Dustin Keith Gamble v. Madison Darlene Gamble
This is an appeal from a divorce proceeding. The mother appeals, arguing, among other things, that the trial court failed to properly apply the statutory best interest factors when making its parenting plan determination. Because of the lack of findings in the final decree, we vacate and remand for further proceedings. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel H. Rader IV ex rel. Estate of Christine Joy Koczwara v. John Beasley
This is an action for abuse or neglect, exploitation, or theft of money or property of Christine Joy Koczwara during her life, as provided by Tennessee Code Annotated § 71- 6-120(b) of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act. The complaint seeks to recover assets as well as compensatory and punitive damages. After the defendant failed to file a timely responsive pleading to the complaint, the trial court entered a default judgment on the issue of liability. Prior to the trial on damages, the defendant moved to set aside the default judgment on the ground of excusable neglect. The claimed excuse was based on the contention that the defendant was the named executor and sole beneficiary under a purported 2020 will. The trial court rejected that argument because there was no pending will contest and the defendant had not filed a petition to admit the purported will to probate. The trial court also denied the motion to set aside upon the finding that the defendant’s failure to file a responsive pleading was willful. After a trial on damages, the court invalidated a quitclaim deed, ordered the return of personal property, and awarded $48,500 in compensatory damages and $97,000 in punitive damages against the defendant. The court also ordered the sale of the decedent’s real property. This appeal followed. We affirm in part and vacate in part. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Cassandra (Averitt) McGuire v. Brian Lewis
In this appeal from the trial court’s 2024 final order disposing of her untimely motion, Appellant fails to properly cite to the record or legal authority and offers no argument that does not stem from alleged errors in the trial court’s 2008 child custody modification or 2012 child support order. Because these procedural and substantive deficiencies prevent effective appellate review, this appeal is dismissed. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Alicia Franklin v. City of Memphis, Tennessee
A crime victim filed a tort action against a city under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, alleging police misconduct. Arguing that it was immune from liability for the alleged misconduct, the city moved to dismiss the complaint. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. We conclude that the city is immune from liability for the asserted negligence under the public duty doctrine and that the allegations in the complaint do not support application of the special duty exception. So we affirm the dismissal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Willow B.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights for abandonment by an incarcerated parent, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of his child. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Leslie K. Jones v. Tennessee State University
Leslie K. Jones (“Mr. Jones”), an at-will support staff employee of Tennessee State University (“TSU”), appeals the termination of his employment. His at-will employment agreement provided for fourteen days-notice prior to termination of his employment. When he received a termination notice on March 1, 2012, Mr. Jones filed a grievance. TSU responded advising Mr. Jones that he could not grieve his termination because he was terminated under the terms of his at-will employment agreement “without cause.” Following extensive delays and a declaratory judgment action in a related proceeding, TSU was ordered to afford Mr. Jones a grievance hearing pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-8- 117(a)(1). Following an evidentiary hearing, the Hearing Officer found that “[TSU] was not obligated to provide a reason for termination under the terms of the employment contract;” nevertheless, he found that good cause for his termination had been established. Therefore, the Hearing Officer ruled that his termination should be upheld. After TSU’s President upheld the Hearing Officer’s decision, Mr. Jones filed a petition seeking judicial review pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-322. The chancellor affirmed and dismissed the petition with prejudice. Mr. Jones appeals. On appeal, TSU insists that its compliance with the notice provision of the employment agreement is the substantial and material evidence needed to uphold the Hearing Officer’s ruling. We disagree. As this court explained in Lawrence v. Rawlins, No. M1997-00223-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 76266, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2001), “[w]hen the General Assembly enacted Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-8-117 in 1993, it modified the employment-will-relationship between the educational institutions in the . . . State University and Community College System [which includes TSU] and their ‘support staff.’” The statute requires these educational institutions to establish a grievance procedure for their support staff, which “must cover employee complaints relating to adverse employment actions[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-8- 117(b)(2)(A). Finding that Mr. Jones’s employment could only be terminated “for cause” or as part of “a bona fide reduction in force,” neither of which was the basis of Mr. Jones’s termination, we reverse the judgment of the chancery court and the Hearing Officer and remand with instructions for the Hearing Officer to, inter alia, ascertain the relief and benefits Mr. Jones is entitled to receive. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mawule Tepe v. Connor McCarthy Blair Et Al.
Petitioner seeks accelerated review of the denial of his motion to recuse the trial judge in two separate cases. After a de novo review, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Araceli Cordova et al. v. Nashville Ready Mix, Inc. et al.
This case concerns a dispute regarding attorney’s fees. Appellee is the next of kin of the attorney who represented Appellants for a period of time in the underlying wrongful death action. After Appellants terminated his representation, the attorney filed a notice of attorney’s lien. A few years later, while represented by their new counsel, Appellants settled their claims against the underlying defendants. While pursuing the attorney’s lien, the attorney died. Thereafter, the attorney’s estate was substituted as a party. In a previous appeal, we reviewed the trial court’s $133,333.33 attorney’s fee award to the attorney’s estate. We affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that Appellants owe the attorney’s estate fees and that the result the attorney obtained for Appellants was a $400,000.00 settlement offer. In the first appeal, we vacated the $133,333.33 attorney’s fee award and remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to make findings consistent with Rule 1.5(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct. Following remand, the attorney’s estate was closed, and Appellee sought to be substituted, individually, as a party to this action. The trial court allowed the substitution, over Appellants’ objections. Concerning the amount of attorney’s fees, the trial court referred the parties to a special master, who disregarded this Court’s prior opinion, wherein we affirmed that the “results obtained” by the deceased attorney was a $400,000.00 settlement offer. Rather, the special master concluded that the “results obtained” was a $450,000.00 settlement offer and awarded attorney’s fees of $150,000.00 based on that amount. The trial court adopted the special master’s findings. Although we affirm the trial court’s substitution of Appellee as a party, we vacate the award of $150,000.00 in attorney’s fees as this amount is in conflict with the law of the case, i.e., this Court’s previous conclusion that the results the attorney obtained was a $400,000.00 settlement offer. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
DAVID HEARING v. DAN E. ARMSTRONG ET AL.
Appellant, who pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree murder and is currently serving two life sentences, filed a complaint in the Hamblen County Chancery Court, alleging that he was not given proper credit for time served. Appellant specifically sought credit for the time he was confined in Texas while fighting his extradition to Tennessee. In his complaint, Appellant requested that the trial court compel the Defendants to enforce the judgments to give him credit for time served and further requested that the Defendants be found in contempt for failure to do so. The trial court dismissed Appellant’s complaint based on collateral estoppel, finding that the criminal court that entered the judgments previously denied Appellant’s request for pretrial jail credits. Appellant appeals the dismissal of his complaint. We conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; thus, we dismiss the appeal. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
NIKKI SIXX v. VANESSA MARIE HENSLEY (CLARK)
This appeal arises from the trial court’s judgment finding the respondent guilty of forty-one counts of criminal contempt of court for violating an order of protection issued on February 23, 2024. The respondent timely appealed from the trial court’s order finding her in contempt. However, due to significant deficiencies in the respondent’s appellate brief, we conclude that she has waived consideration of all issues on appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca Hudson et al. v. Paul Gravette et al.
A kennel technician filed a personal injury action against the owners of two dogs, asserting a claim under the statute governing dog owners’ liability for injuries caused by their dogs and a claim for common law negligence. The technician alleged that the dogs attacked and injured her while they were boarded at her place of employment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the dog owners on both claims. We affirm the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment on the statutory claim, but we reverse the court’s decision to grant summary judgment on the common law negligence claim. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela Crenshaw on behalf of her mother Dorothy Murphy v. Methodist Healthcare-Memphis Hospitals, et al.
This is a health care liability case that centers around the statutory requirements for the pre-suit notice to be provided to defendants pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29- 26-121. The trial court granted the defendants’ joint motion to dismiss with prejudice after determining the pre-suit notice provided in this matter did not substantially comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Gabriel F.
This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that two grounds for termination existed as to the father: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent and (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The juvenile court also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. The father appeals. We vacate in part, affirm in part, and reverse in part, but ultimately affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Harpeth Crest HOA v. Cypressbrook Coley Davis, General Partnership
This case involves a disputed easement. Appellant filed a complaint for declaratory judgment asking the trial court to conclude that Appellee did not possess an easement over Appellant’s property. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that: (1) Appellee had an express easement appurtenant over Appellant’s property; and (2) an increase in traffic due to the normal development of Appellee’s property did not overburden the easement. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
NIKKI SIXX v. VANESSA CLARK
This case involves a petition for criminal contempt filed by the petitioner, Nikki Sixx, against the respondent, Vanessa Clark, concerning Ms. Clark’s alleged violations of multiple orders of protection. The trial court found Ms. Clark guilty of 100 counts of contempt, sentencing her to 300 days in jail and imposing $5,000 in fines. Ms. Clark has appealed. As a threshold matter, we determine that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Ms. Clark’s challenges to the validity and scope of the underlying orders of protection from which no appeal was timely filed. In addition, we conclude that Ms. Clark has waived any challenges to her bond conditions by failing to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 8. Regarding the trial court’s contempt findings, upon our thorough review of the record, we modify the trial court’s judgment in part, vacating the contempt finding regarding count 7 and subtracting count 43, which was found not to constitute a violation of the order of protection, from the trial court’s total. We also reduce Ms. Clark’s sentence by one day, awarding her the appropriate pretrial jail credit. Accordingly, the judgment is modified to reflect a total of 98 counts of contempt. These modifications also require that the judgment reflect total fines of $4,900 and a sentence of 293 days. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Renegade Mountain Community Club, Inc. v. Cumberland Point Condominium Property Owners Association, Inc.
This appeal arises out of a breach of contract action brought by the appellee against the appellant based upon the appellant’s purported breach of a duty to collect and remit to the appellee annual dues owed to it by the appellant’s members. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the appellee. Appellant timely appealed to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
City of Milan, TN v. Frederick H. Agee
This appeal arises from a dispute between two municipalities and the district attorney general responsible for prosecuting cases in the jurisdiction in which the municipalities lie. The district attorney general threatened to cease the prosecution of cases in the courts of the municipalities and stated that he would only continue to do so if the municipalities provided an additional assistant attorney general position for his office or funding for such a position. The district attorney general justifies his threat by citing Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-7-103(1), which he asserts requires municipalities to fund additional prosecutorial personnel in order for his duty to prosecute cases in municipal court to be triggered. The municipalities filed a complaint for writ of mandamus and later amended their claims to include a request for declaratory judgment. The trial court ordered that the municipalities were entitled to a declaratory judgment “that they ha[d] provided ‘sufficient personnel’” to the district attorney general and that he could not avoid the responsibility of prosecuting cases “by invoking Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-7-103(6).” The trial court also determined that the district attorney general had a “clear statutory mandate” and issued a “peremptory writ of mandamus” compelling the district attorney general to comply with the statute. The district attorney general appeals. Finding that Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-7-103(1)’s “personnel requirement” does not refer to prosecutorial personnel, we affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Sawyer B.
This appeal concerns termination of parental rights. John W. and Kelli W. (“Petitioners”) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) against Crystal B. (“Mother”) seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights to her minor daughter, Sawyer B. (“the Child”). The juvenile court previously found that Mother committed severe child abuse by failing to protect the Child’s half-sibling from abuse by John B., a man Mother lived with. Mother did not appeal the juvenile court’s finding. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse. Mother appeals, arguing among other things that she left John B. as soon as she could, although she remained with him for months after the termination petition was filed and continued to contact him. We find, as did the Trial Court, that the ground of severe child abuse was proven against Mother by clear and convincing evidence. We find further by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Trial Court, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE JAXON N. ET AL.
This appeal concerns termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Hamblen County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Janlynn B. (“Mother”) and Eric N. (“Father”) to their minor children Jaxon N. and Colton N. (“the Children,” collectively). Janice B. (“Foster Mother”) filed an intervening petition also seeking to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. The Juvenile Court found in part that Mother failed to attend to the Children’s health needs, including Colton’s serious heart condition. Mother appeals.1 On appeal, Mother argues that the Juvenile Court did not make sufficient best interest findings and, even if it did, it erred in its analysis. We vacate the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan as the record contains only Mother’s third plan. Thus, we modify the Juvenile Court’s judgment to that extent. Otherwise, we find that each of the other grounds found by the Juvenile Court was proven by clear and convincing evidence. We find further that the Juvenile Court made sufficient findings on best interest. We find, as did the Juvenile Court, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm as modified. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
SONYA HARNESS v. JOHN MANSFIELD, ET AL.
A home health nurse was injured in an automobile accident while driving her vehicle in connection with her employment. She later sought uninsured motorist benefits under a business automobile liability policy issued to her employer. Arguing that the uninsured motorist coverage in the business policy did not apply to the employee’s accident, the insurance carrier moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the carrier’s motion. We conclude that the business policy unambiguously limited uninsured motorist coverage to specifically listed automobiles. Because the nurse’s vehicle was not listed, the uninsured motorist coverage in the business policy did not apply. We further conclude that this policy limitation does not contravene our uninsured motorist statutes. So we affirm the grant of summary judgment. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Quinton A. Et Al.
Father appeals the trial court’s findings that (1) termination of Father’s parental rights is supported by the grounds of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, and (2) termination is in the children’s best interests. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County v. Governor Bill Le et al.
In this dispute, the trial court found that certain subsections of 2023 Tennessee Public Acts, chapter 488, violated the home rule amendment and the equal protection guarantee found in the Tennessee Constitution. The defendants, who are officials of the State of Tennessee, have appealed the trial court’s ruling. Following our thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s determination that section two of the act is unconstitutional. However, we reverse the trial court’s determination that sections two, six, seven, eight, and nine of the Act violate the equal protection guarantee found in the Tennessee Constitution. We therefore also reverse the trial court’s elision of sections six, seven, eight, and nine from the statute. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Courtney L. Wherry, et al. v. Obion County Board of Education, et al.
This negligence action arose when Courtney L. Wherry (“Ms. Wherry”), a member of the South Fulton High School sideline cheerleading team, fell and injured her neck while performing a “shoulder sit” stunt in the endzone of a football field prior to a high school football game. Ms. Wherry and her parents, Jason T. Wherry and Jaime L. Tidwell, (collectively, “the Wherrys”) brought suit against the Obion County Board of Education and Obion County School District (collectively, “the School District”)1 under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act to recover damages for the injuries sustained by Ms. Wherry. The Wherrys sought recovery based upon two negligence theories: (1) that the school district’s selection and hiring of the South Fulton High School cheerleading coach Nichole Harrell (“Ms. Harrell”) was negligent, and (2) that the negligent acts and omissions of Ms. Harrell on the night of the accident related to the football field conditions were the cause in fact and proximate cause of Ms. Wherry’s injuries. Following a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the School District on both negligence theories. The Wherrys appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Marilee Z. Hurley, Trustee of the Marilee Z. Hurley Revocable Trust Dated September 26, 2008 v. Green Shadows Homeowners Association, Inc.
This case involves a dispute between a property owner and her homeowners’ association. Appellant’s property is governed by the homeowner’s association’s covenants, conditions, and restrictions. There are two improvements to appellant’s property, a main house and a carriage house, both of which were originally roofed with vintage concrete tiles. Appellant replaced the roof on the carriage house with asphalt shingles, but did not replace the roof on the main house. Rather, appellant had the main house roof cleaned, which resulted in a lighter appearance. The homeowners’ association demanded that appellant replace the main house roof with shingles to match the carriage house. Appellant refused and filed an action for declaratory judgment and injunction. The association filed a counter-complaint alleging that appellant was in breach of certain provisions of the covenants, conditions, and restrictions. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court dismissed appellant’s declaratory judgment action on its finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because appellant failed to join all necessary parties. The trial court granted the homeowners’ association’s motion for summary judgment on its counter-complaint and awarded attorney’s fees. Because the trial court’s order does not adequately explain its reasons for dismissing appellant’s declaratory judgment action, we cannot conduct a meaningful review of that holding, and we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of appellant’s complaint. There are disputes of material fact that preclude the grant of summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and its award of attorney’s fees to the homeowner’s association. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of David Alan Beddingfield
This appeal arises from an order requiring a petitioner to pay a filing fee or face dismissal of his case. Because the order is not final, we lack subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals |
