In re Jamel H. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children's Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother to her two minor children and of the father to his minor child that he shared with the mother. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of the mother's parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to visit, abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home, and failure to comply with the requirements contained in the permanency plan. The court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of the father's parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home and failure to comply with the requirements contained in the permanency plan. The court also found that termination of each parent's rights was in the best interest of the children. The parents appeal. We affirm the court's termination of the mother's parental rights but reverse the court's termination of the father's parental rights. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Leonard Rowe v. Hamilton County Board of Education et al.
In this breach of contract action, the plaintiff appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants on res judicata grounds. The plaintiff in his complaint alleged that the defendant school district and defendant school superintendent breached a contract with him for continuing employment as a certified public school teacher. Upon consideration of competing motions for summary judgment, the trial court found that the plaintiff had no enforceable contract with the defendants and that his claim was identical to that asserted in at least one previous lawsuit decided on the merits. The court therefore concluded that the action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Dyanna Wilson v. City of Memphis
This appeal results from the trial court's order reversing the City of Memphis Civil Service Commission's decision to terminate the employment of one of its employees. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie Brummett Zarecor v. Glenn Payne Zarecor, Sr.
This appeal involves a trial court's award of alimony in a divorce action. Wife filed for divorce in November 2012. Following a two-day trial, the trial court entered an order awarding Wife $10,000 as alimony in solido and transitional alimony of $1,000 per month for three years and, thereafter, $650 per month for an additional four years. Husband appealed the alimony awards. We affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
MLG Enterprises, LLC v. Richard Johnson
The lessor of commercial property brought this action for breach of a lease agreement against the tenant, a limited liability company, and the tenant’s president/owner, Richard Johnson, whom Plaintiff contends agreed to be personally liable for “all of tenant’s obligations” under the lease. Mr. Johnson signed the lease in two places. It is undisputed that his first signature was in a representative capacity on behalf of the tenant; the disputed issue is whether his second signature expresses a clear intent to be personally liable for the tenant’s obligations. After a default judgment was entered against the tenant, Mr. Johnson’s alleged personal liability was tried without a jury. At the close of Plaintiff’s proof, Mr. Johnson made an oral motion for involuntary dismissal. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Mr. Johnson did not personally agree to be liable for the tenant’s obligations. This determination was based on the findings that Mr. Johnson was entitled to the presumption that he signed the lease in a representative capacity because he handwrote the words “for Mobile Master Mfg. L.L.C.” after his second signature, and that the sole provision in the lease, which states that he agreed to be personally liable, was not in capital or bold letters, nor was the one-sentence paragraph indented or otherwise emphasized. The court also noted that the signature provision at issue did not bear the title Guarantor. Plaintiff appealed. As the foregoing indicates, our review is benefited by the trial court’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02 findings of facts and conclusions of law, which disclose the reasoned steps by which the trial court reached its ultimate conclusion and enhance the authority of the trial court’s decision. Having reviewed the trial court’s findings of fact in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d), we have concluded that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, and that the trial court identified and properly applied the applicable legal principles. For these reasons, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
MLG Enterprises, LLC v. Richard Johnson - Dissenting
Because I conclude that the clear intent of the Lease Agreement was to bind Mr. Johnson individually, I respectfully dissent. As the majority states, “[a] cardinal rule of contractual interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties.” Allmand v. Pavletic, 292 S.W.3d 618, 630 (Tenn. 2009). The parties’ intent is determined through examination of the plain language of the contract as a whole. 84 Lumber Co. v. Smith, 356 S.W.3d 380, 383 (Tenn. 2011). In conducting this analysis, the hidden, subjective intent of the parties is of no value because the unexpressed intent of one party is not binding on another party without notice. Cone Oil Co. v. Green, 669 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983). Interpretation of the parties’ intent is a matter of law subject to de novo review. 84 Lumber, 356 S.W.3d at 383. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Bradley K. Lowe et al v. The Greene County Partnership et al.
This is an appeal from an order certified by the Trial Court as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Notice of Appeal was filed more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the judgment. The appellee, The Greene County Partnership, has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal based upon the untimely filing of the Notice of Appeal. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal and grant the motion to dismiss. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Margaret Smith v. HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc., et al.
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In re Avery B.
This appeal arises from a custody dispute in the Juvenile Court of Tipton County. Because the order appealed from is not a final judgment, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Kim Hardy v. Tournament Players Club at Southwind, Inc. d/b/a "TPC Southwind", et al.
This is an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. In March 2014, Plaintiff food server/bartender filed an action alleging, in relevant part, that Defendants violated Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-2-107 by failing to pay her and other similarly situated employees all of the gratuities that they earned. Plaintiff further alleged that Defendants caused the gratuities to be shared with non-tipped employees. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff‘s claim under § 50-2-107 upon determining that the section does not permit a private cause of action in light of amendments to § 50-2-101 in 2013. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kim Hardy v. Tournament Players Club at Southwind, Inc. d/b/a "TPC Southwind", et al. - DISSENT
I must respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion. While I agree with the majority that amendments to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-2-101 do not govern enforcement of Section 50-2-107, I disagree with the court‟s interpretation of section 107 itself, and I further disagree with this Court's holding in Owens. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Stuart H. Kaplow, et al. v. City of Gatlinburg Board of Adjustments and Appeals, et al.
Housing units belonging to the property owners were cited by a city official for condemnation. The property owners appealed to the city’s Board of Adjustments and Appeals. After the board agreed with the city official and condemned the property, the property owners filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari seeking judicial review of the board’s decision. The trial court determined that the decision of the board was supported by material evidence and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The property owners appeal. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
P. Michael Huddleston v. Kenneth L. Harper et al.
P. Michael Huddleston (Plaintiff) brought this action against his former business partner, Kenneth L. Harper, and also against Jerry L. Hurst, the person to whom Plaintiff sold his one-half interest in the partnership. Plaintiff alleged that the primary asset of the partnership is a large building in Maryville, and that Defendants fraudulently concealed the fact that partnership had filed an insurance claim for damage to the buildings roof. The insurance claim was an asset that turned out to be worth over one million dollars. The insurance company paid this amount to the partnership shortly after Plaintiff sold his interest. Plaintiff claimed that Defendants fraudulently represented that the value of the building was about a million dollars less than its actual value because of the damage to the roof. As a consequence, Plaintiff alleged that he was fraudulently induced to sell his one-half interest for substantially less than its actual value. Plaintiff also alleged that partner Harper fraudulently endorsed Plaintiff's name to a check from the insurance company without his permission, and that the Defendants committed promissory fraud by inducing Plaintiff to endorse a second insurance check with the promise “to make things right with” him. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Michelle Benson Smith v. Christopher D. Smith
This appeal arises from a divorce proceeding. The trial court designated the mother as primary residential parent of the parties' young son in its temporary and permanent parenting plans. After a subsequent hearing, the trial court found the mother in criminal contempt of the permanent parenting plan for failing to engage in joint decision-making with Father on certain issues. The trial court fined the mother fifty dollars and ordered both parties to pay their own attorney's fees. The father appeals, raising various issues regarding the parenting plans and the contempt proceedings. We affirm. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Joe Mosley v. State of Tennessee
Plaintiff, a former inmate with the Tennessee Department of Correction, filed suit in the Tennessee Claims Commission against the State of Tennessee for monetary damages. Plaintiff alleged that the State held him in custody longer than the term of his sentence and improperly applied certain sentence-reducing credits. He titled his cause of action as one for “negligent care, custody, and control” of which he asserted the Claims Commission had jurisdiction pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 9-8-307. The State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff's claim was one for the “negligent deprivation of statutory rights,” and that the relevant statutes did not provide a private right of action. The Claims Commission granted the State's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Linda J. Russell, administrator of the Estate of Milford R. Russell, Jr. v. Illinois Central Railroad Company
Linda Russell brought a Federal Employers Liability Act action against Illinois Central Railroad Company to recover for the death of her husband from throat cancer; she alleged the cancer was caused by Mr. Russell‘s exposure to carcinogens while he worked in the Illinois Central maintenance shops in Memphis, Tennessee. A jury found in her favor and awarded damages of $4,255,000.00; on Defendant‘s motion to offset the judgment in the amount of medical expenses paid on behalf of Mr. Russell, the trial court reduced the judgment to $3,335,685.00. On appeal, Illinois Central asserts the trial court erred in admitting the causation opinions of three of Plaintiff‘s medical experts; in approving the jury‘s finding of causation; in making certain evidentiary rulings prior to and during trial; and in denying Defendant‘s post-trial motions based on the statute of limitations and Plaintiff‘s counsel‘s alleged violations of pretrial rulings. In her cross appeal, Mrs. Russell appeals the reduction of the verdict. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tonya D. Thornley v. U. S. Bank, N.A., et al.
Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her complaint on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The complaint stemmed from a foreclosure on plaintiff‘s home. Plaintiff claimed that the foreclosing lender had no right to enforce the deed of trust because the underlying promissory note had been "sold into a securitized trust contemporaneously with the origination of the loan." She also alleged certain irregularities in connection with the foreclosure sale. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel J. Velez v. Christy M. Velez
This is the second appeal arising from the parties’ divorce and post-divorce filings. In the first appeal, we affirmed the division of marital property and the parenting schedule but reversed the award of child support and remanded with instructions to impute Mother’s income based on the minimum wage. We reversed the award of alimony in solido and remanded with instructions to award Mother rehabilitative alimony in an amount and for a duration to be determined by the trial court. We also found that Mother was entitled to recover attorney’s fees incurred in the first appeal in an amount to be determined by the trial court. Prior to conducting hearings on remand, both parties filed petitions and motions with the trial court seeking additional relief in a variety of forms, including petitions to modify the parenting plan. Upon conclusion of the hearings on remand, the trial court set child support, awarded Mother rehabilitative alimony for 39 months at $800 a month, denied both parents’ petitions to modify the parenting plan, and awarded Mother $2,600 for attorney’s fees incurred in the first appeal. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Muller v. Dennis Higgins, et al.
This is a personal injury action in which Plaintiff sued Defendant for injuries he sustained as a result of a two-vehicle accident. The jury allocated fifty percent of the fault for the accident to each party, and the trial court entered judgment on the jury's verdict. On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the jury was not fair and impartial and that the evidence presented does not support the jury's verdict. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Andrew R. Lunn, DDS v. Carole Michelle Lunn
The appeal in this divorce litigation presents issues regarding proper valuation of the parties' business, proper division of marital assets, alimony, child support, attorney's fees, and court costs. The parties were married for seventeen years, with three children being born of the marriage. The husband is a dentist, who started his own practice during the parties' marriage. Much of the testimony at trial focused upon the proper value to be assigned to this marital asset. The trial court adopted the value assigned by the wife's expert of $430,376. The trial court then ordered that all of the marital assets be divided equally between the parties. Further, the trial court awarded Wife rehabilitative alimony, transitional alimony, and alimony in solido. The husband has appealed the trial court's final judgment. We reverse the trial court's valuation of the dental practice, and we remand this matter to the trial court for a proper determination of the value of such asset. The trial court will also be required to redistribute the parties' marital assets as necessary, in accordance with its redetermined valuation of this asset, in order to effectuate the trial court's decision to make an equal division of marital property between the parties. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Andrew R. Lunn, DDS v. Carole Michelle Lunn - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur in the majority’s opinion with the sole exception that I cannot agree with the majority that the amount of alimony in futuro awarded to Wife should be increased from $500 per month after eight years to $2,288. I agree with the majority that the transitional alimony must be changed to another type of alimony to comply with Tennessee law, and that the only other type that fits under the statutes is alimony in futuro. My only disagreement is with the majority’s sua sponte changing of the amount ordered by the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Joann Luna v. White County, Tennessee, et al.
Suit against the Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff of White County, as well as White County, to recover damages for Plaintiff’s asserted causes of action for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and violations of the Tennessee Constitution, arising out of her arrest and incarceration. The Defendants sought summary judgment on the grounds, inter alia, that the Governmental Tort Liability Act and public duty doctrine barred certain of the claims against the County and that the claims against the Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff were barred by the Governmental Tort Liability Act and by common law qualified immunity. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Todd Culver v. Lisa Culver
This appeal arises from a divorce. After 20 years of marriage, Michael Todd Culver (“Husband”) sued Lisa Culver (“Wife”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the Trial Court divided the marital estate and granted the parties a divorce. Wife appeals to this Court. We hold, inter alia, that the Trial Court did not commit reversible error in its valuation or division of the marital estate, or in declining to find Husband in contempt. We hold further that the Trial Court erred in adding $500 per month in alleged rental income to Wife’s income for child support purposes. We, therefore, reverse that portion of the Trial Court’s judgment and remand for a new calculation of child support. We affirm, in part, and, reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In re Jacob B.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of Father’s petition to modify custody. Following a one-day trial, the court found that Father had failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstance as necessary for either a change in primary residential parent or parenting time. Because we find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding of no material change in circumstance for purposes of modification of residential parenting time, we vacate and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Jackson | Court of Appeals | |
Tonya Newcomb v. State of Tennessee
Plaintiff fell down a set of steps while entering a building owned and operated by the State of Tennessee. She filed a claim with the Claims Commission alleging that the stairs were a dangerous condition because the handrail was too low and the steps were not covered with non-skid material. At trial, Plaintiff and her daughter testified about Plaintiff’s fall and the resulting injuries. Plaintiff also introduced into evidence photographs of repairs made to the stairs after her fall. The State called two witnesses, the head facilities administrator and a member of her staff, who testified that they were responsible for the maintenance of the steps. Both testified that they did not know of any prior incidents involving the steps. In his written order, the Commissioner found that both Plaintiff and the State’s witnesses were credible; however, he dismissed Plaintiff’s case because she failed to prove that a dangerous condition existed or that, if such condition existed, the State had notice of a dangerous condition. The Commissioner also concluded that Rule 407 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence prohibited him from considering Plaintiff’s photographs as evidence of the State’s liability. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals |
