Crystal Herpst v. Parkridge Medical Center, Inc. Et Al.
This case involves a second healthcare liability action brought by Crystal Herpst on behalf of the estate of her deceased father, James Ingram. The defendants are Dr. LeAnthony A. Hardy – Mr. Ingram’s treating physician – as well as Parkridge Medical Center, Inc., Chattanooga Diagnostic Associates, LLC, and Columbia Medical Group- Parkridge, Inc. (the Parkridge defendants). The trial court determined that plaintiff could not avail herself of Tennessee’s saving statute because her first complaint was not filed prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The court therefore dismissed plaintiff’s second complaint as untimely filed. She appeals. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Crystal Herpst v. Parkridge Medical Center, Inc. Et Al. - Concurring
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that it was unnecessary for the trial court to treat the motions of LeAnthony A. Hardy, M.D., Parkridge Medical Center, Inc. Chattanooga Diagnostic Associates, LLC, and Columbia Medical Group-Parkridge, Inc. to dismiss as motions for summary judgment. But I reach that conclusion without resort to the pleadings filed in another case. Examining the allegations of the complaint filed in this action only, Crystal Herpst filed outside the applicable statute of limitations. So on the basis of the pleadings filed in this case I would affirm the dismissal of the complaint. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Atrivium K., Et Al.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two children. Upon our review, we conclude that the order of termination fails to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(k)’s requirement that the court make specific factual findings, which precludes our meaningful review. We vacate the order and remand for entry of an order that complies with subsection 113(k). |
Jackson | Court of Appeals | |
Little Hurricane Properties, LLC v. Ralph Cafaro, et al.
Little Hurricane Properties, LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed its Complaint to Remove Cloud on Title and for Injunction against Ralph Cafaro and Margetta Langlois (“Defendants”) in the Chancery Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”). The properties at issue are located in Cumberland and DeKalb Counties. The Trial Court ruled in favor of Plaintiff. Defendants appealed. We hold that, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to quiet title to land in DeKalb County, Cumberland County is not the proper venue. We vacate that element of the Trial Court’s judgment and remand for this case to be transferred to an appropriate court in DeKalb County to address Plaintiff’s action to quiet title to land in that county. Otherwise, we affirm the Trial Court. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Les Stiers
This appeal stems from an ouster proceeding that was commenced against the former mayor of Jellico, Tennessee. When the mayor was defeated in his bid to seek reelection, the trial court dismissed the ouster complaint as moot. Notwithstanding this outcome, the defendant argued that the trial court should consider his “Counter- Complaint” that he filed in connection with the underlying proceeding. The trial court, however, ultimately dismissed the “Counter-Complaint.” For the reasons stated herein, we affirm. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Neas Welding & Steel Fabricating, Inc. v. Patricia Neas
This appeal involves a corporation’s debt collection action. The corporation, a steel welding and fabricating company, was previously owned jointly by husband and wife. After nearly thirty years of marriage, husband filed for divorce, after which he was awarded sole ownership of the company. Following the divorce, the corporation brought a separate suit in a different court against the former wife for money she had taken from the company and which the divorce court had determined was a debt she owed to the company. The former wife argued the debt was for rent money the company owed to her. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the money was a debt that the former wife owed to the corporation. We affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Taylor C.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother/Appellant appeals the termination of her parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support and willful failure to visit. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1- 102(1)(A)(i). Mother also appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Ava H.
Adam R. P. (“Father”) appeals the order of the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminating his parental rights to the minor child Ava H. (“the Child”) after finding and holding that clear and convincing evidence had been proven that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights for abandonment by wanton disregard pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) and that it was in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. We find and hold that grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence to terminate Father’s parental rights and that it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. We, therefore, affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Koczera, Et Al. v. Christi Lenay Fields Steele, Et Al.
This negligence action primarily concerns a failed attempt at service of process in an underlying healthcare liability action filed in 2008. After the dismissal of a defendant doctor in the underlying suit, the plaintiffs filed the present case asserting that the defendants prevented the doctor from being served with process in the healthcare liability action. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court, among other rulings, granted the motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s various rulings. In an opinion filed on April 28, 2017, we affirmed the denial of the plaintiffs’ motions for default judgment, to dismiss their own complaint as moot, and for additional time to conduct discovery; however, we vacated the order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for entry of an order that complied with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04. On remand, the trial court again granted summary judgment explaining that its decision was based on its conclusion that no duty of care was owed by the defendants to the plaintiffs. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Kristin McKenzie Et Al. Women's Health Services-Chattanooga, P.C. Et Al.
Kristin McKenzie and her husband, Joshua McKenzie, filed this health care liability action individually, and on behalf of their infant child, Jacob, who sustained injuries during his birth. As a result of these injuries, Jacob has limited use of his left arm. The plaintiffs allege that defendant Dr. Matthew A. Roberts was negligent in the delivery of Jacob. They assert that he applied a vacuum extractor during the delivery without first obtaining mother’s informed consent. Following a two-week trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Roberts and his employer. Plaintiffs argue that the trial court committed several errors that entitle them to a new trial. They claim that the court erred in allowing the introduction of evidence that violates the collateral source rule. Specifically, they argue that the defendants were allowed to extensively cross-examine plaintiffs’ witnesses regarding possible health insurance benefits under the Affordable Care Act and other benefits under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The plaintiffs argue that the defendants pursued this line of interrogation in an attempt to show that some of Jacob’s needs would be covered by these collateral sources. The plaintiffs state that the trial court also erred in restricting the scope of the plaintiffs’ argument. Plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine. Finally, they argue that the trial court erred in its jury instruction regarding the concepts of “foresight” and “hindsight.” Plaintiffs appeal, arguing reversible errors on the part of the trial court. We vacate the trial court’s judgment on the jury verdict. We affirm some of the actions of the trial court, actions that are challenged by plaintiffs. We vacate the trial court’s order awarding the defendants $81,343.47 in discretionary costs. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Marsha Ann Null v. Kenneth Andrew Cummins
This appeal arises from post-divorce efforts to modify a permanent parenting plan. In her petition to modify, Mother set forth distinct material changes in circumstances she claimed warranted either a change in custody or a change in the residential parenting schedule. Specifically, the petition alleged, among other things, that Father interfered with Mother’s visitation and her ability to be more involved in the children’s lives. The court found Mother did not prove any of the factual allegations in her petition by a preponderance of the evidence and thus found no material change in circumstances. From this ruling, Mother appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
In Re P.G.
Both parties appeal from the trial court’s order finding two grounds to terminate Mother’s parental rights, but ultimately concluding that termination was not in the child’s best interests. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Piper B., Et Al.
A mother’s parental rights to her two daughters were terminated on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support; substantial noncompliance with permanency plans; failure to manifest an ability and willingness personally to assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility for the children; and persistence of conditions. The court also found that termination was in the children’s best interest. The mother appeals. Upon our review, we hold that the evidence in the record does not support a finding that Mother willfully failed to abandon the children by her failure to pay support; in all other respects, we affirm the termination. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
American Recycling & Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Recycle Solutions, Inc.
This action involves a former employee’s alleged misappropriation of confidential business information and improper interference with contractual and business relationships for the benefit of a competitor company. The employer filed suit against the employee and the competitor company, seeking damages for lost profits. The defendants moved for summary judgment, alleging, inter alia, that the employer could not prove causation or damages in support of any of its claims. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the proof submitted was insufficient to support a claim for lost profits. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kathy Fowlkes v. Flora Fowlkes
In this action, the petitioner sought a declaratory judgment establishing that the marriage between her deceased father and stepmother was void ab initio. The petitioner claimed that her father was not legally divorced from her mother when the marriage occurred. The trial court denied the petition, finding that the petitioner failed to rebut the validity of the second marriage. The petitioner appeals. We affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra Jo Robbins v. Robert Scholze Robbins
This appeal arises from a divorce. Sandra Jo Robbins (“Wife”) sued her husband Robert Scholze Robbins (“Husband”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) after approximately 20 years of marriage. Following trial, the Trial Court divided the marital estate, entered a permanent parenting plan regarding the parties’ minor children Ava and Theodore (“the Children”), and awarded Wife alimony in futuro. Husband appeals to this Court, raising a host of issues. We hold, inter alia, that the Trial Court erred in excluding Husband, pro se, and Wife’s attorney from in-chambers questioning of the Children. However, we hold further that, considering the whole record, this error by the Trial Court was not reversible error. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Teal Properties, Inc. v. Dog House Investments, LLC, Et Al.
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether co-owners of a limited liability company who signed a commercial lease agreement on behalf of the entity are personally liable for the lessee’s obligations when they signed the agreement twice: once on a line preceded by the text “By:” and followed on the next line by the text “Title:” and a second time on a line below which the signatory’s name was typed, followed by the word “Individually.” After the lessor filed suit against the lessee company and the co-owners individually to collect utilities and tax payments allegedly owed under the lease agreement, the co-owners filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted, arguing that the lease contains no provisions that make them personally liable for the lessee’s obligations. The trial court granted the co-owners’ motion, and lessor appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Headwaters Of The Harpeth, LLC v. Tina Majors
This appeal arises from a detainer action. After the general sessions court awarded the owner a writ of possession and a monetary judgment for rent, the defendant appealed to circuit court. The defendant also filed a separate action in chancery court seeking an equitable interest in the property under a resulting trust to compensate her for improvements she made to the property. The owner filed an answer and counter-complaint in the chancery court to recover the same damages it sought in the circuit court. While the chancery action was pending, the parties entered into an agreed order in the circuit court requiring the defendant to pay rent for her occupancy of the premises, but that execution would be stayed pending resolution of the chancery court action. After the chancery court dismissed all claims with prejudice, the owner filed a motion in the circuit court to lift the stay of the agreed order and for entry of a final judgment to recover rent owed by the defendant. The defendant filed an objection, maintaining that the counterclaim for rent in chancery court consolidated the two cases; therefore, the owner’s claim for rent had been dismissed by the chancery court. The defendant also contended the claim for rent in the circuit court action was barred under the doctrine of res judicata. The circuit court overruled the objection holding that the two actions were never consolidated, and res judicata did not apply because the circuit court action was filed before and pending when the chancery court case was commenced. This appeal followed. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Kellye And Reid v. Mitchell Sherman Reid
In this post-divorce proceeding the self-employed father of the parties’ two children sought a reduction in his child support obligation on the ground that his income had substantially decreased. The mother of the children opposed the petition, asserting that Father was attempting to hide income by referring income-producing business to his brother, who was also self- employed in the same trade; Mother also sought an increase in support due to Father’s increase in income and modification of the parenting plan. The trial court held that Father was voluntarily underemployed and that the proof of his income was not credible; concluding that neither party had carried their burden of proof the court denied both petitions insofar as each sought modification of the child support obligation. The court denied Mother’s proposed modification of the parenting plan and both parties’ request for an award of counsel fees for services rendered in the proceeding. Both parties appeal. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the denial of Father’s petition to modify his support obligation and the order denying his counsel fees; we reverse the trial court’s holding that Father was underemployed and remand the case for a determination of whether income should be imputed to Father and, if so, whether there has been a significant variance such as to justify an increase in his support obligation; we vacate the order denying Mother’s petition to modify the parenting plan and remand the case for the court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in compliance with Rule 52.01 and, in its discretion, for further consideration; we vacate the order denying Mother attorney’s fees. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
C & C North America, Inc. d/b/a Cosentino v. Natural Stone Distributors, LLC, et al.
This is an appeal from an interpleader action filed by a party who owed funds that were claimed by two other parties. The trial court found that interpleader was appropriate pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 22.01 and allowed the disputed funds to be deposited with the court. The two remaining claimants to the funds filed crossmotions for summary judgment. The trial court found that one party was originally owed the funds but that this party owed a debt to the other claimant. As such, the trial court ruled that the funds would be paid to the party who was not originally owed the funds but who had the outstanding claim against the other claimant. We reverse in part, affirm as modified, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jonathan Elliott v. Apple Investors Group, LLC, et al.
This is an appeal in a slip and fall case. The plaintiff fell in a restaurant bathroom due to water on the floor. According to the plaintiff, the water was steadily dripping from a utility faucet located beneath the bathroom vanity. The plaintiff argues that the existence of the utility faucet was a dangerous condition such that the restaurant had a duty to either remedy it or warn of its existence. The trial court granted summary judgment to the restaurant, concluding that the existence of the faucet was not a dangerous condition. We agree and affirm the decision of the circuit court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Queen City Pastry, LLC v. Bakery Technology Enterprises, LLC
The purchaser of automated cake-line equipment filed this action against the seller alleging breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranties, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. On the seller’s motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint as untimely. Because we conclude that the complaint was filed after the applicable limitations periods, either as agreed to by the parties or set by statute, we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Bethel University v. Tennessee State Board of Education, Et Al.
The Tennessee Board of Education (“the Board”) denied approval of Bethel University’s (“Bethel”) educator preparation program (“EPP”). After unsuccessfully pursuing remedies under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Bethel sought judicial review of the Board’s action. The trial court found that the Board Policy 5.504, relied upon by the Board in its decision, was invalid and reinstated approval of Bethel’s EPP. The Board appeals, asserting 5.504 is a valid policy within the meaning of the UAPA and that the court erred in reinstating Bethel’s EPP. We affirm the trial court’s holding that 5.504 is a rule within the meaning of the UAPA and, since it was not promulgated as a rule in accordance with the UAPA, it is invalid and could not be used as a basis of denying approval of Bethel’s EPP. Further, we have determined that the court exceeded its authority in ordering reinstatement of Bethel’s EPP; we vacate the decision in that regard and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to remand the case to the Board for further consideration of Bethel’s approval status as an EPP. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Extended Stay America v. Scott Wilson
This is an appeal from a judgment entered on February 20, 2015. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the judgment as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Ida Lucille Land
Judy A. Allen (“Allen”) filed suit contesting the Last Will and Testament of Ida Lucille Land dated May 9, 2011 (“the Will”), which was admitted to probate in October of 2015. The case proceeded to trial before a jury, and after trial the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) entered judgment on the jury’s verdict finding that there was undue influence arising from a confidential relationship between Kenneth L. Hill (“the Executor”) and his wife, Pauline Hill, and Ida Lucille Land (“Deceased”); that the Executor and Pauline Hill unduly benefitted from the Will; and that the Executor and Pauline Hill failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the transaction was fair. The Executor appeals to this Court raising issues regarding whether the naming of a person as executor is a sufficient benefit to trigger the presumption of undue influence and whether the Trial Court erred in denying the Executor’s motion for directed verdict. We find and hold that there is material evidence supporting the jury’s verdict that the Executor and Pauline Hill exercised undue influence, that they received a benefit under the Will, and that the Executor and Pauline Hill failed to prove that the transaction was fair. We further find and hold that the Trial Court did not err in denying the motion for directed verdict. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s June 8, 2017 Final Decree. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals |
