Keryl Fillers, as personal representative of the Estate of John J. Craig v. Dwight A. Collins, et al
This appeal involves Wife’s attempt to set aside a judgment entered against her relating to her failure to fulfill seven promissory notes. The trial court granted Wife’s motion to set aside, in part, affirming her liability for three of the seven notes but holding that Wife was not liable for the remaining notes. Wife appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Priscilla Lee Slagle v. Lawrence Fred Slagle
Lawrence Fred Slagle (“Husband”) appeals the Trial Court’s finding that he has the ability to pay to purge his civil contempt. We find no error in the Trial Court’s determination that Husband failed to make a prima facie showing that he had an inability to pay the purge amount, and we affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: William T. H.
Mother and Stepfather filed petition seeking to terminate biological Father’s parental rights and to permit Stepfather to adopt Child. Trial court found Father had abandoned Child by failing to visit or support Child in the four months preceding the petition’s filing and that it was in Child’s best interest to terminate Father’s rights. Father appealed. We reverse the trial court’s judgment terminating Father’s rights because the evidence was not clear and convincing that it is in Child’s best interest that Father’s rights be terminated. |
Court of Appeals | ||
John Wesley Green, Individually and as Shareholder of Champs-Elysees, Inc. v. Champs-Elysees, Inc., et al
This appeal stems from the denial of a Rule 60.02 motion, filed by an attorney on his own behalf, to set aside an order. The attorney tried unsuccessfully to derail a sheriff’s sale of his client’s property through the use of an elaborate contrivance. In the aftermath, contempt charges were filed against the attorney. In the ensuing civil contempt proceedings, the trial court entered an order that concluded that the trial court was unable to hold the errant attorney in civil contempt of court. The order included obiter dictum in which the trial court questioned the attorney’s veracity as an officer of the court, stated that he could have been held in criminal contempt had he been charged with such, and referred the matter to the Board of Professional Responsibility. Over five years later, the attorney and his client filed the Rule 60.02 motion that is the subject of this appeal, asking the trial court to set aside the order with the offending dicta. The trial court dismissed the Rule 60.02 motion, finding that it either did not have subject matter jurisdiction to set aside the order or, in the alternative, that the motion to set aside was untimely and without merit. The attorney and his client appeal. We reverse the trial court’s holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the Rule 60.02 motion, but affirm the trial court’s alternative holding that the motion to set aside is untimely and wholly without merit. In light of improper statements made in the attorney’s appellate brief about the trial judge, we also find it necessary to refer the appellant attorney to the Board of Professional Responsibility. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
David A. and Kasey H. v. Wand T.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Father’s parental rights were terminated on the ground of abandonment for willful failure to visit and willful failure to support. Because the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights fails to set forth sufficient findings, we are unable to adequately address the issue of abandonment in this case. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the chancery court and we remand for entry of an order that sets forth sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the termination of Father’s parental rights. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca Coleman, DVM v. The Humane Society of Memphis and Shelby County, A Tennessee not for profit organization and Ginger Morgan
This appeal involves a veterinarian’s common law and statutory claims for retaliatory discharge and her claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendant employer filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims. The trial court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim because the veterinarian had not introduced expert proof to support her claim. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment on the retaliatory discharge claims. Both parties filed applications for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, which were granted by the trial court and by this Court. We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, and we affirm the trial court’s denial of summary judgment on the retaliatory discharge claims. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca Little v. City of Chattanooga
This appeal questions the propriety of the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7-505(g) (Supp. 2013). The statute provides that an award of fees and costs can be made when a municipality wrongfully fails to disclose public documents requested pursuant to the Public Records Act. In the prior appeal of this action, this Court determined that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award the plaintiff fees and costs she incurred in seeking the disclosure of public documents from the City of Chattanooga pursuant to the referenced statute. Upon remand, the plaintiff filed a petition seeking attorney’s fees and costs exceeding $70,000.00. The trial court found that the total fees and costs sought by the plaintiff were unreasonable and excessive, and the court reduced the amount of fees awarded to $50,284.50. The court also reduced the costs awarded for mileage and court reporter charges. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for entry of an award of the full amount of fees and costs sought. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Valerie Ann Tipton v. Joel David Constance
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the Trial Court’s denial of a Motion to Recuse in a post-divorce proceeding. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by the Petitioner/Former Husband, Joel David Constance (“Petitioner”), pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court, we affirm the Trial Court. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Candace Watson v. City of Jackson
This accelerated interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B results from the trial court’s denial of a post-trial recusal motion. The Appellant filed a motion seeking recusal of the trial judge from presiding over the preparation of the record for her appeal of the substantive issues in the case. The trial judge denied the motion by written order, making specific findings of fact. The Appellant appeals. Discerning no evidence that would lead a reasonable person to question the trial judge’s impartiality, we affirm the denial of Appellant’s recusal motion. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Regions Bank N.A. v. Joseph P. Williams, et al.
The trial court found that Defendants were liable to Plaintiff bank for losses stemming from a scheme wherein Defendants defrauded Plaintiff bank into making automobile loans to unqualified borrowers who were customers of a defendant. Defendants appeal. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: T.R.Y.
This appeal involves the modification of a parenting arrangement. After many years without parenting time, the mother asked the juvenile courtto designate her as the primaryresidential parent for the parties’ daughter. The juvenile court held domestic violence in the father’s home constituted a materialchange in circumstances. However,the juvenile courtconcluded that, despite the incidents of domestic violence, it was in the daughter’s best interest for the father to remain as the primary residential parent. The juvenile court awarded the mother alternate residential parenting time. The mother appeals, raising numerous issues. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
James And Patricia Cullum v. Baptist Hospital System, Inc., et. al
The trial court prohibited the use of taped testimony from a prior trial when a doctor exercised his statutory right not to appear at trial, ordering that the doctor “needs to testify live or not at all.” Efforts of the defendants’ counsel to secure the doctor’s live testimony were successful,only to have the plaintiffs’ counsel argue that counsel was being ambushed. The trial court finally determined not to allow the doctor to testify. The issues relating to prohibiting the doctor’s taped testimony and then prohibiting the doctor’s live testimony were appealed, along with other issues that arose during the trial. We find these two testimonial issues dispositive. We reverse the trial court on both issues and remand for a new trial. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Candice S.
Mother’s parental rights to her daughter were terminated on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and failure to pay support, and persistence of conditions. Mother appeals, asserting that the evidence in support of the grounds is not clear and convincing and that the record does not show that termination of her rights would be in the child’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Action Chiropractic Clinic, LLC v. Prentice Delon Hyler, et al
Chiropractic clinic which provided services to party injured in an automobile accident brought action against the injured party, who had assigned the proceeds of his claim against tortfeaser to the clinic in payment of the services, and the tortfeasor’s liability insurer, which did not honor the assignment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer holding that: the victim did not have any rights relative to the insurance provider; the insurance policy required written consent for an assignment and there was no evidence of such consent; there was no privity between the clinic and the insurance provider; the clinic was not a beneficiary of the insurance policy; and the suit was a direct action against an insurance company which is prohibited by Tennessee law. The clinic appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the grant of summary judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Christopher K.W.
This appeal involves the termination of a biological father’s parental rights with regard to his son. The child at issue was removed from the custody of the mother as a result of the mother’s drug use and neglect. The child, now five years of age, did not have a significant relationship with the father, if any. Following a hearing, the juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights for failure to substantially comply with the responsibilities of the permanency plan. The father appeals. We affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Richard E. Riegel, Jr. v. Patricia A. Wilkerson
This is an easement case in which the Appellant, the servient estate owner, appeals the trial court’s grant of injunctive relief in favor of the Appellee, the dominant estate owner. Specifically, the trial court found that Appellant had interfered with Appellee’s use of the easement by erecting a gate across it. The trial judge ordered the Appellant to remove the gate, and enjoined her from further interference with the Appellee’s use of the easement. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Juliette Y. Hamilton v. Julia A. Chesson
This is an appeal from an Order of Protection entered on July 2, 2013. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until August 19, 2013, more than (30) days from the date of entry of the order to which it is directed. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Heather Widner, Administratrix of the Estate of Glenn Edward Smith v. Chattanooga Entertainment, Inc, d/b/a Electric Cowboy, et al.
Heather Widner, Administratrix of the Estate of Glenn Edward Smith (“Plaintiff”) sued Chattanooga Entertainment, Inc. d/b/a Electric Cowboy (“Electric Cowboy”) and Ashley Langworthy with regard to the tragic death of Glenn Edward Smith (“Deceased”). Electric Cowboy filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Electric Cowboy summary judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that on the relevant night there had been no sale of alcoholic beverages pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-10-102 by Electric Cowboy to Ashley Langworthy. Plaintiff appeals to this Court raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in granting Electric Cowboy summary judgment and whether the Trial Court erred in refusing to allow Plaintiff additional time for discovery. We find and hold, as did the Trial Court, that no sale of alcoholic beverages by Electric Cowboy to Ashley Langworthy occurred on the relevant night, and that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow further discovery. We, therefore, affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
David Kaniecki v. O'Charley's Inc. et al.
The sole issue in this putative class action is whether Plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees under the common law substantial benefit doctrine. Plaintiffs, shareholders of O’Charley’s Inc., filed this action against several parties to enjoin the imminent merger with and acquisition by Fidelity National Financial, Inc.; no monetary relief was sought. The gravamen of the complaint was breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs requested additional disclosures but did not seek to enjoin the merger. After the merger was completed, Defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; Plaintiffs contemporaneously filed a motion to recover attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs did not oppose the motions to dismiss and an agreed order was entered by which the complaint was dismissed but, by agreement, the issue of attorneys’ fees was reserved for hearing. Plaintiffs acknowledged this was not a shareholder derivative action and that they were not entitled to recover attorneys’ fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-17-401; however, Plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to attorneys’ fees under the common law substantial benefit doctrine. The chancellor disagreed and denied Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Terry Morrison, et al. v. Richard Hubbell
Landlords filed suit against a tenant for breach of the rental contract. The trial court held the tenant breached the contract and awarded the landlords damages for the breach. Tenant appeals asserting that the landlords failed to mitigate their damages, that his counsel was ineffective, and that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. Tenant’s arguments are without merit. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert L. Macy v. Quida J. Macy
This appeal challenges the effectiveness of a QDRO which requires Wife to pay taxes on a $115,000.00 divorce settlement. The trial court held that the amount should not be reduced by taxes. We conclude that the trial court erred in holding that Wife’s $115,000.00 divorce settlement was not subject to reduction for taxes, and we reverse its holding in that regard. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
DeKalb | Court of Appeals | |
Sarah McKissack, by Conservator Tyowanna McKissack v. Davidson Transit Organization and John Doe
Conservator for injured bus passenger challenges the trial court’s dismissal of her action after the defendant’s filing of a confession of judgment for the full amount of damages requested in the general sessions warrant. In light of the plaintiff’s failure to amend the complaint after transferring the case to circuit court to increase the amount of damages sought, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cynthia Sherwood McKenzie v. Jason Wayne McKenzie
This is an appeal of the trial court’s denial of a motion to recuse. The motion was based upon allegations of bias against the party, who is also a licensed attorney representing herself in this matter. Because we can find no evidence in the record of any bias that would require recusal, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Edward Holifield v. Michelle Lynn Billings Holifield
Plaintiff Husband appeals the trial court’s division of marital property and awards of transitional alimony, alimony in futuro, and alimony in solido in this divorce action. Finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, we affirm. Husband also appeals the trial court’s judgment holding him in contempt for failing to comply with the trial court’s order to pay to Wife one-half of a health savings account. We affirm on this issue. Wife’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal is granted. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
David G. Young, Individually and as City Administrator for the City of Lafollette v. City of Lafollette et al.
In this retaliatory discharge action brought by a former city administrator of the City of LaFollette, Tennessee (“LaFollette”), the trial court, following a bench hearing, denied LaFollette’s motion to strike the city administrator’s demand for a jury trial. The trial court, however, granted LaFollette permission for interlocutory appeal on the question of whether the city administrator’s request for a jury trial properly may be granted pursuant to the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), see Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (Supp. 2013), despite the non-jury provision of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”), see Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-20-307 (Supp. 2013). We conclude that the non-jury requirement of the GTLA applies to this TPPA claim. We therefore reverse the trial court’s denial of LaFollette’s motion to strike the city administrator’s jury demand, and we remand to the trial court for further proceedings without a jury. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals |
