Carolyn M. Heaton v. Jason Barrett Heaton
This case focuses on whether the trial court properly enforced and interpreted the parties’ prenuptial agreement when equitably dividing their assets incident to a divorce and whether the trial court properly set child support pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines. The plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce on May 30, 2012. The parties proceeded to trial in May 2013 on the issues of property division, child support, and attorney’s fees. An agreement was reached concerning a co-parenting schedule for their daughter. The court found that the parties’ prenuptial agreement was enforceable but that it did not require that the parties’ jointly owned marital residence be divided equally. The trial court did, however, divide the parties’ jointly owned personalty equally. In making findings with regard to the parties’ respective annual income amounts, the court set child support accordingly. The trial court also declined to award attorney’s fees to either party. Husband timely appealed. We vacate the trial court’s rulings regarding division of the real property, the award of child support, and attorney’s fees, and we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Carolyn M. Heaton v. Jason Barrett Heaton - Dissent
I cannot concur in the majority’s treatment of the marital residential property as joint property. The majority concludes that it was, in the language of the parties’ prenuptial agreement, “Co-Owned Property.” The trial court held that a finding of “Co-Owned Property” would be “inconsistent with the intent and conduct of the parties, not compelled by the pre-marital agreement.” The court went on to say that such a finding “would result in an unequivocally inequitable windfall.” Hence, in my judgment, the issue for us is whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings on this subject. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Asher S.C.
This is a termination of parental rights case concerning A.S.C. (“the Child”), the son of A.G.S. (“Mother”) and C.D.T. (“Father”). Mother and Father were never married. Two years after the Child was born, Mother, as the sole plaintiff, filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights based on his alleged abandonment of the Child. After Mother and C.R.S. (“Stepfather”) were subsequently married, Mother filed a motion to join Stepfather and an amended petition to terminate Father’s rights and allow Stepfather to adopt the Child. Father objected and filed a counterclaim in which he requested that he be designated as the alternate residential parent and granted traditional visitation rights. After a bench trial, the court terminated Father’s rights based on its finding, said to be made by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple forms of abandonment exist. The court further found, also by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was in the best interest of the Child. Father appeals. He challenges the four-month period of time used to establish abandonment by failure to visit or support the Child; the sufficiency of the evidence of grounds for termination; and the trial court’s best-interest determination. We conclude that the trial court erred in its calculation of the four-month period for consideration of abandonment pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i)(2010). As a result, we vacate the trial court’s finding of abandonment by failure to provide child support as a ground for termination. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Everette Ivey v. CRS Exteriors
The appellant, Everette Ivey (“Plaintiff”), appeals from an order of the trial court which granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the appellee, CRS Exteriors (“Defendant”), entered judgment in favor of Defendant on its counterclaim and dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for relief in the original complaint. The order held in abeyance “[t]he remaining issues with regard to the damages due [Defendant], along with the issue of attorneys’ fees recoverable by [Defendant] under the terms of the contract” at issue in the proceedings below. Because it is clear that the order appealed from does not resolve all issues raised in the proceedings below, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Marianna F. et al.
Unmarried parents of two children sought to modify a Permanent Parenting Plan. Mother also sought to collect a child support arrearage owed by Father. The trial court modified the residential parenting plan without conducting a best interest analysis. The trial court also declined to add statutory interest, as requested by Mother, to the child support arrearage owed by Father. Mother appealed certain aspects of the trial court’s judgment and sought attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Shainna S.C., Et Al.
This is an appeal by Joseph C. from an order terminating his parental rights to his two minor children, Shainna S. C. and Jason L. C. Because the record does not support the trial court’s finding that the Department of Children’s Services (DCS) proved by clear and convincing evidence the only ground relied upon in support of the termination of the appellant’s parental rights to his children, we vacate the order and remand for further proceedings. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Union County Education Association v. Union County Board of Education
A Union County schoolteacher was twice interviewed by school administrators in an investigation of charges regarding the teacher’s alleged improper conduct. Both times, the teacher’s request to have a representative from the Union County Education Association (“the Association”) present with him for the investigatory interview was denied. After the investigation was complete, the teacher was not disciplined and no adverse action was taken against him. The Association brought this action alleging that the Union County Board of Education (“the Board”), acting through its agents, violated the Professional Educators Collaborative Conferencing Act of 2011 (“the Collaborative Conferencing Act”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-603 (2013), which provides that “[p]rofessional employees have the right to selforganization, to form, join or be assisted by organizations, to participate in collaborative conferencing . . . and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of other mutual aid and benefit. . . .” The Association sought a declaratory judgment that the Board’s refusal to allow the teacher to have a representative present was an unlawful act under Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-606. The trial court granted the Board summary judgment on the ground that the Association “had no injury in fact and therefore lacked standing to proceed with this action.” We hold that the rights provided to professional employees under section 603 of the Collaborative Conferencing Act include the right to have a representative of his/her organization present, upon the employee’s request, at an investigative interview where the employee reasonably believes the investigation may result in disciplinary action against him or her. We further hold that the Association has standing to pursue this action. Consequently, we vacate the trial court’s judgment. |
Union | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Mark B. Garrett v. City of Norris, Tennessee
This appeal arises from a challenge to an annexation ordinance. The City of Norris, Tennessee (“Norris”) passed two annexation ordinances on the same day. The second territory to be annexed was contiguous to the city only through bordering the territory annexed earlier that same day. Mark B. Garrett (“Garrett”), a property owner in the second annexed territory, sued Norris in the Chancery Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) in a bid to stop the annexation of this second territory (“the Territory”). The Trial Court eventually voided the annexation of the Territory on the basis that the Territory was not contiguous to the city. Norris appeals. We hold, inter alia, that the annexation ordinance purporting to annex the Territory is void because at the time of the passage of the annexation ordinance, the first annexation was not yet operative and the Territory, therefore, was not contiguous to the city as required by law. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re J.F., Et Al.
C.R.H. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order terminating her rights to two minor children. The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed the children from Mother’s care following allegations that she locked one child in a bedroom for three days without access to water, food, or a bathroom. The children entered protective custody and were adjudicated dependent and neglected. DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. After a bench trial, the court found (1) that multiple 1 grounds exist to terminate Mother’s rights and (2) that termination is in the children’s best interest, both findings said by the trial court to be made by clear and convincing evidence. Mother appeals. She challenges the trial court’s findings with respect to grounds, but does not contest the best-interest determination. We affirm. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Dennis Michael Christie v. Shannon Denise Christie
In this divorce action, Mother asserts that the trial court erred in designating Father as primary residential parent and in allocating sole decision-making authority to him, in the distribution of marital property, and in failing to seal her medical records at trial. We modify the distribution of marital property in part; in all other respects we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Deborah Russo v. Suntrust Bank
This is an action brought against SunTrust Bank, executor of the estate of James Darrel Russo, Sr. (“decedent”). Decedent’s former wife, plaintiff Deborah Russo, alleged that Albert W. Secor, a SunTrust employee, who was handling the estate’s affairs for the bank, promised her that SunTrust would continue to pay insurance premiums under a policy of health insurance insuring plaintiff. In July 2006, SunTrust paid one premium payment. Coverage under the policy lapsed after that due to non-payment of premium. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to SunTrust, holding that the bank “cannot be held liable as executor of the estate of [decedent] because the Plaintiff is not a beneficiary of that estate.” After Secor filed an affidavit attesting that he acted on behalf of SunTrust as the executor of the estate only, and not on behalf of the bank in any other capacity, the trial court granted SunTrust summary judgment as far as its individual responsibility is concerned. At issue is the correctness of the trial court’s second ruling. We hold that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the capacity in which Secor was acting when he made the alleged promise. Plaintiff presented no evidence suggesting that Secor acted in any capacity other than as a representative of SunTrust in its fiduciary capacity. Furthermore, any alleged promise by Secor to bind SunTrust individually to pay the insurance premiums is barred by the statute of frauds, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-2-101(a)(1) (2012). We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Bonny Browne v. Alexander Lee Browne, Jr.
In this divorce action, Wife appeals the trial court’s valuation of Husband’s ownership interest in three businesses, determination of Husband’s income, division of marital assets, duration of rehabilitative alimony awarded to her, amount of child support Husband was ordered to pay, and the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to her. We determine that the trial court accepted the calculation of a $134,085.00 promissory note as a liability for one business co-owned by Husband but failed to require value of the same amount as a note receivable for the business collecting payment on the debt, owned 50% by Husband. We therefore increase the trial court’s valuation of the business collecting payment on the debt by one-half the amount of the applicable note receivable, or $67,042.50. We also determine that the trial court erred by attributing to Husband the full liability for the third business, a limited liability company in which Husband owns a one-half interest. We accordingly reduce the allocation for that liability by one-half, or $45,689.50, increasing the total modification of the value of Husband’s net assets awarded by the trial court by the amount of $112,732.00. We award to Wife 48% of this increase, or $54,111.36, commensurate with what we determine to be the trial court’s equitable distribution of marital property, and we remand for a determination regarding the proper method of distribution for this additional award to Wife. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Anya G.
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Anya G. (“the Child”), the minor child of Melisa G. (“Mother”). In October 2011, temporary custody of the Child was granted to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), and the Child was placed in foster care. DCS subsequently filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and the Child’s father, Michael G., on December 27, 2012. The petition alleged 1 as statutory grounds for termination abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by an incarcerated parent who exhibited wanton disregard for the welfare of the child prior to incarceration, and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition as to Mother upon finding that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence the grounds of (1) abandonment by engaging in conduct prior to her incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child and (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Mother has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Reelfoot Utility District of Lake County, Tennessee v. Samburg Utility District of Obion County, Tennessee, et al.
This appeal involves water service by one utility district to a neighboring utility district. The plaintiff utility district provided water service to the defendant neighboring utility district for many years pursuant to a series of contracts. The last contract included a date certain on which the contract expired. Before the expiration date, the defendant neighboring utility district agreed to begin purchasing its water from a different provider upon expiration of the water service contract with the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit seeking, inter alia, to enjoin the defendant provider and the neighboring utility district from entering into a contract for water services. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant neighboring utility district and denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the defendants were permitted to contract for water services. It then dismissed all remaining claims against the defendants. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Malinda Annette Stills v. Chadburn Ober Harmon
This is an appeal from a Restraining Order entered on May 20, 2014. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until June 20, 2014, thirty-one (31) days after the date of entry of the Restraining Order. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Austin C.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights contending the evidence is insufficient for this court to appropriately review the testimony in the trial court because a portion of the evidentiary record is set forth in a statement of the evidence. We have determined the record is sufficient for proper appellate review because the entirety of Mother’s testimony is set forth in a verbatim transcript of the evidence, in which Mother admits knowing she had a duty to support her child, that she had the capacity to provide support during the relevant period, and she failed to do so. Thus, the record contains sufficient evidence to establish the ground of abandonment by failing to support the child. The evidence also supports the trial court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Candace D. Watson v. The City of Jackson
Plaintiff in a premises liability action appeals from the trial court’s finding that she was more than fifty percent at fault for her injury. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Re/Max-Carriage v. Matthew McLaughlin, Et Al.
Lessor sued lessees for failure to payrent and received a default judgment in general sessions court. Lessee appealed to circuit court and filed a counterclaim for failure to maintain the premises and make repairs. The trial court found for lessor. Lessees appealed. Due to the lack of a transcript or a proper statement of the evidence, we must affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel P. Rousos v. Kristi Boren (f/k/a Rousos)
This appeal arises out of contentious post-divorce proceedings. The parties had equal parenting time with their three sons. Both parents filed a petition to modify the parenting plan and sought to be named primary residential parent. The parties also filed competing petitions for contempt. Following a five-day trial, the trial court named Father the primary residential parent of the oldest son, but it continued the parties’ equal parenting arrangement for the two younger sons. The trial court found Father guilty of two counts of criminal contempt. The court also made an award of attorney’s fees to Mother. Both parties appeal. We dismiss the appeal of the contempt order for lack of a final judgment. We affirm the custody order, vacate the award of attorney’s fees, and remand for further proceedings |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kyla P.
Father appeals the termination of parental rights to his child. The maternal grandparents obtained custody of the child shortly after her birth due to evidence of drugs in the child’s bloodstream. When the child was one year of age, Father was incarcerated and remained so two years later when the maternal grandparents filed a petition for termination of parental rights. The juvenile court found statutory grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights and concluded that it was in the child’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights. On appeal, Father argues that the evidence did not support the juvenile court’s conclusion that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. We disagree and affirm the juvenile court’s termination of Father’s parental rights. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
First Tennessee Bank National Association v. Shelby Village Mobile Home Park, LLC, Et Al
This appeal arises from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and imposition of discovery sanctions. A bank sued holders of an assumption agreement for default, and the holders of the assumption agreement filed a counter-claim against the bank requesting rescission of the assumption agreementduetothe bank’s alleged negligentmisrepresentation of the existence of flood insurance on the property as well as a misrepresentation regarding the value of the property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank and imposed discovery sanctions against the holders of the assumption agreement. Finding no genuine issues of material fact, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. In addition, we have reviewed the record and cannot say the trial court abused its discretion |
Court of Appeals | ||
Jeremiah David Hawk v. Erika Leigh Hawk (Ricker)
This post-divorce appeal concerns a parenting plan that provided for equal time between the Parents, who subsequently filed competing petitions to modify, claiming that a material change in circumstances necessitated a change in the parenting plan. The trial court found that a change in circumstances had not yet occurred but awarded Mother approximately 12.5 days of additional parenting time after deciding that the Child should attend school in Mother’s county. Father appeals. We affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Barry Wood v. Decatur County Tennessee
Applicant filed a petition for writ of certiorari against Decatur County challenging the denial of his beer permit application. The trial court reversed the decision of the local beer board on the basis that the sale of beer was allowed due to Decatur County’s status as a Tennessee River resort district. Because we conclude that Decatur County’s ordinance restricting the sale of beer within two thousand feet of a church remains in effect despite Decatur County’s status as a Tennessee River resort district, we reverse the decision of the trial court. Reversed and remanded. |
Decatur | Court of Appeals | |
Edwin Dennison, et al. v. Glenna Overton
Edwin Dennison, Kaye Dennison, Joel Campbell, and Christine Campbell (“Plaintiffs”) sued attorney Glenna Overton (“Defendant”) for legal malpractice. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that Plaintiffs’ claim was barred by the statute of limitations and that Defendant’s actions were not the proximate cause of any loss to Plaintiffs. After a hearing, the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”) granted Defendant summary judgment after finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiffs had notice of the alleged negligence and the fact that Plaintiffs had suffered an injury by August of 2009 and, therefore, the suit filed on September 21, 2010 was barred by the applicable one year statute of limitations. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in finding their suit barred by the statute of limitations and whether the Trial Court erred in finding that Plaintiffs could not prove that Defendant’s actions were the proximate cause of any loss to Plaintiffs. We find and hold, as did the Trial Court, that Plaintiffs were on notice of the alleged negligence and loss in August of 2009 and that their suit, therefore, was barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm the Trial Court’s judgment. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Theresa R. Francis v. Robert A. Francis, Jr.
Wife appeals the trial court’s division of property and denial of an award of alimony in this divorce action. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals |
