Breanna Nicole Emerson v. Samuel Ryan Emerson
This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because Appellant’s application for appeal is untimely under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, §2.02, this Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal, and it is dismissed. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
John H. Capps v. OneCare Dental Solutions, LLC et al.
In this dispute between members of a limited liability company, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached her fiduciary duty through the unilateral sale of company assets. The trial court referred the matter to a Special Master, who determined the assets were significantly undervalued in the sale and recommended a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant filed no objections to the Special Master’s report. The trial court subsequently adopted the findings and recommendations. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s adoption of the report, asserting that the trial court failed to make independent findings. We affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly P. Urquia v. Eric D. Neal - DISSENT
I agree with the underlying facts of this dispute as stated in the majority opinion. I disagree with the trial court and the majority in their application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-17-1206 (“UM statute”). My disagreement is two-fold. First, the trial court should not have looked any further than the plain language of section (d) of the UM statute. Second, although I would hold section (e) of the UM statute inapplicable here, I also take issue with the trial court’s findings that led to its grant of summary judgment under section (e). |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE ISAIAH M.
Petitioner seeks accelerated review of the denial of her motion to recuse the trial judge. The motion to recuse was filed after the entry of a judgment and the denial of a motion under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Because issues related to the denial of the motion to recuse may be raised in petitioner’s appeal of the final judgment, we dismiss this appeal. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly P. Urquia v. Eric D. Neal
This case involves the application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-1206(d) in a personal injury lawsuit in which the plaintiff seeks to proceed directly against her uninsured motorist insurance carrier. The trial court granted summary judgment to the carrier. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Daisy B.
Great-Grandmother appeals the denial of her petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The trial court found one ground for termination but concluded that termination of Mother’s parental rights was not in the child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Ben C. Adams v. Buchanan D. Dunavant, et al.
This is an appeal from an interpleader action filed by a trustee of a trust who held funds that were to be distributed to a beneficiary but were subject to claims by other parties. The trial court granted the trustee permission to deposit the funds, discharged him from liability, and ordered some of the funds to be disbursed in accordance with settlement agreements the beneficiary had entered into in other litigation involving his children. The trial court proceeded to consider the claims of various other parties to determine who was entitled to the remainder of the interpleaded funds. Law firms who had represented the beneficiary in separate litigation filed an answer and claimed that they had an attorney charging lien against the trust distributions. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that the law firms presented no proof of an attorney lien against the trust distributions. As such, the trial court ordered the remaining funds to be distributed to other parties. After an additional hearing on motions to revise, the trial court again found that no attorney lien existed. The law firms appealed. For the following reasons, the decision of the trial court is hereby affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Bridget Mathis v. Jason Mathis
Husband/Appellant failed to answer Wife/Appellee’s complaint for divorce. On Wife’s motion, the trial court granted default judgment against Husband. Husband moved to set aside the default judgment, and the trial court denied his motion. Husband appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Clint Johnson v. Airtight Resources Inc. et al.
As permitted by statute, the plaintiff in a personal injury action amended his complaint to add a nonparty as a new defendant based on the original defendant’s allegations of comparative fault in an amended answer. The new defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations barred the claims against him because the original defendant lacked permission to file the amended answer. The trial court struck the amended answer and dismissed the claims against the new defendant on statute of limitations grounds. Because the original defendant had written consent to file the amended answer, we reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
CONTRACK WATTS, INC. v. RELYANT GLOBAL, LLC
Because the orders from which the appellant has filed an appeal do not constitute a final, appealable judgment, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Rimon Abdou v. Marcy McCool et al.
The trial court entered an agreed order dismissing some of Appellant’s claims with prejudice, an order granting Appellant’s voluntary dismissal of all of his claims in two consolidated cases without prejudice, and an order awarding discretionary costs to Appellees. Appellant later sought relief from each of these orders pursuant to Rule 60 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. In litigating the Rule 60 motion, Appellant filed a motion to disqualify Appellees’ counsel and a motion to compel compliance with subpoenas he issued against his own prior counsel, and the parties filed cross-motions for sanctions. The trial court denied Appellant’s Rule 60 motion, motion to disqualify, and motion to compel. The trial court also denied both motions for sanctions; however, Appellant was awarded his attorney’s fees in opposing Appellees’ motion. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling in all respects. Appellees are also awarded their attorney’s fees for defending this frivolous appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela Moses v. State of Tennessee
This appeal concerns a health care liability lawsuit. Pamela Moses (“Moses”) sued the State of Tennessee (“the State”) in the Claims Commission after receiving dental treatment from the University of Tennessee Health Science Center (“UTHSC”). Moses alleged that her root canal was botched, leaving her injured. The State filed a motion to dismiss. The Claims Commission granted the State’s motion to dismiss on multiple independent grounds including that Moses failed to file a certificate of good faith with her complaint in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. Moses appeals. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Stephen Johnson v. David A. LeFeve et al.
This case stems from an alleged oral promise by the owner of two companies to pay the chief financial officer of one company a bonus of ten percent of the “profits” of both companies for work performed for the companies, including related to the sale of certain real property by one company. The plaintiff sued, alleging breach of contract, promissory estoppel, fraud, and unjust enrichment. The defendants, the companies and their owner, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the claims were barred by the parties’ written contract and the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss but later granted summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims and ruled in favor of the defendant as to their defense under the real estate broker statute. Both parties appeal. We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s claims for fraud and unjust enrichment but reverse as to the claims for breach of oral contract and promissory estoppel. We also reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on their defense under the real estate broker statute. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Leann Linder v. Garry Phillip Linder
A husband appeals from a Final Order of Absolute Divorce. Because the husband did not file his notice of appeal with the Appellate Court Clerk within thirty days after entry of the final order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Adrian Delk v. ATV Powersports, et al.
Appellant, Adrian Delk, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Circuit Court that was entered on March 13, 2025. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re John W. et al.
The mother of two minor children appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found that multiple grounds for termination had been proven and that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Brian Coblentz et al. v. Tractor Supply Company
This is a premises liability case brought by a sales representative for a product vendor who was injured while in a Tractor Supply store performing his job. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Tractor Supply. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s decision based upon the conclusion that Tractor Supply was the statutory employer of the sales representative under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-113(a) and was, therefore, shielded by the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation statutes. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted permission to appeal, concluded that Tractor Supply was not the sales representative’s statutory employer, and remanded the case to this Court to consider the pretermitted issues. We have determined that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Tractor Supply on the issue of whether Tractor Supply owed a duty of care to the sales representative. We vacate and remand for further proceedings. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Skylar K. et al.
A circuit court found four children dependent and neglected because they were suffering from abuse or neglect. It also determined that the children’s father committed severe child abuse. Upon review, we conclude that the court’s severe child abuse finding is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. So we reverse that finding and affirm the lower court’s decision as modified. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Carla Novak
In this interlocutory recusal appeal, Appellant argues that in addition to the grounds for recusal relied upon in the trial court, the trial judge’s failure to promptly rule on his motion constitutes an additional basis for recusal. Based on Appellant’s failure to comply with Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee, we dismiss this appeal. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Karla M. Reichert v. David K. Reichert
This is a dispute over a child support obligation for a severely disabled adult child that would have terminated on the child’s 25th birthday under the Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”). Prior to the expiration of Father’s agreed upon support obligation, the child’s mother petitioned for child support to continue due to the adult child’s ongoing disability and needs. Finding that the adult child was severely disabled and living with her mother prior to attaining eighteen years of age and she remains severely disabled, the trial court granted the mother’s petition and ordered that the father’s child support obligation be extended indefinitely. The trial court also awarded the mother a judgment of $21,700 in retroactive child support. The father appealed. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Secure Air Charter, LLC v. Michael John Barrett, Jr.
The Plaintiff brought a claim of intentional interference with business relationships against the Defendant, and the Defendant moved to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (TPPA). The Defendant attached to the motion a declaration to establish that the suit was in response to his exercise of the right to free speech and right to petition. The Plaintiff did not attempt to establish a prima facie case but instead sought to amend the complaint to allege a different cause of action and sought to exclude the declaration. The trial court dismissed under the TPPA. The Plaintiff appeals. We affirm and remand for a determination of attorney’s fees under the statute. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
SAMUEL PINNER v. JESSIE CONNATSER
This action arises from the parties’ repeated petitions to modify a permanent parenting plan set forth by the trial court in 2016 regarding co-parenting of the parties’ two minor children. Shortly after the children were born, the mother moved to Virginia with the children, and the father remained in Tennessee. The parenting plan designated the mother as primary residential parent and set forth a schedule wherein the children would reside with the mother and attend school in Virginia during the school year, and reside primarily with the father in Tennessee during the summers. The parenting plan further provided that each parent would enjoy co-parenting time with the children while the children were living with the other parent. Since moving to Virginia in 2016, the mother had filed several motions to change venue to the trial court in Virginia. The mother argued that a change of venue was proper, pursuant to Tennessee’s version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), because the trial court in Tennessee had lost continuing, exclusive subject matter jurisdiction and because Tennessee was an inconvenient forum. At the beginning of trial, after considering Mother’s renewed motion to change venue, the trial court determined that it retained subject matter jurisdiction over the matter and that Tennessee was not an inconvenient forum. The trial court then conducted a three-day hearing on the substantive arguments presented in the parties’ competing motions to modify and motions for contempt. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court determined that a material change in circumstance had occurred warranting modification of the parenting plan. Additionally, the trial court found the mother guilty of two counts of civil contempt for violating the parenting plan by failing to allow the father his weekend co-parenting time in October 2023 and by failing to timely return the children to the father for the beginning of his summer co-parenting time in 2024. The trial court fined the mother $100.00 for the civil contempt charges. The trial court also ordered the mother to pay the father’s attorney’s fees in the amount of $15,000.00 for her actions in prolonging the lawsuit and other violations of court orders. Upon careful review, we vacate the two civil contempt charges and resultant fine of $100.00. In all other respects, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
City of Hendersonville v. J and J Ventures, LLC, et al.
A municipal court determined that property owners repeatedly violated a city zoning ordinance restricting vacation rentals in residential areas. The property owners appealed to circuit court, where the matter was consolidated with another action filed by the City against the property owners in which the City was seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The circuit court found the property owners in violation of the zoning ordinance and granted a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction, and affirmed the municipal court’s rulings as to the violations. The property owners appeal. In doing so, they advance numerous issues challenging the circuit court’s rulings. While significant briefing deficiencies result in the waiver of the majority of these issues, in considering the issues that are properly before this court, we conclude that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the ordinance. However, because our decision does not fully resolve whether the property owner violated the ordinance, we remand for further proceedings. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE ISAIAH M.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court denied Appellant’s 11th motion to recuse, and Appellant filed an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Ralph Ray Bailey, Personal Representative of the Estate of Roberta Bailey v. Sonya Smith Wright, Executrix, Estate of Vondie Lee Smith
The Testator asked her great-niece, a licensed Attorney, to make changes to her will that were to the Attorney’s financial benefit. The Attorney returned to the Testator a revised version of the will, which included the changes requested by the Testator and additional changes. Several months later, the Testator executed the revised will. The Testator’s Nephew, acting as a personal representative, claimed that the Testator lacked capacity and that the new will was a product of undue influence. While the trial court instructed the jury that it must decide which party bore the burden of proof regarding undue influence, the trial court gave the jury a verdict form that definitively indicated that Nephew retained the burden of proof. The jury found in the Attorney’s favor. On appeal, the Nephew presents challenges to several evidentiary rulings as well as a jury instruction concerning the Testator’s capacity, which we affirm. However, Nephew also asserts that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury with respect to his undue influence claim. We conclude that the trial court’s inconsistent instructions regarding the Nephew’s undue influence claim warrant a retrial as to this claim. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals |
