Vincent Garrard v. Tennessee Department of Correction
This appeal involves the trial court’s denial of relief to an inmate based upon a writ of certiorari.The inmate raises several issues regarding violations of the Tennessee Department of Correction Uniform Disciplinary Procedures, as well as basic due process. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Antonius Harris, et al. v. Tennessee Rehabilitative Initiative in Correction et al.
Inmates in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction who are housed at Riverbend Maximum Security Institution in Nashville, Tennessee, filed various claims related to their “prison jobs,” inter alia, for wages and damages under the Tennessee Wage Regulation Act, specifically Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-2-101 and 50-2-104, and for breach of oral contract,promissory estoppel ,unjust enrichment, and conversion.The Tennessee Claims Commission dismissed all of the inmates’ claims upon the defendants’Tenn.R.Civ.P.12.02 (1) and (6) motion to dismiss. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In the Matter of: Kason K. C.
This is a dependency and neglect case. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the minor child was dependent and neglected under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 37-1-102(b)(23)(A)(i) due to Appellant/Father’s knowing use of force upon the child, which force was likely to cause the child serious bodily injury. Father appeals this finding. We conclude that the evidence clearlyand convincingly establishes that Father did knowingly “use . . . force on [the] child that [was] likely to cause serious bodily injury or death.” Affirmed and remanded. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Alexander J. G.
In this termination of parental rights case, Mother appeals the trial court’s determination that she abandoned her son by failing to support him and that termination was in the child’s best interest. Finding clear and convincing evidence in support of the trial court’s determinations, we affirm the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda Dianne Cook Rayfield v. Tony Dale Rayfield
This appeal arises from a divorce action. The husband appeals the trial court’s division of marital property and debt and the award of compensatory and punitive damages to the wife for injuries she allegedly sustained at the hands of the husband. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Leona Ruth Salyer, et al v. Courtney L. Linnen
This is a personal injury action in which Plaintiff sued Defendant for injuries she sustained as a result of a two-vehicle accident. The jury found the parties equally at fault, and the trial court affirmed the jury’s verdict. On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence and that the trial court erred in limiting testimony concerning Defendant’s acceptance of fault at the scene of the accident. We affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Western Farm Products, LLC v. Sumner County
Land owner applied to the Sumner County Board of Zoning Appeals for a conditional use permit to operate a quarry with accessory asphalt and concrete plants and rock crushing facilities. After a public hearing, the Board denied the application. The land owner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Board’s decision; the trial court affirmed the Board’s denial. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Bobo v. State of Tennessee Real Estate Commission
This is an appeal from an administrative decision permanently revoking a real estate broker’s license. The Chancery Court reversed the decision of the administrative panel, finding that the decision was not based on substantial and material evidence, that the procedure utilized violated both statutory and constitutional principles, and that the administrative panel demonstrated “evident partiality.” We reverse the decision of the Chancery Court and reinstate the decision of the administrative panel. Reversed and remanded. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joyce E. Monday, et al v. Earl D. Thomas, et al
The trial court dismissed this tort action as barred by the statute of limitations upon determining that Plaintiffs had failed to comply with Rule 4.03(1) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure where they failed to return alias summonses until 235 days after they were issued. We reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
Robert C. Litton v. Jennifer M. Litton
In the parties’ divorce, the trial court denied Wife’s request for spousal support and her request for reimbursement for medical expenses incurred. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Lena Barner v. Burns Phillips, Acting Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, et al
This case involves Employee’s right to unemployment compensation benefits. The Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development denied Employee’s claim for unemployment compensation benefits after finding that she voluntarily quit her job based on her belief that she would soon be terminated. Employee appealed that finding in the trial court, where she also contended that she was denied her due process rights of notice and representation during the agency proceedings. The trial court upheld the denial of benefits, finding substantial and material evidence that Employee voluntarily quit her job, and finding that Employee was not denied due process during the agency proceedings. We affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
In Re D'Vante P.
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on D’Vante P., the minor child (“Child”) of Ashley C. (“Mother”) and Sylvester P. (“Father”). The Child was taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on October 27, 2010, following investigation of lack of supervision in the home. On October 10, 2012, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents. The proceeding to terminate Father’s parental rights subsequently became a separate action, and Father is not a party to this appeal. Following a bench trial conducted on July 15, 2013, the trial court granted the petition as to Mother upon the court’s finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) Mother had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plans and (2) the conditions causing the removal of the Child into protective custody persisted. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Mother has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Landon R. W.
This is a grandparent visitation case. The grandparents filed a petition seeking to have a parenting plan established which designated them as primary caregivers or, in the alternative, provided them with “regular custodial time” with respect to a grandson who previously lived at their home. The juvenile court judge held that the Grandparents did not prove that the mother opposed visitation, and dismissed the petition. Concluding thatthe evidence does not preponderate against the court’s finding that the mother did not oppose visitation, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Ashley B.
The order appealed is not a final judgment and therefore, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Jim Najib Jirjis v. Tammy Sue Jirjis
The trial court granted a divorce to a husband and wife after a marriage of nineteen years. The court named the husband as the primary residential parent of the parties’ children, divided the marital property between the parties, and awarded the wife transitional alimony of $3,000 per month for five years. The husband argues on appeal that the trial court erred in including his separate property in the marital estate subject to division. The wife argues that the alimony award was insufficient in light of the length of the parties’ marriage and the disparity in income between them, and that the court erred in failing to award her attorney’s fees. We agree that husband’s separate property should not be included in the marital estate, but that the division of property is still equitable. We hold that the wife is entitled to alimony in futuro. We also find that she should be awarded one-half of the attorney’s fees she incurred at trial. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Ella M. I., et al.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. We conclude from the record that clear and convincing evidence does not support the trial court’s finding of willful abandonment and, accordingly, reverse. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Margaret Renee Wright v. Patricia Dunlap et al.
The plaintiff, Margaret Renee Wright, has appealed from the dismissal of her action for damages arising out of an automobile accident. Upon review of the record, this court determined that neither Ms. Wright’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59 motion nor her notice of appeal were timely filed. We thus ordered Ms. Wright to show cause why her appeal should not be dismissed. Ms. Wright’s trial counsel has filed a response asserting that both Ms. Wright’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59 motion and her notice of appeal were in fact timely filed. 2 It appears fromMs. Wright’s response that certain documents were omitted from the record. Nevertheless, we still conclude that Ms. Wright’s Tenn. R. Civ. P.59 motion was untimely and thus dismiss the appeal. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Hannah Ann Culbertson v. Randall Eric Culbertson
This is the second extraordinary interlocutory appeal in this divorce case and custody dispute. In the first appeal, this Court held that the father did not automatically waive the psychologist-client privilege as to his mental health records by seeking custody or by defending against the mother’s claims that he was mentally unfit. While the first appeal was pending, the mother filed a motion asking the trial court to require the father to undergo a second mental health evaluation pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 35; the trial court granted the motion. The Rule 35 evaluating psychologist concluded that the father did not pose a danger to his children. Dissatisfied with this conclusion, the mother again asked the trial court to compel the father to produce all of the mental health records from his treating psychologists. After this Court rendered its decision in the first appeal, the trial court granted the mother’s request and again ordered the father to produce all of the mental health records from his treating psychologists. The trial court reasoned that the father waived the psychologist-client privilege as to all of his mental health records by allowing the evaluating psychologists to speak to his treating psychologists, by providing mental health records to the evaluating psychologists, and by testifying that he had a history of depression and had undergone treatment for it. It also ordered the father to produce all of his mental health records because the mother needed them to prepare her case. The father filed a request for a second extraordinary appeal, which this Court granted. We vacate the trial court’s order as inconsistent with this Court’s holding in the first appeal; we hold that there was at most a limited waiver of the psychologist-client privilege, only as to the privileged mental health information that the father voluntarily disclosed to the two evaluating psychologists involved in this case. As for mental health records not subject to a limited waiver of the privilege, we hold that the standard for the trial court to compel disclosure of the records is not met in this case. We remand the case for factual findings on any privileged mental health records the father voluntarily disclosed and other proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth James Worgan v. Jeannie Antoinette Worgan
In this post-divorce case, Jeannie Antoinette Worgan (“wife”) filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion to alter or amend the final judgment, which had been entered over eleven months earlier. The final judgment had incorporated the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”). Wife’s Rule 60.02 motion alleges that the MDA “failed to mention the division of the former husband’s pension” and that “[t]his oversight certainly must have resulted from a mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.” The trial court denied the motion, finding that wife was aware of the pension of Kenneth James Worgan (“husband”) when she signed the MDA and that she had ample time and opportunity to review the MDA before signing it. We agree with the trial court’s ruling that wife has presented no ground for Rule 60.02 relief. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
David R. Seaton et al. v. Wise Properties-TN, LLC
This case involves the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to the defendant property buyer upon remand from this Court. The sellers initiated the original action for specific performance and breach of contract after the buyer refused to close on the purchase of real property. The buyer filed a counterclaim requesting attorney’s fees. The buyer subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing that the sellers had been the first to breach the contract by failing to fulfill a condition precedent. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the buyer, and the seller appealed. Upon that original appeal, while this Court affirmed summary judgment, the issue of attorney’s fees was not raised. Following this Court’s remand to the trial court, the buyer moved for an award of attorney’s fees, pursuant to a default provision of the parties’ agreement. After conducting a post-remand hearing, the trial court awarded the buyer attorney’s fees in the amount of $106,485. The seller appeals. We conclude: (1) that the buyer abandoned its counterclaim for attorney’s fees by failing to question the finality of the summary judgment and by failing to raise the issue during the first appeal and (2) that the trial court exceeded its authority by considering the buyer’s post-remand motion. We therefore vacate the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Alexis L., et al.
Mother appealed the trial court’s determination that several grounds for terminating her parental rights had been met and that termination was in the best interest of her children. She failed to appeal or argue one of the grounds for termination, so the trial court’s finding regarding that ground is final. Because only one ground need be found, we decline to examine the other grounds. We agree with the trial court’s determination that clear and convincing evidence existed to conclude that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
Antonius Harris, et al v. Tennessee Rehabilitative Initiative In Correction
Fourmen who worked forTennessee Rehabilitative Initiative in Correction (TRICOR)while incarcerated in the Department of Corrections filed a grievance with the Department, contending that TRICOR had failed to pay them all the wages they had been promised. The Grievance Committee ruled in their favor, but TRICOR and the Department refused to authorize any additional pay. The men filed two different actions in the Davidson County Chancery Court. This appeal is from the denial of the trial court in Part III of a motion to reconsider. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
A To Z Smart Products & Consulting, et al. v. Bank of America
Garnishor obtained a final judgment which held Garnishee liable for full amount of outstanding debt of the judgment-debtor. The trial court granted Garnishee’s motion to alter or amend and vacated the conditional judgment and the final judgment against the Garnishee; Garnishor appeals. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Glenn J., et al
Father of two children appeals the termination of his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support and the finding that termination of his parental rights would be in the best interest of the children. Finding no error we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
City Press Communications, LLC et al v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association
The principal issue is whether an association that governs and coordinates interscholastic athletic competition of substantially all public and private secondary schools in Tennessee is the functional equivalent of a government agency for purposes of the Tennessee Public Records Act. Two reporters and their newspaper filed this action pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505 to obtain records from the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association regarding the enforcement of its bylaws on member schools. The chancery court held that the association was the functional equivalent of a government agency; therefore, it was subject to the Tennessee Public Records Act, codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503 et seq. The court also ordered it to produce the records at issue, subject to the redaction of students’ names. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
