COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

Kim Brown v. Shelby County Schools
W2022-00123-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor JoeDae L. Jenkins

This appeal involves the termination of a tenured teacher for the cause of inefficiency.
After receiving a written charge recommending his dismissal, the teacher requested a
tenure hearing before a hearing officer, who found that there was substantial evidence to
support the charge of inefficiency and that there was just cause for termination. The teacher
appealed, the board of education voted to sustain the decision of the hearing officer, and
the teacher was terminated. The teacher petitioned for judicial review of the decision in
the chancery court. The chancery court reversed and reinstated the teacher with back pay.
The school system appeals. We reverse.

In Re Leah T.
M2022-00839-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Mark Rogers

In this case involving a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights to her child and to allow the petitioners to adopt the child, the trial court determined that three statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that the petitioners had provided clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed the best interest determination. Upon our review, we affirm the trial court’s finding as to the statutory grounds of abandonment through failure to support, abandonment through failure to visit, and severe abuse of the child’s sibling. However, having determined that under the facts of this case, the trial court erred in applying the statutory best interest factors applicable to the initial termination petition rather than those applicable to the amended petition, we reverse the trial court’s best interest finding and remand for reconsideration applying the amended best interest factors contained in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i) (Supp. 2022).

Fred Whitley, Jr. v. Metropolitan Nashville Board of Education
M2022-01079-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Patricia Head Moskal

Appellant, a tenured teacher employed by Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools, was involved in an altercation with students at an alternative high school. Subsequently, Appellee Metropolitan Nashville Board of Education (the “Board”) terminated Appellant’s employment. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Appellant filed an action with the trial court arguing that the Board exceeded its authority under the Teachers’ Tenure Act. The trial court vacated the Board’s decision on the ground that the Board violated the Open Meetings Act. We affirm the trial court’s decision on different grounds, i.e., that the Board committed a clear error of law when it conducted a third hearing concerning the termination of Appellant’s employment. We also conclude that Appellant is entitled to reinstatement and back pay. There is nothing further for the Board to do; accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order of remand.

In Re Stephanie D. Et Al.
M2023-00780-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge David Howard

A father appeals an order transferring jurisdiction over his minor children to West Virginia. Because the father did not file his notice of appeal with the clerk of the appellate court within thirty days after entry of the final order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

Madison Holdings, LLC ET AL. v. The Cato Corporation
W2022-00685-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

In litigation commenced by landlord to recover unpaid rent, the tenant asserted a
counterclaim alleging violations of the parties’ lease agreement and seeking a declaration
of the parties’ rights and obligations. Featuring prominently in the parties’ dispute is a
lease provision providing for, among other things, rent abatement if a non-party to this
litigation, the designated “Major Anchor Tenant,” ceases operations in the shopping center
where the tenant’s store is located. Under another lease provision, which is also at issue,
the right to rent abatement is triggered, subject to certain exceptions, if landlord enters into
another lease agreement “with or by any national or regional tenant having . . . more than
one store for whom the majority of its revenue is from the sale of apparel and/or clothing
accessories.” In this case, the tenant has asserted rights to relief with respect to both of
these provisions. Following a bench trial, the trial court rejected various defenses raised
by landlord in the litigation and determined that the tenant was entitled to relief under the
parties’ lease. As part of its order, the trial court awarded the tenant a monetary judgment
against landlord related to rent overpayments the tenant had made during a period when
rent abatement was in effect. Although we conclude that the trial court erred in awarding
a monetary judgment related to the rent overpayments given that the remedy provided
under the relevant lease provision specifically provides only for an offset against current
or future rent, we otherwise affirm the trial court’s order in this case.

Eric Todd Sparks v. Rachel Collins Sparks
E2022-00586-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael E. Jenne

Eric Todd Sparks (“Husband”) and Rachel Collins Sparks (“Wife”) were divorced by order of the Chancery Court for Bradley County (the “trial court”) on December 2, 2021. In addition to $693 in monthly child support, the trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife $750 per month in alimony in futuro. The trial court also ordered that once the parties’ minor child, who was nine years old at the time of trial, reached the age of majority, Husband’s alimony in futuro obligation would automatically increase to $1,250 per month. Husband timely appealed to this Court. We affirm the trial court’s decision to award Wife alimony in futuro, but, considering Husband’s ability to pay and Wife’s need, we vacate the trial court’s ruling as to the monthly amount and remand for further proceedings. We also conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the automatic increase in Husband’s alimony obligation upon the Child reaching the age of majority and vacate that portion of the trial court’s order. Consequently, the trial court’s ruling is vacated in part and affirmed in part. We decline to award Wife her attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

In Re Destyni S. Et Al.
M2022-00910-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stella L. Hargrove

In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her two children, the Lawrence County Chancery Court (“trial court”) determined that seven statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company, Inc. v. Linda Linkous Et Al.
M2022-01035-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Elizabeth C. Asbury

The trial court held that an insurance company properly denied an insured’s claim for property loss arising out of a fire. The trial court found that the denial was supported by two grounds: (1) that the property was not “occupied” as defined by the policy at the time of the fire and, therefore, the policy did not cover the loss, and (2) that the policy was voided by the insured’s misrepresentations relating to the loss. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

John Clark Ritenour v. Sara D. Bennett
E2023-00540-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gregory S. McMillan

This is an appeal from a final order entered on March 9, 2023. The Notice of Appeal was
not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until April 12, 2023, more than thirty days from
the date of entry of the order from which she is seeking to appeal. Because the Notice of
Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Joshua M. Harman Qui Tam v. Trinity Industries, Inc., Et Al.
M2022-00167-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.

A qui tam relator brought a Tennessee False Claims Act suit on behalf of himself and the State of Tennessee against a manufacturer of guardrail end terminals. The manufacturer moved to dismiss, and the trial court granted the motion on a wide variety of bases. The qui tam relator appeals. We conclude that a number of the rationales relied upon by the trial court were in error; nevertheless, the trial court properly dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Tennessee False Claims Act.

Philip Hyer v. Juanita Miller
E2022-00640-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jean A. Stanley

After flooding washed away a bridge and part of a driveway which a homeowner used to
access his house, he made repairs. The repaired route was also used on rare occasions by
an easement holder who had a right to access a family cemetery. The homeowner brought
suit against the easement holder, seeking equitable reimbursement for the costs of repairs.
The trial court ruled against the homeowner, concluding the equities of this case did not
warrant requiring the easement holder to contribute to the costs of repair. The homeowner
appealed. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion; accordingly, we
affirm the trial court’s ruling.

John F. Curran v. Angela M. Melson
W2021-00907-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Vicki Hodge

Appellant and Appellee were involved in a romantic relationship during which time
Appellee adopted her biological grandson. After Appellee ended the relationship with
Appellant, Appellant filed a petition to adopt Appellee’s grandson. The trial court
dismissed Appellant’s petition with prejudice on its conclusion that Appellant did not have
standing to file an adoption petition. Discerning no error, we affirm. We grant Appellee’s
motion to declare Appellant’s appeal frivolous and award her damages.

In Re Robert McPhail Hunt Jr.
E2022-00649-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Douglas T. Jenkins

This appeal arises out of a settlement agreement between the parties that resolved the
distribution of the decedent’s estate’s assets. Under the settlement agreement, Appellant
agreed to receive $1,800,000.00 from a joint brokerage account in his name and the
decedent’s name. Appellant alleged that he was entitled to $1,800,000.00 outright and was
not required to pay the capital gains taxes associated with the disbursement of such funds.
Appellant also alleged that he was entitled to post-judgment interest on the $1,800,000.00.
The trial court concluded that Appellant was responsible for the capital gains taxes
associated with the disbursement and that Appellant was not entitled to post-judgment
interest on the same. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Heather Smith v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tennessee
E2022-01058-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jeffrey M. Atherton

This appeal concerns a claim of retaliatory discharge. Heather Smith (“Smith”), then an
at-will employee of BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc. (“BlueCross”), declined to
take a Covid-19 vaccine. Smith emailed members of the Tennessee General Assembly
expressing her concerns and grievances about vaccine mandates. BlueCross fired Smith
after it found out about her emails. Smith sued BlueCross for common law retaliatory
discharge in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). For its part,
BlueCross filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. After a hearing, the Trial
Court granted BlueCross’s motion to dismiss. Smith appeals. We hold that Article I,
Section 23 of the Tennessee Constitution, which guarantees the right of citizens to petition
the government, is a clear and unambiguous statement of public policy representing an
exception to the doctrine of employment-at-will. Smith has alleged enough at this stage to
withstand BlueCross’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. We reverse the Trial
Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Estate of Willie Harold Hargett et al. v. Charlotte R. Hodges Brown
M2022-00250-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Louis W. Oliver

A decedent’s estate sued his girlfriend for the proceeds of his life insurance policy, items from his home that were missing or damaged, and money withdrawn from his credit union account. The trial court found for the estate on the basis of fraud, conversion, and undue influence. The girlfriend appealed. We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand.

Lynne Ingram Bolton v. David Bolton
M2022-00627-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Senior Judge Robert E. Lee Davies

This is a criminal contempt case. Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s finding that he is guilty of four counts of criminal contempt for violating the trial court’s orders regarding medical treatment for the minor child. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Infinity Homes, Inc. et al. v. Horizon Land Title, Inc. et al.
M2022-00829-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Charles K. Smith

Appellants, purchasers of several unimproved lots, filed suit against Appellee title company. Appellants asserted five counts against Appellee based on Appellee’s alleged failure to disclose the existence of a lien lis pendens on the lots. The trial court dismissed all but one of the counts against Appellee and certified its orders of partial dismissal as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. We conclude that the trial court improvidently certified its orders as final and dismiss the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Maryam Sobhi (Soryana) Mikhail v. George Aziz Mikhail
M2021-00500-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clara W. Byrd

A wife sought a divorce after a long-term marriage. The trial court granted the wife a default judgment for divorce as a sanction for the husband’s discovery abuses. After a trial, the court also valued and divided the marital estate and awarded the wife alimony in futuro. On appeal, the husband challenges the court’s decisions on multiple grounds. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Vondell Richmond v. City of Clarksville, Tennessee
M2022-00974-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kathryn Wall Olita

This case involves a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the plaintiff, then a member of the Clarksville City Council, was entitled to a declaration of rights concerning alleged communications between the Clarksville City Attorney and the local District Attorney General potentially pertaining to plaintiff. The trial court dismissed the action, concluding that the plaintiff was seeking an impermissible advisory opinion because there was no justiciable controversy. Having reviewed the record, we affirm.

Kristie M. Haun v. Jason B. Haun Et Al.
E2021-01012-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lawrence Howard Puckett

This is an appeal regarding the final decree of divorce for this couple. The husband’s inlaws
are included as intervening petitioners. The trial court granted the wife a divorce on
the ground of inappropriate marital conduct, $1250 per month alimony in futuro, and
payment of her attorney fees as alimony in solido.1 Further, the court awarded a judgment
to the intervening petitioners of $297,670, with a lien in their favor upon all the real
property to secure payment of the indebtedness. The husband appeals. We affirm.

Heidi Pendas v. Christopher J. Irizarry et al.
M2022-00603-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Laurence M. McMillan, Jr.

This case involves an intrafamily dispute over a home and the alleged indebtedness thereon. The trial court found that the son committed promissory fraud with regard to the conveyance of the home and awarded the mother $180,000.00 in damages as the value of the home at the time of the conveyance. The trial court further dismissed a claim against the daughter related to a loan on the property. Both the son and the mother appeal. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

John Jahen v. Aer Express, Inc. Et Al.
E2022-00344-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Pamela A. Fleenor

An injured truck driver brought suit against his alleged employer seeking to recover worker’s compensation benefits. The alleged employer did not appear at trial, and the trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Eight months later, the alleged employer moved the trial court to set aside the judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, on the grounds that it did not receive notice of the trial date. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the alleged employer failed to notify the court and the plaintiff of its change of address and that plaintiff would be severely prejudiced if the court set aside the judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Michael R. Adams v. Edwin Brittenum ET AL.
W2023-00800-COA-T10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gina C. Higgins

A pro se petitioner seeks accelerated interlocutory review of an order denying a motion for
recusal. Because the filing does not comply with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we
dismiss the appeal.

Lyon Roofing, Inc. et al. v. James H. Griffith, Jr. et al.
E2022-00530-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge William E. Phillips, II

This appeal involves the denial of a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion. In the original action,
the trial court granted summary judgment to the City of Mount Carmel, Tennessee (“the
City”), finding that it had negated an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim against it.
In the summary judgment pleadings, the City presented expert evidence concluding that
the retaining wall in question was failing due to lateral earth pressure and not a problem
with the foundation. In that report, the expert stated that the backfill of the retaining wall
was red clay but that regardless of whether the backfill consisted of red clay or crushed
stone, the wall would fail. The plaintiff presented no evidence to rebut this opinion. The
plaintiff filed a Rule 60.02 motion seeking to be relieved of the grant of summary judgment
after discovering that the backfill of the wall was crushed stone and not red clay as stated
in the expert’s report.1 The trial court denied the Rule 60.02 motion upon its determination
that even with a backfill of crushed stone, summary judgment still would have been
granted. Discerning no error, we affirm.

John Patton Et Al. v. Anita Pearson
M2022-00708-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Amanda McClendon

After a fire at a rental home, suit was brought against the tenant.  During discovery, the tenant sought admissions related to the landlords’ insurance coverage and as to whether the suit was actually a subrogation action by the insurer brought in the names of the insured.  As a result of resistance to disclosure, the tenant moved to compel.  The trial court granted the motion.  Following admissions indicating that this suit is a subrogation action by the insurer brought in the names of the insured, the tenant moved for summary judgment asserting that under the Sutton Rule she is an implied co-insured under the landlords’ insurance policy.  Opposition to summary judgment was advanced based upon the purported inapplicability of the Sutton Rule and the purported applicability of the collateral source rule.  The trial court granted summary judgment to the tenant.  This appeal followed.  We affirm the trial court’s grant of the motion to compel and summary judgment in favor of the tenant.