Howard Jefferson Atkins v. Tennessee Department of Correction et al.
This is an action for declaratory judgment filed by an inmate to correct his sentence expiration date. The inmate was sentenced to life in prison for first-degree murder, and his sentence was governed by the release eligibility provision in Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-501(h)(1). The State agreed that § 40-35-501(h)(1) entitled the inmate to apply credits for good behavior and program performance to reduce his parole eligibility date, but the parties disagreed on whether the inmate could also apply his credits to reduce the length of his sentence, to advance his sentence expiration date. The trial court entered judgment for the inmate. The court reasoned that the sentence credit statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-236, applies to all inmates unless otherwise specified and that the General Assembly had not specifically prohibited the application of credits to the expiration date of life sentences for first-degree murder. We agree with the trial court and affirm its judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Rogers v. Frank Strada et al.
This is an action for declaratory judgment filed by an inmate to correct his sentence expiration date. The inmate was sentenced to life in prison for first-degree murder, and his sentence was governed by the release eligibility provision in Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-501(h)(1). The State agreed that § 40-35-501(h)(1) entitled the inmate to apply credits for good behavior and program performance to reduce his parole eligibility date, but the parties disagreed on whether the inmate could also apply his credits to reduce the length of his sentence, to advance his sentence expiration date. The trial court entered judgment for the inmate. The court reasoned that the sentence credit statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-236, applies to all inmates unless otherwise specified and that the General Assembly had not specifically prohibited the application of credits to the expiration date of life sentences for first-degree murder. We agree with the trial court and affirm its judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Toni S.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court determined that the Department of Children’s Services failed to meet its burden of proof as to any of the statutory grounds set out in its petition to terminate appellee/mother’s parental rights to the minor child. Although unnecessary in view of its determination that there were no grounds for termination, the trial court undertook a best interest analysis and found that it was not in the child’s best interest to terminate mother’s rights. Because the evidence does not support the trial court’s findings as to either grounds or best interest, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand for entry of an order terminating appellee/mother’s parental rights |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Debbie Antista v. Barry Craft et al.
In this dispute between neighboring property owners, the trial court determined that a concrete fence built by one neighbor violated a setback ordinance and entered an injunction requiring the neighbor to remove the fence. We have determined that the trial court erred in so ruling and reverse that portion of the trial court’s decision. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Lou Ann Zelenik v. Crowell Homebuilding, LLC et al.
A buyer signed an agreement with a contractor for the construction of a custom home. After disagreements arose over the construction and its pace, the buyer sued the contractor and its owner seeking damages and to quiet title to the property. The trial court awarded the buyer damages, title to the property, and attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Robert W. Smith, et al. v. Maxie Jones d/b/a Tennessee River Investors
This appeal stems from a boundary line dispute. Mr. Jones sold the Smiths two lots within a subdivision in Hardin County. It is undisputed that the Smiths bought Lots 87 and 88 on September 11, 2012. Several years later, Mr. Jones claimed that the Smiths had encroached on “Lot 89.” The Smiths insisted they occupied only the 80 linear feet purchased from Mr. Jones. When the parties were unable to come to a resolution, the Smiths filed suit in chancery court to quiet title to Lots 87 and 88, declare the lot numbers on the survey misnumbered, and prayed for damages for slander of title and attorney’s fees. Mr. Jones filed a counter-complaint to quiet title to “Lot 89,” for ejectment, conversion and/or civil theft, civil conspiracy, breach of contract, defamation, and punitive damages. After a bench trial, the trial court held that “Lot 89” did not exist, granted damages to the Smiths for slander of title, and dismissed Mr. Jones’s counter-complaint. We affirm the trial court’s holding that “Lot 89” does not exist and the dismissal of Mr. Jones’s counter-complaint. We vacate the court’s decision as to slander of title, reverse the grant of attorney’s fees as to damages, and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE JAXEN F.
This is a termination of parental rights appeal. The trial court found that four statutory grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the minor child: abandonment by failure to visit, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court further concluded that termination was in the child’s best interests. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
DORIAN JONES v. AUTOMATED BUILDING SYSTEMS INC. ET AL.
Appellant sued appellees alleging breach of contract, fraud, and property damage. The trial court granted separate default judgments against the two appellees. Appellees moved the trial court to set aside the default judgments due to a lack of personal jurisdiction and due to mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. The trial court set aside the default judgments over the objections of appellant, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. The trial court involuntarily dismissed appellant’s complaint at the conclusion of his case-in-chief. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Gabby G.
he child’s mother, the child’s biological father, and the mother’s former husband who believed himself to be the child’s biological parent for the majority of her life. After the mother disclosed the child’s parentage to both men, the biological father filed a petition to be named the child’s parent and for a parenting plan to be established. The mother agreed with his petition in all respects. But the mother’s former husband soon intervened with a petition to be awarded stepparent visitation pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-303. Following the filing of the stepparent visitation petition, the mother and the biological father, who at this point had never had any unsupervised or overnight visitation with the child, executed an agreed parenting plan in which they would share joint custody and equal parenting time with the child, as well as waive child support. After a joint hearing on both petitions, the trial court adopted the mother and biological father’s proposed parenting plan, except that the former husband was granted stepparent visitation with the child every other weekend and over the summer holiday; the former husband’s weekend visitation only occurred during the time that the proposed plan would have allotted to the mother. The mother now appeals this decision. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
KELLY BROOKE MARTIN v. NGHIA TRONG VAN
This appeal arises out of a divorce proceeding. The trial court granted appellee a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct by the appellant, divided the parties’ assets and debts, and entered a permanent parenting plan designating appellee as primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child, granting the parties equal co-parenting time, and providing appellee with sole decision-making authority with respect to the child. Appellant raises a number of issues on appeal; however, each of those issues has been waived due to appellant’s failure to comply with the relevant rules of briefing in this Court. Additionally, appellee argues that the trial court erred in awarding the parties equal co-parenting time and requests his attorney’s fees incurred on appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, in the exercise of our discretion, we decline to find this appeal frivolous and further decline to award appellee his attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Donald Bartsch, Jr. v. Premier Orthopaedics & Sports Medicine, PLC
This is a health care liability case that centers around the application of the discovery rule. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss with prejudice after determining that the discovery rule did not toll the accrual of the statute of limitations to the time asserted by the plaintiff. The trial court based this determination on two independent bases. The first basis was predicated on certain information provided by the defendants, which was taken from the Tennessee Secretary of State’s website. The trial court took judicial notice of this information and determined that it indicated that a reasonable person would have been able to discover the identity of the defendant. The second basis, an express alternative finding, stated that even if the information was not considered, sufficient information existed in exhibits attached to the plaintiff’s complaint to support its determination. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
ANGELA LYDTIN ET AL. v. ADAM BLAKE CARRINGER
This appeal concerns the trial court’s dismissal of a petition for an order of protection filed by the appellant mother against the appellee father. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the order of protection. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Alexander Georg Warnatzsch v. Ashly Camille Warnatzsch
This appeal concerns the modification of a parenting plan. Alexander Georg Warnatzsch (“Father”) filed a petition against his ex-wife Ashly Camille Warnatzsch (“Mother”) in the Chancery Court for Rutherford County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to modify the parties’ parenting plan concerning their three minor children. Mother exercised most of the parenting time under the original plan. Following a hearing, the Trial Court found that Father had proven a material change in circumstances and that the residential parenting schedule should be modified. Mother remained primary residential parent, but Father was granted equal parenting time. Mother appeals, raising various issues implicating the Trial Court’s discretion. We find no reversible error. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
NONA G. ROGERS v. MICHAEL L. ROGERS
Following a divorce, a husband appeals the trial court’s classification of marital assets, division of marital assets, and alimony determination. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s order. We grant the wife’s request for reasonable attorney fees on appeal. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE DEZIRAY J., ET AL.
This is an appeal by a father of the termination of his parental rights to his daughter. The Juvenile Court for Sevier County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the father’s parental rights after finding by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions which led to his daughter’s removal persisted, that he had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of his daughter, and that termination of his parental rights was in his daughter’s best interest. The father appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Shirley Jean Cupples Blankenship v. Charles Gary Blankenship, Sr. and Charles Gary Blankenship, II v. Shirley Jean Cupples Blankenship
This appeal arises from the death of the husband during a divorce proceeding. While the divorce was pending, the spouses sold real property they owned as tenants by the entirety and deposited the proceeds with the clerk of the court pursuant to an agreed order. Subsequently, the husband died and the wife filed a motion to dismiss the case and to distribute the proceeds. The chancery court determined that the husband’s death abated the divorce proceedings and that the proceeds had been owned by the spouses as tenants by the entirety. Thus, the court granted the motion to dismiss and determined that the wife was entitled to distribution of the proceeds as the surviving tenant by the entirety. The spouses’ son, acting as administrator of the husband’s estate, appeals. We affirm. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
INDUSTRIAL BOILER & MECHANICAL CO., INC. v. TYLER ANDREW EVATT ET AL.
The plaintiff in this non-compete dispute raised several causes of action in the operative complaint but later filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit as to one of the claims within the suit. The defendants did not object at the time but nearly two years later filed a motion to dismiss the entire suit. The defendants asserted that Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01 does not allow plaintiffs to dismiss one or more but fewer than all of the claims in a lawsuit. The trial court agreed and dismissed the plaintiff’s remaining claims without prejudice. The plaintiff appeals. We reverse. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Alexander C. Ricketts v. Ashlee N. Bennett
The trial court approved a parenting plan jointly proposed by an unmarried Mother and Father, who at the time were living together. Their relationship, subsequently, deteriorated, and each parent later sought modification of the existing plan. With some minor alterations, the trial court largely adopted Mother’s proposed parenting plan. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Elijah Shaw et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
This is an equal protection challenge to a city ordinance that restricts customer visits to some home-based businesses but not others, which the plaintiffs contend are similarly situated in all material respects in relation to the purpose of the restrictions. After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court held that the restrictions were constitutional because they were rationally related to the city’s interest in preserving the residential nature of neighborhoods. Thus, the court granted Metro’s motion and denied the plaintiffs’ motion. The plaintiffs appeal, contending that the trial court reached the incorrect conclusion because the plaintiffs presented evidence that their home-based businesses have no greater impact on the residential nature of neighborhoods than the exempt home-based businesses. We agree with the plaintiffs. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Company, Inc., et al. v. Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance
This appeal arises from a chancery court petition for interlocutory judicial review of an intermediate agency decision in a contested case proceeding before the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance. The petition sought judicial review of the administrative law judge’s denial of a motion to dismiss. The department moved to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The chancery court construed the challenge as a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction and determined that an adequate remedy would be available to the petitioners in the form of subsequent judicial review of a final administrative decision. Accordingly, the chancery court granted the motion to dismiss. Petitioners appeal. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Anderson, By Her Conservator Rebecca Woods Et Al. v. Alexian Village of Tennessee
In this health care liability action, the trial court dismissed the action with prejudice upon finding that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
IN RE ESTATE OF BETTY RUTH SHAW MORGAN
This is an appeal from a trial court’s final order entered on February 7, 2025. The notice of appeal was not mailed to the Appellate Court Clerk via certified mail until May 9, 2025, more than thirty days from the final order’s entry date. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Floyd Edward Faulkner
After the decedent’s most recent will was admitted to probate, the decedent’s grandson moved to certify standing for a will contest. The grandson claimed standing as a beneficiary of a prior will. After a couple of hearings, he came forward with signed copies of several prior wills that named him as a beneficiary. The trial court ruled the grandson lacked standing because he failed to produce an original instrument or establish a lost will. We conclude that the copies of the prior wills, standing alone, were insufficient to establish standing. So we affirm. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
JAMES E. BLOUNT, IV v. WEIGEL’S STORES, INC. ET AL.
The plaintiff sued a third party in North Carolina. During that litigation, the plaintiff learned that a Tennessee business might have information relevant to the lawsuit, so the plaintiff obtained a subpoena in North Carolina and, under the Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act, received a corresponding subpoena from the Circuit Court Clerk for Knox County, Tennessee. After serving the subpoena on an agent for the defendant, the plaintiff heard no response. He then brought a petition to enforce the subpoena against the company and its agent. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss and for Rule 11 sanctions, which the trial court granted. Because we find that the trial court did not adequately explain its decisions to dismiss the petition, grant attorney’s fees, and order Rule 11 sanctions so as to allow for meaningful appellate review, we vacate the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Darryl Whisnant v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole
This appeal concerns a decision by the Tennessee Board of Parole (“the Board”). Following a hearing, the Board denied parole to inmate Darryl Whisnant (“Whisnant”). The Board said that, going forward, Whisnant should complete his programming as recommended by his Strong R Assessment, namely by continuing his positive behavior, remaining drug free, and taking a few minutes each day for positive reflection. Whisnant filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court upheld the Board’s decision. Whisnant appeals. According to Whisnant, the Board violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b)(2)(B) by failing to state in writing how he could improve his chances of being released on parole. Whisnant argues that his recommended tasks were open-ended and impossible to complete. We find, as did the Trial Court, that the tasks given to Whisnant clearly were meant to be complied with up to his next parole hearing, at which time the Board can consider Whisnant’s compliance or non-compliance as part of its decision-making. The recommended tasks are neither open-ended nor impossible to complete. We hold that the Board complied with Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b)(2)(B). We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
