COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

In Re Miguel P., et al.
W2023-01261-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Special Judge W. Ray Glasgow

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate a mother’s parental rights to two of her children. The trial court found that two grounds had been proven and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Based on these findings, the court terminated the mother’s parental rights. The mother appeals. We reverse the trial court’s finding that the ground of persistence of conditions has been proven but affirm the trial court’s finding that another ground for termination has been proven and that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Thus, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

Mary McCabe Peirce v. Lee Wesson Hope
W2023-00621-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gina C. Higgins

This is a grandparent visitation case brought by the maternal grandmother of the child at issue. When the trial court dismissed the grandmother’s petition following a trial, it held, among other things, that there was no danger of substantial harm to the child in the absence of visitation. Although the trial court ruled in favor of the child’s father on the merits of the underlying case, it ultimately rejected the father’s request to recover attorney’s fees for his defense of the lawsuit. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the grandmother’s petition and also affirm the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees to the father.

Abigail Lynn Sevigny v. Warren Maxwell Sevigny
M2023-00325-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phillip R. Robinson

This is the second post-divorce contempt case between the parties. While Mother’s petition
for contempt was pending in the trial court, Father filed a petition alleging that Mother was
guilty of 29 counts of criminal contempt for various violations of the parties’ permanent
parenting plan and the mandatory “Parental Bill of Rights” incorporated into the plan. The
trial court: (1) found Mother guilty of seven counts of contempt; (2) sentenced Mother to
29 days in jail; and (3) awarded Father a portion of his attorney’s fees and costs. Mother
appeals. Because Father failed to meet his burden to show, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that Mother was in criminal contempt of the parenting plan, we reverse the trial court’s
order.

Teonnia Sykes v. Bristol Park at Riverchase
M2024-00706-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph P. Binkley, Jr.

The plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her complaint against her former landlord. Because
the plaintiff did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the dismissal
order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

In Re Estate of Jerry A. Dunn
W2023-00686-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe Townsend

This is a probate matter which concerns whether a decedent devised his widow a parcel of real estate in fee simple absolute or whether the real property at issue was to be placed in trust for the benefit of decedent’s children. The probate court rendered a declaratory judgment determining that decedent devised his widow the parcel in fee simple absolute. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

Hidden Lake Resorts Homeowners Association, Inc v. Charles Z. Moore, Et AL
M2022-01323-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor David D. Wolfe

This appeal arises out of a dispute between the homeowners’ association for a planned
development and the successor owner of the development over the obligations of the
successor owner. We agree with the trial court’s ruling that the successor owner assumed
all of the previous owner’s rights and responsibilities as the declarant under the
development’s recorded restrictive covenants. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all
respects.

Cedric Crutcher v. Johnny B. Ellis, Et Al.
M2023-00283-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lynne T. Ingram

This appeal concerns the denial of a motion to set aside default judgment and the award of
damages in a premises liability action. After sustaining injuries from a shooting in a
Nashville nightclub, Cedric Crutcher (“Plaintiff”), filed a premises liability action against
various co-defendants, including the owner and operator of the nightclub, Paul Eichel
(“Defendant”), and the owners of the building where the nightclub was located (“the
Ellises”). The Ellises filed an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint and a cross-claim against
Defendant. When Defendant failed to respond to Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff filed a
motion for default judgment, which the trial court granted. When Defendant failed to
respond to the Ellises cross-claim, the Ellises also filed a motion for default judgment,
which the court granted. Thereafter, the only remaining issues were the amount of damages
that the Ellises and Plaintiff were entitled to recover from Defendant. Following a hearing
on damages, the court awarded Plaintiff $300,000 against Defendant for his pain and
suffering, and awarded the Ellises $31,745.76 against Defendant for the attorney’s fees
they incurred in defending the action as authorized under their lease agreement. Defendant
filed a motion to set aside the default judgment pertaining to Plaintiff’s premises liability
claim, which the court denied. Defendant then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment
relating to Plaintiff’s damages, which the court granted. Following a second evidentiary
hearing on Plaintiff’s damages, the court awarded Plaintiff a judgment against Defendant
in the amount of $15,014.19 for medical expenses and $300,000 in noneconomic damages.
Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to set aside default judgment in
favor of Plaintiff, as well as the award of damages to Plaintiff. Finding no error, we affirm.

Jackie L. Jones v. Unrefined Oil Company, Inc. Et Al.
E2023-00272-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Tom McFarland

Upon competing motions for declaratory judgment in this action involving an oil and gas lease, the trial court granted declaratory judgment in favor of the plaintiff, who owned the mineral rights to the real property on which the oil well was located. The court found that although the oil well had been in production as required by the lease, the defendant corporation had failed to comply with the lease’s requirement that it make at least one oil sale within a one-year period. The court thereby found that the lease had terminated pursuant to its own terms. The defendant has appealed, and the plaintiff has raised an issue regarding the trial court’s finding that the well was in production as required by the lease. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

John Milton Arledge v. Darl Smith, Et Al.
M2022-01471-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Senior Judge Robert E. Lee Davies

John Milton Arledge (“Arledge”) filed a complaint seeking to quiet title to property he purported to own and the ejection of Darl Smith (“Smith”) from the disputed property. Smith filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Warren County Circuit Court (“the Trial Court”) granted. Arledge appeals. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In Re Azay C., et al.
W2022-01156-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jerry Stokes

In this case, Mother appeals the trial court’s severe abuse finding, after one of her children was killed in a car accident while she was driving. The trial court found that Mother failed to protect her children when she failed to ensure that the children were properly restrained in the automobile. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Edward Jones Trust Company, as personal representative of the Estate of Charles S. Woods, Jr. v. Kathy Marie Woods
M2023-00172-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Charles K. Smith

A widow received pension benefits that were payable only to her as a surviving spouse. A
trust company representing the decedent’s estate filed suit against the widow arguing that
she breached the antenuptial agreement between her and the decedent that required her to
disclaim any right she had in the decedent’s separate property. The trial court granted
summary judgment to the widow after concluding that the antenuptial agreement contained
an exception that allowed the widow to retain pension benefits that were payable only to
her as surviving spouse. The trust company appealed. Because the antenuptial agreement
is ambiguous, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

In Re Treylynn T., et al.
W2023-00752-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Steven W. Maroney

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. Amanda L. W. (“Foster Mother”) and Brian L. W. (“Foster Father”) (“Foster Parents,” collectively) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Madison County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Angel T. (“Mother”) and Fortrell C. (“Father”) to their minor children Treylynn T. and Amelia C. (“the Children,” collectively). The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), the Children’s legal custodian, supported the petition. This matter arose after Amelia received a suspicious head injury while in Father’s care. Mother never accepted that Father was responsible despite Father’s ensuing nolo contendere plea to attempted aggravated child abuse. After a hearing, the Trial Court terminated Mother’s parental rights on three grounds. The Trial Court found further that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals, arguing only that the Trial Court erred in its best interest determination. We find, as did the Trial Court, that the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody were proven against Mother by clear and convincing evidence. We further find by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Trial Court, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm.

In Re Estate of Peggy Jean Semanek
M2023-01644-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Russell Parkes

This appeal concerns the trial court’s determination that Tennessee law does not require a testator to sign their will prior to an attesting witness subscribing their signature as a witness to the will. Upon review of the relevant statutory language and associated case law, we conclude that Tennessee law requires that a testator sign their will prior to an attesting witness subscribing their own signature, and therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

George E. Gamble, III v. Patricia D. Morris
E2024-00683-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jerri Bryant

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment,
this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Aloha Pools & Spas of Jackson, LLC v. Khaled Eleiwa a/k/a Kevin Eleiwa
W2023-00941-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph T. Howell

This appeal arises from a dispute over the construction of a swimming pool. The defendant entered into a written contract with the plaintiff for the construction of a pool at the defendant’s home. The plaintiff later filed a complaint alleging that the defendant failed to pay the amount due under the contract. The defendant filed a counter-complaint and alleged breach of contract, fraud and/or misrepresentation, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant subsequently filed a motion for relief from the judgment, which the trial court denied. The defendant appeals. We affirm the trial court’s decision and remand for determination of appellate attorney’s fees.

Vincent Stormes v. FF Property Holdings, LLC
E2023-01430-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor James H. Ripley

This is a breach of contract action involving the sale of real property in which the plaintiff seller alleged that the defendant buyer withdrew from the sale in violation of the terms of the contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. We affirm.

In Re Isaiah M.
E2024-00616-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge Suzanne Cook

Because no final order has been entered in the underlying trial court proceedings, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

William D. Crowder v. State of Tennessee
M2023-01288-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Commissioner James A. Haltom

This case involves the claimant’s pro se appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission’s dismissal, on res judicata grounds, of his claims of libel and malicious prosecution against the State of Tennessee. The claimant timely appealed to this Court. Because the claimant’s appellate brief does not comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6, we hereby dismiss the appeal.

Janice Farmer v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP
W2023-00468-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge A. Blake Neill

Appellant filed this premises liability action against Appellee after she fell inside Appellee’s store. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Appellant failed to establish that a dangerous condition existed or that Appellee had actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition, if it did exist. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In Re Aubrianna O.
E2023-00842-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carter S. Moore

In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court found that three
statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further
found that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in
the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Having determined that the trial court erred by failing to make
sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the ground of abandonment by failure to visit and the best interest analysis, we vacate those portions of the trial court’s judgment and remand for further findings of fact and conclusions of law. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

John Doe Corp. v. Kennerly, Montgomery & Finley, P.C.
E2023-00236-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Christopher D. Heagerty

This is a legal malpractice suit filed by John Doe Corporation (“Plaintiff”) against its former counsel, Kennerly, Montgomery & Finley, P.C. (“Defendant”). The case arises from the expiration of a judgment obtained by Plaintiff against a defendant (“the third party”) in a suit that concluded more than a decade ago, and
Defendant’s alleged failure to advise Plaintiff of the judgment’s impending expiration. The legal malpractice
action was before Judge William T. Ailor, who had represented the third party in the underlying suit before
becoming a judge. Judge Ailor granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on Plaintiff’s failure to bring the
action within the time set by the relevant statute of limitations. After becoming aware of Plaintiff’s and the
third party’s identities, Judge Ailor recused himself while Plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the judgment was
pending. Plaintiff sought to void the judgment dismissing the case. Chancellor Christopher D. Heagerty was
assigned to sit by interchange over the case and denied Plaintiff’s motion. Plaintiff appealed. Discerning no
reversible error, we affirm.

Sarah Elizabeth Woodruff ex rel. Ethan Woodruff et al. v. Ford Motor Company et al.
E2023-00488-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge William T. Ailor

After a tragic motor vehicle accident caused her husband’s death and her minor child’s serious injuries, the plaintiff filed this products liability action against several manufacturers and sellers. The plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., a booster seat manufacturer. Based on the Tennessee Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Carolyn Coffman, et al. v. Armstrong International, Inc., et al., 615 S.W.3d 888 (Tenn. 2021), and the relevant provisions of the Tennessee Products Liability Act, we affirm the trial court.

Richard A. Petersen v. Margaret E. Georgiades et al.
M2023-00538-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe H. Thompson

This is an action to rescind a quitclaim deed conveyed pursuant to a durable general power of attorney. On August 1, 2006, Richard Petersen (“Plaintiff”) appointed his sister, Margaret Georgiades (“Defendant”) as his attorney-in-fact. The power of attorney was recorded on July 8, 2009. In April 2010, Defendant conveyed, via quitclaim deed, one-half of Plaintiff’s undivided interest in his residence to herself for no consideration. Plaintiff contends that he did not discover the transfer until the fall of 2020, at which time he revoked Defendant’s power of attorney. Then, on February 4, 2021, he filed suit against Defendant to rescind the conveyance on the basis that the deed was void ab initio as the power of attorney did not authorize Defendant to make gifts or transfers “without consideration to anyone.” He also contended that the conveyance should be set aside because Defendant’s conduct “constitutes a clear breach of the fiduciary duty” she owed to Plaintiff as his attorney-in-fact. For her part, Defendant contends that the action is barred by the ten-year statute of limitations. She also contends that Plaintiff instructed her to make the conveyance and that he subsequently told others that he had consented to the conveyance. Following discovery, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that the deed was void ab initio. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the power of attorney did not grant Defendant “the authority to transfer [Plaintiff’s] property by gift to her or to any third party” and, on this basis, declared the deed “void ab initio and to have no effect whatsoever.” This appeal followed. As provided by Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-6- 110(a), because the power of attorney expressly authorized Defendant “[t]o exercise or perform any act, power, duty, right or obligation whatsoever that I now have,” Defendant had “the power and authority to make gifts, in any amount, of any of the principal’s property, to any individuals, . . . in accordance with the principal’s personal history of making or joining in the making of lifetime gifts.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-6-110(a). Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. Because the trial court did not rule on other issues, including, inter alia, whether Plaintiff’s claim is time barred, whether Plaintiff approved of the conveyance, whether the gift was in accordance with Plaintiff’s history of making lifetime gifts, and/or whether the conveyance constitutes a breach of Defendant’s fiduciary duty to Plaintiff, we remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Orson E. Steward v. Regent Homes, LLC et al.
M2023-01059-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lynne T. Ingram

This is an appeal by a pro se appellant. Due to the deficiencies in the appellant’s brief on appeal, we conclude that he waived consideration of any issues on appeal and hereby dismiss the appeal.

In Re Rayden R. et al.
M2024-00618-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: PER CURIAM
Trial Court Judge: Judge Sharon Guffee

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. Because the mother did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.