Theophilus Ebulueme v. Fred E. Onoh
The Circuit Court for Montgomery County (“the Trial Court”) entered a default judgment in favor of Theophilus Ebulueme (“Plaintiff”) in this breach of contract action. Fred E. Onoh (“Defendant”) filed a motion pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 to vacate the judgment asserting that Defendant was not properly served and never received notice of the suit. The Trial Court denied the Rule 60 motion. Defendant appealed to this Court. We find and hold that Plaintiff did not achieve personal service and that the service by publication that was attempted was improper. As such, Plaintiff failed to properly serve Defendant rendering the default judgment void. We, therefore, vacate the Trial Court’s August 7, 2017 order granting a default judgment and the Trial Court’s order denying Defendant’s Rule 60 motion. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Johnson v. Memphis Guitar Spa, LLC
After losing in general sessions court, Plaintiff attempted to appeal the judgment to the circuit court. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and a counterclaim in the circuit court. Plaintiff’s appeal was thereafter dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it was not perfected in a timely manner. The circuit court then entered a default judgment against the Plaintiff based upon Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the counterclaim. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the circuit court lost subject matter jurisdiction over the counterclaim upon the dismissal of the appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Stacy Renee Carter v. Antonio Elmore Carter
This is an appeal from a final order in the parties’ divorce proceeding entered on April 18, 2017. The Notice of Appeal, filed with the Appellate Court Clerk on April 16, 2019, was accompanied by a motion seeking leave to file it late, presumably pursuant to certain provisions in Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, and because there is no authority in Rule 4(a) for a waiver of the timely filing of a Notice of Appeal in a civil case, we do not have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Rocky McElhaney Et Al. v. Hughes & Coleman PLLC Et Al.
The defendants have appealed from the trial court’s rulings granting the plaintiffs a partial summary judgment and directing the entry of a final judgment under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. Because the order appealed was not properly entered under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58 and because the order is not appropriate for certification as final under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02, we dismiss the appeal |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Lennon R.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s order that: (1) designated Father/Appellee as primary residential parent; (2) awarded him sole decision-making authority; and (3) set visitation. Mother/Appellant appeals: (1) the designation of Father as primary residential parent; (2) the award of sole decision-making authority to Father; and (3) her number of parenting days with the child. Because the trial court failed to make any findings regarding decision-making authority, we vacate the trial court’s award of sole decision-making authority to Father and remand for findings of facts and conclusions of law related to same. We also conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to maximize Mother’s parenting time with the child. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s visitation award and remand for a more equal award of parenting time. Finally, we reverse the trial court’s order concerning child support and remand for a recalculation of support consistent with the new parenting schedule entered on remand. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Karen Nisenbaum v. Michael Nisenbaum
In this divorce action, the trial court awarded Wife transitional alimony of $2,000 per month for 24 months and $1,000 per month for the next 24 months; the court denied her requests for alimony in futuro and for alimony in solido to cover the cost of future dental care. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Jack R. Owen Revocable Trust v. City of Germantown Tennessee, et al.
Appellee Germantown Planning Commission voted to change the zoning designation of property held by Appellant trust. In response, Appellant filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari seeking review of the Planning Commission’s decision. Appellees moved for dismissal of Appellant’s petition for writ of certiorari under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(1). Following a hearing on Appellant’s request for temporary injunction to halt Appellee City of Germantown from taking any action on the Planning Commission’s recommendation for rezoning, the trial court granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the Planning Commission’s recommendation did not constitute a final judgment for purposes of review under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 27-9-101. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court’s adjudication of the motion to dismiss was premature because Appellant had no opportunity to respond to the motion. Appellant also contends that the grant of the motion to dismiss was error because, under Tennessee Code Annotated sections 13-7-203(b) and 13-7-204, the Planning Commission’s decision was a final approval of the rezoning as opposed to a mere recommendation. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lucas D. Bottorff, Et Al. v. Anne A. Sears, Et Al.
After the administrator of an estate obtained a judgment vesting title to real property in the estate, the administrator filed a detainer summons against the decedent’s daughter in general sessions court seeking possession of the property. The general sessions court determined that the estate was entitled to possession of the property, and the decedent’s daughter appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court granted possession of the property to the estate and ordered the decedent’s daughter to vacate the premises within thirty days. The decedent’s daughter appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Patrick Masserano v. Alyse Masserano
Husband and Wife both appeal the trial court’s ruling with regard to alimony. Based on Husband’s failure to adequately support his arguments with legal authority, his issues are waived. We affirm the trial court’s decision to exclude Wife’s affidavit of income and expenses. We vacate the trial court’s alimony award and remand for the entry of an order that contains specific findings of fact as to Wife’s need and Husband’s ability to pay. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jasmine Desiree Wightman v. Joshua Charles Wightman
In this appeal, the father challenges the trial court’s determination of the residential parenting schedule as it relates to visitation during the school term. Upon our review, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Marie Paterson (Potter) v. Scott Paterson
This appeal involves a request for, inter alia, the modification of child support. Because the trial court failed to provide sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, we are unable to effectively review the issues raised on appeal. Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
April R. Burchfield v. D. Ryan Burchfield
Mother filed a petition for modification of the residential parenting schedule in a permanent parenting plan. Father filed a |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
Earl Gene Davis v. Civil Service Commission Of The Metropolitan Government Of Nashville And Davidson County, Et Al.
This appeal arises from the Metropolitan Government of Nashville Civil Service Commission’s decision to suspend and demote Appellant, a police officer with Metropolitan Nashville Police Department. The department’s decision to suspend Appellant was affirmed by the administrative law judge, but the administrative law judge reversed the demotion. The Commission then reviewed the administrative law judge’s order and upheld the suspension but reinstated the demotion. On appeal to the Davidson County Chancery Court, the Commission’s decision was affirmed. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the Chancery Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Earl Gene Davis v. Civil Service Commission Of The Metropolitan Government Of Nashville And Davidson County, Et Al. - Concurring In Part
The majority opinion concludes that the Commission’s finding that Officer Davis violated both MNPD Policy § 4.20.040(B) and MNPD Policy § 4.20.040(K) was neither arbitrary nor capricious and was supported by substantial and material evidence. In reaching its decision concerning MNPD Policy § 4.20.040(B), the majority essentially concludes that consideration of the public authority defense is irrelevant because the only question involved is whether Officer Davis committed the acts that constitute the offense outlined by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-301(a), not whether Officer Davis would be able to assert any defense to criminal prosecution of that crime. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Terry Wallace v. City Of Lewisburg, Tennessee
Former employee of the City of Lewisburg brought an action pursuant to the Tennessee Human Rights Act challenging his termination. The trial court held a bench trial and, a year and a half later, entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order, finding in favor of defendant and dismissing the action. The judge who tried the case retired shortly thereafter. Five months later, the employee filed a motion under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, seeking to have the order dismissing the complaint set aside on the grounds that his counsel did not receive the order dismissing the case and that, because the order did not comply with Rule 58, it was not a final order. The motion was heard by a new judge, who ruled that the order substantially complied with Rule 58 and was therefore an effective, final order. The employee appeals. Upon our review, we determine that the order dismissing the case did not comply with Rule 58 and was not a final order. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand the case for entry of a final order that complies with Rule 58. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Dialysis Clinic, Inc. Et Al. v. Kevin Medley, Et Al.
The owner of four contiguous properties filed unlawful detainer actions against the entities that were occupying the properties. The owner did not name as defendants the individual who signed the lease or his company. A year and a half after the cases were filed, the lessee moved to intervene, claiming that it was entitled to intervene pursuant to Tenn. Rs. Civ. P. 24.01 and/or 24.02 and that it was a necessary party pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 19.01. The trial court denied the lessee’s motion on the grounds of prior suit pending and timeliness. The lessee appealed. Because the court failed to address the lessee’s claim that it was a necessary party, we are unable to address that argument on appeal. We vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Josiah Manual Davis v. Akira Hayes
The father has filed a notice of appeal from a final judgment entered on January 7, 2019. Because the father did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the judgment as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Raeshad B.
Nearly three years after a child was placed with them by an unlicensed child placing agency, the child’s guardians petitioned to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents. The chancery court found two statutory grounds for termination: abandonment by willful failure to visit and abandonment by willful failure to support. The court also found that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Only the child’s mother appeals. We conclude that the evidence was less than clear and convincing as to each of the alleged statutory grounds. So we reverse the termination of mother’s parental rights. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Raeshad B. - Concurring
I concur in the result reached in this very difficult case. Our holding that the record does not clearly and convincingly establish the grounds for termination means that we do not reach the question of what is in Raeshad’s best interest. The dismissal of the termination proceeding means that Mother and Raeshad retain the parent-child relationship and does not compel his return to her custody. Neither does it necessarily lead to the lack of involvement by the Guardians in his life; it is clear that Raeshad and the Guardians, along with their other children, have formed familial bonds. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
John Vergos v. Randall Swaney
A private citizen initiated a proceeding in Shelby County Environmental Court to remove a billboard; the environmental court denied the petition, and the citizen appealed to Circuit Court. That court held that the citizen did not have standing to initiate the action and granted summary judgment to the billboard’s owner. The citizen appeals, contending that he has standing. The undisputed facts show that the Memphis and Shelby County Office of Construction Code Enforcement issued a citation to the billboard’s owner indicating that the billboard violated the Uniform Development Code, and initiated a proceeding in Shelby County General Sessions Court against the billboard owner, which was dismissed and no appeal was taken. We conclude that the fact that a proceeding to remove the billboard was initiated by the City deprives the citizen of standing to enforce the pertinent provisions of the Code himself. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
William Michael Grissom v. Nicole Xiomara Grissom
The trial court designated Father primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child, and adopted Father’s proposed parenting plan. Mother appeals. Because we conclude that the trial court’s order regarding the designation of the child’s primary residential parent does not contain sufficient findings of fact such that meaningful appellate review is possible, we vacate the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald R. Lemonte, Jr. v. Elke Lemonte, Et Al.
The day before a hearing on a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution was held, Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. Plaintiff did not appear at the hearing the following day. As such, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the case with prejudice. We reverse and remand for the entry of an order of dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen Simpson Et Al. v. William B. Simpson
Siblings appeal the trial court’s refusal to set aside a deed conveying real property from their decedent father to their brother. The siblings also appeal the trial court’s denial of their post-trial motion to consider purported newly discovered evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Shane Maddox Bruce v. Carolyn Marsh Jackson Et Al.
The petitioner commenced this action in the Knox County Circuit Court (“trial court”), naming as respondents his mother, his brother, and a purported family trust. He alleged, inter alia, that his mother and brother had “brought about” the wrongful death of his father and had mishandled trust funds. Additionally, the petitioner requested “financial separation” from familial assets, a money judgment, and injunctive relief to freeze familial assets. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order dismissing this action with prejudice upon finding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because all parties involved in the matter resided in Campbell County and all acts forming the basis for the petitioner’s claims had occurred in Campbell County. The petitioner has appealed. We determine that although the trial court correctly found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the court erred by dismissing this action with prejudice. We further determine that, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 16-1-116 (2009), this matter should be transferred to the court wherein jurisdiction lies. We therefore vacate the portion of the trial court’s judgment dismissing the case with prejudice and remand for entry of an order transferring this action to the Campbell County Circuit Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Stinson, Et Al. v. David E. Mensel, Et Al.
Charles Stinson and Glenda Stinson (“the Stinsons”) appeal the November 17, 2017 order of the Chancery Court for Hickman County (“the Trial Court”) expanding the injunctive relief granted in our Opinion in Stinson v. Mensel, No. M2016-00624-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 2972219 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 12, 2017), no appl. perm. appeal filed. We find and hold that the Trial Court lacked the authority to modify or revise the injunction entered by this Court in the first appeal of this case. We, therefore, vacate the portion of the Trial Court’s November 17, 2017 order modifying the injunction. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals |
