Coffee County Board of Education v. City of Tullahoma, et al.
The Coffee County Board of Education filed suit against the City of Manchester and the City of Tullahoma to recover certain tax revenue the Board alleges it was owed pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-4-306. The trial court held that the Board of Education lacked capacity to bring the suit and dismissed the petition. The Board of Education appeals asserting that the authority to sue to recover the funds is necessarily implied from the General Assembly’s grant of express powers and duties to the Board. We agree. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-203(b)(5), the General Assembly has granted the Board the power to “[e]mploy legal counsel to advise or represent the board.” We find that this provision vests the Board with the authority to file suit to recover the funds at issue. Therefore, we must reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the lawsuit. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Judy Muffley v. David George
This appeal arises from the grant of a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside a final judgment. The plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a motion to revive or renew a judgment against the defendant. Due to inclement weather, the plaintiff was unable to attend the hearing on her motion. The trial court dismissed her motion with prejudice and released the underlying judgment. Subsequently, the plaintiff obtained counsel and filed a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside the trial court’s order. The trial court granted her motion and reinstated the original judgment. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Court of Appeals | ||
3659 Mendenhall, Inc., et al v. City of Memphis, et al.
This is a declaratory judgment action. Appellant's application for a permit to erect a sign was denied by Appellee, the Memphis and Shelby County Office of Construction Code Enforcement. Appellant petitioned the trial court to declare that Code Enforcement was estopped from denying the permit. As grounds for estoppel, Appellant cites a letter issued to the Appellant five years earlier by an assistant county attorney when Appellant sought advice on erecting multiple signs at its location. After a hearing, the trial court granted the Appellees' motion for involuntary dismissal. We affirm and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Robert John Skowronski v. Donna Rae Wade
This case involves the modification of a permanent parenting plan naming Mother the primary residential parent. Father petitioned to be named the primary residential parent after Mother moved with the child out-of-state without providing prior notice. After a one-day hearing, the trial court found a material change in circumstance and that naming Father the primary residential parent was in the best interest of the child. Although conceding she failed to give notice of the move, Mother argues there was no material change in circumstance and a change in primary residential parent was not in the best interest of the child. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Warren Bruce Maples v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Co., et al.
In this appeal, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, breach of contract by the insurance carrier. Pursuant to settled law in this state, the plaintiff had one year plus sixty days to institute suit on the policy. This action was filed one year and 134 days after the fire loss. The trial court found the lawsuit was not timely filed. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Harold Flynn Et Al. v. Citizens National Bank
This appeal involves a long-term ground lease and leasehold financing. After numerous assignments to successor tenants and several foreclosures, Citizens National Bank (“the Bank”) became the successor tenant under the ground lease. After a fire at the property, the Bank notified the landlord that it intended to surrender the leased property and cease paying rent, according to its interpretation of a separate agreement executed by the parties. The landlord denied that the Bank was entitled to unilaterally surrender the leased property and cease paying rent. The landlord filed a detainer warrant in general sessions court and, after an adverse ruling, appealed to circuit court. The circuit court concluded that the separate agreement did not limit the Bank's liability under the ground lease, as the Bank claimed. Accordingly, the circuit court entered a judgment against the Bank for approximately $130,000 for unpaid rent, taxes, and attorney's fees. The Bank appeals, challenging the circuit court's interpretation of the separate agreement and its award of damages beyond the sum of $25,000. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Eberbach v. Christopher Eberbach
This post-divorce case involves issues concerning reimbursement for the parties’ children’s uncovered medical expenses and an award of attorney’s fees in favor of Mother. Father/Appellant contends that he is not responsible for the uncovered medical expenses on grounds that Mother/Appellee failed to timely send him copies of the bills as required under the permanent parenting plan. Father also contests the award of attorney’s fees and costs. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Garner v. Coffee County Bank
Plaintiff and his former wife purchased a house together in 2002. The former wife moved out of the house with all of her belongings in 2009, and the house suffered damage from a fire in 2010. The former wife was a named insured on the house, and each of the insurance checks issued to cover property loss and living expenses was made payable to both Plaintiff and his former wife. The president of the bank that held a mortgage on the house had a separate business relationship with the former wife. According to Plaintiff, the bank president informed him that he could not have any of the insurance proceeds unless one-half was given to the former wife, which proceeds were used to pay down the former wife’s separate and unrelated loan. The bank ultimately foreclosed on the house because the loan became delinquent. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the bank and president asserting conversion, wrongful foreclosure, and other related causes of action. The bank and the president filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff did not file his opposition within the time prescribed by the procedural rules, and the trial court granted the bank and the president’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in some respects and reverse the judgment in other respects. Plaintiff’s deposition transcript that the trial court considered in ruling on the motion for summary judgment raised genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment on several of the causes of action alleged. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Brittany Hatcher Loewen v. Jeffrey Wade Loewen
This is a divorce case. Wife/Appellant appeals the trial court’s award of transitional alimony in the amount of $1,625.00 per month for three years. Because the record contains neither a transcript of the proceedings, nor a Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 statement of evidence, we have no basis on which to review the ruling of the trial court. Affirmed and remanded. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In re: A.J.
This is the second appeal from a finding of criminal contempt. Appellant and his wife originally filed a petition to have the Appellees’ daughter adjudicated dependent and neglected. The trial court entered an order, in which the parties could not contact each other or each other’s families. Appellant made contact with Appellees’ daughters on multiple occasions via text message and once in person. The Appellees filed a petition for contempt against Appellant, and the trial court found the Appellant guilty of four counts of criminal contempt and sentenced Appellant to the maximum punishment allowed for each contempt conviction with the sentences to run consecutively. On the first appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions of criminal contempt but vacated the sentence and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to resentence the Appellant and explain its reasons for the sentence it imposed. On remand, the trial court found the Appellant guilty of twenty eight counts of criminal contempt. The trial court imposed twenty-four hour sentences for each count except one, for which the trial court imposed a five-day sentence. Appellant appeals from the convictions, the sentence, and the trial court’s denial of a motion to recuse. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
City of Oak Ridge v. Joseph J. Levitt, Jr.
The Oak Ridge City Court found the manager of three apartment buildings liable for several violations of the local building code. The manager appealed to the circuit court, and the City moved to amend the cause to add the purported owner of the properties as a defendant. The case proceeded to trial. After the City closed its proof, the trial court noticed that the purported owner of the property had not been properly made a party to the action. Accordingly, the trial court granted the City‟s motion to amend. Although the purported owner moved for a mistrial and/or a continuance, the trial court proceeded on to rule against the purported owner for several violations of the local building code. The purported owner appeals. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings to allow the purported owner of the properties an opportunity to meaningfully respond to the allegations against him in accordance with Rule 15.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Abbigail C.
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse as to the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, vacate as to the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and support by an incarcerated parent, and affirm as to the grounds of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home and persistent conditions. We also affirm the trial court's finding that termination is in the child's best interest. Accordingly we affirm the termination of Father's parental rights |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Brennan, et al. v. Board of Parole For The State of Tennessee
This appeal arises from a decision by the Tennessee Board of Parole (the “Board”) to deny an inmate parole after his initial parole review hearing. In 2009, the inmate pled guilty to two counts of attempted rape of a child and two counts of incest and was sentenced to 20 years in prison with parole eligibility after serving 30% of his sentence. Apparently because of his good behavior, the Board considered the inmate for release on parole after he had served only 20% of his sentence. Without further explanation, the Board denied the inmate parole based solely on its finding that “[t]he release from custody at this time would depreciate the seriousness of the crime of which the offender stands convicted or promote disrespect of the law,” and deferred review of his parole application for five years. The inmate filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari, arguing, among other things, that the Board acted arbitrarily in denying him parole based solely on the seriousness of the crime without providing any support or explanation for its decision. The trial court affirmed the Board’s decision and this appeal followed. On appeal, we conclude that the Board acted arbitrarily in deferring further review of the inmate’s parole application beyond the time when he would have otherwise been parole eligible—at 30% of his 20-year sentence. Because the inmate has already served more than 30% of his 20-year sentence, we hold that he should immediately be granted a new parole hearing. We therefore vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mark A. Winslow v. John Bruce Saltsman, Jr., et al.
Mark Winslow brought suit against Charles Fleischmann and his campaign advertising consultant, John Saltsman, to recover for allegedly false and defamatory statements made in the course of Mr. Fleishman’s campaign for election to the United States Congress, and related contractual claims. Mr. Fleishman and Mr. Saltsman moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the statements were not false or capable of defamatory meaning or published with actual malice, and that they took no action to induce a breach of contract or otherwise interfere with the relationship between Mr. Winslow and the Tennessee Republican Party. Mr. Winslow did not contest the grant of summary judgment on the contract claims; the trial court granted the motion as to the defamation and false light claims, holding that there was no evidence from which to infer malice, that the statements were not defamatory or capable of a defamatory meaning, and that any statements upon which the action was based which related to Mr. Winslow were either true or substantially true and, therefore, not actionable. Mr. Winslow appeals. Because Mr. Fleishman and Mr. Saltsman demonstrated that the undisputed facts negate the element of actual malice which is essential to the defamation and false light claims, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: William K.
This is an appeal from an order designating a primary residential parent and setting visitation and child support. The juvenile court found that naming Father as primary residential parent was in the child’s best interest and set child support accordingly. Mother appealed both the designation of primary residential parent and the amount of child support owed to father. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
F&M Marketing Services, Inc. v. Christenberry Trucking and Farm, Inc., et al.
Plaintiff brought an action to pierce the corporate veil of defendant company and hold its sole shareholder personally liable for a debt. The trial court conducted a bench trial on the issue and found in favor of the defendant company and shareholder. The trial court initially declined to issue findings of fact in its final judgment. After both parties submitted their own proposed findings of fact, the trial court adopted the defendants‘ version nearly verbatim, incorporating two additional findings of fact of its own. However, because we find the trial court‘s findings of fact and conclusions of law insufficient to facilitate appellate review, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re Greg S.
This appeal concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Greg S. (“Father”) to his minor child Greg S., Jr. (“the Child”). The Juvenile Court terminated Father’s parental rights to the Child on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. Father appeals to this Court arguing only that it is not in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re Kaedince M. et al.
This appeal concerns the termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Bridgetta M. (“Mother”) to her minor children Greg S. and Kaedince M. (“the Children”). The Juvenile Court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Children on the grounds of wanton disregard and severe abuse. Mother appeals to this Court arguing only that it is not in the Children’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Tino C. Sutton v. Bedford County Tennessee Sheriff Department
An individual who sought records from a county sheriff’s department was provided the records outside the seven business day period required by the Tennessee Public Records Act. The individual, who was acting pro se, requested an award of attorney’s fees and discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(g). The trial court denied the request because the individual plaintiff did not incur attorney’s fees and did not incur the types of costs contemplated by Rule 54 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The individual appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Zia Mousavi Kabiri v. Shirin Davari Kabiri
This is a divorce action in a marriage of a long duration. The trial court granted the parties a divorce and divided the marital property. The wife appeals the trial court’s classification of the parties’ separate property, the valuation of their pensions, and the division of the marital property. We affirm |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Duff Brumley v. The City of Cleveland
A former police officer with the City of Cleveland brought this retaliatory discharge action, alleging that he was fired for reporting his superior for the crime of official misconduct and official oppression. During the pendency of the retaliatory discharge action, the officer’s termination was upheld in the administrative appeal process. A panel of this court affirmed the administrative decision. Thereafter, the City of Cleveland moved for summary judgment in this action, arguing, in pertinent part, that the claim was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel because the issues raised were addressed in the administrative appeal of the termination. The trial court agreed and dismissed the action. We reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Honey Bunch v. B.F. Bunch
Honey Bunch (“Plaintiff”) filed suit seeking partition by sale of a parcel of real property located in Anderson County, Tennessee. B.F. Bunch (“Defendant”) filed a counterclaim alleging, in pertinent part, that a quit claim deed of a portion of the property was void for lack of capacity, undue influence, or fraud, and that the property at issue should be partitioned in kind. After a trial, the Chancery Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) found and held, inter alia, that the quit claim deed was valid and that the remaining property should be partitioned by sale. Defendant appeals raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in finding the quit claim deed valid, whether the Trial Court erred in finding that the property should be partitioned by sale, and whether the Trial Court erred in prohibiting Defendant from using a common driveway. We find and hold that the evidence in the record on appeal does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings, and we find no error by the Trial Court. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Angeli Chan Selitsch v. Michael John Selitsch
Husband filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion to set aside an agreed upon Final Decree of Divorce. He claims the agreed order was the result of a mutual mistake concerning one of his military benefits and that he lacked the mental capacity to understand the agreement. The parties married in 1989. Husband retired from the military in 2009 with 100% disability. Wife filed for divorce in 2012. Over the course of several months, the parties negotiated an agreement as to the division of all of their marital property. The agreement was announced in court in August 2013, at which time both spouses were called to testify concerning their understanding and approval of the agreement. The final divorce decree was subsequently approved by the trial court and entered in January 2014. Pursuant to the final decree, Husband received the entirety of his Veterans Affairs disability benefits, and Wife received one-half of Husband’s other retirement benefit. Husband subsequently filed a Rule 60.02 Motion to Set Aside Marital Agreement for Lack of Capacity and Mistake. He contended that the parties mistakenly believed that his military retirement benefit was marital property when, as a matter of law, the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act prohibits the courts from treating a disability benefit as marital property. He also contended that he lacked the mental capacity to appreciate the nature of the hearing in which he agreed to the division of marital property due to the pain and stress related to his disease, as well as his medication. The trial court denied relief on both grounds. We affirm. The trial court acted within its discretion by denying Rule 60 relief on the finding that Husband failed to present sufficient proof to obtain relief on the ground of mental incapacity. Furthermore, a mistake of law is not a ground for Rule 60.02 relief and the trial court acted within its discretion when it denied relief on this ground and enforced the parties’ agreement. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Lynn Morgan v. John David Drauss
Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of a motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.02. The trial court denied the appellant’s request to elicit testimony from the appellee during the Rule 52.02 hearing and denied the appellant’s motion. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
John A. W. Bratcher, Clerk And Master/Special Commissioner, et al v. Beverly M. Hubler, et al.
This appeal involves a suit to condemn an easement or right-of-way to access landlocked property. The plaintiff named as defendants all neighboring landowners, including the State of Tennessee and the Town of Smyrna. The State and the Town filed motions to dismiss, asserting sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motions to dismiss but granted the State and the Town permission to seek an interlocutory appeal. This Court granted the applications for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We hold that the State and the Town are entitled to dismissal based on sovereign immunity and therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals |
