Margaret Bush (Wright) v. Ronald Stevens Wright, Jr.
This appeal arises from post-divorce petitions and counterpetitions for enforcement and modification of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (the “MDA”), and permanent parenting plan (the “PPP”). The dispositive issue on appeal is whether either party is the prevailing party for the purpose of recovering his or her attorney’s fees. Because the final decree of divorce incorporated a mandatory dispute resolution provision, we must first determine whether either party qualifies as the prevailing party concerning claims “to procure enforcement” of the MDA or PPP. We then consider whether either party qualifies as the prevailing party pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c), (the “Statute”), which has a broader application but is discretionary. During the pendency of the action, the defendant/father delivered two checks to the plaintiff/mother, one in satisfaction of the mother’s claim for past due child support and a second check in satisfaction of her claim for past due alimony. Thereafter, the remaining claims went to mediation, after which the parties approved an agreed order resolving all remaining claims except attorney’s fees, reserving the fee issue for the trial court. Each party, claiming to be the prevailing party, sought to recover their respective attorney’s fees. The trial court ruled that “[s]ince both parties were awarded their beneficial, judicial relief that materially altered the other party’s behavior, the court cannot consider either party the sole ‘prevailing party.’” Thus, neither was awarded any attorney’s fees. This appeal followed. Because the father paid the child support and alimony arrearages after the mother filed her petition and motion to enforce the MDA and PPP, we find that the mother is the prevailing party on the enforcement claims, for which she is contractually entitled to recover her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the dispute resolution clause in the MDA. As for the respective claims and defenses related to modification of the MDA and PPP, for which the Statute applies, we affirm the trial court’s decision to not award attorney’s fees based on the finding that neither party can be considered the prevailing party. Thus, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand with instructions for the trial court to award the mother a judgment for the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs she incurred to enforce the father’s obligations to pay child support and alimony pursuant to the MDA 03/13/2026 - 2 - and PPP. Because neither party can be considered the sole prevailing party on appeal, we deny both parties’ requests to recover their attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Stockton Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a AccuWorks v. Lamont Bell et al.
Defendants appeal from a final judgment in a dispute over a construction contract. Because the defendants did not file their notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Elijah S.
Mother/Appellant appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4), and on its finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Monsieur Shawnellias Burgess v. Bradford Hills HOA et al.
This is a dispute between a neighborhood homeowners’ association (“HOA”) and a homeowner in the HOA’s neighborhood. On remand after a prior appeal, the trial court entered a declaratory judgment in favor of the homeowner. The homeowner appealed the declaratory judgment and then filed multiple motions in the trial court seeking inherent authority sanctions and costs against certain attorneys who had been involved in the case. The trial court denied the motions, and the homeowner appealed those determinations. We affirm the trial court’s decisions in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
William Woodall v. Robert D. Cooper et al.
This is an action to enforce an oral agreement for the transfer of stock in a corporation formed to purchase a parcel of commercial real estate. The plaintiff alleged that he helped obtain financing for the purchase in exchange for 50% of the company. The defendants alleged that the plaintiff had only an option to buy a 50% interest within one year of closing. The trial court credited the plaintiff’s testimony and awarded him a judgment for his share of the company’s profits. This appeal followed. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Eugene Moxley v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc. d/b/a Saint Francis Hospital, et al.
The trial court granted Appellees’ joint motion to dismiss Appellant’s healthcare liability action based on its finding that Appellant failed to substantially comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Appellant appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Eden B. et al.
The trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights to two minor children after finding that the mother abandoned the children through failure to support and subjected the children to severe abuse. The mother appeals to this Court, and, discerning no error, we affirm. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
4U2ASKY Entertainment, Inc. v. Blessing Chibueze Offor
A music publisher sued a musician for breach of contract. The musician, saddled with legal fees related to this litigation, eventually filed for bankruptcy and claimed certain musical works as his own intellectual property during the bankruptcy proceedings. The parties settled by agreeing that ownership rights to a subset of the musician’s songs would be transferred to the publisher. Subsequently, the publisher contacted a licensing agency in pursuit of royalties, claiming ownership of more songs than were actually provided for under the settlement. The musician objected to the licensing agency, asserting that the publisher misrepresented the breadth of works it obtained in the settlement. This led to a second lawsuit with the music publisher asserting breach of contract against the musician. The musician filed a counterclaim against the publisher in this second lawsuit, asserting that the publisher’s communications with the licensing agency amounted to tortious interference with the musician’s existing and prospective business relationships. The publisher sought to dismiss the musician’s counterclaim under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (TPPA). The trial court dismissed the publisher’s TPPA petition. The publisher appeals the denial of its TPPA petition. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tino Cartez Sutton v. State of Tennessee et al.
This is an appeal from an order denying relief under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Dahlia S.
A father filed several documents in the Juvenile Court for Madison County (the “trial court”) seeking, inter alia, parenting time with his minor child. The trial court dismissed the father’s petition, and the father filed a timely appeal to this Court. Because the father’s brief fails to comply with the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure addressing briefing, father waives any issues purportedly raised. This appeal is dismissed. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Legends Bank v. Samson Orusa et al.
This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to reconsider. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Appellate Court within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE AYBREE Y.
This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial with neither the mother nor her counsel present, the court found that clear and convincing evidence established several grounds of termination and that termination was in the best interest of the child. The mother argues on appeal, inter alia, that the court erred in permitting counsel to withdraw on the day of the hearing. We vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
MARY SUE GASTON LEE v. DANNY C. LEE
In this divorce matter, the trial court classified and valued the parties’ assets, subsequently fashioning a distribution of the marital assets and liabilities that the court deemed equitable. The husband has appealed. We reverse the trial court’s determination regarding the classification and valuation of two assets and remand those issues to the trial court for further determination. Accordingly, because of these unresolved classification and valuation issues, we vacate the trial court’s overall distribution of marital property and remand that issue for further determination as well. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Penelope S.
The juvenile court magistrate denied Appellant/Father’s petition for custody of the minor child on its finding that Tennessee was not the child’s home state under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. Father filed a timely request for review by the juvenile court judge under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-107(d)(1)(A). Because the trial court’s order denying review fails to comply with section 37-1-107(d)(1)(E), it is vacated. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Breanna Nicole Emerson v. Samuel Ryan Emerson
This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because Appellant’s application for appeal is untimely under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, §2.02, this Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal, and it is dismissed. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
John H. Capps v. OneCare Dental Solutions, LLC et al.
In this dispute between members of a limited liability company, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached her fiduciary duty through the unilateral sale of company assets. The trial court referred the matter to a Special Master, who determined the assets were significantly undervalued in the sale and recommended a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant filed no objections to the Special Master’s report. The trial court subsequently adopted the findings and recommendations. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s adoption of the report, asserting that the trial court failed to make independent findings. We affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly P. Urquia v. Eric D. Neal - DISSENT
I agree with the underlying facts of this dispute as stated in the majority opinion. I disagree with the trial court and the majority in their application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-17-1206 (“UM statute”). My disagreement is two-fold. First, the trial court should not have looked any further than the plain language of section (d) of the UM statute. Second, although I would hold section (e) of the UM statute inapplicable here, I also take issue with the trial court’s findings that led to its grant of summary judgment under section (e). |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE ISAIAH M.
Petitioner seeks accelerated review of the denial of her motion to recuse the trial judge. The motion to recuse was filed after the entry of a judgment and the denial of a motion under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Because issues related to the denial of the motion to recuse may be raised in petitioner’s appeal of the final judgment, we dismiss this appeal. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Daisy B.
Great-Grandmother appeals the denial of her petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The trial court found one ground for termination but concluded that termination of Mother’s parental rights was not in the child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly P. Urquia v. Eric D. Neal
This case involves the application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-1206(d) in a personal injury lawsuit in which the plaintiff seeks to proceed directly against her uninsured motorist insurance carrier. The trial court granted summary judgment to the carrier. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ben C. Adams v. Buchanan D. Dunavant, et al.
This is an appeal from an interpleader action filed by a trustee of a trust who held funds that were to be distributed to a beneficiary but were subject to claims by other parties. The trial court granted the trustee permission to deposit the funds, discharged him from liability, and ordered some of the funds to be disbursed in accordance with settlement agreements the beneficiary had entered into in other litigation involving his children. The trial court proceeded to consider the claims of various other parties to determine who was entitled to the remainder of the interpleaded funds. Law firms who had represented the beneficiary in separate litigation filed an answer and claimed that they had an attorney charging lien against the trust distributions. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that the law firms presented no proof of an attorney lien against the trust distributions. As such, the trial court ordered the remaining funds to be distributed to other parties. After an additional hearing on motions to revise, the trial court again found that no attorney lien existed. The law firms appealed. For the following reasons, the decision of the trial court is hereby affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Bridget Mathis v. Jason Mathis
Husband/Appellant failed to answer Wife/Appellee’s complaint for divorce. On Wife’s motion, the trial court granted default judgment against Husband. Husband moved to set aside the default judgment, and the trial court denied his motion. Husband appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Clint Johnson v. Airtight Resources Inc. et al.
As permitted by statute, the plaintiff in a personal injury action amended his complaint to add a nonparty as a new defendant based on the original defendant’s allegations of comparative fault in an amended answer. The new defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations barred the claims against him because the original defendant lacked permission to file the amended answer. The trial court struck the amended answer and dismissed the claims against the new defendant on statute of limitations grounds. Because the original defendant had written consent to file the amended answer, we reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
CONTRACK WATTS, INC. v. RELYANT GLOBAL, LLC
Because the orders from which the appellant has filed an appeal do not constitute a final, appealable judgment, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Rimon Abdou v. Marcy McCool et al.
The trial court entered an agreed order dismissing some of Appellant’s claims with prejudice, an order granting Appellant’s voluntary dismissal of all of his claims in two consolidated cases without prejudice, and an order awarding discretionary costs to Appellees. Appellant later sought relief from each of these orders pursuant to Rule 60 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. In litigating the Rule 60 motion, Appellant filed a motion to disqualify Appellees’ counsel and a motion to compel compliance with subpoenas he issued against his own prior counsel, and the parties filed cross-motions for sanctions. The trial court denied Appellant’s Rule 60 motion, motion to disqualify, and motion to compel. The trial court also denied both motions for sanctions; however, Appellant was awarded his attorney’s fees in opposing Appellees’ motion. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling in all respects. Appellees are also awarded their attorney’s fees for defending this frivolous appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
