COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

BENJAMIN MCCURRY v. AGNESS MCCURRY
E2024-00042-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Senior Judge D. Kelly Thomas

The trial court found the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of three charges of criminal contempt. The appellant appeals those criminal contempt findings. Discerning no error, we affirm.

IN RE MICHAEL S.
E2025-01028-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Douglas T. Jenkins

In this case involving termination of a mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court
determined that clear and convincing evidence supported two grounds for termination:
abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to financially support the
child. The trial court also found that termination was in the child’s best interest. The
mother has appealed. After thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s determination
relative to the ground of abandonment by failure to support. However, the evidence did
not support a finding of abandonment by failure to visit, and we reverse the trial court’s
determination as to that ground. We vacate, for insufficient findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the trial court’s conclusion that termination was in the child’s best
interest and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to conduct a thorough
analysis of the best interest factors found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i).

IN RE SYLIS K., ET AL.
E2025-01109-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor J. Michael Sharp

This appeal involves a grandmother and grandfather’s petition to terminate the parental
rights of a father to two of his children. The petition alleged the following grounds for
termination: (1) abandonment by failure to visit, (2) abandonment by failure to support,
and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court
held that each ground was proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court also
determined that the termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children.
The father appeals. We ultimately affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights but
must vacate the trial court’s determination regarding the failure to manifest an ability and
willingness to assume

BRITTANY WILSON (HAMILTON) v. JEFFERY D. WILSON
E2026-00081-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: JOHN W. MCCLARTY, P.J., E.S.; KRISTI M. DAVIS, J.; AND WILLIAM E. PHILLIPS, II, J.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Gregory S. McMillan

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final
appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

In Re The Carl Edwin Osborne, Jr. Living Trust, dated May 19, 2020
W2024-01768-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kathleen N. Gomes

The decedent left a will in which he directed the majority of his property into a trust. The
trust named his wife as the trustee. The trust made several specific distributions to wife
effective upon the decedent’s death, including the grant of life estate interests in certain
assets. Several other beneficiaries were designated to receive distributions from the life
estate assets upon wife’s death. The trust directed its remaining assets into a separate
marital trust which provided that all income generated by its property would be distributed
to wife. It also provided that the trustee would be required to distribute as much of the
principal of the marital trust to wife as she requested in writing and granted her a power of
appointment. Several of the remaining trust beneficiaries filed a petition to construe the
trust in the Shelby County probate court. They sought an order declaring that the remainder
interests of assets in which wife had been granted life estates did not pass into the marital
trust. The probate court held that the remainder interests did not pass into the marital trust
and wife could not alter or destroy them. Wife appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in
part.

In Re Michael S.
E2025-01028-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Douglas T. Jenkins

In this case involving termination of a mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court determined that clear and convincing evidence supported two grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to financially support the child. The trial court also found that termination was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. After thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s determination relative to the ground of abandonment by failure to support. However, the evidence did not support a finding of abandonment by failure to visit, and we reverse the trial court’s determination as to that ground. We vacate, for insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court’s conclusion that termination was in the child’s best interest and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to conduct a thorough analysis of the best interest factors found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i).

In Re Carl Edwin Osborne, Jr. Living Trust -Concur in Part/Dissent in Part
W2024-01768-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kathleen N. Gomes

The majority opinion offers a thoughtful examination of the issues before this court.
I agree fully with the majority that the failure to make an offer of proof results in the waiver
of Wife’s challenge to exclusion of the testimony of Anthony Bradley, the drafter of the
trust. Nevertheless, because I do not understand the trust to operate in the same manner as
my colleagues, I respectfully dissent.

Brittany Wilson (Hamilton) v. Jeffery D. Wilson
E2026-00081-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gregory S. McMillan

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Robert Anthony Caleb Wise v. Lindsay Marie Snapp Wise
W2026-00203-COA-T10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Valerie L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor James R. Newsom

A Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B petition for recusal appeal was filed in this Court
following the denial of Petitioner’s motion for the disqualification of the trial court judge.
Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

IN RE ISAIAH M
E2026-00272-COA-T10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Suzanne Cook

Petitioner seeks accelerated review of the denial of her motion to recuse the trial judge.
The trial court deemed the motion repetitive. We agree.

Timothy Williams v. Lee Ann Sikes
W2025-00471-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Valerie L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Michael Mansfield

Appellant appeals the trial court’s judgment in favor of Appellee for work performed pursuant to an oral contract between the parties. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In Re Heavenlee J.
M2025-00543-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gregory Wayne Traylor

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights on grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. We affirm.

Adam Thomas v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
M2025-00288-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph P. Binkley, Jr.

A paramedic sued the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. He asserted that in violation of the Tennessee Public Protection Act he was discharged by the Nashville Fire Department because he refused to participate in or remain silent about the department forcing mentally competent inmates to undergo medical treatment without their consent. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the trial court granted the motion. The paramedic appealed. We reverse the trial court’s dismissal.

MATTHEW HAWN v. SULLIVAN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL.
E2025-00027-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Katherine Leigh Priester

I concur with the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Hawn was not shown to have
engaged in unprofessional conduct. I also concur with the majority’s conclusion that Mr.
Hawn was shown to have committed an act of insubordination and that the trial court’s
judgment should be modified to reflect that this statutory ground for a tenured teacher’s
dismissal was proven pursuant to the Teacher Tenure Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. 49-5-
511(a)(2). I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s conclusion that the Board’s
dismissal of Mr. Hawn “over one isolated act of insubordination was excessive.” In
support of this conclusion, the majority refers to the trial court’s findings regarding Mr.
Hawn’s service record and other factors in determining that the consequence of dismissal
was excessive.

MATTHEW HAWN v. SULLIVAN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL.
E2025-00027-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Katherine Leigh Priester

This appeal concerns a local board of education’s decision to dismiss a tenured teacher.
The teacher sought judicial review of his dismissal in the trial court. The trial court found
no grounds for dismissal and reversed the board’s decision. The board appeals. We
conclude that the teacher was insubordinate in showing his class a video containing
profanity without parental consent. However, this lone act of insubordination did not
warrant the drastic step of dismissal given the teacher’s long record of good service. We
affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.

Jasmine, LLC v. Jasmine Asian Cuisine, Inc.
M2025-01201-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Senior Judge Vanessa A. Jackson

A restaurant based in Williamson County sued a restaurant based in Rutherford County in Williamson County Chancery Court over the use of the name Jasmine. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of venue, and the plaintiff amended the complaint, including allegations that the defendant provided services in Williamson County, advertised in Williamson County, and caused customer confusion and economic harm in Williamson County. The chancery court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding the fact that the plaintiff alleged economic harm in Williamson County was not sufficient to establish venue. We reverse the dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

Angela Clark v. Dr. Roseann Maikis et al.
M2025-01540-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Amanda McClendon

A plaintiff sued a physician and the physician’s practice, alleging the physician performed a biopsy during a medical office visit without the plaintiff’s consent. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for failure to comply with the pre-suit notice requirement in the Health Care Liability Act. Because the court also determined that the action was time-barred, it dismissed the complaint with prejudice. We conclude that the plaintiff’s claim relates to the provision of, or failure to provide, health care services. So we affirm the dismissal of the complaint for failure to comply with the Health Care Liability Act. But because we conclude that the complaint does not clearly show that it was filed more than one year after the plaintiff discovered the injury, we modify the dismissal to a dismissal without prejudice.

Dr. Regina Jordan-Sodiq v. State of Tennessee et al.
M2025-02083-COA-T10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Valerie L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Matthew Joel Wallace

This appeal stems from a trial court judge’s denial of Petitioner’s motion to recuse. Petitioner filed this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to recuse.

IN RE SCARLET J.
E2025-01566-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Steven W. Maroney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Steven Lane Wolfenbarger

This appeal requires us to determine whether clear and convincing evidence supports: (1)
at least one statutory ground for termination of Appellant’s parental rights; and (2) that
termination is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Sarah Chapman v. Chris Wade
M2025-00129-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Sharon Guffee

The trial court entered a parenting plan setting parenting time and child support between Mother and Father. Mother appealed. Mother raises a due process challenge to the trial extending into the late evening of the last day. She also challenges the trial court’s analysis of the best interest factors, its allocation of parenting time, its designation of Father as the primary residential parent, its awarding to Father sole decision-making authority, and its denial of Mother’s motion to alter or amend. Father seeks attorney’s fees on appeal. We affirm the trial court’s ruling and award attorney’s fees.

Tray Simmons v. Dr. Shahidul Islam et al.
M2025-01261-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph P. Binkley, Jr.

The Appellant brought suit against his psychiatrist and the psychiatrist’s clinic, but the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants. After appellate briefing and oral argument but prior to the filing of the opinion of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial
court, the psychiatrist died. The Appellant became aware of the death after the Tennessee Supreme Court denied his application for permission to appeal. He, subsequently, filed numerous motions for relief in the trial court. The trial court denied relief under Rule 60
and denied the other motions. We affirm.

Jenifer Hutcherson Hall, et al. v. Robertson County, Tennessee
M2025-00163-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kathryn Wall Olita

This appeal arises from a general claim of negligence stemming from a dog bite. The plaintiffs adopted a dog from an animal shelter owned and operated by the defendant, a governmental entity. The dog bit one of the plaintiffs shortly after adoption. The plaintiffs sued, claiming that the shelter had a duty to warn them of the dog’s dangerous propensities but failed to do so. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court determined that the evidence did not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the foreseeability of the incident, and therefore, the plaintiffs could not establish the defendant owed them a duty to warn. Accordingly, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Retail Direct, LLC v. Payano Express, LLC et al.
M2024-01896-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Anne C. Martin

An employee suffered severe injuries while working for a subcontractor and sought workers’ compensation benefits from the logistics company that had retained the subcontractor. In response, the logistics company filed a declaratory judgment action asserting that it was exempt from liability as a “common carrier.” The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the logistics company, concluding that the company’s federal operating authority established its common carrier status as a matter of law. The injured employee appeals, arguing that a genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding the logistics company’s status because it exclusively served a single customer rather than the general public. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

Jo Kelly Stephenson v. 2300 & 2306 SSR Property Trust et al.
M2026-00621-COA-T10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Patricia Head Moskal

Plaintiff appeals the denial of her motion to recuse the trial court judge, which raised allegations of bias related to, inter alia, the treatment of her pro se status and her lack of personal notice of court filings, the lack of response to her ex parte communication, the failure to report alleged attorney misconduct, and the entry of certain court orders. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Jayesh Patel et al. v. Shailesh Patel et al.
M2024-01371-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Erin Nations

This appeal arises from the denial of a petition to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-17-101 to -110. The plaintiff-respondents, Jayesh Patel, Devesh Patel, and Vimal Patel (“Plaintiffs”),filed suit in Tennessee asserting claims for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and abuse of process against the defendants-petitioners, Shailesh Patel, BMGPC, LLC, Parul N. Patel, Dharmesh Patel, Ujval Patel, and Jyoti Patel (collectively, “Defendants”),who had initiated a related action against Plaintiffs in California state court. In response to the Tennessee action, Defendants filed a petition to dismiss pursuant to the TPPA, asserting that Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in response to Defendants’ exercise of their rights to petition and of free speech. Plaintiffs responded to the TPPA Petition and sought to amend their complaint to add claims that predated the filing of the California lawsuit. At a joint hearing on both the TPPA Petition and the Motion to Amend, the trial court granted the Motion to Amend and instructed Defendants that, if they proceeded on the TPPA Petition, the court would apply it to the First Amended Complaint. Defendants decided to press forward with the TPPA Petition. After considering the evidence produced by the parties, the trial court denied the TPPA Petition, concluding that the statute did not apply because Defendants failed to make a prima facie showing that the action was based on, related to, or in response to their exercise of the rights to petition or of free speech. This appeal followed. We respectfully disagree with the trial court’s decision. We conclude that Defendants established a prima facie case that Plaintiffs initiated this action in response to Defendants’ exercise of both their right to petition and their right to free speech. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.