintiff’s testimony from the trial in general sessions court. The circuit court granted the motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff again appealed. We vacate the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lori Ann Amacher v. Stanley Dwight Amacher
This is a divorce case. Appellant Wife appeals the trial court’s division of property, arguing that the court erred in: (1) classifying the appreciation of her separate property as marital property; (2) excluding from the marital estate certain real property that Husband transferred to his father; (3) not finding that Husband dissipated the marital estate; and (4) inequitably dividing the estate. Wife argues that alimony in solido should have been granted in light of the inequitable division and that she should have been awarded her attorney’s fees. Wife also requests attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal. We affirm the trial court’s exclusion of the transferred property from the marital estate. We also conclude that Wife failed to prove dissipation by a preponderance of the evidence. However, we vacate the property division and remand for additional findings of fact with respect to the appreciation of Wife’s separate property, and for a reconsideration of the property division. The reconsideration of the property division necessitates a reconsideration of alimony; thus, we vacate the trial court’s denial of alimony in solido and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We award Wife’s attorney fees for this appeal. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Franklin Real Estate Group, Inc. v. Spero Dei Church
A real estate broker filed a complaint against a client alleging that the client breached the parties’ brokerage agreement by purchasing a property and not paying a commission to the broker. The client filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the brokerage agreement was void for vagueness because one of its provisions was illogical. The trial court disagreed with the client after concluding that any confusion was due to a simple drafting error. The trial court reformed the brokerage agreement to reflect the parties’ intentions and determined that the client breached the brokerage agreement as reformed. The trial court then, sua sponte, granted summary judgment to the real estate broker. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Azariah R. et al.
This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Cocke County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Shauntel C. (“Mother”) to her minor children Azariah R. and Ahleigha C. (“Azariah” and “Ahleigha” respectively; “the Children” collectively). After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children. Mother appeals, arguing that the Juvenile Court erred in its best interest determination by failing to account for her improvements over the course of the case. Although we reverse the ground of failure to visit, we affirm the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. We also affirm the Juvenile Court’s best interest determination, finding Mother’s improved efforts in some areas to be real but insufficient. We thus affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, resulting in our affirming the termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Children. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Colonial Pipeline Company v. TN State Board Of Equalization
An interstate pipeline company filed this direct appeal from a decision of the Tennessee Board of Equalization rejecting the company’s claims for equalization relief. Having considered the company’s arguments that Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-501(10)(B)(iii) has been inconsistently applied, we affirm the Board’s decision. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Darla Jo Adams Audirsch v. Griffin Lynn Audirsch
The Appellant, who is the former spouse of the Appellee, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for “Rule 60” relief seeking residential time with the Appellee’s child. There is no dispute that the Appellant has been excluded as the father of the child based upon DNA testing he requested. Discerning no error on the part of the trial court, we affirm its judgment. |
Moore | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Conservatorship of Mary Ann Tapp
This appeal stems from a petition to remove a co-conservator for a person with a disability. Several years ago, the ward’s brother and her personal attorney were appointed as coconservators of the ward’s person and estate. Subsequently, the ward’s remaining siblings filed this action to remove the brother as a co-conservator, alleging that the brother had failed to act in the best interest of the ward. After a hearing on the petition, the trial court dismissed the petition to remove the brother as a co-conservator and awarded the coconservators attorney’s fees. Some of the siblings appealed the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. We reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and remand. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Investigation Of Law Solutions Chicago, LLC
The trial court granted the Tennessee Attorney General’s petition seeking to compel the respondent corporation, Law Solutions Chicago LLC d/b/a UpRight Law (“UpRight”), to provide information regarding the identities of consumers who had paid for but allegedly not received UpRight’s services. In so ruling, the trial court determined that the attorney general had established that UpRight’s practices, if proven, would likely constitute violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court also determined that the information sought was not protected by the attorney-client privilege. UpRight has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
