Lisa Rawlings Redmon v. Brent Alan Redmon
This appeal involves post-divorce parental relocation. The parties were divorced in Tennessee, and the mother was designated as the primary residential parent for the parties’ minor child. After the divorce, the mother graduated from a nurse practitioner program and obtained a job offer in Mississippi. She notified the father of her intent to relocate with the parties’ child. The father objected and filed a petition opposing her relocation. At trial, the father argued that the proposed relocation did not have a reasonable purpose under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(d)(1), in that the mother failed to apply for nurse practitioner jobs in Tennessee. The trial court agreed with the father and denied the mother permission to relocate with the child. The mother appeals. We hold that, by failing to submit proof of comparable jobs in Tennessee for which the mother was qualified, the father did not meet his burden of proving that the mother’s proposed relocation did not have a reasonable purpose. Therefore, we reverse. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Petros Goumas v. Jimmy Mayse et al.
The issue in this slip-and-fall premises liability case is whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to the defendants. Petros Goumas (“plaintiff”), the fiancé of the daughter of defendants Jimmy Mayse and wife, Barri Mayse, was staying at the defendants’ house for an extended visit. Plaintiff was working outside in the yard, helping to clear away dead brush and trees from the property, when he stepped on a rock, slipped, fell, and broke his arm. The trial court held that plaintiff presented no proof that the rock (1) was in any way unusual or posed any particular danger, (2) was hidden or concealed, or (3) created any kind of defective or dangerous condition. The court concluded that there was no proof of a known or foreseeable unreasonable risk of injury created by the condition of defendants’ property. Consequently, the court held, as a matter of law, that defendants owed no duty to plaintiff. He appeals. We affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
In Re S.H. et al
V.H. (“Mother”) appeals the order terminating her parental rights to her four minor children, S.H., R.L.R. III., M.B and K.C.B. (“Children”). The Children were placed in the temporary custody of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) based on allegations of lack of supervision, physical abuse, and Mother’s drug use. The Children were subsequently adjudicated as being dependent and neglected. After a trial, the court found that there was clear and convincing evidence to establish the existence of multiple grounds for termination and that termination was in the best interest of the Children. Mother appeals. She challenges the court’s denial of her motion to continue the trial and its best interest determination. We affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Felisha Brown et al. v. Karen L. Samples et al.
This is a medical malpractice action brought against the State of Tennessee and others. The issue as to the appealing State is whether the plaintiffs complied with the pre-suit notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 (2012 & Supp. 2013). The State argues that the plaintiffs were required to send the pre-suit notice applicable to their claim against the State to either (1) the Attorney General of Tennessee or an Assistant Attorney General, or (2) the Division of Claims Administration of the State. The Tennessee Claims commission denied the State’s motion to dismiss, finding (1) no statutory authority requiring that pre-suit notice as to the State be served upon one of the parties alluded to by the State, and (2) that the State received adequate pre-suit notice in this case. We affirm and hold that the plaintiffs complied with Section 121’s pre-suit notice requirements by providing notice to the University of Tennessee Graduate School of Medicine, a health care provider, which entity is a division of an agency of the State of Tennessee and also a named defendant in this case. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
April Miller, et al. v. Northland Insurance Company
A commercial truck driver was injured while sitting in the passenger seat with another person driving. The question presented is whether the passenger qualified as an employee and was, therefore, excluded from benefits under the trucking company’s liability insurance policy. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the passenger was an employee when the accident occurred. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Lester G. Murphy, Sr. v. State of Tennessee Child Support Services
A mother and father divorced and the trial court ordered the father to pay the mother $50 a week as support for their two children. The children subsequently came into the legal custody of their maternal grandfather, but the court did not order support. Ten years later, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to set child support against the father. After a hearing which the father did not attend, the trial court increased his child support obligation to $333 a month and declared that he owed back support of $31,635, which he was ordered to pay in monthly installments. Four years later, the father, acting pro se, filed a petition to modify the support order. The trial court dismissed the father’s petition, declaring only that its previous order was a valid one. Because there was an existing support order for the two children, the appropriate proceeding would have been one to modify that order. The requirements for modification were not met, and the trial court exceeded its authority by assessing an arrearage based upon an amount different from the amount set in the existing order. We accordingly hold that the father was entitled to Relief from a Final Order under Tenn. R. App. P. 60.02(5), and reverse the trial court’s denial of that relief. We also vacate the trial court’s earlier order imposing on the father a duty to pay a modified amount of support and retroactive child support. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Aiden W.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Father’s parental rights were terminated on the grounds of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(vi), failure to establish/exercise paternity; Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), abandonment for willful failure to visit; Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-113(g)(2), substantial non-compliance with a permanency plan; and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3), persistent conditions. We reverse in part and we affirm in part; we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights to Aiden W. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Rebekah Shay Trembley v. Guy Dale Dunn, II
This is a post-divorce action involving a modification of the defendant’s child support obligation. Because the order from which the plaintiff appealed adjudicated fewer than all of the claims of the parties, it was not a final appealable order pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a). We must therefore dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Annie Harris v. Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency
Former tenant of an apartment complex whose lease was terminated for an alleged breach sued alleging violations of the Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-101 et seq. Specifically, the former tenant contends the defendant failed to make reasonable accommodations in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-601(b)(2)(B); she also contends it intentionally discriminated against her due to her disabilities in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-311(e). The defendant denied all claims and moved for summary judgment contending the plaintiff could not establish essential elements of her claims;it also contended it terminated the lease on legitimate, nondiscriminatory grounds. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint, finding there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the landlord violated the Tennessee Human Rights Act. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Lance Allen v. Robbie Marie Allen
Mother appeals the trial court’s denial of her petition to modify child support. We reverse and remand for entry of a judgment setting child support in accordance with this opinion and for an award of attorney fees to Mother. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Joe Houghland Hooper, III v. Amanda Marie Bures Hooper
In this divorce action, Father appeals the denial of his motion to suspend Mother’s parenting time and the decision to lower Mother’s child support; he also requests that this court modify the residential parenting schedule. Mother appeals the trial court’s calculation of the number of days she exercises parenting time in determining the amount of child support she was ordered to pay. Finding that the court erred in its calculation of Mother’s residential time, we vacate the award of child support and remand for recalculation; in all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Kory W. A.
This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father to the Child. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of Father’s parental rights based upon his incarceration. The court likewise found that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Father appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. v. William S. Lockett, Jr., et al.
This is a detainer action in which Mortgagors sought to rescind the foreclosure sale of their property. Wells Fargo filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that recision of the sale was not a remedy available under Tennessee law. The trial court agreed and upheld the sale. Mortgagors appeal. We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Debra Lynn Lloyd v. Huston Foley Lloyd
Husband in divorce proceeding appeals numerous issues relating to the trial court’s administration of the trial and valuation and division of marital property. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Dawn Moss v. William Moss
In this post-divorce action, Mother and Father both sought to modify the child support obligation of Father. The trial court, inter alia, found that Father had an annual income of $65,000 and held that there had been a significant variance. The court raised Father’s child support obligation to $233.00 per month, applied a downward deviation of $83.00, and ordered support to continue past age 21 for one of the children due to her disabilities. Father appeals, contending that the court erred in its calculation of his income. We affirm the method used to determine Father’s income; we vacate the child support obligation and remand for a redetermination of the support amount. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Consulting and Financial Services, Inc, et al. v. John H. Friedmann, Sr.
This is the second appeal of this case, arising from the installation of tile flooring. In Consulting and Financial Services, Inc. v. Friedmann, No. M2011-00093COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 1390621 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 19, 2012), we held that the trial court’s measure of damages was correct, but remanded for re-calculation of the amount of damages. The remand was necessary because the original judgment included damage amounts that were based upon tile repairs to certain areas of the home, which repairs were not raised by Appellees/homeowners within the one-year warranty period. We did not, however, mandate the method by which the trial court could determine the adjusted amount. Upon remand, the only evidence presented was from the original contractor, who relied upon his original estimate. To arrive at the portions of the original estimate that were for the excluded areas, the contractor had his tile subcontractor submit separate estimates for those areas. The separate estimates were calculated using the current price-per-square-foot applicable at the time of remand, which was less than the price-per-square-foot that was used in the original estimate. To arrive at the adjusted damages amount, the trial court simply subtracted the separate estimate amounts from the original estimate. Appellant/Contractor appeals, arguing, inter alia, that the lower price-per-square-foot applicable at the time of remand should apply to the entire judgment, or, in the alternative, that the excluded amounts should be calculated using the same price as was used in the original estimate. The “law of the case,” based upon our holding in the first appeal, was that the judgment would be adjusted to exclude all costs associated with the excluded areas. Although we did not mandate that the trial court re-try the issue of damages, we did not preclude that option in our first opinion. However, it was implicit in our holding that, if the trial court chose to use the original estimate (which it did), then the total costs for the excluded areas would be calculated, at the same price used in the original estimate, and subtracted from the original estimate. Because the trial court used new estimates for the excluded areas, which were not calculated at the same rate as in the original estimate, the adjusted judgment did not remove the full amount for repairs to the excluded areas that were contemplated in the original estimate. Accordingly, the law of the case was not followed. Vacated and remanded with instructions. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of Ryan K.M., et al.
Mother’s parental rights to her three sons were terminated after she pled guilty to the second degree murder of a fourth son. On appeal, Mother concedes that termination grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence; she challenges only the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interest. We affirm the trial court’s best interest finding, and thus, its termination of Mother’s parental rights. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
Carroll Marie Stovall, et al. v. UHS of Lakeside, LLC, et al.
Appellant medical providers appeal the trial court’s denial of their motions to dismiss a medical malpractice complaint for failure to strictly comply with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-122(d)(4). Because we conclude that the trial court had good cause to grant an extension, within which to file a certificate of good faith, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Norma Simpson, Ind. and next of kin of J. W. Simpson v. Faye Fowler
This is the second appeal of this case, involving the application of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 31-1-105 to set aside certain transfers by decedent to his long-term companion, which transfers were allegedly made with intent to deny his surviving spouse of her share of his estate. From the totality of the circumstances, and applying the factors outlined by this Court in Finley v. Finley, 726 S.W.2d 923 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986), we conclude that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s award of $8,500.00 in insurance proceeds to the surviving spouse for decedent’s funeral costs, but that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s award of a $28,000.00 bank account to the surviving spouse. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Melinda Jan Metzinger v. Ronald Wayne Metzinger
This appeal involves the classification and division of Husband’s $66,000.00 personal injury settlement in a divorce proceeding. The trial court classified the settlement as marital property, it deducted $13,400.00 for what it found to be “legitimate expense[s] of the marriage” paid by Husband, and it awarded Wife one-half of the balance, or $26,300.00. We reverse the trial court’s award to Wife. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Kathy Austin, et al v. Jacob Wilds, Jr., et al
Kathy Austin, Vickie Shipley, and Sherry Foshie (“Plaintiffs”) sued their brothers, Jacob Wilds, Jr. and James Wilds (“Defendants”), seeking to have certain deeds from their mother set aside due to alleged undue influence and/or duress. After a bench trial, the Chancery Court for Greene County (“Trial Court”) entered its order rendering judgment in favor of Defendants after finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiffs had failed to prove the existence of a confidential relationship necessary to show that the subject deeds were procured through undue influence. Plaintiffs appeal. We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings, and we affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
RCK Joint Venture, (A Joint Venture Comprised of River Road Construction, LLC, Creative Homes, LLC and Keystone Homes of TN, INC.) v. Garrison Cove Homeowners Association, A Tennessee Nonprofit Corporation
The only issue in this appeal is whether two property owners in a subdivision are entitled to an award of attorney fees for prevailing in a third-party action brought against them by the homeowners association to enforce restrictive covenants. The association argued that the property owners were not entitled to attorney fees because they did not prevail on every issue that came up during litigation, because the attorney fee provision in the restrictive covenants could be read to mean that no such award could be made if additional damages were not also awarded, and because they did not personally pay their own attorney fees. The trial court agreed with those arguments and denied the motion for attorney fees. We reverse the trial court and remand the case for a determination of the amount of the attorney fee award. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
RCK Joint Venture, (A Joint Venture Comprised of River Road Construction, LLC, Creative Homes, LLC and Keystone Homes of TN, INC.) v. Garrison Cove Homeowners Association, A Tennessee Nonprofit Corporation - Dissent
I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority. I do not believe that the fact that fees are available to the Pattons requires that they be awarded under the particular facts and circumstances of this case. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda J. Hutcherson v. Wallace Jackson Hutcherson
This is a contract interpretation case involving the proper apportionment of proceeds from the sale of several properties owned by the parties as tenants in common. When Husband and Wife divorced in 2005, a marital dissolution agreement was incorporated into their Final Decree of Divorce. In pertinent part, the agreement required the parties to sell six properties and split the proceeds therefrom. The agreement listed each of the properties with a dollar amount beside it. The agreement provided that Wife could be compelled to accept an offer for a particular property so long as her share of the proceeds equaled the dollar amount listed with that property in the agreement. The sum of the amounts listed with the properties at issue was $565,800. Real estate values declined substantially after the agreement was entered, and the properties were finally sold together for $322,287.71 in 2012. Following the sale Husband filed a motion seeking an equal division of the sale proceeds. Wife answered, insisting that the agreement entitled her to $565,800 and that she was therefore entitled to all of the sale proceeds, less Husband’s expenses related to the properties. During a bench trial, the court found the agreement ambiguous and therefore considered parol evidence to determine the intent of the parties. Based on its findings, the trial court determined that the parties intended to split the sale proceeds equally. Additionally, the trial court concluded that the agreement entitled Husband to reimbursement for one-half of his expenses on the properties, which the parties stipulated to be $156,270.48. In its final accounting, the trial court awarded $234,834.09 to Husband and $87,453.62 to Wife. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cassidy Aragon v. Reynaldo Aragon
This post-divorce case concerns parental relocation. Father sought to relocate to Arizona, citing family ties and increased career opportunities. The parties agreed that Father spent substantially more time with the child than Mother; however, Mother objected to the relocation, arguing that the move had no reasonable purpose. The trial court agreed with Mother and entered a parenting plan naming Mother primary residential parent. Because the trial court made no best interest finding regarding either the proposed relocation, or the parenting plan, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. Vacated and Remanded. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals |
